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美国堡垒论文展示了零知识证明如何证明加密钱包所有权

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隐私基础设施开发商AmericanFortress的团队撰写了一篇新论文,提出了一种证明加密钱包来源的新方法。AmericanFortress的Vincenzo Botta、Michal Pospieszalski、Emanuele Ragnoli和Justus Ranvier共同撰写了《来源证明:面向区块链DeFi、钱包和身份系统的可链接后量子零知识派生关系》。

The team at privacy infrastructure developer AmericanFortress have authored a new paper. It proposes a novel means of proving the origin of crypto wallets. Vincenzo Botta, Michal Pospieszalski, Emanuele Ragnoli and Justus Ranvier of AmericanFortress authored “Provenance Proofs: Linkable, Post-Quantum ZK Derivation Relations for Blockchain DeFi, Wallet and Identity Systems”.

在论文中,研究人员提出了一种方法,让钱包能够证明多个地址或凭证属于同一加密身份,而无需泄露钱包种子、私钥、派生路径或钱包的其他信息。这本质上是一种选择性披露形式,允许个人在不泄露私人信息的情况下证明钱包所有权。

In it, the researchers propose a way for a wallet to prove that several addresses or credentials belong to the same cryptographic identity. It can do so without revealing the wallet seed, private keys, derivation paths or the rest of the wallet. It’s essentially a form of selective disclosure that allows an individual to prove wallet ownership without giving away private information.

零知识证明的新用例 零知识证明(ZKP)是一项用途广泛的技术,它允许一方在不透露陈述本身的情况下证明该陈述为真。ZKP发明于80年代中期,随着新用例不断涌现,尤其是在web3领域,这项技术仍在持续演进。Vincenzo Botta等人的最新论文为这一不断增长的清单再添一项应用:保护隐私的钱包所有权证明。

A New Use Case for ZKPs Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) are a versatile technology. They let one party prove that a statement is true without revealing the statement itself. ZKPs were invented in the mid-80s. They are still evolving as new use cases emerge, particularly within the web3 space. The latest paper from Vincenzo Botta et al adds another application to this growing list: privacy-preserving proof of wallet ownership.

研究人员试图解决的问题源于加密钱包的一个独特特征。这类钱包用于在比特币和以太坊等区块链上保护数字资产。大多数现代加密钱包并非由单一地址组成,而是依赖分层确定性(HD)设计。

The problem the researchers were trying to solve stems from a singular characteristic of crypto wallets. These are the sort of wallets used to secure digital assets on blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Rather than consisting of a single address, most modern crypto wallets rely on hierarchical deterministic (HD) design.

这些所谓的HD钱包可以从同一个底层秘密生成多个地址和密钥。你创建一个私钥,通常将其记录为12或24个单词的助记词。然后你可以生成多个公钥,每个公钥都有自己的钱包地址。

These so-called HD wallets can generate multiple addresses and keys from the same underlying secret. You create one private key, typically recording it as a 12- or 24-word mnemonic phrase. You can then generate numerous public keys, each with its own wallet address.

那么,如何在不泄露与某个 HD 钱包相关联的其他地址的敏感信息的情况下,证明该钱包的所有权呢?实际上,ZKPoSP 已经解决了这个问题——它提供了一种方法,可以证明某个公钥确实来源于某个特定的钱包。

So how do you prove ownership of an HD wallet without revealing sensitive information pertaining to the other addresses connected to its parent private key? ZKPoSP has in fact already solved this challenge. It provides a way of proving that a public key was derived from a particular wallet material.

不过,这篇新论文更进一步,证明了两个或多个公钥具有相同的“隐藏来源”(即它们都来自同一个 HD 钱包),同时又不暴露该钱包的具体地址。

But the new paper goes one further, proving that two or more public values have the same hidden origin. In other words, proving that they came from the same HD wallet without disclosing the address of that wallet.

