胡塞武装与沙特阿拉伯断断续续交战已有十余年，但他们对沙特的怨恨可追溯至近一个世纪前。
The Houthis have been in an intermittent war with Saudi Arabia for a dozen years, but their resentment of Saudi Arabia stretches back nearly a century.
20世纪20年代，沙特阿拉伯国王阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹夺取了历史上由宰德派穆斯林控制的阿西尔省。当也门统治者试图收复该领土时，于1934年被沙特击败。胡塞武装是山地民族，信奉宰德派，而沙特人则是瓦哈比派逊尼派。胡塞武装致力于恢复已于1962年结束的宰德派统治，并对阿西尔省的丧失耿耿于怀。
In the 1920s, King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia seized the Asir province that historically had been under Zaidi Muslim control. When the rulers of Yemen tried to reclaim the territory, they were defeated by the Saudis in 1934. The Houthis, a mountain people, are Zaidis, the Saudis are Wahhabi Sunnis. The Houthis are committed to restoring Zaidi rule, which had ended in 1962, and continue to resent the loss of Asir.
2004年，当萨利赫政府试图逮捕其领导人侯赛因·巴德尔丁·胡塞时，胡塞武装反抗萨利赫领导的北也门政府。胡塞同年身亡，但叛乱并未随之终结。随着战争拖延，沙特代表萨利赫政府进行了干预。
In 2004, the Houthis revolted against the north Yemeni government of Ali Saleh when Saleh sought to arrest their leader, Hussein Badereddin al-Houthi. Al-Houthi died the same year, but the rebellion did not die with him. As the war dragged on, the Saudis intervened on behalf of Saleh’s government.
最初起义十年后，胡塞武装攻占了北也门古都萨那。作为回应，在美方情报和后勤支持下，沙特试图击退胡塞武装但以失败告终。相反，在伊朗提供武器和教官等援助下，胡塞武装继续扩大对北也门领土的控制。
Ten years after their initial uprising, the Houthis captured Sana’a, the ancient north Yemeni capital. In response, the Saudis, with American intelligence and logistical support, tried but failed to drive back the Houthis. Instead, with Iranian assistance, including arms and trainers, the Houthis continued to expand their control over north Yemeni territory.
经过数年的和平后，胡塞武装介入哈马斯与以色列的战争，声援哈马斯。2024年，他们向以色列发射导弹，招致以色列对其阵地的打击。他们还袭击了红海上与以色列有关联的航运，将袭击范围扩大至其他国家船只，并向正在保卫通过红海和阿拉伯海舰船的美英海军单位发射导弹和无人机。
After several years of peace, the Houthis intervened on behalf of Hamas in its war with Israel. In 2024 they fired missiles at Israel, prompting Israeli attacks on their formations. They also attacked Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea, expanded those attacks to ships from other countries, and fired missiles and drones on American and British naval units that were defending vessels transiting the Red and Arabian seas.
袭击在2025年美以攻击伊朗时持续升级，在针对伊朗的美国军事行动于2月重启后，胡塞武装在伊朗的怂恿下暂停开火，随后夺取了曼德海峡的关键岛屿，并将其对沙特航运关闭。他们还袭击了沙特的军事和民用目标，包括以无人机和导弹袭击麦加和利雅得。
The attacks continued when the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran in 2025, and after holding their fire after renewed American operations against Iran in February, the Houthis, with Iranian encouragement, seized key islands in the Bab el Mandeb strait and closed it to Saudi shipping. They also attacked Saudi military and civilian targets, including targeting drones and missiles on Mecca and Riyadh.
沙特正获得其《麦加条约》盟友巴基斯坦的支持，后者已部署8000名士兵和防空系统，并向阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹国王空军基地派遣了一个中方制造的歼-17战斗机中队。然而，从该基地到胡塞武装大本营的600英里（约965公里）距离构成了这些战机作战半径的极限。这使得它们在不得不返航前，难以执行超过一次的攻击任务。
The Saudis are receiving support from Pakistan, their Mecca Treaty allies, which has deployed 8,000 troops and air defense systems, and has sent a squadron of Chinese-built J-17 fighter aircraft to the King Abdul Aziz air base. The 600 miles from the base to the Houthi strongholds constitutes the outer limits of the fighters’ combat radius, however. It would be difficult to conduct more than one attack before having to return to base.
