普里扬卡·基肖尔是新加坡研究公司“亚洲解码”（Asia Decoded）的创始人兼首席经济学家。
Priyanka Kishore is the founder and principal economist at research company Asia Decoded in Singapore.
签证并非首次成为经济外交的工具。2026年7月，日本将签证费用提高了五倍，表面上针对所有外国公民。但2025年签发的签证中，中国公民占比达73%，而一个脚注显示，印度公民——仅占签发签证的3%——的费用保持不变。中国并未忽视这一象征意义，并于9月将日本公民的签证费用提高了近七倍，明确援引对等原则。
Not for the first time, visas have become tools of economic statecraft. In July 2026, Japan raised its visa fees fivefold, ostensibly for all foreign nationals. But Chinese citizens accounted for 73% of the visas issued in 2025, and a footnote left fees for Indian nationals -- 3% of the visas issued -- unchanged. The symbolism was not lost on China, which increased the fee for Japanese citizens nearly sevenfold in September, explicitly invoking reciprocity.
这种针锋相对发生在更广泛的外交争端背景下。去年，日本首相高市早苗警告称，中国针对台湾的军事行动可能威胁到日本的生存。北京随即通过限制对日贸易作出回应，并试图将东京描绘成地区的不稳定因素。
The tit-for-tat comes amid a broader diplomatic row triggered by Prime Minister Takaichi's warning last year that Chinese military operations against Taiwan could threaten Japan's survival. Beijing immediately responded by restricting trade with Japan and has sought to portray Tokyo as a destabilizing force in the region. Tokyo has pushed back against the Chinese narrative.
东京反驳了中国的叙事。但与此同时，它也表现出恢复关系的意愿，派遣贸易代表团和议员代表团访问北京。这种双重方法凸显了日本及该地区其他国家在面对中国时所面临的困境。它们在贸易、旅游和投资方面对大陆的高度依赖，使中国成为其增长的重要驱动力。但北京日益倾向于利用这种依赖作为杠杆，使得局势更加复杂。
But at the same time, it has shown willingness to restore ties by sending trade and lawmaker delegations to Beijing. The dual approach underlines the dilemma Japan and the rest of the region face when it comes to China. Their significant dependence on the mainland for trade, tourists and investment makes China an important driver of their growth. But Beijing's increasing inclination to use this dependence as leverage complicates the calculus. For Japan, the situation is not new.
对日本而言，这种情况并不新鲜。2010年，由于东海安全争端，北京对日本企业实施了事实上的稀土出口限制，日本当时就面临过度依赖中国的风险。这标志着日本开始进行长达十余年的努力，以分散其贸易和供应链，减少对中国的依赖。
It confronted the risks of overdependence on China in 2010, when Beijing imposed de facto restrictions on rare-earth exports to Japanese businesses following a security dispute in the East China Sea. That marked the start of more than a decade of Japanese efforts to diversify trade and supply chains away from China. How that has evolved offers useful insights for Southeast Asia as it assesses its own growing economic dependence on the mainland, not only in raw materials and intermediate goods but also in finished products.
这一演变过程为东南亚提供了有益的见解，因为该地区正在评估自身对大陆日益增长的经济依赖，不仅体现在原材料和中间产品上，还体现在成品上。
Japan's overall policy goal has been strategic autonomy rather than a narrowly focused China policy.
日本的总体政策目标一直是追求战略自主，而非实施狭隘的对华政策。除了偶尔采取反倾销措施外，日本并未对中国商品加征关税，也没有专门针对来自中国大陆的进口或投资实施广泛限制。在其《经济安全保障推进法》（ESPA）确定的16类关键产品中，对中国进口依赖度显著的仅有5类。
Barring the occasional antidumping measure, Japan hasn't raised tariffs on Chinese goods or imposed wide-ranging restrictions on imports or investments from the mainland specifically. Only five of the sixteen critical products identified under its Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) showed significant import reliance on China. More recently, the line between the two approaches has blurred.
最近一段时间以来，这两种方法之间的界限变得有些模糊。日本在2023年与美国和荷兰协调实施的先进半导体制造设备管制措施，其隐含的目标就是中国。尽管如此，东京远未采取华盛顿所奉行、且在欧洲日益引发讨论的全面遏制中国的政策。
Japan's 2023 controls on advanced semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, implemented in coordination with the U.S. and the Netherlands, implicitly focused on China. Still, Tokyo has stopped well short of the broad-based China containment policy pursued by Washington and increasingly debated in Europe. Japan's reliance on China's storage batteries has grown: An employee works on a battery assembly line at a Leapenergy plant in Huzhou, China, on April 26.
日本对中国蓄电池的依赖有所加深：4月26日，一名员工在中国湖州的一家立中能源工厂的电池组装线上工作。
Its primary objective remains to minimize the risk of disruption to the domestic economy from external sources, using trade, investment and industrial policies to diversify Japan's economic partners and encourage onshoring and "friendshoring," or relocating supply chains to friendly countries.
