珍妮特·伊根(Janet Egan)居住在华盛顿,但她回到家乡是为了就相关技术问题发出警告。据《Politico》的芬恩·麦克休(Finn McHugh)报道,珍妮特·伊根是位于华盛顿的政策智库“进步研究所”(Institute for Progress)的人工智能政策主管,她负责分析前沿人工智能技术对国家安全和经济可能产生的影响。
Janet Egan lives in Washington, but returned home to issue warnings over the technology Finn McHugh Add POLITICO on Google Janet Egan is director of artificial intelligence policy at the Institute for Progress, a policy think tank based in Washington, where she leads analysis of the national security and economic implications posed by frontier models. Before departing for the U.S., Egan worked in the Australian public service — including a stint as a director in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
在前往美国之前,伊根曾在澳大利亚的公共服务部门工作,其中包括在总理内阁部担任过职务。
POLITICO’s Finn McHugh spoke to in Canberra the day after revelations OpenAI autonomous agents had breached an Australian government service.
《Politico》的芬恩·麦克休在堪培拉接受了采访,该采访是在 OpenAI 的自主智能系统入侵澳大利亚政府系统的事件曝光后的第二天进行的。这段采访记录经过编辑,以缩短篇幅并提高清晰度。
This transcript has been edited for length and clarity. What do you make of calls for Australia to develop its own sovereign capabilities from scratch, and how feasible would that be?
您如何看待澳大利亚呼吁从零开始发展自己的自主人工智能能力的呼声?这是否可行?
I do not think it is feasible for Australia to develop its own sovereign capabilities from scratch. One researcher estimated it would cost around $500 billion to do this to even have a chance of developing a frontier model. Other models we’ve seen that call themselves sovereign AI are often just built off a Chinese open-source model, then further refined and fine-tuned. It’s just the sheer scale of upfront costs needed, particularly compute costs, which makes this a really high barrier to entry. I think there’s every chance that countries like Australia, if they try, could end up just throwing away a bunch of money and still ending up with a model that is not at the frontier.
我认为澳大利亚从零开始发展自己的自主人工智能能力是不可行的。有研究人员估计,即使只是为了有机会开发出一个前沿的人工智能模型,所需的成本也将高达 5000 亿美元。我们见过的一些自称“自主人工智能”系统的模型,实际上都是基于中国的开源代码进行进一步开发和优化的。高昂的前期成本(尤其是计算成本)构成了巨大的进入壁垒。我认为,如果澳大利亚尝试这样做,很可能会白白浪费大量资金,最终得到的模型仍然无法达到前沿水平。那么,澳大利亚还有哪些其他可行的选择呢?
I do not think it is feasible for Australia to develop its own sovereign capabilities from scratch. One researcher estimated it would cost around $500 billion to do this to even have a chance of developing a frontier model. Other models we’ve seen that call themselves sovereign AI are often just built off a Chinese open-source model, then further refined and fine-tuned. It’s just the sheer scale of upfront costs needed, particularly compute costs, which makes this a really high barrier to entry. I think there’s every chance that countries like Australia, if they try, could end up just throwing away a bunch of money and still ending up with a model that is not at the frontier. So what other potentially effective options does Australia have?
让我感到非常兴奋的是,澳大利亚在提供前沿人工智能培训及计算资源方面确实具有很强的优势。目前,我们正面临着人工智能发展的未来:许多人工智能技术的成果和利润可能会被少数几家大型企业所垄断(这些企业主要集中在两个国家)。但如果澳大利亚能够成为人工智能产业链中的一环,那么我们就有可能掌握这项技术的发展方向,影响其发展进程,并从中获得相应的利益。
The thing that I am really excited by is Australia actually has a pretty good hand in hosting frontier training compute. At the moment, we’re looking at an AI future where there’s a chance that a lot of the AI gains and profits flood into these major AI companies, and there’s just a handful of companies in just two countries. But if you can insert Australia as part of the supply chain of frontier AI, you actually have an ability to understand the trajectory of the technology, shape the trajectory and the governance around that, and then also capture some of the gains.
如果澳大利亚真的遭遇大规模的劳动力结构变化(这种情况确实有可能发生,因为未来充满不确定性),那么政府就必须拥有足够的税收基础,以便在变革过程中为公民提供必要的支持。通过提供前沿的人工智能培训及计算资源,澳大利亚或许能够抓住这一关键机会。
If we do experience widespread labor force disruption in Australia — which could happen, the future is highly uncertain — you need to have a tax base and a government that can actually respond to support its citizens through change. Capturing a really big share of the frontier AI supply chain through hosting training compute could be that opportunity. So we can only really have a role in shaping the technology if we make ourselves a part, if not an indispensable part, of the supply chain?