无论如何，巴基斯坦迄今尚未对胡塞武装发动任何攻击，其部队极有可能维持防御姿态。
In any event, the Pakistanis have thus far not launched any attacks on the Houthis, and their forces are likely to remain in a defensive posture.
利雅得的另一《麦加条约》盟友土耳其曾提出协助沙特，但迄今未承诺派兵防卫沙特或攻击胡塞武装——毫无疑问是因为安卡拉的部队仍在叙利亚和伊拉克开展行动。
Riyadh’s other Mecca Treaty allies, the Turks, have offered to assist the Saudis, but thus far have not committed forces to defend them or attack the Houthis — no doubt because Ankara’s forces continue to operate in Syria and Iraq.
得益于胡塞武装对红海航运和沙特输油管道的袭击，加上其对霍尔木兹海峡的控制，伊朗已成功扼制沙特石油出口。该王国面临经济收缩的前景，却发现自己无法击败胡塞武装，尤其是在持续遭受伊朗导弹袭击的情况下。
Thanks to Houthi attacks on both Red Sea shipping and Saudi oil pipelines, together with its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has been able to throttle Saudi oil exports. The kingdom is facing the prospect of economic contraction, while finding itself unable to defeat the Houthis, especially as it continues to suffer from Iranian missile attacks.
利雅得已向美国寻求援助，但迄今遭到拒绝。华盛顿专注于其针对伊朗的行动，面临日益严重的弹药短缺，如果再次卷入对胡塞武装的战斗——后者已威胁将进行报复——这一短缺将严重恶化。
Riyadh has turned to America for assistance, but thus far the Saudis have been rebuffed. Washington is committed to its operations against Iran and faces an increasing munitions shortfall that would seriously worsen if it again joined the fight against the Houthis, who have threatened to retaliate.
任由沙特自生自灭只会促使利雅得重新评估其与美国的关系。沙特的国防战略建立在美国在伊朗发动袭击时会冲锋陷阵保卫沙特的基础之上，但迄今为止，美军未能阻止伊朗导弹和无人机对沙特军事和民用目标造成大规模破坏。
Leaving the Saudis to their own devices will simply encourage Riyadh to reevaluate its relationship with the U.S., however. Its defense strategy has been predicated on America’s rushing to its defense in the event of Iranian attack, yet until now American forces have been unable to prevent Iranian missiles and drones from inflicting extensive damage on Saudi military and civilian targets.
毫无疑问，中国长期与沙特保持着良好的经贸关系，过去还曾向沙特出售武器，若华盛顿留下真空，中国必会迅速填补。如果沙特倒向中国而远离美国，几个较小的海湾国家——特别是同样遭受过伊朗袭击的巴林、科威特和卡塔尔——极有可能跟进。随着阿曼继续与伊朗商讨共同管理霍尔木兹海峡的安排，届时可能只有阿拉伯联合酋长国会站在美国一边共同应对伊朗。
No doubt China, which long has had an excellent economic relationship with the Saudis and in the past has sold them weapons, would act quickly to fill any vacuum that Washington leaves. Should the Saudis turn toward China and away from the U.S., several of the smaller Gulf states — notably Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, which have also suffered from Iranian attacks — would likely follow suit. With Oman continuing to discuss a joint arrangement with Iran to manage the strait of Hormuz, only the United Arab Emirates might stand with America to confront the Iranians.
即使华盛顿希望降低在中东的存在感，将该地区拱手让给中国也绝非其乐见之景。因此，特朗普政府理应重新考虑其拒绝沙特请求的决定，尽管美军无疑面临物资短缺，仍应伸出援手，支持这一长期的中东盟友。
Ceding the region to China surely is not a prospect Washington should relish, even if it wishes to lower its Middle Eastern profile. For that reason, it would behoove the Trump administration to reconsider its rejection of Saudi entreaties, and, despite the materiel shortages it surely confronts, come to the aid of its longstanding Middle Eastern ally.
多夫·S·扎克海姆是战略与国际研究中心高级顾问，外交政策研究所董事会副主席。他曾于2001年至2004年担任国防部副部长（财务主管）兼首席财务官，1985年至1987年担任国防部副次长。
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.