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大西洋月刊

气候运动现在该做什么?What Does the Climate Movement Do Now?

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就在拜登政府庆祝美国历史上首部重要气候立法通过的那一天,天气格外宜人。白宫的南草坪宛如一块巨大的台球桌,翠绿的草坪在湛蓝的天空下延伸开来。本·比奇(Ben Beachy)曾是拜登总统的特别助理,负责监督该法律的实施工作;他告诉我:“那一刻,仿佛是一个新时代的黎明。”2022年《通胀削减法案》为清洁能源项目提供了数千亿美元的联邦资金支持,对在华盛顿庆祝这一成就的人来说,这项法律是实现长期目标的重要一步——它为美国的未来制定了一个切实应对气候变化挑战的方案。

The day the Biden administration celebrated the first major piece of climate legislation in U.S. history, the weather happened to be sublime. The White House’s South Lawn, a billiard-table green, stretched out beneath a cerulean sky. Ben Beachy, who served as a special assistant to President Biden and would help oversee the law’s implementation, told me that “it felt like the dawn of a new era.” The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 was set to deliver hundreds of billions of dollars in federal investments to clean-energy programs, and to those partying in Washington, the law was a major step toward a long-sought goal: a plan for America’s future that addressed the realities of climate change.

然而四年过去了,共和党控制的国会几乎完全废除了这项法案;电动汽车的销量持续低迷,而特朗普政府却在加速石油和天然气的开发,同时削减环境保护措施。比奇表示,美国的气候保护运动“目前正处于一个低谷期”。这种描述其实还算是轻描淡写的。长期以来一直支持气候保护事业的民主党内部人士似乎也开始失去兴趣;企业界在做出“走向更绿色”的承诺后,几乎完全不再关注气候保护问题;慈善机构的支持力度也大幅减弱。与此同时,地球的平均气温正加速上升,即将突破《巴黎协定》所设定的1.5摄氏度这一危险临界值。

Four years on, the Republican Congress has mostly dismantled the IRA, electric-vehicle sales are in a slump, and the Trump administration is accelerating oil and gas development while axing environmental protections. The U.S. climate movement, Beachy said, “is currently experiencing a bout of dysphoria.” That’s putting it lightly. Longtime allies in the Democratic Party seem to be losing interest. Corporate America has all but ghosted climate advocates after making big pledges to go greener. Philanthropic support has gone squishy. Meanwhile, the planet is on track to speed past a 1.5-degree-Celsius increase in average global temperatures, the threshold that has been considered the bright line of danger since the Paris Agreement.

尽管如此,气候保护领域的领导者们仍试图保持冷静的态度。前塞拉俱乐部(Sierra Club)主席、现任Clean Break Fund首席执行官迈克尔·布鲁内(Michael Brune)对我说:“我认为这只是历史上的一个普通时刻罢了。”这些倡导者坚持认为,这只是暂时的挫折而已,并不比过去那些气候问题被忽视、被排除在政治讨论之外的时期有什么不同。

Climate leaders have sought to project a keep-calm-and-carry-on attitude. “I would characterize this moment in time as just a moment in time,” Michael Brune, the former head of the Sierra Club and the CEO of the Clean Break Fund, told me. This is just an ebb tide, advocates insist, not all that different from past periods when climate slipped to the margins of the political conversation.

毫无疑问,这种沮丧情绪(即对未来发展的迷茫与不确定感)是真实存在的。我与来自学术界、环保组织及慈善机构的十多位气候问题专家进行了交谈,他们纷纷表示,美国的气候保护运动目前不知道该何去何从。在取得巨大进展后却迅速陷入低谷,气候活动家们正在努力寻找新的发展方向——希望找到一条能够带领运动重新走出政治困境的道路。但目前,他们确实陷入了迷茫。

There’s no doubt, however, that the dysphoria is real. I spoke with more than a dozen climate leaders spanning the academic, advocacy, and philanthropic sectors who told me, in different ways, that the American climate movement is unsure where to go from here. Having sunk to such lows so soon after climbing to such great heights, climate activists are scrambling to find the movement’s next big idea—some path that will lead them back out of the political wilderness. But right now they’re lost.

