经过近两周的激烈战斗，埃塞俄比亚联邦军队进入了提格雷首府梅克莱，包括提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）在内的反政府武装联盟部队已从该市撤出。
After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle as forces from an alliance of rebel groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), withdrew from the city.
上月底爆发的战斗实际上终结了2022年《比勒陀利亚停火协议》以及毁灭性的提格雷战争后脆弱的和平局面。
The fighting that erupted late last month has effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed the devastating Tigray war.
但攻占梅克莱可能标志着常规战争的结束，而非冲突的终结。战斗在提格雷其他地区仍在继续，而有关厄立特里亚军队进入提格雷北部城镇的报道，则为局势增添了一个可能更具危险性的地区维度。
But Mekelle’s capture may mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting has continued elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering northern Tigrayan towns have added a potentially more dangerous regional dimension.
埃塞俄比亚联邦军队利用空中力量和地面部队在提格雷推进。在阿拉马塔和科博等城镇周边遭受连续失利后，反政府武装撤退至周边农村地区。他们誓言将继续战斗。
Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground forces to advance across Tigray. After suffering successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside. They have pledged to continue fighting.
“我们将按我们的条件、在我们选择的地点与敌人对抗，”提格雷人民解放阵线领导人德布雷西翁·格布雷迈克尔表示。一场可能尚未结束的战争这与2020年爆发的战争有着相似之处，当时阿比·艾哈迈德总理政府在联邦军队攻占梅克莱后宣布胜利。随后提格雷武装在山区重整旗鼓，收复了该地区大部分领土并重夺首都，将战争拖延了近年半。
“We will confront the enemy on our terms and where we choose,” TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said. A war that may not be over There are echoes of the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces subsequently regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and recaptured the capital, prolonging the war for nearly a year and a half.
如果提格雷人民解放阵线和其他武装团体成功利用多山地形将冲突转化为长期武装叛乱，新一轮冲突可能遵循类似轨迹。埃塞俄比亚已在阿姆哈拉和奥罗米亚地区应对叛乱，这引发了联邦军队可能陷入多线作战的前景。
The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, particularly if the TPLF and other armed groups succeed in turning the mountainous terrain into a prolonged armed rebellion. Ethiopia is already fighting insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising the prospect of its federal forces being stretched across multiple fronts.
但反政府武装遭遇的战场挫折可能产生远超提格雷的影响。据布鲁姆斯伯里情报与安全研究所非洲分析师霍萨姆丁·易卜拉欣称，这已引起埃及及其他埃塞俄比亚对手的担忧。
But the battlefield reversals suffered by the rebels could have implications well beyond Tigray. They have raised concern in Egypt and among other Ethiopian rivals, according to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an African analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute.
“埃及将复兴大坝以及埃塞俄比亚军队向红海方向的任何军事动向视为战略威胁，因此与厄立特里亚、苏丹和索马里结成同盟，以共同应对埃塞俄比亚的单边行动，”易卜拉欣对半岛电视台说道。
“Egypt views the Renaissance Dam, and any Ethiopian [army] move towards the Red Sea, as a strategic threat, so it has allied with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against any Ethiopian unilateralism,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.
“埃塞俄比亚试图获得出海口；而厄立特里亚则将此视为关乎国家存亡的威胁。”自1991年厄立特里亚赢得独立战争以来，埃塞俄比亚便成为内陆国家，这使得亚的斯亚贝巴在开展国际贸易时严重依赖周边国家。
“Ethiopia is seeking a sea outlet; Eritrea sees this as an existential threat.”Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea won its war of independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on neighbouring countries for access to international trade.
自2023年起，阿比便将获取红海出海口视为战略重点，这一举措引发了厄立特里亚的担忧，尤其是针对埃塞俄比亚对阿萨布港的觊觎。
Abiy has increasingly made access to the Red Sea a strategic priority since 2023, raising concerns in Eritrea over Ethiopia’s ambitions, particularly over the port of Assab.
目前，埃塞俄比亚的海上贸易高度依赖吉布提，同时也在寻求其他替代方案，包括通过肯尼亚和索马里兰开展贸易。
Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade, while also pursuing alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland.
在6月1日的选举中获胜后，阿比于周一宣誓连任，开启新的五年任期。他在议会演讲中再次将这一问题置于核心位置。
After being sworn in on Monday for another five-year term following his party’s victory in the June 1 election, Abiy again put the issue at the centre of his parliamentary address.
