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日本时报

制裁有效的观念是一种幻觉The notion that sanctions work is an illusion

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贝鲁特/肯塔基州路易斯维尔——当政府实施经济制裁,例如美国总统唐纳德·特朗普目前对伊朗实施的“经济D日”时,它们将其描绘为一种精确的工具——是手术刀而非利剑——能够在施压统治精英的同时,让普通公民免受伤害。这一叙事被用来为现代历史上一些最广泛的经济胁迫行为辩护。唯一的问题是,其核心前提是不真实的。

BEIRUT/LOUISVILLE, Kentucky - When governments impose economic sanctions, like the “economic D-Day” U.S. President Donald Trump is now imposing on Iran, they portray them as a precision instrument — a scalpel rather than a sword — capable of pressuring ruling elites while sparing ordinary citizens.That narrative has been used to justify some of the most sweeping acts of economic coercion in modern history. The only problem is that the central premise is untrue.The case against sanctions is not merely strategic — that they rarely achieve their stated foreign-policy objectives — but also moral. Sanctions, particularly financial ones, do not fall equally on a population. They fall hardest on those least able to bear them: low-income, wage-dependent and publicly employed people. Thus, anyone who claims to care about the ethics of coercive statecraft must confront its distributional realities with the same rigor applied to questions of military tactics.

反对制裁的理由不仅是战略性的——即它们很少能实现既定外交政策目标——也是道德上的。制裁,特别是金融制裁,对人口的影响并不均等。

BEIRUT/LOUISVILLE, Kentucky - When governments impose economic sanctions, like the “economic D-Day” U.S. President Donald Trump is now imposing on Iran, they portray them as a precision instrument — a scalpel rather than a sword — capable of pressuring ruling elites while sparing ordinary citizens.That narrative has been used to justify some of the most sweeping acts of economic coercion in modern history. The only problem is that the central premise is untrue.The case against sanctions is not merely strategic — that they rarely achieve their stated foreign-policy objectives — but also moral. Sanctions, particularly financial ones, do not fall equally on a population. They fall hardest on those least able to bear them: low-income, wage-dependent and publicly employed people. Thus, anyone who claims to care about the ethics of coercive statecraft must confront its distributional realities with the same rigor applied to questions of military tactics.

它们对承受能力最弱的人群打击最大:低收入者、依赖工资者以及公共部门雇员。

BEIRUT/LOUISVILLE, Kentucky - When governments impose economic sanctions, like the “economic D-Day” U.S. President Donald Trump is now imposing on Iran, they portray them as a precision instrument — a scalpel rather than a sword — capable of pressuring ruling elites while sparing ordinary citizens.That narrative has been used to justify some of the most sweeping acts of economic coercion in modern history. The only problem is that the central premise is untrue.The case against sanctions is not merely strategic — that they rarely achieve their stated foreign-policy objectives — but also moral. Sanctions, particularly financial ones, do not fall equally on a population. They fall hardest on those least able to bear them: low-income, wage-dependent and publicly employed people. Thus, anyone who claims to care about the ethics of coercive statecraft must confront its distributional realities with the same rigor applied to questions of military tactics.

因此,任何声称关心强制性国家行为伦理的人,都必须以与审视军事战术问题同等的严谨态度,直面其分配现实。

BEIRUT/LOUISVILLE, Kentucky - When governments impose economic sanctions, like the “economic D-Day” U.S. President Donald Trump is now imposing on Iran, they portray them as a precision instrument — a scalpel rather than a sword — capable of pressuring ruling elites while sparing ordinary citizens.That narrative has been used to justify some of the most sweeping acts of economic coercion in modern history. The only problem is that the central premise is untrue.The case against sanctions is not merely strategic — that they rarely achieve their stated foreign-policy objectives — but also moral. Sanctions, particularly financial ones, do not fall equally on a population. They fall hardest on those least able to bear them: low-income, wage-dependent and publicly employed people. Thus, anyone who claims to care about the ethics of coercive statecraft must confront its distributional realities with the same rigor applied to questions of military tactics.