虽然《通胀削减法案》的名称显得平淡无奇且令人困惑,但它实际上代表了美国气候保护行动的一个重大突破,为重新调整美国经济结构、使其符合气候保护目标提供了机会。总体而言,美国的气候保护运动此前主要采取了两种战略:

If the Inflation Reduction Act managed to be one of most tepidly—and confusingly— titled laws in American history, it also represented a genuine breakthrough for climate action, an opportunity to begin reorganizing the U.S. economy around climate goals.

  1. 政策层面:推动国际协议的制定(例如《京都议定书》,但该协议最终未能获得美国批准),以及制定限制温室气体排放的国内法律(例如奥巴马政府提出的“总量控制与交易”法案,但该法案在参议院未能通过)。2015年,《巴黎协定》的签署是美国在气候保护方面取得的最大胜利;不过,各签署国至今仍未实现该协议所设定的宏伟目标。

Previously, the climate movement had two strategic strands, broadly speaking. The first focused on policy: pushing for international agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol, which was never ratified) and national laws that would limit greenhouse-gas emissions (such as the Obama-era cap-and-trade bill that died in the Senate). Advocates scored their clearest win in 2015 with theg of the Paris Agreement—though the signatories have failed to meet the accord’s lofty goals.

  1. 直接打击化石燃料:通过各种手段抵制化石燃料的开采及相关的金融机构。这一策略取得了一些成果:Keystone XL输油管道项目被取消;数百所美国大学和教会撤资了化石燃料企业;全国各地的煤矿也计划逐步关闭。

The second strategy was to attack fossil fuels directly, along with the financial institutions underwriting them. The movement had some victories: The Keystone XL pipeline died; hundreds of U.S. colleges and churches divested from fossil-fuel companies; coal plants across the country were scheduled for closure.

随后,“绿色新政”登场,提出重振美国制造业的愿景。在“市场能够管理碳排放”的新自由主义共识瓦解之后,倡议者们及其在民主党的盟友开始支持一种主张:要逐步降低排放量,最好的办法就是建设各种设施:太阳能电站、电动汽车工厂、高速铁路。这当然是一种技术官僚式的思路,但也很大胆,仿佛是在呼唤罗斯福新政时代。在产业政策之下,市场的“看不见的手”将被联邦政府设定政策优先事项的严密“手套”紧紧裹住。如今已泄了气的《通胀削减法案》,则是这一宏大愿景中更偏技术官僚、胆识也稍逊的版本。

Then came the Green New Deal and its vision of an American manufacturing renaissance. After the neoliberal consensus that markets could manage carbon emissions fell apart, advocates and their allies in the Democratic Party got behind the idea that the best way to ratchet down emissions would be to build things: solar farms, electric-vehicle factories, high-speed rail. It was technocratic, sure, but also bold, a callback to the FDR era. Under industrial policy, the invisible hand of the market would be enclosed in a tight glove of federal priority-setting. The now-deflated Inflation Reduction Act was the wonky and somewhat less bold version of this ambition.

今天,主导变革的理论依然如故:让化石燃料彻底入土,推动以速度和规模为标志的可再生能源转型。然而,运动内部对于如何实现这一目标几乎没有共识。气候运动从不缺少巧妙方案——州级总量控制与投资计划、电网现代化、污染者付费法律、加大气候变化适应投资。它所缺乏的,是既坚定又广泛的民意支持。

Today, the overriding theory of change remains the same as ever: Back fossil fuels into the grave and drive a transition to renewable energy marked by speed and scale. But within the movement, there’s little consensus on how to do that. The climate movement does not lack for clever proposals—state-level cap-and-invest programs, grid modernization, make-polluters-pay laws, greater investments in climate-change adaptation. What it lacks is support that’s as resolute as it is broad.

