For over two decades, Pakistan has waged countless counterterrorism campaigns against Taliban and Baloch insurgents in its western regions bordering Afghanistan and Iran, yet remains mired in a cycle of violence it cannot break.

Scores of soldiers, policemen and civilians are killed every month in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and southwestern Balochistan provinces, where near-daily attacks on security personnel, government officials and other prominent figures are carried out by militants to undermine the state’s authority and credibility.

Scores of soldiers, policemen and civilians are killed every month in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and southwestern Balochistan provinces, where near-daily attacks on security personnel, government officials and other prominent figures are carried out by militants to undermine the state’s authority and credibility.

Insurgents target patrols, checkpoints, police stations and administrative centres with roadside bombs, explosive-laden drones, coordinated ambushes, suicide attacks, large-scale raids, assassinations and kidnappings.

Pakistan’s military regularly hails the success of its counterterrorism operations, touting the eradication of hundreds of perpetrators each month. Its press releases often read like scoreboards, listing the number of insurgents “sent to hell” – with only a handful surviving to be interrogated.

Yet these tactical victories have not translated into the strategic success Islamabad has long yearned for, analysts say. “Force alone won’t help in curbing security issues long term,” said Farwa Aamer, director of South Asia initiatives at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York. “Force will continue to meet force, keeping the loop alive. There has to be some political solution and dialogue.” Such a solution would not appear overnight, she said, but without one – or at least a viable strategy to combat insurgency – Pakistan faced the prospect of continued instability deterring foreign investment, not least in its critical minerals sector.

“Force alone won’t help in curbing security issues long term,” said Farwa Aamer, director of South Asia initiatives at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York. “Force will continue to meet force, keeping the loop alive. There has to be some political solution and dialogue.” Such a solution would not appear overnight, she said, but without one – or at least a viable strategy to combat insurgency – Pakistan faced the prospect of continued instability deterring foreign investment, not least in its critical minerals sector.

“Force alone won’t help in curbing security issues long term,” said Farwa Aamer, director of South Asia initiatives at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York. “Force will continue to meet force, keeping the loop alive. There has to be some political solution and dialogue.” Such a solution would not appear overnight, she said, but without one – or at least a viable strategy to combat insurgency – Pakistan faced the prospect of continued instability deterring foreign investment, not least in its critical minerals sector.

Armed groups have long exploited the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border to seek sanctuary, smuggle goods and provide logistical support. In recent years, months-long terrorist campaigns have driven up casualty numbers and prompted Pakistan to launch retaliatory air strikes against insurgents based in eastern Afghanistan.

The latest came on Monday, when military jets struck Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) “terrorist camps and safe havens” in Afghanistan’s Paktika and Kunar provinces, killing 28 militants, Pakistan’s information ministry said, including what it said were suicide bombers in training.

Monday’s air strikes followed an assault on a mosque on September 18 that left at least 31 people dead and more than 100 injured at a police compound in the northwestern town of Kohat, Pakistan.

Zabihullah Mujahid, chief spokesman for Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, has repeatedly denied the existence of terrorist camps in his country and claimed in a statement that Pakistan’s air strikes killed three civilians.

After he vowed revenge, border skirmishes intensified, culminating on Thursday in eight “rudimentary” drones being launched from Afghan territory into Pakistani airspace, security officials said. All were shot down, four of them near Kohat.

Mujahid again denied responsibility for the drone incursions, though Pakistani officials view them as further evidence that Kabul is actively supporting the TTP, not merely tolerating its presence.

Pakistan retaliated in the early hours of Thursday with “precision aerial and drone strikes” on 10 locations in Afghanistan “used for launching and storing these drones”, Information Minister Attaullah Tarar announced in a social media post.

Officials in Islamabad have made clear they believe the Taliban government in Kabul has been feigning interest in recent diplomatic efforts by China, Turkey and Qatar to de-escalate tensions, following a previous cycle of insurgent violence that ended with Pakistan carrying out cross-border air strikes in June.

At a meeting in Belarus this summer, officials discussed potential compromises, including a joint mechanism to monitor the cross-border movement of TTP militants, according to Islamabad-based security analyst Iftikhar Firdous, who disclosed details of the talks in a social media post on September 16.

The meeting reportedly failed to produce a breakthrough because Kabul refused to compel the TTP to halt its attacks on Pakistan or relocate militants away from the border. The day before the Kohat attack, Qatar’s National Security Council deputy secretary general Hamad Khamis al-Kubaisi and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın had visited Kabul in a renewed attempt to broker further talks between Afghan and Pakistani officials.

The day before the Kohat attack, Qatar’s National Security Council deputy secretary general Hamad Khamis al-Kubaisi and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın had visited Kabul in a renewed attempt to broker further talks between Afghan and Pakistani officials.

Analysts see the repeated cycles of violence as proof that Islamabad’s largely reactive approach to counterterrorism, built around retaliatory counter-attacks, is not working.

Riccardo Valle, a researcher tracking militancy across South and Central Asia, called the strategy “incomplete and limited”. Local grievances and poor governance constrained the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations in violence-hit areas, he said, adding that local security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan – especially the police – were ill-equipped to confront “full-fledged insurgencies”.

Local grievances and poor governance constrained the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations in violence-hit areas, he said, adding that local security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan – especially the police – were ill-equipped to confront “full-fledged insurgencies”.

The reactive, rather than preventive, nature of intelligence-based operations is another limiting factor, according to Valle.

“Thus, tactical success cannot compensate for a broader strategic deficiency, which fuels a circle of instability” in the affected provinces, he said, with the twin insurgencies becoming a “multigenerational issue”, drawing in new cohorts of young militants.

As such, Valle said a holistic approach that accounted for both Pakistan’s domestic concerns and the wider conflict’s international dimensions would be essential.

Signs have also emerged of increasing collaboration between the radical Islamist TTP and ethno-nationalist Baloch separatist groups in Balochistan.

The vast and sparsely populated province, bordering southern Afghanistan and eastern Iran, recorded a marked rise in attacks over the summer. In one instance this July, the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army carried out separate attacks in the province’s Pishin and Ziarat districts within hours of each other.

Muhammad Faisal, a South Asia security researcher based at the University of Technology Sydney, said tactical coordination between the TTP and Baloch insurgents was “increasingly documented”, including reports of joint training and logistical links. However, he doubts this will amount to a “durable strategic coalition” given the two groups’ different ideologies and aims – the TTP seeks to overthrow the government of Pakistan and establish an Islamist political order, while Baloch groups are more concerned with achieving independence. Linguistic, cultural and geographic differences further limit each group’s ability to operate in the other’s core territory, likely confining cooperation to an exchange of tactics and targets, according to Faisal.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s ties with Iran have improved since the two countries exchanged air strikes against militants based on the other’s soil in January 2024.

Islamabad helped broker talks earlier this year aimed at ending the US-Israel war on Iran, but Faisal said that widening conflict and residual Pakistan-Iran mistrust would continue to hamstring relations.

Pakistan has also accused India, with which it fought a brief air war in May last year, of covertly supporting Baloch separatists as proxies.

However, Faisal said Islamabad would be better off closely monitoring the separatist networks involved instead of treating every one of their attacks as proof of foreign backing.

The more immediate danger was the effect the Iran conflict might have on border security if it created a power vacuum filled with more militancy and foreign intelligence operatives, he said.

“This is a serious security risk, but one best managed through intelligence cooperation and sustained diplomacy,” Faisal added. By Tom Hussain