因此,只有当我们成为人工智能产业链中不可或缺的一部分时,才能真正发挥我们在技术发展中的影响力。虽然“不可或缺”这个概念可能具有绝对性,但实际上,如果某个环节被移除,整个产业链的成本可能会大幅增加。
Indispensable is probably a binary category, but you could be an incredibly costly part of the supply chain to remove. On copyright laws: there’s obviously a big debate about the creative sector and how they’d be impacted. What do you think Australia’s most effective approach would be?
关于版权法:显然,创意产业在版权法改革中备受关注,人们也在讨论这些改革会对创意产业产生怎样的影响。你认为澳大利亚最有效的应对方式是什么?
I’m not a lawyer and I don’t understand the intricacies of copyright law. But I have to say: there must surely be a way through that supports both parties in this, that allows AI training to happen in Australia, and then on the other side ensures that Australian creatives, who currently get nothing, can benefit.
我不是律师,也不了解版权法的复杂细节。但我认为,肯定存在一种既能支持人工智能产业发展,又能让澳大利亚的创意工作者从中受益的解决方案。
In the U.S., you can train for free under fair use, even on Australian content. Surely there are ways to ensure that they are remunerated. I’ve been trying to talk to people about this for the past few months to understand this, and it seems that AI companies are license-sensitive but not price-sensitive. There is a way that the Australian government could just extract a very large amount of value from these companies, require them to pay into a central fund that then ensures that Australian creatives are better off.
在美国,根据“合理使用”(fair use)的原则,人们可以免费使用澳大利亚的版权内容来进行相关训练。当然,应该有办法确保这些内容的所有者能够从中获得报酬。过去几个月里,我一直在尝试与相关人士讨论这个问题,发现人工智能(AI)公司似乎更关注许可证的获取问题,而非价格问题。澳大利亚政府其实完全可以采取某些措施,从这些公司那里获取大量收益,并将这些收益用于建立一个专项基金,从而帮助澳大利亚的创作者们获得更好的发展条件。
In the U.S., you can train for free under fair use, even on Australian content. Surely there are ways to ensure that they are remunerated. I’ve been trying to talk to people about this for the past few months to understand this, and it seems that AI companies are license-sensitive but not price-sensitive. There is a way that the Australian government could just extract a very large amount of value from these companies, require them to pay into a central fund that then ensures that Australian creatives are better off.
我担心创意产业会成为第一个受到AI技术负面影响的行业。以编程领域为例:在线软件仓库虽然不受版权保护,但它们被广泛用于AI模型的训练;如今,AI技术的发展使得软件工程师(尤其是初级软件工程师)找工作变得更加困难。因此,如果AI技术真的开始侵蚀许多行业的就业机会,那么我们确实需要一个能够支持整个经济体系顺利过渡的机制。
I worry that the creative sector is the very first sector to feel the impacts of AI in this way. Take for example coding. Online software repositories are not copyright protected, but they have been used to train AI models, and now we have AI capabilities that are making it much, much harder for software engineers, especially entry software engineers, to get jobs. So ideally, you would have a model that you could actually use to support different sectors of your economy through tough transitions if AI does start to hollow out a lot of the prospects of different sectors. Can you explain what you mean when you say AI companies are “price-sensitive”, not “license-sensitive”?
你能解释一下为什么你说AI公司“对价格敏感”而不是“对许可证的获取敏感”吗?
The interesting part, my understanding is, is that AI companies think that if they pay a license in Australia, that would weaken the applicability of fair use in the U.S. They seem unwilling to take that risk.
据我了解,AI公司认为:如果在澳大利亚支付许可证费用,那么在美国的“合理使用”原则就会受到削弱(即他们担心这种支付行为会影响自己在美国的合法使用权利)。因此,他们不愿意承担这种风险。
I want to caveat that I don’t work for an AI company — I’m not paid by one, I don’t speak for them, and I don’t understand all the internal machinations that are informing them. But it does seem that the fair use doctrine in the U.S. is supported by the criteria you have to meet for fair use to apply. One of them, as I mentioned, is that use is “transformative,” which AI training seems to be. Everyone agrees. Then the second is that fair use isn’t undermining a market for licenses for that purpose already.
需要说明的是,我并不为任何AI公司工作,也没有接受过他们的报酬;我也不会代表他们的立场发言,也不了解他们内部的决策机制。不过,美国的“合理使用”原则确实有明确的标准:其中一条标准就是使用行为必须具有“创造性”或“变革性”(即使用该技术后必须能够带来新的价值或推动行业变革),而AI模型的训练显然符合这一标准。此外,合理使用原则也不应破坏现有的许可证市场秩序。
Gina Hinojosa wants to make Texas a test case for Democrats’ future Which goes back to your suggestion about a central fund. Is their strategy to avoid setting the precedent of a license? I haven’t seen any labs propose this directly. I’m not sure if they have. But there’s a Good Ancestors proposal that talks about how you could do this public interest benefit fund.
