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AWS需要接受自己作为人工智能基础设施领域家得宝的定位AWS needs to embrace its place as the Home Depot of AI infrastructure

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从历史上看,在 AWS 上构建应用程序的感觉与其说是购买精心设计的产品,不如说是去了一趟家得宝(Home Depot)。在那个还没有计算机能帮我们“把所有零件组装在一起”的时代,这固然很好,但如今这种方式正显得越来越过时。今天,你可以使用 Railway、Vercel(其本身就是建立在 AWS 之上的平台)、CloudFlare 以及其他许多下一代服务提供商,这些提供商无疑会试图在评论区进行自我推销。

Historically, building an application on top of AWS felt less like buying well-thought-out products, and more like a trip to Home Depot. This was great in an era before we had computers that would handle the "bolting all the parts together for us" parts, but increasingly it's starting to feel a lot more dated. Today, you can use Railway, Vercel (itself a platform built atop AWS), CloudFlare, and a host of other next-generation providers who will no doubt attempt to show up self promotionally in the comments. The thing these new platforms have in common is pretty basic.

这些新平台的共同点非常基础:它们没有过去二十年里积累的、必须支持 AWS 客户的历史包袱。它们拥有的是一种以客户为先的理念,不需要客户先证明自己有资格使用其产品。机构傲慢在我看来,AWS 对市场的看法中几乎有一种机构傲慢感,即“我们是 AWS,客户理所当然会选择我们”。他们网站上最近的一条推荐语引用了一位 YC 创始人的话:“对于达到一定规模的初创公司来说,条条大路通向 AWS 这样的超大规模云服务商。”

They don't have the legacy baggage of having to support AWS customers accrued over the past twenty years. What they do have is a customer-forward philosophy that doesn't require customers to prove themselves worthy of using their product first. Institutional arrogance From where I sit, there's almost been a sense of institutional arrogance in AWS' view of the market, of the form "we're AWS, obviously customers will choose us." A recent testimonial on their site cites a YC founder saying "For startups of a certain scale, all roads lead to a hyperscaler like AWS."

请注意,这里存在某种选择性偏差:这是 AWS 官网上的引言,而该引言的提供者其产品正是专门为了让 AWS 更易于使用而设计的。这显然包含了一种根深蒂固的“我们理应获胜”的观念,这意味着当现实冲击来临时,他们将面临极其糟糕的一天。

Note there's some selection bias at play: this is a quote on the AWS site itself, from a vendor whose product is explicitly aimed at making AWS easier to live with. There's clearly a baked-in sense of "we have a right to win here," which means they're in for one heck of a bad day when reality comes crashing in.

AWS 在发掘处于起步阶段的突破性成功案例方面记录平平。他们喜欢提及 Pinterest,这是一家诞生于 AWS 的上一代明星初创公司。如果 Pinterest 当初选择了其他供应商——虽然在 2010 年并没有太多其他好的选择——那么可以说他们可能永远不会转向亚马逊,因为迁移过程非常困难,且必须具备足够的价值支撑。

AWS has shown a track record of missing breakout success stories when they're small. They like to point at Pinterest, a previous-generation darling startup that was born on AWS. Had Pinterest picked another vendor – not that there were a lot of other great options back in 2010 – an argument could be made that they'd never have found their way to Amazon, because migrations are hard and the value has to be there.

你可以这样推测:在过去十五年里,Pinterest 也曾多次考虑放弃使用 AWS(亚马逊的网络服务平台)——但迁移服务确实非常困难。OpenAI 很早就选择了 Azure 作为自己的技术合作伙伴;为了吸引 Sam Altman(OpenAI 的重要投资人)的支持,AWS 不得不加快自身的技术升级步伐。OpenAI 从 2016 年开始在 Azure 上运行其大型实验项目,而微软则通过一笔价值十亿美元的投资正式确立了与 OpenAI 的合作关系。

You could also theorize that over the past decade-and-a-half there are times Pinterest would have jumped ship away from AWS — but again, migrations are hard. OpenAI went early with Azure, and to get Sam Altman's darling to play ball with them, AWS has had to play a catch-up game. OpenAI started running its big experiments on Azure in 2016, and Microsoft formalized the relationship with a billion dollar investment, although things seem to have gotten rockier since. Amazon, meanwhile, went from an ordinary cloud contract to "up to $50B" in investment, and OpenAI expanded its AWS commitment by $100B earlier this year.

不过,自那以后,AWS 与 AI 行业的发展趋势似乎逐渐脱节了。以 Vercel 为例:这个平台完全建立在 AWS 的基础上,这意味着在当前这个新时代中,AWS 只是一个“批发商”罢了(即只是提供基础技术服务的供应商)。通常情况下,批发商只有在新兴技术的发展势头放缓后才会注意到这些新兴平台的存在。在技术发展初期,试图说服这些新兴平台放弃现有的服务、转而使用 AWS,其实是一个糟糕的销售策略——因为这等于告诉他们:“虽然使用我们的服务会让你的开发体验变得更差(因为你需要重新搭建许多现有的基础设施),但你的成本反而会降低。”

Overall, AWS seems out of the loop with the current AI zeitgeist. Take Vercel as an example. They're a platform built entirely atop AWS itself, which means that, in this new era, AWS is a wholesaler. Wholesalers don't tend to find out about the new upstart that's taking the world by storm until its growth levels off. Until that point, telling a rocket ship "hey, come for a worse experience where you get to build a lot of the things you currently take for granted, but your infrastructure bills will be smaller" is a craptastic sales pitch.