这一直是气候运动的阿喀琉斯之踵,即便在疫情前几年,受格蕾塔·桑伯格启发而举行的学校罢课和大规模游行达到高潮时也是如此。气候变化在民调所谓的“重要性”方面得分不高。多数美国人担心气候变化;事实上,表示担忧的人数已接近历史最高水平。但当被要求在生活成本、移民和医疗保健等议题中为气候变化排定轻重时,结果却显示,多数美国人并没有那么担心。

This has always been the climate movement’s Achilles’ heel, even at the high-water mark of the Greta Thunberg–inspired school strikes and mass marches in the years leading up to the pandemic. Climate change doesn’t score well on what public-opinion pollsters call “salience.” A majority of Americans are worried about climate change; in fact, the number of people who say they are concerned is near an all-time high. But when asked to rank climate change among other issues such as the cost of living, immigration, and health care, it turns out that most Americans aren’t very worried.

这是一道结构性障碍。数十年来,气候倡导者一直将他们的努力建立在代际责任、国际团结以及对其他物种关怀等宏大理想之上。尽管这些理想令人振奋,但它们听起来或许——该如何形容呢?——有些抽象。因此,气候运动领袖们迫切希望找到一种方式,与美国民众及其切身利益产生共鸣,于是他们正在寻找可以借势的政治浪潮。

This has always been the climate movement’s Achilles’ heel, even at the high-water mark of the Greta Thunberg–inspired school strikes and mass marches in the years leading up to the pandemic. Climate change doesn’t score well on what public-opinion pollsters call “salience.” A majority of Americans are worried about climate change; in fact, the number of people who say they are concerned is near an all-time high. But when asked to rank climate change among other issues such as the cost of living, immigration, and health care, it turns out that most Americans aren’t very worried.

目前最受关注的气候行动口号,似乎也是所有人都在谈论的议题:可负担性。在这方面,气候运动迎来了一位新盟友——经济学。保守选民联盟主席皮特·梅史密斯(Pete Maysmith)告诉我:“就在十年前,风能和太阳能并不更便宜。句号。完。虽然有很多理由去做这件事,但可负担性并不是其中之一。”如今,太阳能加电池储能已成为最便宜的新型发电方式,也是建设速度最快的方式。尽管特朗普总统抨击风力发电,但2025年在美国投入运营的新增电力容量中,超过90%来自可再生能源。

This is a structural hurdle. For decades, climate advocates have anchored their efforts in grand ideals of generational responsibility, international solidarity, and care for other species. Although inspiring, those ideals might also sound—how to put this?—abstract. So, desperate for a way to connect with Americans and their immediate concerns, climate-movement leaders are searching for some political wave to surf.

这种技术和市场现实意味着,倡导者可以真正首次主张,清洁能源转型不仅对地球有益,对钱包也有益。随着特朗普对伊朗的战争推高家庭能源成本,这一点尤为突出。倡导者们的希望是,太阳能、电池和风能能够摆脱“自由派”的标签,仅仅被贴上“便宜”的标签——用比尔·麦基本(Bill McKibben)喜欢说的话来说,就是能源界的“好市多”(Costco),而非能源界的“全食超市”(Whole Foods)。

The most talked-about notion for a climate-action banner is the same issue everyone seems to be talking about: affordability. In this, the climate movement has a new ally—economics. As recently as a decade ago, “wind and solar were not cheaper. Period. Full stop,” Pete Maysmith, the president of the League of Conservation Voters, told me. “There were a bunch of reasons to do it, but it wasn’t affordability.” Now solar-plus-battery storage has become the cheapest form of new energy generation, as well as the quickest to build. Despite President Trump’s attacks on wind power, more than 90 percent of new electricity capacity that came online in the U.S. in 2025 was from renewables.