“基于互惠互利的原则，我们将竭尽全力确保埃塞俄比亚拥有通往大海的通道，”他在议会上说道。如今，这一问题已逐渐成为更大范围地区博弈的一部分。
“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” he told parliament. The issue has increasingly become part of a wider regional contest.
近期，埃及、厄立特里亚、苏丹和索马里因对埃塞俄比亚的地区野心存在共同顾虑而走到了一起。10月4日，四国领导人齐聚埃及新阿拉曼，举行了四方磋商峰会。会上，各方就地区事务展开讨论，并承诺加强政治、经济与贸易合作，增进沟通与协调。
A loose regional alignment In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves sharing concerns over Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. On October 4, the leaders of the four countries met for a quadrilateral consultative summit in New Alamein, Egypt, where they discussed regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.
此次会晤并不构成正式的军事同盟，四国在与埃塞俄比亚的交往中也各自有着不同的利益诉求。峰会发表的联合声明还呼吁尊重各国主权与领土完整、互不干涉内政并以和平方式解决争端。
The meeting does not amount to a formal military alliance, and the four countries have different interests in their dealings with Addis Ababa. The summit’s joint declaration also called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
不过，对于埃塞俄比亚在红海、尼罗河以及整个非洲之角地区的野心，各方的担忧正日益趋同。
But their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.
自比勒陀利亚停火协议达成后，埃塞俄比亚与厄立特里亚的关系也急剧恶化。10月1日，埃塞俄比亚关闭了驻厄立特里亚大使馆并驱逐厄立特里亚外交官，指责阿斯马拉实施敌对行为且参与了新一轮冲突。厄立特里亚则回应称将断绝外交关系，同时否认自己支持反对派联盟。埃及和苏丹也均否认了埃塞俄比亚关于两国暗中支持该联盟的指控。
Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in the renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying that it supported the opposition alliance. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they are backing the alliance.
埃塞俄比亚军队向提格雷地区的推进则为这种对立关系又增添了新的变数。
The Ethiopian army’s advance into Tigray has added another layer to that rivalry.
“埃塞俄比亚军队在提格雷的推进直接威胁到了伊萨亚斯·阿费沃基及厄立特里亚国家本身，”迈阿密大学非洲历史助理教授埃塔纳·H·丁卡说道。
“The [Ethiopian army’s] advance in Tigray directly threatens [Eritrean President] Isaias [Afwerki] and the Eritrean state,” said Etana H Dinka, an assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami.
在2020至2022年的提格雷战争中，厄立特里亚军队曾与埃塞俄比亚军队并肩作战，但此后阿比耶与伊萨亚斯之间的关系持续恶化。据报道，厄立特里亚军队已出现在提格雷北部的多个城镇，这可能为这场冲突带来新的重要变数。据美联社报道，厄立特里亚军队越过边境后进入了阿迪格拉特和伊达加哈穆斯，而厄立特里亚方面既未证实也未否认这些军事动向。
Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops during the 2020–22 Tigray war, but relations between Abiy and Isaias have since deteriorated. Eritrean troops have reportedly been seen in towns in northern Tigray, adding a potentially significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press news agency reported Eritrean troops entering Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing into Ethiopia, while Eritrea has neither confirmed nor denied the troop movements.
厄立特里亚的作用可能起到决定性作用 对厄立特里亚而言，冲突发生的地点与战争结果同样重要。
Eritrea’s role could be decisive For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as its outcome.
若提格雷地区的冲突长期持续，埃塞俄比亚军队将深陷泥潭，亚的斯亚贝巴推行红海战略的能力也会受到限制。反之，若埃塞俄比亚取得决定性胜利，联邦政府便能腾出更多精力来应对区域内的竞争对手。
A prolonged conflict in Tigray could keep Ethiopian forces tied down and limit Addis Ababa’s ability to pursue its Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could leave the federal government with greater freedom to turn its attention towards regional rivals.
“有报道称厄立特里亚军队正在进入提格雷地区，看来厄立特里亚有意协助正向北撤退的提格雷人民解放阵线武装力量，这样埃塞俄比亚与厄立特里亚士兵的交火就会发生在提格雷境内，而非厄立特里亚境内，”专门研究非洲之角问题的研究员穆罕默德·凯尔·奥马尔说道。
“With reports that Eritrean troops are moving into Tigray, Eritrea seems keen on boosting TPLF forces withdrawing northwards, so that the engagement between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers takes place in Tigrayan territory, and not in Eritrea,” said Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher focused on the Horn of Africa.
此举或许能促使厄立特里亚支持那些能够牵制埃塞俄比亚军队的武装力量，而自身却不必直接卷入冲突。
That could create an incentive for Eritrea to support forces capable of keeping the Ethiopian army tied down, without necessarily entering a direct confrontation of its own.
