去年洛杉矶地区发生火灾时，警方调度员不得不暂时将所有911报警电话转接到一位队长的私人手机上。由于来电量过大，部分消防队甚至与调度中心失去了联系——也就是说调度员无法再追踪到这些消防队的动向。随着通讯系统陷入混乱，一些消防员开始听从他们信任的队长指挥，而非听从上级领导的指示。这些只是这份关于此次致命火灾的全面调查报告中所列举的若干应急通讯失灵案例。
During last year’s fires in the Los Angeles area, police dispatchers had to temporarily route 911 calls through a single captain’s personal cellphone. So many calls came in that some firefighter units went “dark” — meaning dispatchers were no longer tracking them. As communications broke down, some firefighters began to take their cues from captains they trusted instead of the agency’s top leaders. These are just a few examples of emergency communications failures described in a new, comprehensive review of the deadly fires.
报告指出，此次火灾应对工作存在诸多问题：准备工作不足、通讯不畅、指挥体系混乱，各相关部门之间也难以有效协调。这份长达724页的报告由专注于安全科学研究的UL研究学院于周五发布。加州州长加文·纽森曾委托该机构对影响火灾发展的各种条件、决策、行动及机制进行评估。这是UL研究学院针对此次火灾发布的两份报告中的第二份。
The findings paint a picture of a response marred by poor preparation, communication issues and disorganized leadership that struggled to coordinate between jurisdictions. The 724-page report, released Friday, comes from UL Research Institutes (ULRI), an organization that focuses on safety science. Gov. Gavin Newsom tasked the researchers with evaluating the conditions, decisions, actions and systems that influenced the conflagration. This is the second of two ULRI reports evaluating the fires.
总体而言，研究人员发现洛杉矶当局并未为此类极端情况做好充分准备，也缺乏相应的培训；随着火势蔓延，各部门之间也难以协同合作。UL研究学院高级研究项目经理兼首席调查员德里克·阿尔科尼斯在新闻发布会上表示：“伊顿火灾爆发当晚，火势蔓延的速度与规模远远超出了911系统的处理能力，来电量之多以至于调度人员根本无法及时处理或分配任务。”
Overall, the researchers found that Los Angeles authorities were not prepared or trained for such extreme conditions and that they struggled to work side by side as the situation deteriorated. On the night the Eaton Fire took off, for example, “the speed and scale of the event overwhelmed the 911 system,” Derek Alconis, a senior research program manager and lead investigator at ULRI, said in a news briefing. “Calls came in faster than dispatch could manage or assign them.”
随着情况愈发糟糕，各机构间的沟通也变得困难重重，指挥人员甚至无法掌握消防队员的具体位置及行动情况。“整个指挥体系缺乏统一性，”阿尔科尼斯指出，“这种混乱局面严重阻碍了疏散工作的进行。”报告还证实了此前关于帕利塞兹火灾起因的评估结论：洛杉矶消防局未能彻底扑灭该地区此前发生的一场小火。报告称，该部门当时甚至没有针对此类工作的相关标准。
As the situation worsened, agencies struggled to communicate, and those in charge lost track of where crews were working and what they were doing. “It was not an effective unified command,” Alconis said, adding that the confusion hampered evacuation efforts. The report confirmed previous assessments of how the Palisades Fire started: LAFD did not fully mop up an earlier burn in the area. The department did not have standards for that kind of work, the report says.
最初发生的这场火灾被称为“拉赫曼大火”，据称是有人蓄意纵火所致。今年夏天，因陪审团无法达成一致意见，涉嫌纵火的被告的审判以无效审判告终。第二次审判定于今年秋季举行。洛杉矶消防局在一份声明中表示，他们正在仔细审阅相关分析报告。“虽然FSRI指出没有任何单一决策能解释今年1月份发生的这场悲剧，但这并不能减轻洛杉矶消防局在相关决策上的责任，”声明称，“报告指出了多个需要改进的方面，包括如何在恶劣天气再度来袭前确认火势已完全扑灭、如何对大型火灾中的各救援单位进行追踪与指挥，以及如何与合作伙伴共同规划并执行疏散工作。我们接受这些结论。”
The original burn, called the Lachman Fire, was the result of an alleged arson. The trial of the man accused of starting that fire ended in a mistrial this summer after the jury deadlocked. A second trial is scheduled for this fall. In a statement, LAFD said it was carefully reviewing the analysis. “While FSRI found that no single decision explains last January’s tragedy, that does not lessen LAFD’s responsibility for the decisions that were ours,” LAFD said. “The report identifies a number of areas where the LAFD must do better. They include how we confirm a fire is truly out before dangerous weather returns, how we track and direct every unit on a major fire, and how we plan and carry out evacuations with our partners. We accept those findings.”
该局还表示，在内部审查后已实施一系列改进措施，包括在恶劣天气条件下优化人员调配流程，并制定相关规程以确保火灾彻底熄灭。“这份报告对洛杉矶消防局提出了高标准要求，这是理所应当的，”声明写道，“我们将认真评估所有适用于本局的改进建议，持续监测实施成效，从而进一步提升保护辖区居民的能力。”
The department said it had implemented a series of changes after its own review, including improving staffing procedures during dangerous fire weather and developing protocols to ensure fires are fully extinguished. “This report holds the LAFD to a high standard, as it should,” the statement said. “We will carefully evaluate every recommendation that applies to us, continue to track our progress, and strengthen our ability to protect the communities we serve.”