这种对廉价、清洁能源的强调,很大程度上是一种信息传递策略,但作为政策它确实有真正的潜力。环保团体利用“清洁即廉价”的论点,推动公共事业委员会批准可再生能源项目,而国会中的民主党人已提出立法,如《能源账单减免法案》,试图利用可负担性论点来挽救已夭折的《通胀削减法案》的部分内容。

That technological and market reality means that advocates can argue, for really the first time, that a clean-energy transition is good, not just for the planet, but also for pocketbooks. This is especially true as Trump’s war against Iran spikes household energy costs. The hope among advocates is that solar, batteries, and wind can go from being coded as liberal to being coded simply as cheap—the Costco of energy as opposed to the Whole Foods of energy, as Bill McKibben likes to say.

但一些气候倡导者警告说——通常是不具名地——大肆宣扬清洁能源多么廉价有过度承诺的风险。即使整个公用事业部门全面拥抱可再生能源,也不太可能在短期内削减大多数美国人的月度账单,而只会减缓预计的成本上涨。“成本平台期”在政治上是很难推销的,而最近的民调显示,“清洁即廉价”的信息并未深入人心。

This emphasis on cheap, clean energy is mostly a messaging strategy, but it does have real potential as policy. Environmental groups have used the clean-as-cheap argument to push public utilities commissions to approve renewable-energy projects, and Democrats in Congress have floated legislation, such as the Energy Bills Relief Act, that seeks to use the affordability argument to revive portions of the doomed IRA.

因此,许多气候倡导者正寻求将清洁能源的未来与民众对人工智能的担忧挂钩——人工智能正在推动美国能源需求的增长,而且,如果你还没注意到的话,它极其不受欢迎。

But some climate advocates caution, usually off the record, that crowing about how cheap clean energy is risks overpromising. Even a full utility-sector embrace of renewables is unlikely to cut most Americans’ monthly bills in the short run, and will merely slow the projected increase in costs. “Cost plateau” is a tough political sell, and recent polling suggests that the clean-as-cheap message isn’t breaking through.

一些气候领域的领导者认为,人工智能(AI)的快速发展可以为向可再生能源的转型提供支持。 “我们会让那些大型科技公司为此买单,我认为这一观点很可能会被民主党总统候选人采纳,”约翰·波德斯塔(John Podesta)告诉我。波德斯塔曾担任前三位民主党总统的顾问,并长期致力于推动气候保护工作。这个想法的缩写是“BeYONCE”——即“Bring Your Own Clean Energy”(自己提供清洁能源)。另一个类似的提议是:要求这些AI巨头通过为家庭能源升级项目出资来弥补它们所消耗的电力;比如,允许它们在每个家庭安装热泵,作为允许其建设数据中心的条件。然而,这样做最终可能会使气候保护运动与美国最不受欢迎的产业之一结盟。那些因AI数据中心对当地环境或乡村风貌造成负面影响而组织抗议活动的社区,不太可能改变自己的立场——尤其是当这些数据中心还配备了大型太阳能发电设施时。对于更激进的气候活动家来说,与这些AI巨头建立合作关系显然是一个令人担忧的问题。

So many climate advocates are looking to hitch the clean-energy future to populist concerns about AI, which is driving U.S. energy-demand growth and, in case you missed it, is strikingly unpopular. Some climate leaders think the AI boom could be a way to underwrite the transition to renewables. “We’re going to make the hyperscalers pay for it, and that’s what I think is going to likely catch on with Democratic presidential candidates,” John Podesta, a consigliere to the last three Democratic presidents and a longtime climate-action champion, told me. BeYONCE is the cringeworthy acronym for this idea—bring your own clean energy. A parallel notion is to force the AI giants to offset their electricity guzzling by paying for household energy upgrades—putting heat pumps in every home in exchange for being allowed to build data centers But that would ultimately ally the climate movement to one of the least popular industries in America. A community that is organizing to stop an AI data center because of its impact on local landscapes or the area’s rural character is unlikely to change positions because the AI facility comes with a giant solar farm. And for more radical climate activists, the notion of getting cozy with the AI bros raises major red flags.