其主要目标仍然是最大限度地降低外部因素对国内经济造成中断的风险，通过贸易、投资和产业政策来使日本的经济合作伙伴多元化，并鼓励回流以及“友岸外包”（即把供应链转移到友好国家）。
Results have been mixed.
成效喜忧参半。自2010年以来，中国占日本稀土进口的份额已下降了30%以上，但仍约占所有出货量的一半。根据“解密亚洲”（Asia Decoded）的数据，在《经济安全保障推进法》确定的关键产品组合中，2022年至2025年间，日本对中国在化肥和蓄电池方面的进口依赖度有所上升，而对永磁体以及稀土以外的关键矿产的依赖度则基本保持不变。
China's share of Japan's rare-earth imports has declined by more than 30% since 2010, but it still accounts for about half of all shipments. According to Asia Decoded, across the basket of critical products identified by the ESPA, Japan's import dependency on China rose for fertilizers and storage batteries between 2022 and 2025, and it is broadly unchanged for permanent magnets and critical minerals other than rare earths. The evidence for restructuring of supply chains by Japanese companies is also limited.
日本企业重组供应链的证据也十分有限。尽管中国占日本对外直接投资（FDI）的份额在2012年达到顶峰，但日本对华直接投资的总体存量直到2021年仍在继续增长。这里有一则教训、一个警告以及一些针对东南亚地区的建议。
While China's share of Japan's outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) peaked in 2012, Japan's overall FDI stock in China continued to rise until 2021. There's a lesson, a warning and some guidance for Southeast Asia here. The lesson is not to confuse economic resilience with disengagement from China.
教训是：不要将经济韧性（即经济系统的恢复能力）与与中国脱钩混为一谈。虽然东南亚国家应该重新审视并调整自己与中国之间日益不平衡的关系，但重点应放在减少关键行业的脆弱性上，而不是设置广泛的贸易和投资壁垒。需要记住的是，中国仍占东南亚出口总额的约15%；同时，中国也是该地区外国直接投资（FDI）的主要来源，为经济发展提供了技术转让、知识传播、技能提升以及国内能力建设等方面的支持。这些积极因素不应因防范风险而被忽视或受到损害。
While Southeast Asian countries should review and recalibrate their increasingly asymmetric relationship with China, the focus should be on reducing vulnerabilities in priority sectors rather than erecting broad trade and investment barriers. It's important to remember that China still accounts for around 15% of Southeast Asia's exports. Moreover, China is the fastest growing source of FDI for the region, providing avenues for economic development through technology and knowledge transfer, skills development and domestic capacity-building. These opportunities should not become collateral damage to derisking.
警告是：不要过度依赖产业政策。日本通过对稀土供应链的扶持，降低了自身对中国的依赖。2010年稀土争端发生后，日本政府投入了11亿美元用于开发替代技术、支持稀土回收，并在海外开发稀土矿场。此后，日本还积极推动国内关键矿产的储备工作。然而，这种策略存在局限性——尤其是考虑到日本财政预算紧张的实际情况；日本在其他关键领域复制稀土产业成功的努力也遭遇了困难。
The warning is not to lean excessively on industrial policy. Japan's targeted support for rare-earth supply chains lowered its reliance on China. After the 2010 dispute, the government introduced a $1.1 billion package to develop alternative technologies, support rare-earth recycling and develop overseas mines. It later complemented this with a push to create domestic stockpiles of critical minerals. However, there are limits to this strategy, given stretched fiscal budgets, as Japan's own struggle to replicate its rare-earth success in other critical categories shows.
因此，贸易和产业政策应辅以结构性改革（如简化商业监管、提升基础设施质量以及改善劳动力素质），以增强国内产业竞争力，并逐步引导供应链向本地转移。
Hence, trade and industrial policy should be complemented by structural reforms, such as easing business regulations and upgrading infrastructure and workforce quality, to strengthen domestic capabilities and organically encourage the relocation of supply chains.
指导原则是将去风险视为一场长期博弈。首次稀土冲击发生十多年后，东京已减少了对中国的一些关键依赖。但在多个领域，它仍与大陆保持深度融合，这凸显了建立可行替代方案的艰巨过程。因此，东京试图保持贸易和投资渠道畅通，即使在外交紧张时期也是如此。东南亚应制定自己的去风险路线图。各国应根据自身资源和发展雄心确定优先领域，在限制现有合作之前建立替代伙伴关系和供应商网络，并避免造成得不偿失的突然政策转向。
The guidance is to treat derisking as a long game. More than a decade after the first rare-earth shock, Tokyo has reduced some critical dependencies on China. But it remains deeply integrated with the mainland in several areas, underlining the arduous process of building viable alternatives. Tokyo has therefore tried to keep trade and investment channels open, even amid diplomatic tensions. Southeast Asia should chart its own derisking road map. Each country should identify priority sectors based on its resources and development ambitions, build alternative partnerships and supplier networks before restricting existing ones and avoid abrupt policy shifts that would cost more than they protect.