苏丹局势又为这一地区竞争增添了新变数。苏丹战争为区域内的势力角逐带来了新的维度。
Sudan adds another layer Sudan’s war adds another dimension to the regional rivalry.
据路透社报道，埃及为苏丹军队提供了政治支持以及后勤与技术援助；而苏丹快速支援部队则被指控在达尔富尔地区犯下暴行。
Egypt has provided political backing and logistical and technical support to Sudan’s army, according to the Reuters news agency, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.
埃塞俄比亚也被指为快速支援部队提供了援助。路透社2月份的一篇调查报道称，埃塞俄比亚在其西部的本尚古尔-古穆兹地区设立了一处训练营，数千名与快速支援部队有关联的武装分子在此接受训练。路透社援引包括一名埃塞俄比亚政府高级官员在内的8名消息人士的话称，阿联酋为该训练营的建设提供了资金，还派出了军事教官及后勤支援。阿联酋方面否认了这些指控，路透社也表示无法独立核实阿联酋在其中所起的作用。
Ethiopia has faced accusations of facilitating support for the RSF. A Reuters investigation reported in February that Ethiopia was hosting a camp in its western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of fighters linked to the RSF were being trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, who said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the allegations, and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s role.
这些错综复杂的利益关系其实都是围绕尼罗河、苏丹、红海以及贸易通道控制权展开的更大范围博弈的一部分。
Those competing relationships are part of a broader contest over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes.
对埃及而言，与埃塞俄比亚在“埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝”问题上的争端仍是其战略层面的重大关切；对厄立特里亚来说，埃塞俄比亚谋求通往红海的出海口之举则关乎国家安全；而对苏丹的周边国家而言，这场冲突有可能重塑地区力量格局。埃及、厄立特里亚、苏丹和索马里会介入吗？
For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s search for a Red Sea outlet is viewed through the lens of national security. For Sudan’s neighbours, the conflict threatens to reshape regional power balances. Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?
埃塞俄比亚的周边对手们虽然存在共同利益，但这并不一定会转化为直接的军事干预行动。
The shared interests of Ethiopia’s regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention.
埃及在尼罗河问题及与苏丹的关系上有着自己的考量。厄立特里亚则对提格雷地区的局势发展有着直接的安全利益关切。索马里正忙于应对自身的安全挑战，同时还需处理与亚的斯亚贝巴之间复杂的关系。而苏丹至今仍深陷毁灭性内战的泥潭之中。
Egypt has its own calculations over the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia is dealing with its own security challenges and a complicated relationship with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains consumed by its devastating civil war.
与此同时，埃塞俄比亚联邦政府军如今面临着可能在多条战线上作战的局面。
At the same time, Ethiopia’s federal forces now face the possibility of fighting on several fronts.
提格雷人民解放阵线、阿姆哈拉法诺组织以及奥罗莫解放军各自试图在埃塞俄比亚的不同地区向联邦政府发起挑战。倘若这些势力能够在从主要人口聚居区撤退的同时持续对政府军施加压力，那么默克莱的失守或许只是这场旷日持久冲突的第一阶段而已。
The TPLF, Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have each sought to challenge the federal government in different parts of the country. If they can maintain pressure on the army while retreating from major population centres, the fall of Mekelle could prove to be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.
对于埃塞俄比亚的对手们而言，眼下的问题在于：究竟该利用这一脆弱局势，还是避免被卷入又一场地区战争。
For Ethiopia’s rivals, the question is whether to exploit that vulnerability or avoid being drawn into another regional war.
最终，地区各方的介入程度很可能取决于提格雷人民解放阵线能否将联邦政府军牢牢牵制在提格雷地区，使其无法靠近厄立特里亚边境。
The extent of any regional involvement may ultimately depend on whether the TPLF can keep federal forces tied down in Tigray, and away from the Eritrean border.
“无论埃塞俄比亚政府军的目标是什么——包括阿比耶所宣称的打通通往红海的通道——开罗方面都绝不容许埃塞俄比亚在当前战争中得逞，这一点不难理解，”迈阿密大学的丁卡说道。
“It isn’t difficult to understand Cairo’s commitment to prevent Ethiopia from succeeding in the current warfare, whatever its army’s intended goals, including Abiy’s acclaimed access to the Red Sea, are,” University of Miami’s Dinka said.
如今的问题在于：这些地区层面的考量最终会仅停留在外交层面，还是会演变为实际的军事行动呢？
The question now is whether those regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill into the battlefield.