Aru Shiney-Ajay是“Sunrise Movement”(一个由年轻人领导的环保组织)的执行董事,该组织曾帮助推广“绿色新政”(Green New Deal)的理念。她对利用AI技术来推动可再生能源的发展兴趣不大(与波德斯塔的观点不同),她更关注的是:能否将对科技巨头的反感与对石油巨头的反感结合起来。她对我说:“归根结底,这关乎的是企业是否应该控制我们周围的土地、空气和水资源,还是应该由普通民众来掌控这些资源。”

Aru Shiney-Ajay, the executive director of the Sunrise Movement, the youth-led climate group that helped popularize the Green New Deal, floated the idea that challenging AI build-out could be a political bank shot. She’s less interested in using the AI boom to also build renewable energy—à la Podesta—than she is in exploring whether antipathy to the tech giants can be married to antipathy to oil giants. “It’s basically a question of whether or not corporations get to control the land and the air and water around us, or whether ordinary people get to,” she told me.

莉亚·斯托克斯(Leah Stokes)是加州大学圣塔芭芭拉分校的政治学教授,同时也是新书《碳浪潮》(The Carbon Wave)的作者。她提出了一种新的政治分析视角:将高昂的能源成本、数据中心运营所带来的负面后果,以及人们对特朗普政府腐败行为的愤怒情绪联系在一起。从理论上讲,人们对精英阶层的失望情绪,以及“赶走那些腐败官员”的民粹主义思潮,可能会促使一些人开始关注石油和天然气公司的牟利行为及其巨大的政治影响力。

Leah Stokes, a professor of political science at UC Santa Barbara and the author of the new book The Carbon Wave, also proposed a political bank shot—connecting high energy costs and the data-center blowback to anger with Trump-administration corruption. Frustration with elites and “throw the bums out” populism could, in theory, lead some people to focus on the profiteering, and the massive political influence, of oil and gas companies.

“人们不喜欢那些依赖化石燃料的公司,”斯托克斯告诉我。“对于普通人来说,很容易理解:这些公司正在牟取巨额利润,而美国的其他民众甚至连能源费用都支付不起。”

“People don’t like fossil-fuel companies,” Stokes told me. “It’s quite intuitive for a normal person to understand that those people are profiting and making billions while the rest of America can’t even pay their energy bills.”

与我交谈过的那些气候问题专家认为,如今美国人对气候变化的态度已经发生了变化。他们更加清楚地认识到:气候变化正在导致食品价格急剧上涨,并开始直接威胁到一些家庭最宝贵的资产——他们的住房;在加利福尼亚州、佛罗里达州和路易斯安那州等易受灾地区,房主们越来越难以获得保险。一些气候问题倡导者认为,是时候彻底转变我们的行动方向了:从以往以道德为核心的气候保护运动,转向以人们的实际生活状况为核心的气候保护行动——首次将气候变化问题视为一个与人们日常生活息息相关的问题。

The climate leaders I talked with believe that Americans are thinking about climate change differently these days. They have a clearer understanding that it is contributing to painful increases in grocery costs and beginning to directly weigh on some families’ most valuable asset—their home; as homeowners in disaster-prone areas of California, Florida, and Louisiana are finding it more difficult to get insurance. It is time, some climate advocates believe, for a wholesale pivot from a morally centered movement to one centered on people’s material conditions—to reframe climate change as a kitchen-table issue for the first time. “You’ve never had more people who are experiencing climate change as a reality, not as a future problem,” Abigail Dillen, the president of Earthjustice, an environmental-law nonprofit, told me. “Real people at actual kitchen tables are talking about extreme heat, extreme weather, the insurance crisis.” Real talk among real people is, no doubt, essential for any political movement. It’s also insufficient. If a climate message begins with energy affordability or the simmering insurance crisis or the health impacts of wildfire smoke, it then needs to build to the ultimate goal of limiting carbon pollution, whether through the supply-side strategy of stopping future oil and gas projects or through the demand-side tactic of installing more solar panels that are hooked up to EVs. Perhaps that’s a bridge too far?