吉娜·伊诺霍萨(Gina Hinojosa)希望将德克萨斯州打造为民主党未来的试验田。这回到了你关于设立中央基金的建议。他们的策略是否是为了避免开创“许可证”的先例?
That would provide ongoing funding, not just for the creatives of yesterday, but the creatives of the future as well. We have had major disruptions in the labor market before — particularly industrialization. Do you think governments have learned the lessons?
我还没有看到任何实验室直接提出这一点。我不确定他们是否这样做过。但有一个“好祖先”(Good Ancestors)提案,探讨了如何建立这种公共利益基金。
I’m worried that no government has a very strong playbook on how to do that well, and I look as way of example at the China shocks’ impact on the U.S. economy — not on the macro level, but on the experience of groups in the U.S. economy who have just been completely disenfranchised and disempowered by economic transitions.
这将提供持续的资金,不仅是为了昨天的创作者,也是为了未来的创作者。
I’m worried that no government has a very strong playbook on how to do that well, and I look as way of example at the China shocks’ impact on the U.S. economy — not on the macro level, but on the experience of groups in the U.S. economy who have just been completely disenfranchised and disempowered by economic transitions.
我们过去曾经历过重大的劳动力市场动荡,尤其是工业化时期。你认为各国政府吸取了教训吗?
You believe the U.K. AI Security Institute could be a model for Australia to look at.
我担心没有哪个政府有一套非常成熟的方案来妥善处理这些问题。我以“中国冲击”对美国经济的影响为例——不是从宏观层面,而是从美国经济中那些因经济转型而完全被剥夺权利和丧失能力的群体的经历来看。
It’s an interesting model because it does three things really well. The first is it’s really well funded — above $120 million Australian dollars annually goes into funding, and that doesn’t include access to advanced compute, which is another cost.
你认为英国人工智能安全研究所(U.K. AI Security Institute)可以成为澳大利亚参考的模式。
The second is that it had really strong political backing. So you could say the U.K. government could go to researchers and say: “Hand on heart, we deeply care about understanding the frontier AI risks and capabilities. Come join us, help us solve this, and we can make sure the world is better off.” That led to junior researchers forgoing AI lab salaries to be part of that mission.
这是一个有趣的模式,因为它在三方面做得非常好。首先,它的资金非常充足——每年的资助额超过1.2亿澳元,这还不包括对先进计算资源的获取,那是另一笔开支。
The second is that it had really strong political backing. So you could say the U.K. government could go to researchers and say: “Hand on heart, we deeply care about understanding the frontier AI risks and capabilities. Come join us, help us solve this, and we can make sure the world is better off.” That led to junior researchers forgoing AI lab salaries to be part of that mission.
其次,它拥有非常强大的政治支持。所以你可以说,英国政府可以向研究人员表示:“我们真心实意地关心如何理解前沿人工智能的风险和能力。加入我们,帮助我们解决这个问题,我们可以确保世界变得更美好。”这促使初级研究人员放弃了人工智能实验室的高薪,投身于这一使命。
The third is this ability to shape global policy, but that last one seems to be declining a bit. We’ve seen the White House saying that they want to restrict access to the U.K. getting the most frontier model until the U.S. has done their assessments. So that started to shift a bit, because the U.K. doesn’t really have any direct leverage over frontier AI companies themselves. But I think in general that those three things have really built up a robust ecosystem of hundreds of researchers doing work that they really believe in.
第三点是塑造全球政策的能力,但最后这一点似乎正在稍微下降。我们看到白宫表示,他们希望限制英国获取最前沿模型,直到美国完成评估。因此情况开始发生一些变化,因为英国并没有对前沿AI公司本身拥有任何直接影响力。但我认为总的来说,这三点确实建立了一个强大的生态系统,数百名研究人员在从事他们真正相信的工作。所以我猜想您希望看到下一份澳大利亚预算大幅增加资金投入?
[@portabletext/vue] Unknown block type "most-read", specify a component for it in the components.types prop So I imagine you’d want to see the next Australian budget include a significant uptick in funding?
It also depends. The key to an AI safety institute doing its best work is having access to frontier models and access to the technical talent at the frontier AI companies. I worry that under the status quo, Australia doesn’t have the ability to really stand out above the pack of every other country’s AI safety institute asking for time with just a handful of technical people.