洛杉矶警察局未对置评请求作出回应；截至发稿时，县警长办公室亦未给出答复。洛杉矶县消防局发言人则称，由于相关诉讼尚在进行中，该局无法发表评论。2025年1月，一场强风引发多起火灾，导致太平洋帕利塞兹和阿尔塔迪纳地区的31名居民丧生。大火共摧毁了16,250多栋住宅及商业建筑。至今仍有大量居民无法返回家园，并一直在努力清理火灾留下的烟尘与残骸。人们对火灾应对及重建工作的不满情绪，如今已成为洛杉矶市长选举中的热门议题。
The Los Angeles Police Department did not respond to a request for comment, and the Sheriff’s Department did not provide a response by the time of publication. A spokesperson for the Los Angeles County Fire Department said the agency could not comment because of pending litigation. The fires, which started during a windstorm in January 2025, killed 31 people in the Pacific Palisades and Altadena communities. The blazes destroyed more than 16,250 homes and commercial buildings. Many residents still have not returned home and have struggled to clean up contamination left by smoke and debris. Frustration over the fire response and the rebuilding effort has become a heated election issue in the Los Angeles mayoral race.
然而，一份最新报告称，其中列出的缺陷并非导致这场悲剧的原因。消防应急人员面对的是极端火情，多风天气使住宅本身成为火灾的燃料。ULRI副总裁、消防安全研究院负责人史蒂夫·克伯说：“2025年1月的条件非常有利于火灾发生。帕利塞兹火灾和伊顿火灾的蔓延速度、规模及复杂性，超出了许多为扑救火灾提供支援的系统所能应对的能力。”
The new report says, however, that the shortcomings it outlines did not drive the tragedy. Emergency responders were up against extreme fire behavior in windy conditions that made the homes themselves the fire’s fuel. “The conditions in January 2025 were perfect for fire,” said Steve Kerber, a vice president at ULRI who leads its Fire Safety Research Institute. “The speed, scale and complexity of the Palisades and Eaton fires exceeded many of the capabilities of the systems designed to support suppression.”
对于那些关注过接连不断的诉讼、调查性新闻报道以及市县事后行动评估的人来说，报告中的175项发现many都不会令人意外。不过，该报告全面呈现了哪里出了问题，也大致勾勒出一条应对西部日益常见的强风驱动型城市火风暴的路线图。其266项建议包括，增加加利福尼亚州野火和突发事件管理方面的培训机会，为指挥人员配备便携式卫星互联网套件，以备通信中断之需，并培训消防员利用住宅泳池中的水灭火。
Many of the 175 findings in the report will not come as a surprise to those who have followed the flurry of lawsuits, investigative news reports and city and county after-action reviews. But it offers a comprehensive picture of what went wrong, as well as something of a road map for the wind-driven urban firestorms that are growing more common across the West. Among its 266 recommendations are to increase training opportunities for wildfire and incident management in California, to equip command staff with portable satellite internet kits in case of communication failures, and to train firefighters to use water from residential pools.
报告也记载了许多成功经验。作者表示，美国国家气象局有效传达了极端火险天气威胁，并肯定了一个名为“社区旅队”的志愿者项目在协助居民撤离方面发挥的作用。报告称，私营消防公司也帮助保住了一些建筑并阻止火势蔓延，不过报告承认，私营消防行动存在争议。ULRI还就2023年毛伊岛拉海纳火灾编写了一份事后行动报告。
The report describes plenty of successes, as well. The authors said that the National Weather Service effectively communicated the extreme fire weather threat, and it credited a program of volunteers called Community Brigade with helping residents to evacuate. Private fire companies, too, helped save some structures and prevent fire spread, it says, though the report acknowledges that private firefighting is controversial. ULRI also produced an after-action report about the 2023 Lahaina fires in Maui, an effort the authors said they were just finishing when the Palisades and Eaton fires took off.
作者表示，就在他们即将完成这份报告时，帕利塞兹火灾和伊顿火灾爆发了。他们立即意识到两起事件存在相似之处：快速蔓延、由强风驱动的火灾使消防部门不堪重负。
They immediately saw similarities between the events, in which fast-spreading, wind-driven fires overwhelmed fire departments.
为了了解洛杉矶究竟出了什么问题，撰写该报告的研究人员实地评估了900多栋烧毁的建筑，并采访了200名居民以及22个参与火灾应对机构的295名工作人员。团队审查了911报警电话、无线电通信、调度数据、疏散地图、人员配置方案等资料。然而，他们表示，包括洛杉矶消防局（LAFD）和洛杉矶警察局（LAPD）在内的许多机构，未能提供报告作者一年多前就曾要求的记录，导致评估存在关键缺口。
To understand what went wrong in Los Angeles, the researchers behind the report evaluated in person more than 900 structures that burned and interviewed 200 residents and 295 people working at 22 agencies involved in the fire response. The team reviewed 911 calls, radio communications, dispatch data, evacuation maps, staffing plans and more. However, many agencies, including LAFD and LAPD, did not provide records the report authors requested more than a year ago, they said, leaving key gaps in the assessment.
例如，作者表示，他们没有拿到应急疏散计划的副本，也没有拿到关于拉赫曼火灾应对情况的记录。他们还表示，LAPD没有提供调度记录、无线电通信记录，也没有提供警官和主管的报告。克尔伯说，洛杉矶地区的火灾表明，消防安全已不再取决于单个房主或政府机构的行动。“风险越来越体现于社区和区域层面……未来的韧性取决于整个系统的协同行动，而不是某一个房产所有者或机构单独进行改进，”他说。
For example, the authors said they did not get copies of emergency evacuation plans or records about the response to the Lachman Fire. And LAPD did not provide dispatch or radio communications or reports from officers and supervisors, they said. Kerber said the L.A. area blazes demonstrated how fire safety no longer depends on the actions of a single homeowner or government agency. “Risk increasingly operates at the neighborhood and regional level … future resilience depends on coordinated action across the entire system rather than on improvements made by one property owner or agency at a time,” he said.