本我、自我与超级智能 当米利都的泰勒斯——可以说是第一位哲学家——因贫穷和其行当的无用而遭人嘲笑时,他观察天象,预见橄榄大丰收,悄悄雇下了附近所有的榨油机,大赚一笔。亚里士多德告诉我们,他由此证明,哲学家若想发财易如反掌,只是他们不屑于此。花了约两千五百年,市场似乎终于接受了泰勒斯的观点。
The Id, the Ego and the Superintelligence When Thales of Miletus, arguably the first philosopher, was mocked for his poverty and the uselessness of his trade, he read the skies, foresaw a bumper olive harvest, quietly hired every olive press nearby and made a killing. He thereby proved, Aristotle tells us, that philosophers could easily be rich if they wished, but that this is not what they care about. It has taken some two and a half thousand years, but the market appears finally to have come around to Thales’ point of view.
对人工智能的恐慌往往聚焦于机器是会取代(抑或直接消灭)我们。但机器擅长的往往是一组特定任务:检索、近乎即时的摘要,以及对已有言论的无缝、惊艳重组。它们不擅长的,正是哲学训练人类数千年的能力:判断。于是,人工智能公司开始雇佣哲学家。他们不只是咨询哲学家,或把他们推出来饭后谈谈电车难题取乐;他们真给薪水、大概还给牙科保险,正式雇佣他们。人工智能公司需要哲学家,因为真正的思考需要遗忘——以及知道何时该遗忘。他们需要哲学家,是因为机器做不到的那些事。
Panic around A.I. often focuses on whether machines will replace (or simply kill) us. But what the machines are often good at is a distinct set of tasks: Retrieval, near-instant summary and the frictionless, stunning recombination of everything that has already been said. What they are not good at is what philosophy has been training humans to do for thousands of years: judgment. And so the A.I. companies have started hiring philosophers. They don’t just consult them or wheel them out for an amusing after-dinner talk on the trolley problem; they actually hire them with salaries and, presumably, dental plans. A.I. companies need philosophers because actually thinking requires forgetting — and knowing when to forget. They need philosophers because of what their machines cannot do.
判断不是计算。它是权衡、辨别、感知的能力,能感觉到一个答案是真实的,而另一个只是正确的。它是品味、洞察力和横向思维的诀窍。它只能通过经验来磨练——通过错误、尴尬、无聊、悲伤,以及偶尔的宿醉。意义源于我们是凡人的事实:事物对我们重要,是因为我们终将死去,且我们知晓这一点。不朽中不可能有意义。借用我朋友克里斯蒂安·马兹比耶的话,我想提出一个比图灵测试更好的测试:机器能体验社交焦虑吗?它能在凌晨四点辗转反侧,反复回味晚餐桌上说的那句蠢话吗?等聊天机器人能做到这一点时再叫我。要具备人类意义上的智能,机器得会在乎才行。
Judgment is not calculation. It is the capacity to weigh, to discriminate, to sense that one answer is true and another merely correct. It is taste, discernment and the knack of thinking sideways. It is refined only through experience — through error, embarrassment, boredom, grief and the occasional hangover. Meaning is derived from the fact that we are mortal: Things matter to us because we are going to die, and we know it. There can be no meaning in immortality. To borrow from my friend Christian Madsbjerg, I would like to propose a better Turing test than Turing’s: Can a machine experience social anxiety? Can it lie awake at 4 in the morning replaying the stupid thing it said at dinner? Call me when a chatbot does that. To be intelligent in the human sense, the machine would need to give a damn.
进入人工智能公司的哲学家行列。Anthropic 公司在薪资单上保留着一个小型哲学家团队,其中包括阿曼达·阿斯凯尔,她的博士论文研究无限伦理学——即在一个拥有无限价值的宇宙中如何善行——她的工作是塑造公司机器的“性格”。Google DeepMind 任命剑桥哲学家亨利·谢夫林为新设立的“哲学家”职位,这是我努力了约 40 年却始终未能获得的头衔。OpenAI 首席执行官山姆·奥特曼表示,他的公司在制定 ChatGPT 背后的原则时咨询了“数百位道德哲学家”(这大约相当于一场中等规模哲学会议的出席人数)。在一生中无数次被问及哲学学位究竟有什么用之后,我发现这一发展近乎令人难以忍受地滑稽。
Enter the A.I. companies’ philosophers. Anthropic keeps a small squad on the payroll, among them Amanda Askell, whose doctoral thesis was on infinite ethics — the question of how to act well in a universe of infinite value — and whose job is to shape the character of the company’s machine. Google DeepMind has appointed the Cambridge philosopher Henry Shevlin to the newly minted post of “Philosopher,” a job title I have been trying and failing to secure for some 40 years. The OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman says his company consulted “hundreds of moral philosophers” in drawing up the principles behind ChatGPT. (That’s roughly the turnout of a middling philosophy conference.) After a lifetime of being asked at parties what one actually does with a philosophy degree, I find this development almost unbearably funny. Why now? Because the questions the A.I. companies are stumbling into are not engineering questions. What should the machine say to the grieving, the lonely, the person typing into the void at 4 in the morning? What sort of character should it have — candid, flattering, evasive, kind? Could such a thing conceivably suffer, and would we owe it anything if it did? These are questions about what matters. The engineers, to their credit, have noticed that no quantity of computational capacity will settle them. Ethics, it turns out, cannot be scraped from the internet, because the internet is precisely the contemporary record of our failure to agree about ethics.
