“就中国而言，我们在伊朗问题上与中国的共同点多于分歧，”美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特本月早些时候在Newsmax的《罗布·施密特今夜秀》节目中表示。“我们都同意伊朗不能拥有核武器。”特朗普政府需要补一堂历史课：伊朗之所以有核武器项目，完全是因为中国直接和间接地向其提供了制造核弹所需的东西。
“In terms of China, we have more in common with China on Iran than we disagree on,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said earlier this month on Newsmax’s “Rob Schmitt Tonight”. “We both agree that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.”The Trump administration needs a history lesson: Iran has a nuclear weapons program only because China, both directly and indirectly, supplied it with what it needed to build nukes.
中国首先向巴基斯坦输送了核武器技术，巴基斯坦随后充当了中国的代理人，在亚洲大陆扩散核技术，包括中东和朝鲜。“巴基斯坦核弹之父”阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗承认向伊朗等国出售了核技术。伊朗从汗那里获得了第一批离心机——这种超音速运转的机器能将铀气体分离成不同同位素，并将有效材料提纯至武器级纯度。
China first sent nuclear weapons tech to Pakistan, which then took on the role of China’s surrogate by distributing nuclear technology across the Asian landmass, including the Middle East and North Korea. The “father of Pakistan’s bomb,” Abdul Qadeer Khan, confessed to nuclear sales to Iran, among others. Iran got its first centrifuges — supersonic-speed machines that separate uranium gas into different isotopes and upgrade the potent material to weapons-grade purity — from Khan.
本世纪头十年，汗网络的瓦解是中国野心的一次挫折。中国随后采取了两项备用策略。首先，北京允许朝鲜人前往伊朗，数百名朝鲜人在约10个核武器和导弹设施中工作。据防扩散政策教育中心的亨利·索科尔斯基称，科学家、专家和技术人员数量之多，以至于他们接管了伊朗的一个海滨度假胜地。
The breakup of Khan’s network in the first decade of this century was a setback for Chinese ambitions. China then employed two backup stratagems. First, Beijing permitted North Koreans to go to Iran, where hundreds of them worked in about 10 nuclear weapons and missile facilities. There were so many scientists, specialists and technicians that they took over an Iranian coastal resort, according to Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
朝鲜还向伊朗出售了用于制造核弹芯的材料，甚至可能是武器级铀。《每日电讯报》报道称，2002年，一桶朝鲜铀破裂，污染了新德黑兰机场的停机坪。
The North Koreans also sold Iran material for bomb cores, perhaps even weapons-grade uranium. The Telegraph reported that in 2002, a barrel of North Korean uranium cracked open and contaminated the tarmac of the new Tehran airport.
2012年10月，伊朗开始向朝鲜靠近中国边境的一个山区军事基地派驻人员。据报道，来自伊朗国防部及相关企业的伊朗人正在同时从事导弹和核武器项目。
In October 2012, Iran began stationing personnel at a military base in North Korea, in a mountainous area close to the Chinese border. The Iranians, from the Ministry of Defense and associated firms, were reportedly working on both missile and nuclear weapons programs.
平壤的武器销售额十分可观。2011年，战略与国际研究中心 Larry Niksch 估计，朝鲜通过这项贸易获得的收益“每年在15亿至20亿美元之间”。其中一部分与德黑兰的核武器计划有关。
Pyongyang’s weapons sales were substantial. In 2011, Larry Niksch of the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that North Korea’s proceeds from this trade were “between $1.5 billion and $2.0 billion annually.”A portion of this amount was related to Tehran’s nuclear weapons effort.
伊朗用这笔钱购买了大量设备。被认为是德黑兰首席核科学家的 Mohsen Fakhrizadeh，几乎可以肯定于2011年2月在朝鲜丰溪里观摩了平壤的第三次核试验。报道称，伊朗技术人员也曾在现场参与前两次核爆。
Iran bought a lot with its money. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2011 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.