多层面的关联性:这篇由 AmericanFortress 撰写的论文提出了一种方法,可以证明多个文件或数据来源于同一个“文件柜”(即同一个 HD 钱包)。这种方法无需向任何人透露打开这个“文件柜”或查看其中其他文件的密码。论文将这种关联性称为“共享来源证明”(shared origin proof)。用户可以根据自己的需求来配置这种关联性的程度:可以选择仅在必要时才建立这种关联;也可以选择暂时保持这些数据之间的独立性,之后再建立关联;或者让钱包之间的关联关系永久可见。在这种模型中,用户可以选择自己希望使用的关联性程度,而这不再是证明钱包所有权过程中的必然结果。

Linkability on Multiple Levels Essentially, the AmericanFortress-authored paper proposes a way of proving that several documents came from the same filing cabinet. It does so without showing anyone the combination to open the cabinet or view the other documents inside it. The paper calls this shared origin provenance. It provides varying degrees of linkability depending on how much info the wallet owner wishes to Options include linking things only when necessary; keeping things unlinkable now, but making them linkable later; or making the relationship between wallets permanently recognizable. In this model, the degree of linkability selected by the user becomes a configurable property. It is no longer an unavoidable consequence of proving wallet ownership.

为什么这很重要?虽然这篇论文中描述的方法听起来可能有些复杂,但其应用范围远比乍看之下要广泛得多。例如,在反钓鱼支付场景中,Bob 可以证明一个新的支付地址与他已使用的身份信息来自同一个 HD 钱包;Alice 也可以验证攻击者是否偷偷替换了支付地址,而这一切都不需要 Bob 暴露自己钱包的其余信息。此外,这种方法还适用于合规性验证(例如交易所可以根据合规性证书来验证用户的钱包)以及跨链身份识别(例如在不同区块链之间验证用户的身份)等场景。

Why This Matters The approach detailed in the paper may sound esoteric, but its applications are much broader than they at first appear. Proposed use cases include anti-phishing payments. Here, Bob can prove that a new address originates from the same hidden wallet provenance as his established identity. Alice, meanwhile, can verify that an attacker hasn’t silently substituted another payment address, all without Bob exposing the rest of his wallet.

总之,这种技术不仅有助于提高安全性,还能简化合规流程,为各种实际应用提供有力支持。

Other applications include regulatory compliance and cross-chain identity. Regulatory compliance would allow an exchange to onboard a wallet against a compliance credential. It could subsequently recognize deposits associated with the same certified wallet.

跨链身份认证或许是所有应用场景中最有趣的一个。它能够实现跨不同区块链及加密方案的溯源功能(即验证资金来源的真实性)。

Cross-chain identity is perhaps the most interesting use case of all. It makes it possible to prove provenance across different blockchains and cryptographic schemes.

以某人将比特币(BTC)转移到 Solana 平台为例:他们可以证明比特币的来源地址与 Solana 的目标地址实际上源自同一个“隐藏的秘密信息”(即相同的加密密钥)。在资金转移之前,相关桥梁系统甚至可以验证这一信息;这样一来,在那些要求用户身份一致性的应用中,目标地址被篡改的可能性就会大大降低。同时,这种技术也能有效防范诸如“钱包被恶意控制”(即攻击者操控用户钱包)之类的安全威胁。

For example, take someone moving BTC to Solana. They could prove that the Bitcoin source address and Solana destination address originate from the same hidden secret. A bridge could even verify this before releasing the funds. That would make destination-address substitution considerably harder in applications that require same-user provenance. It would also mitigate threats such as wallet poisoning.

目前这一切还只是理论上的设想——论文的作者们尚未实际部署任何他们提出的技术方案。但他们相信,这项技术能够在“完全保护用户隐私”与“完全公开用户身份及账户信息”之间找到一个平衡点。

It’s all theoretical for now: the authors of the paper have yet to deploy any of their proposed implementations. But they’re confident that the tech can achieve a middle ground between total wallet pseudonymity and full disclosure of the user’s identity and account structure.

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Contributed article. Not produced by the TNW newsroom and does not reflect the editorial stance of TNW.