我的《Last Week in AWS》新闻通讯的发布系统主要依赖于 Vercel 而非 AWS;虽然每月的使用成本更高(大约 30 美元,而不是之前的几美分),但用户体验却有着天壤之别,因此我正计划将更多的工作负载迁移到 Vercel 上。用户体验一直都非常重要;如今,用户本身越来越像是一个“AI 代理”(即能够自主完成各种任务的智能工具),而如果在使用某个平台时需要花费大量精力去处理登录认证等基本操作,那无疑会让用户感到非常沮丧。

The publication system for my Last Week in AWS newsletter runs mostly on Vercel rather than AWS. This costs me more per month (roughly $30 instead of "pennies") but the user experience is absolutely night-and-day different, to the point where I'm about to migrate more workloads to Vercel. User experience has always been important; increasingly the user is becoming an AI agent, and having to fight on the agent's behalf just to establish credentials to the platform, let alone do anything complicated with it, distills down to feeling like a platform hates you.

也许这个平台真的“讨厌”用户……或者它只是漠不关心用户的感受罢了。不过,如今有很多平台确实非常重视用户体验,这一点在产品选择上表现得非常明显。

Maybe it does! Maybe it just doesn't care. But there are a lot of platforms out there nowadays that do care, and that manifests in product selection.

AWS在试图提升自身的产品竞争力方面屡次遭遇失败。唯一值得注意的例外是 Amazon Connect——该公司如今将其重新定位为一个涵盖多种功能的品牌,而不仅仅是最初那个成功的“呼叫中心管理”服务。每当 AWS 推出新的 SaaS 类产品,或者进入那些用户体验至关重要的市场领域时,这些产品几乎都注定会失败。上周,AWS 发布了名为 CloudWatch Infinidash 的新工具,旨在提升现有 CloudWatch 产品的用户体验;然而,我和我的团队花了整整三个小时才完成配置工作(尽管我们并非从零开始进行设置)。

Moving up the stack, badly With the notable exception of Amazon Connect – which they are now repurposing as a brand to mean a bunch of things other than the "run your call center" service that actually succeeded – AWS's attempts to move up the stack have ended horribly. Every time they attempt to bring something to market that's a SaaS-shaped product, or is competing in a place where good user experience is going to dominate, it's just a matter of time before it ends up in the AWS graveyard. Last week, they launched what I insist on calling CloudWatch Infinidash, a new agentic experience layer for existing CloudWatch offerings.

同样,Amazon Quick 也面临着类似的困境:虽然该产品在刚推出时让我印象深刻,但自那以后几乎没有任何改进(而在这个领域,产品更新几乎是常态)。总体而言,AWS 似乎天生就不适合成为一家提供综合性服务的公司(尽管它在基础设施和物流服务方面确实表现出色)。他们不断尝试突破自身局限,却屡次以惨败告终,这反映出该公司高层存在严重的自我认知问题。

Sure enough, my agent and I took over three hours just to get the thing configured, and I wasn't exactly starting from zero. Amazon Quick (whatever that's supposed to mean, given it changes from week to week) is in much the same boat. I liked it very much at launch, but it doesn't appear to have materially changed since then, in a space where weekly change is a given. Amazon as a whole feels constitutionally incapable of being more than an (admittedly impressive) infrastructure and logistics company.

对 AWS 来说,正确的策略应该是停止试图成为一家 SaaS 公司,而是专注于提升自身作为服务提供商的能力。他们应该为那些小型企业(尤其是像 Vercel 这样的初创公司)提供优质的服务,让使用 AWS 的体验变得愉快(而不仅仅是依靠补贴来维持客户关系)。任何想要在竞争激烈的市场中取得成功的机遇,都必须在对客户而言还处于起步阶段、尚未脱颖而出的时候去争取。

The fact that they keep trying to be otherwise, yet keep failing abysmally, says that there's a self-awareness issue going on in their executive suites. Be the best wholesaler you can be The right move for AWS would be to stop trying to be a SaaS company, and emphasize being excellent as a wholesaler. Make life great for the Vercels of the world, and focus on making the experience of being a three-person company on AWS actually pleasant, not just subsidized with credits.

只有这样,才能建立起持久的客户忠诚度。否则,AWS 只会在重复那些早已被市场淘汰的错误(比如像 Home Depot 这样在组织结构上做出无意义的调整罢了)。

Any "right to win" has to be earned while the customer is small, and in no way a standout. That's what builds loyalty that lasts into the hypergrowth era. Otherwise, you're just reorganizing where Home Depot put the hinges this week. ®