中国与朝鲜和伊朗之间的贸易有何联系？中国帮助平壤制造核武器，并严密控制金氏政权，尤其是在苏联解体后莫斯科再也无力资助朝鲜的情况下。因此，神秘人物 Fakhrizadeh 据报道在前往朝鲜观摩该国第三次核试验途中途经中国，并不令人意外；而中国几乎肯定被用作前往朝鲜观摩前两次核爆的中转地。
What were China’s ties to the North Korea-Iran trade? China helped Pyongyang build its bomb and tightly controlled the Kim regime, especially after Moscow could no longer fund North Korea after the Soviet collapse. No surprise then that the shadowy Fakhrizadeh was reported to have traveled through China on his way to North Korea to observe the nation’s third test, and China was almost certainly used as a transit point for travel to the other two North Korean detonations.
中国在汗之后采取的第二项策略，是直接取代巴基斯坦的角色。随着汗的网络被瓦解，北京在利用巴基斯坦和朝鲜等间接渠道的同时，加大了向德黑兰直接转移材料和设备的力度。中国似乎至少从20世纪90年代末起就在向伊朗走私零部件。
China’s second post-Khan stratagem was to take over Pakistan’s role directly. As the Khan network was being dismantled, Beijing supplemented the indirect routes through Pakistan and North Korea by stepping up direct transfers of materials and equipment to Tehran. It appears that China was smuggling parts to Iran since at least the late 1990s.
例如，2003年11月，国际原子能机构工作人员认定，中国是伊朗核武器计划所用设备的来源之一。伊朗问题分析师 Michael Ledeen 表示，2003年秋，中国核专家正在伊朗辛勤工作。
In November 2003, for instance, the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency had fingered China as one of the sources of equipment used in Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Chinese nuclear specialists were toiling away in Iran in the fall of 2003, according to Iran analyst Michael Ledeen.
2002年，异见组织伊朗全国抵抗委员会披露了阿拉克的重水生产设施和纳坦兹的地下铀浓缩厂。该组织在2005年9月指控中国自2003年以来一直秘密向伊朗出售离心机。
The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the dissident group that in 2002 disclosed the heavy-water production facility at Arak and the underground uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz, charged in September 2005 that China had been secretly selling centrifuges to Iran since 2003.
该组织还称，中国在2004年暗中向伊朗运送了铍——一种用于中子引发器以触发核武器的金属。由于这些转移的隐蔽性质，伊朗购买该材料用于和平目的的可能性极低。这一指控与当时关于伊朗秘密试图获取铍的其他报道相一致。
The group also said that the Chinese in 2004 had surreptitiously sent Iran beryllium, a metal used in neutron initiators to trigger nuclear weapons. Due to the covert nature of the transfers, it is highly unlikely that Iran bought the material for peaceful purposes. The allegation is consistent with other reports about Iran’s covert attempts to source beryllium at that time.
2007年7月，《华尔街日报》报道称，国务院已就中国公司违反联合国安理会关于伊朗的前两项决议、出口可能帮助德黑兰制造核武器的物项向北京提出了正式抗议。
In July 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that the State Department had lodged formal protests with Beijing about Chinese companies, in violation of the first two Security Council resolutions on Iran, exporting items that could help Tehran build nukes.
2011年3月，马来西亚警方在巴生港从一艘由中国驶往伊朗的船只上查获了两个集装箱。当局怀疑，标注为“用于制药、化工或食品工业的液体混合或储存货物”的物品实际上是核弹头部件。
In March 2011, Malaysian police in Port Klang seized two containers from a ship en route to Iran from China. Authorities suspected that items labeled “goods used for liquid mixing or storage for pharmaceutical or chemical or food industry” were actually parts for nuclear warheads.
亚洲官员经常查获中国国有企业向伊朗公司出售的设备和技术材料。中国实体已被牵涉到马氏体时效钢、环形磁铁、阀门和真空计的转让中，所有这些显然都用于伊朗的原子弹研制工作。贝森特部长，是中国让伊朗变得危险。
Officials in Asia confiscated shipments of equipment and materials sold by Chinese state enterprises to Iranian companies regularly. Chinese entities have been implicated in transfers of maraging steel, ring-shaped magnets and valves and vacuum gauges, all apparently for use in Iran’s atom bomb effort. Secretary Bessent, it is China that has made Iran dangerous.
戈登·G·张是《红色计划：中国摧毁美国的工程》和《中国的即将崩溃》的作者。
Gordon G. Chang is the author of “Plan Red: China’s Project to Destroy America” and “The Coming Collapse of China.”