为什么是现在?因为人工智能公司正跌跌撞撞闯入的那些问题,并非工程问题。机器该对悲伤者、孤独者、凌晨四点在虚空中敲击键盘的人说些什么?它该拥有何种性格——坦诚、奉承、回避、善良?这样一种事物会不会痛苦?如果它真的痛苦,我们是否欠它什么?这些都是关乎“何为重要”的问题。工程师们值得肯定的是,他们已意识到,无论多大的计算能力都无法解决这些问题。原来伦理无法从互联网上抓取,因为互联网正是我们当代在伦理上无法达成共识的记录。
Enter the A.I. companies’ philosophers. Anthropic keeps a small squad on the payroll, among them Amanda Askell, whose doctoral thesis was on infinite ethics — the question of how to act well in a universe of infinite value — and whose job is to shape the character of the company’s machine. Google DeepMind has appointed the Cambridge philosopher Henry Shevlin to the newly minted post of “Philosopher,” a job title I have been trying and failing to secure for some 40 years. The OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman says his company consulted “hundreds of moral philosophers” in drawing up the principles behind ChatGPT. (That’s roughly the turnout of a middling philosophy conference.) After a lifetime of being asked at parties what one actually does with a philosophy degree, I find this development almost unbearably funny. Why now? Because the questions the A.I. companies are stumbling into are not engineering questions. What should the machine say to the grieving, the lonely, the person typing into the void at 4 in the morning? What sort of character should it have — candid, flattering, evasive, kind? Could such a thing conceivably suffer, and would we owe it anything if it did? These are questions about what matters. The engineers, to their credit, have noticed that no quantity of computational capacity will settle them. Ethics, it turns out, cannot be scraped from the internet, because the internet is precisely the contemporary record of our failure to agree about ethics.
这里还有一重讽刺,而且是个老生常谈。哲学史上第一次有记录的技术恐慌,正是关于这些机器如今已臻完美的事物:人工记忆。在柏拉图的《斐德若篇》末尾,苏格拉底讲述了埃及神祇图特的故事,他是数字、几何、天文学、跳棋和骰子的发明者,他将自己的杰作——文字——呈献给埃及神王塔姆斯。图特宣称,这一发现将使埃及人更加睿智:它是记忆的“良药”。塔姆斯却不以为然。他写道,文字将在灵魂中植入遗忘;人们将依赖外在的符号,不再从内心记忆;他们将获得智慧的名声,却无其实质。“良药”恰巧也意为“毒药”。此后每一次恐慌——关于印刷机、小说、电视、智能手机、聊天机器人——皆是塔姆斯警告的注脚,而讽刺的是,我们之所以知道他反对文字的警告,仅仅因为柏拉图把它写了下来。
There is a further irony here, and it is an old one. Philosophy’s first recorded technology panic was about exactly the thing these machines have now perfected: Artificial memory. Toward the end of Plato’s “Phaedrus,” Socrates tells the story of the Egyptian god Theuth, inventor of numbers, geometry, astronomy, draughts and dice, who presents his masterpiece — writing — to Thamus, god-king of Egypt. This discovery, Theuth announces, will make the Egyptians wiser: It is a pharmakon, or remedy, for memory. Thamus is unpersuaded. Writing, he replies, will implant forgetfulness in the soul; people will trust the external marks and cease to remember from within; they will acquire the reputation of wisdom without the reality. Pharmakon, conveniently, also means poison. Every panic since — about the printing press, the novel, television, the smartphone, the chatbot — has been a footnote to Thamus, and the joke, of course, is that we know his warning against writing only because Plato wrote it down.