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新右翼正在失去其宗教The New Right Is Losing Its Religion

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作者:阿德里安·伍尔德里奇(Adrian Wooldridge)德国另类选择党在最近两次德国州选举中取得惊人成功,其最令人惊讶的后果之一是极右翼政党和基督教建制派之间的战争。德国选择党希望结束长期以来对主要教会的国家财政支持制度。这些教堂在全国范围内每年面临价值6亿欧元(6.75亿美元)的补贴损失,仅萨克森-安哈尔特每年就损失4000万欧元的补贴,不出所料,他们愤怒不已,警告说这一变化将造成混乱并威胁宗教自由。

By Adrian Wooldridge One of the most surprising consequences of the Alternative for Germany’s spectacular success in two recent German state elections is a war between the radical-right party and the Christian establishment. The AfD wants to end the long-established system of state financial support for the major churches. The churches, which face a loss of subsidies worth €600 million ($675 million) a year nationwide and €40 million a year in Saxony-Anhalt alone, are predictably livid, warning that the change would create chaos and threaten religious freedom.

这里有一种针锋相对的元素:教会领导人一致谴责该党兜售仇恨言论和践踏基督教原则。德国天主教主教会议甚至禁止德国选择党成员从事教堂工作。但还有一个因素:德国选择党是德国所有政党中最世俗的政党,只有约22%的全国议员认为是基督徒,而联邦议院议员的这一比例超过48%,而且其世俗主义可能会演变成反基督教。该党在萨克森-安哈尔特的主要候选人乌尔里希·齐格蒙德经常骑着苏联时代的西姆森轻便摩托车,他利用了对东德旧政权的怀旧之情,制造业就业稳定和官方无神论。

There is an element of tit-for-tat here: Church leaders uniformly denounced the party for peddling hate speech and trampling Christian principles. The German Catholic bishops’ conference even banned AfD members from church jobs. But there is also an element of : The AfD is the most secular of all Germany’s parties, with only about 22% of its national MPs identifying as Christian, compared with more than 48% of all Bundestag MPs, and its secularism can shade into anti-Christianism. The party’s leading candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, Ulrich Siegmund, who often rides a Soviet-era Simson moped, played on nostalgia for the old East German regime of stable manufacturing jobs and official atheism.

这场争吵可能会让人觉得是德国特有的。该国政府对教会发动战争的历史由来已久,从统一德国的第一任总理奥托·冯·俾斯麦开始,到阿道夫·希特勒时期达到顶峰。德国战后的领导人将国家对宗教的支持视为政治正常化的一种方式。

The row might strike one as peculiarly German. The country’s government has a long history of waging war on churches, starting with Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of unified Germany, and reaching its height under Adolf Hitler. Germany’s postwar leaders regarded state support for religion as a way of normalizing politics.

但这场冲突也有一个更普遍的教训。自由派评论员对宗教和政治的融合感到非常害怕(参见:任何有关基督教民族主义的文章),并且对美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯等一些著名保守派人士将信仰披在袖子上的事实感到非常愤怒,以至于他们失去了任何平衡感。现实更加微妙:随着活动人士转向民族主义和移民等世俗问题,宗教右翼是保守派政治中一支正在减弱的力量。

But the conflict also has a more general lesson. Liberal commentators are so terrified of the fusion of religion and politics (see: anything written about Christian nationalism) and so maddened by the fact that a few prominent conservatives, such as US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, wear their faith on their sleeves, that they have lost any sense of balance. The reality is more nuanced: The religious right is a waning force in conservative politics as activists turn to earthier concerns such as nationalism and immigration.

美国另类右翼比基督教更反基督教。众所周知,它很难确定--它没有正式的结构,更不用说政治代表了,并且作为一个由古怪的键盘战士领导的基于互联网的网络而存在。尽管如此,它在年轻的保守派和唐纳德·特朗普总统的支持者中享有巨大的文化影响力。

The US alt-right is much more anti-Christian than Christian. It’s also notoriously difficult to pin down — it has no formal structure, let alone political representation, and exists as an internet-based network led by eccentric keyboard warriors. Nevertheless, it enjoys substantial cultural clout with young conservatives and supporters of President Donald Trump.