这也取决于具体情况。AI安全研究所发挥最佳作用的关键在于能够接触前沿模型,并能接触前沿AI公司的技术人才。我担心在现状下,澳大利亚没有能力在各国AI安全研究所争抢极少数技术人才时间的竞争中脱颖而出。
I think if Australia does manage to attract a large amount of frontier AI training here, having a really robust AI safety institute is super important. Even without that, it would be important — it would be beneficial for Australia to put more funding into understanding frontier AI issues. So it’s a public good, regardless.
我认为如果澳大利亚确实设法吸引大量前沿AI训练落地,拥有一个真正强大的AI安全研究所就至关重要。即使没有这一点,这也很重要——澳大利亚增加资金投入以了解前沿AI问题将是有益的。所以无论如何这都是一种公共产品。OpenAI代理泄露澳大利亚政府数据让您有多担忧?
How much does OpenAI agents breaching Australian government data concern you? I’m really concerned. The models internal to AI companies, the ones that aren’t yet released, are their most capable products. They’re also often the least safeguarded. It seems to me that dangerous capabilities might be emerging, models aren’t properly aligned and in control, and at the moment there aren’t really clear obligations on any of these AI companies to report that.
我非常担忧。AI公司内部的模型,即那些尚未发布的模型,是它们最强大的产品。这些模型往往也是防护最薄弱的。在我看来,危险能力可能正在涌现,模型没有得到妥善对齐和控制,而目前这些AI公司并没有明确的义务报告这种情况。
The uniform call from AI companies for a slowdown and to be regulated seems unusual. How much of that is motivated by a desire to be legally covered in the event their technology does something absolutely catastrophic?
AI公司纷纷呼吁放缓发展并接受监管,这看似反常。其中有多少是出于希望在技术发生绝对灾难性后果时获得法律豁免的动机?
I wrote a piece about AI needing to avoid “The Chernobyl moment.” It could be that that’s some of the incentive at play. I think even without that incentive, there are enough voices saying we are really worried about the pace of AI progress, and that capability seems to be outstripping our ability to align and control them.
我曾撰文论述AI需要避免“切尔诺贝利时刻”。这或许是其中一部分激励因素。我认为即便没有这种激励,也已有足够多的声音表达对AI发展速度的深切担忧,认为其能力似乎已超越我们对齐和控制它们的能力。
I wrote a piece about AI needing to avoid “The Chernobyl moment.” It could be that that’s some of the incentive at play. I think even without that incentive, there are enough voices saying we are really worried about the pace of AI progress, and that capability seems to be outstripping our ability to align and control them.
许多行动呼吁并不一定源自高层管理——高层也是在回应公司工程师的呼声。我们已看到证据表明,OpenAI和Anthropic等前沿公司的工程师都在警告称,他们对这些AI系统未来的影响深感忧虑——不是担心当下的系统,而是担心我们前进的方向——并呼吁放缓发展。从工程师到高层管理有着非常清晰的传导线索。他们都开始警告:“哇,我们在这个问题上推进得真的很快,但尚未一切受控。”我花时间与AI公司内部人士交谈,了解他们的世界观和工作内容,并试图思考该领域良好的政策是什么。我交谈的这些AI实验室里的大多数人,真心实意地恐惧这些AI模型前进的方向。
A lot of these calls for action actually stem not necessarily from the leadership — the leadership is also acting in response to the company engineers. We’ve seen evidence that company engineers across both frontier companies, OpenAI and Anthropic, are warning that they are deeply worried about the future impacts of these AI systems — not the ones today, but the direction we’re heading in — and are calling for a slowdown. There are very clear lines from the engineers through to their leadership. They’re all starting to warn: “Oh wow, we really are moving quite quickly on this, and we haven’t got everything managed.” I’ve spent time talking to people in the AI companies to understand their worldviews and what they’re working on, and to try and think about what good policy looks like in this space. Most people I talk to at these AI labs are just genuinely scared about the direction these AI models are heading.
我们曾见Anthropic一名员工离职,公开声称这项技术有10%的几率在本十年末灭绝全人类。有没有办法真正核实这是否属实?
We had an Anthropic employee quit, publicly claiming there was a 10% chance this technology will kill all humans by the end of the decade. Is there any way of actually verifying whether it’s true?
我认识其中一些研究人员,我认识的人真心相信这一点。我不认为这是营销炒作。
I know some of these researchers, and the people I know genuinely believe that. I do not think this is marketing hype.
从我的视角和我在华盛顿的位置来看,人们持有这种观点。我们甚至有参议员……特德·克鲁兹说:“好吧,如果我们都要被杀人机器人杀死,那最好是美国的杀人机器人,而不是中国的。”在美国语境下,人们确实存在这种观点。
From my perspective and from where I sit in D.C., people hold this view. We’ve even got people like Sen. Ted Cruz saying: “Well, if we’re all going to get killed by killer robots, they better be American killer robots, not Chinese.” People genuinely have these perspectives in the U.S. context.