“如今,越来越多的人将气候变化视为现实中的问题,而不再是未来的隐患,”非营利性环保组织 Earthjustice 的主席阿比盖尔·迪伦告诉我。“普通人在日常生活中都在讨论极端高温、极端天气以及日益严重的保险危机。”毫无疑问,这样的真实对话对于任何政治运动来说都是至关重要的。然而,仅靠这些讨论还不够。如果气候保护的信息仅仅停留在讨论能源价格的可负担性、保险危机的严重性或野火烟雾对健康的影响等方面,那么这些信息就必须进一步引导人们认识到最终的目标——即限制碳排放。这可以通过两种途径来实现:一是从供应端入手,停止新的石油和天然气项目的开发;二是从需求端入手,推广更多太阳能电池板,并将其与电动汽车连接起来。不过,这样的目标或许有些过于遥远(或者说:实现这些目标需要付出巨大的努力)。

The climate leaders I talked with believe that Americans are thinking about climate change differently these days. They have a clearer understanding that it is contributing to painful increases in grocery costs and beginning to directly weigh on some families’ most valuable asset—their home; as homeowners in disaster-prone areas of California, Florida, and Louisiana are finding it more difficult to get insurance. It is time, some climate advocates believe, for a wholesale pivot from a morally centered movement to one centered on people’s material conditions—to reframe climate change as a kitchen-table issue for the first time. “You’ve never had more people who are experiencing climate change as a reality, not as a future problem,” Abigail Dillen, the president of Earthjustice, an environmental-law nonprofit, told me. “Real people at actual kitchen tables are talking about extreme heat, extreme weather, the insurance crisis.” Real talk among real people is, no doubt, essential for any political movement. It’s also insufficient. If a climate message begins with energy affordability or the simmering insurance crisis or the health impacts of wildfire smoke, it then needs to build to the ultimate goal of limiting carbon pollution, whether through the supply-side strategy of stopping future oil and gas projects or through the demand-side tactic of installing more solar panels that are hooked up to EVs. Perhaps that’s a bridge too far?

如今,气候运动提出的许多“好主意”其实都只是些表面的宣传手段罢了。虽然该运动拥有大量详尽的研究报告(这些报告的数量之多几乎足以用来为发电厂的锅炉提供燃料),但自从NASA科学家詹姆斯·汉森向国会警告全球变暖的威胁以来,近40年来,真正将气候变化视为首要问题的美国人数量与应对这一挑战所需的实际工作规模之间存在着巨大的差距。

The climate movement’s best ideas these days are little more than communication plays. The movement has a pile of white papers big enough to practically fuel a power plant’s boiler. But nearly 40 years after the NASA scientist James Hansen warned Congress of the dangers of global warming, a brutal mismatch exists between the number of Americans for whom climate change is priority No. 1 and the scale of the task at hand.

所有政治运动都会经历兴衰周期;即使在低谷时期,也同样可能是进行创新和探索新思路的宝贵时机。在这方面,前拜登政府官员比奇(Beachy)常常引用自由市场理论家米尔顿·弗里德曼的建议(其中带着一丝讽刺意味):“要不断开发替代方案,直到那些在政治上‘不可能’的事情最终变成‘不可避免’的事情。”然而,所谓的“不可避免”往往需要很长时间才会真正发生;而应对气候变化显然是一场时间紧迫的挑战。尽管气候运动提出了许多有价值的想法,但它最缺乏的恰恰就是时间。

All political movements go through times of boom and bust, and even the bust moments can be a fertile time for experimentation and visioning. On that point, Beachy, the former Biden-administration official, likes to quote (with no small amount of ironic self-knowing) the advice of the arch free-market fundamentalist Milton Friedman, to keep developing alternatives to favorite policies, “until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.” Inevitable, though, can take an awfully long while to arrive, and addressing climate change is, infamously, a timed test. Despite its many bright ideas, the one thing the climate movement doesn’t have is time.