在这个阴暗的世界中,许多最响亮的声音都对基督教的基本原理充满了强烈的敌意,而不仅仅是信仰的偶然表达。基督教基于普遍主义和平等的原则,而另类右翼则相信民族主义和等级制度。这些理想的冲突无情地导致了另类右翼所谓的“病态利他主义”,欢迎破坏你文化的陌生人。

Many of the loudest voices in this shadowy world are violently hostile to the fundamentals of Christianity, not just incidental expression of the faith. Christianity is based on the principles of universalism and equality, whereas the alt-right believes in nationalism and hierarchy. The clash of these ideals inexorably leads to what the alt-right calls “pathological altruism,” welcoming strangers who undermine your culture.

以下是白人民族主义者/非主流势力对此事的看法:格雷格·约翰逊认为“基督教是白人衰落的主要原因之一”,也是“白人种族自杀的必要条件”。“格雷戈里·胡德”(化名)认为,基督教是“为颓废的现代性及其有毒信条铺平道路的重要宗教步骤”。这位自称青铜时代变态(媒体上称他为科斯汀·阿拉马柳)的博主将白人至上与对异教和古典英雄(以及健康的肌肉男)的热情融为一体。

Here’s what the White nationalist/manosphere set has to say on the matter: Greg Johnson argues that “Christianity is one of the main causes of White decline” and a “necessary condition of White racial suicide.”“Gregory Hood” (a pseudonym) argues that Christianity is “the essential religious step in paving the way for decadent modernity and its toxic creeds.”The blogger who goes by Bronze Age Pervert (and has been identified in the press as Costin Alamariu) mixes White supremacy with enthusiasm for paganism and classical heroes (and well-oiled musclemen).

这些人物中有令人惊讶的高比例受过高等教育(约翰逊和阿拉马里乌均拥有名校博士学位)。他们在著作中引用宗教领域的重量级批评家(弗里德里希·尼采和奥斯瓦尔德·施彭格勒)以及古怪的右翼英雄来强化论点。法国种族民族主义哲学家阿兰·德·贝诺伊斯特,曾是《……》的作者,他写道:“基督教的传入必须算作有史以来袭击欧洲的最大意识形态灾难。”

A surprising number of these figures are highly educated (both Johnson and Alamariu have PhDs from elite universities). They reinforce their writings with references to heavyweight critics of religion (Friedrich Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler) as well as eccentric right-wing heroes. Alain de Benoist, a French ethno-nationalist philosopher and author of wrote that “the introduction of Christianity has to count as the single greatest ideological catastrophe to ever strike Europe.”

萨姆·弗朗西斯曾担任前白宫通讯主任帕特·布坎南的顾问,是特朗普主义的思想先驱,他在2001年写道:“当今基督教是西方及创造西方的种族的敌人。”特朗普高级顾问斯蒂芬·米勒和法国的玛丽娜·勒庞都曾赞扬让·拉斯皮耶1973年的反乌托邦小说《……》,该书设想基督教活动家欢迎大量暴力且无法同化的非白人进入西方国家,随后这些人屠杀白人人口并夺取政权。

Sam Francis, once an adviser to former White House Communications Director Pat Buchanan and an intellectual forebear of Trumpism, wrote in 2001 that “Christianity today is the enemy of the West and the race that created it.”Both Stephen Miller, a senior Trump adviser, and France’s Marine Le Pen have praised Jean Raspail’s 1973 dystopian novel, , which envisions Christian activists welcoming into Western countries masses of violent and unassimilable non-White people who then slaughter the White population and seize power.

至少像“青铜时代变态者”这样的人,还算是把基督教当回事,给了它起码的尊重。右翼阵营中越来越多的人,与其说是反基督教,不如说是“后基督教”时代的产物——他们把宗教视为无关紧要、过时陈规或单纯的烦扰。特朗普可以说是美国首位“异教徒”总统——一位两度离婚的花花公子,对基督教倡导的宽恕敌人、怜悯弱者等美德毫无兴趣。

The likes of Bronze Age Pervert at least pay Christianity the compliment of taking it seriously. A growing number on the right are not so much anti-Christian as post-Christian, treating religion as either an irrelevance, anachronism or annoyance. Trump is arguably America’s first pagan president — a twice-divorced playboy who has no interest in the Christian virtues of forgiveness for his enemies or compassion for the weak.

