欧洲是全球最大的 AI 数据中心基础设施市场之一，但其本土企业仅占据了极小部分的价值，因为海外供应商主导着芯片、服务器和云基础设施领域。根据全球电子协会（GEA）的数据，欧盟总部企业仅占该集团数据中心半导体市场的 6%、服务器制造与组装的 7% 以及云基础设施的 8%。其报告《从芯片到系统：构建面向数据中心、云基础设施与 AI 的端到端欧盟战略》指出，欧盟的《云与 AI 发展法案》（CADA）旨在在五到七年内至少将集团的数据中心产能提高两倍。该协会认为，欧洲需要制定政策来发展自身的产业生态系统，并获取 CADA 预计将刺激的“服务器、电子系统和半导体组件前所未有的需求”所带来的更多价值。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
在电子供应链的许多环节上，欧洲已落后于其他地区。台湾主导代工芯片制造，生产全球大部分尖端处理器，其中许多由美国公司设计；而韩国和美国供应商主导存储市场。大多数主要服务器制造商为美国企业，中国联想是显著例外。美国公司同样主导网络和存储领域，导致欧洲鲜有大型自主供应商。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
报告建议欧盟为数据中心供应链追求端到端战略，利用欧洲需求鼓励私人投资，同时吸引全球技术和制造企业在集团内扩大生产。其论据部分基于这样一个观点：受 AI 处理需求驱动，服务器自 2024 年起已成为整个电子行业的主要增长引擎，超越了其他细分领域。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
它指出，预测显示到2030年，服务器将成为最大的电子细分市场，超越智能手机或汽车电子。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
报告还将数据中心、云和AI基础设施确定为欧盟技术主权最具战略重要性的市场。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
服务器农场构成了关键基础设施，大量基本服务如今都依赖于此，而运行在其上的云服务现已成为许多实体产品的设计、制造和运营中不可或缺的一部分。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
GEA认为，孤立地支持供应链的个别环节无法打造具有竞争力的欧洲产业。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
它指出《芯片法案2.0》和CADA是朝着正确方向迈出的步伐，但表示其他产业政策工具也需要与之配套。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
它表示：“印制电路板、电子制造服务、先进封装和基板首次与半导体制造一道，成为欧洲产业战略的明确目标。”
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
报告承认，欧洲无法现实地仅靠总部设在欧盟的公司来构建这一供应链。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
它表示，政策制定者应利用“欧盟市场的吸引力和增长潜力，鼓励全球领军企业扩大在欧洲的制造版图。”
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
这可能涉及与欧洲科技公司和研究机构建立合作伙伴关系，将制造专业知识扩散至该地区的电子产业中。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
该提案呼应了特朗普政府重振美国制造业的推动，尽管它更多依赖激励措施，而非关税或威胁排除外国产品（除非其制造商在美国建立生产基地）。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
尽管如此，GEA表示，欧洲的目标应是逐步将更大比例的端到端价值链锚定在欧洲境内。
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®
欧盟成员国是否具备这样做的集体意愿是另一个问题，能否扭转欧洲大陆对海外技术的深度依赖同样是个未知数。®
Europe is one of the world's largest markets for AI datacenter infrastructure, but its own local companies capture only a fraction of the value, because overseas suppliers dominate chips, servers, and cloud infrastructure. According to the Global Electronics Association (GEA), EU-headquartered companies account for only six percent of the bloc's datacenter semiconductor market, seven percent of server manufacturing and assembly, and eight percent of cloud infrastructure. Its report, "From Chips to Systems: Building an End-to-End EU Strategy for Data Centre, Cloud Infrastructure and AI," says that Europe's Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to at least triple the bloc's datacenter capacity within five to seven years. The association argues that Europe needs policies to develop its own industrial ecosystem and capture more of the "unprecedented demand for servers, electronic systems and semiconductor components" CADA is expected to stimulate. Europe has fallen behind other regions in much of the electronics supply chain. Taiwan dominates contract chip manufacturing and produces most of the world's leading-edge processors, many of them designed by American companies, while South Korean and US suppliers dominate the memory market. Most major server makers are American, with China's Lenovo a notable exception. US companies also dominate networking and storage, leaving Europe with few large suppliers of its own. The report recommends that the EU pursue an end-to-end strategy for the datacenter supply chain, using European demand to encourage private investment while enticing global technology and manufacturing companies to expand production within the bloc. Its case rests partly on the claim that servers, driven by AI processing requirements, have become the primary growth driver of the entire electronics industry since 2024, overtaking other segments. It points to forecasts that expect servers to become the largest electronics segment by 2030, ahead of smartphones or automotive electronics. The report also identifies datacenter, cloud, and AI infrastructure as the most strategically important market for EU technological sovereignty. Server farms constitute the critical infrastructure on which a large number of essential services now depend, and the cloud services that run on them are now integral to the design, manufacture, and operation of many physical goods. GEA argues that supporting individual parts of the supply chain in isolation will not create a competitive European industry. It points to the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA as steps in the right direction, but says that other industrial policy instruments will need to match them. "For the first time, printed circuit boards, electronic manufacturing services, advanced packaging, and substrates sit alongside semiconductor fabrication as explicit targets of European industrial strategy," it says. The report acknowledges that Europe cannot realistically build this supply chain using EU-headquartered companies alone. It says policymakers should use the "attractiveness and growth of the EU market to encourage global leaders to expand their manufacturing footprint in Europe." That could involve partnerships with European technology companies and research organizations, spreading manufacturing expertise through the region's electronics industry. The proposal echoes the Trump administration's push to rebuild American manufacturing, although it relies more on incentives than on tariffs or threats to exclude foreign products unless their manufacturers establish US production. Nevertheless, the GEA says that the European objective should be to progressively anchor a greater share of the end-to-end value chain within Europe. Whether EU members have the collective will to do this is another question, as is whether it is possible to reverse the continent's deep dependence on overseas technology. ®