2016年共和党初选期间,宗教右翼最初支持“任何人,只要不是特朗普”;那年4月,当时候选人最坚实的支持基础来自无宗教归属的共和党选民(50%),而经常去教堂的共和党选民中仅有34%支持他。勒庞同样两度离婚,已放弃其政党长期以来对堕胎权和同性恋权利的反对立场。英国改革党领袖法拉奇(仅离婚一次!)对酒吧凳子的兴趣远胜讲坛。

During the 2016 primary, the religious right initially supported anyone but Trump; in April of that year, the then-candidate’s most robust support came from religiously unaffiliated Republicans (50%), while only 34% of frequent GOP churchgoers supported him. Le Pen, also twice divorced, has abandoned her party’s opposition to abortion and gay rights. Reform UK’s Nigel Farage (divorced just once!) is more interested in the bar stool than the pulpit.

荷兰自由党领袖维尔德斯自视为欧洲世俗主义的捍卫者,对抗激进宗教性;尽管他担心的宗教是伊斯兰教,但他呼应了启蒙运动对基督教、特别是天主教的许多批判。

Geert Wilders, leader of the Netherlands’ far-right Party for Freedom, sees himself as a defender of European secularism against aggressive religiosity and, although the religion he’s concerned about is Islam, he echoes many Enlightenment critiques of Christianity, particularly Catholicism.

在美国,“后宗教右翼”的崛起反映了社会结构的变迁。保守派基督徒在欧洲以世俗政治为主导的环境中,向来是边缘群体。如今,他们在美国也正变得更加边缘化。自称“无宗教信仰”的美国人比例,已从1972年的5%上升至如今的约30%。诚然,最高法院为宗教右翼赢得了实质性胜利,最著名的是推翻“罗诉韦德案”。但这可以说是该运动在小布什政府时期达到顶峰后的“绝唱”,而非当今右翼的“主打曲”。

In the US, the rise of the post-religious right reflects a structural change to society. Conservative Christians have always been a marginal group in Europe’s overwhelmingly secular politics. Today, they are becoming more marginal in the US as well. The number of Americans who say that they have “no religion” has risen from 5% in 1972 to about 30% today. It is certainly true that the Supreme Court has scored substantial victories for the religious right, notably overturning Roe v. Wade. But this is arguably the swan song of a movement that reached its height during the George W. Bush administration, not the signature tune of today’s right.

当下的保守派活动家如克里斯托弗·鲁福和塔克·卡尔森,聚焦于移民与身份认同议题,而非校园祈祷和避孕等传统议题。

Current conservative activists such as Christopher Rufo and Tucker Carlson are focused on immigration and identity rather than, say, school prayer and contraception.

其结果是20世纪80年代文化战争的角色逆转。美德政治的最响亮的鼓吹者现在来自进步派。Wokery深深植根于基督教传统:它希望将人类从罪恶中拯救出来,使不公正的受害者成圣,并享受高道德标准。自由意志主义最坚定的支持者是红州的保守派,他们一提到沃克主义就发疯,花几个小时听乔·罗根的演讲。

The result is a reversal of roles from the culture wars of the 1980s. The loudest preachers of the politics of virtue now come from the progressive side. Wokery is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition: It wants to save humanity from sin, sanctifies the victims of injustice and relishes imposing high moral standards. The most determined supporters of do-your-own-thing libertarianism are red-state conservatives who go carpet-chewing mad at the mention of wokeism and devote hours to listening to Joe Rogan.

这并不是说旧联盟已经完全消亡。后宗教民粹主义者当然会利用宗教:出卖了自己的宗教的特朗普,在适合他的时候会高举文本。美国和欧洲的极右翼游行者经常携带十字架或打扮成十字军。但这些符号更多的是作为文化标记,就像旗帜一样,而不是作为对宗教教条的承诺声明。它们是旧右翼的最后一次抽搐,而不是下一步的表现。新右翼是一个与以前截然不同的生物--植根于血与土的政治,而不是十字架和祭坛的政治。

This is not to say that the old alliance is completely dead. Post-religious populists certainly make use of religion: Trump, who sold his own , holds the text aloft when it suits him. Far-right marchers in the US and Europe frequently carry crosses or dress as crusaders. But these symbols function more as cultural markers, like flags, than as statements of commitment to religious dogma. They are the last twitch of the old right rather than a manifestation of what’s next. The new right is a very different creature from what came before — rooted in the politics of blood and soil rather than cross and altar.

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To contact the author of this story: at awooldridge5@bloomberg.net