A string of electoral victories in recent years has inspired the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) to go for more urbanised and developed states in the run-up to Malaysia’s next general election. PAS’ strategy is straightforward: besides leveraging its religious credentials, it also seeks to underscore its ability to govern well. The problem here, however, is that PAS might not have a solid technocratic record to sell to voters.

PAS was established by the ulama (religious scholars) wing of the United Malays National Organisation. As part of an Islamic resurgent wave starting in the 1980s, the ulama leadership began to shape PAS into a movement that represented the “authentic Islam”, as opposed to the more “Westernised” and “secular” Umno.

PAS became synonymous with the image of a party that exclusively focuses on matters of faith and whose solutions to real-world problems can only be found in religious texts. Consequently, the general public perceives PAS’ ulama leadership to be ill-equipped to deal with the complex challenges of modern life.

Currently, PAS controls the state governments of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu. In the 2022 general election and various state polls the following year, PAS made inroads into states previously controlled by Umno, such as Perak, Pahang and Selangor. These states, however, are more urbanised, economically developed and demographically diverse, and campaigning on a platform of Islamic credibility to govern was not enough to attract Malay voters there. They may be religiously conservative but will not blindly vote based on faith alone.

The results of the Johor and Negeri Sembilan state elections this year show that the more urbanised west coast and southern states pose a challenge for PAS. The only way for PAS to expand its presence is by allying with Malay nationalist parties such as Umno and the newly formed Wawasan.

A nationwide poll in April by the Merdeka Centre showed that 81 per cent of Muslim Malays listed economic concerns as the country’s main challenge. About 53 per cent of Malays feel the country is going in the wrong direction. Most of those making less than 4,000 ringgit per month (US$980), many of whom are Malays, feel the same. PAS is targeting these voters, and it is clear that their top priority is the economy. PAS’ aim is to show them it has a sound and feasible economic agenda and, more importantly, the technocratic chops to carry it out.

At its annual congress, or muktamar, last month, PAS sought to convince the Malaysian public of its ability to govern. The party put forth reformist-like motions, such as the creation of a Royal Commission of Inquiry on the so-called corporate mafia; increasing protection of healthcare workers and ramping up rice production to augment food security. Whether PAS can convince voters of this reformist, welfare-focused vision remains a challenge in the months leading up to the general election.

PAS has some ground to cover from its posturing of the past decade. After purging the “professional” faction in 2015, PAS has since adopted a more ethno-religious stance. It has fused Islamism and Malay nationalism and coalesced around its hardline president, Abdul Hadi Awang. The image turns off many Malays who are pious but do not buy into PAS’ divisive rhetoric. Hence the appeal of technocrats in PAS who are seen as the party’s moderate face.

Since 2018, PAS has been showcasing technocratic leaders such as Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, the chief minister of Terengganu, and Syahir Sulaiman, MP of Bachok in Kelantan. Ahmad Samsuri holds a PhD in aerospace engineering from the University of Leeds and is a protege of Abdul Hadi. Syahir has a private sector background, having worked with the Sime Darby Group before becoming a full-time politician in 2018.

PAS regularly uses the Samsuri administration in Terengganu as an example of the party’s governing achievements. But PAS might be overstating its case. As an oil-producing state, Terengganu is highly dependent on oil royalties from the federal government, which make up about 80 to 90 per cent of its budget. Such royalties played a big role in the Samsuri administration’s ability to fulfil its populist agenda in its first term from 2018 to 2023. This was primarily due to the unimpeded flow of revenue from the then Perikatan Nasional federal government, of which PAS was part.

The dynamic changed after 2022 when the current Madani federal government took over. These royalty payments are now subjected to onerous conditions set by Putrajaya. This affects the Samsuri administration’s visibility significantly, as the federal government can now claim credit for the payments. The federal government has also opted to develop the state directly by funding myriad projects such as a new hospital in Dungun and a 60 million ringgit (US$14.7 million) poverty eradication programme.

But are the technocrats in PAS actually more religiously moderate compared with the hardline ulamas in the party? Given that PAS seeks to propel an ideologically driven movement, party members must go through a regimented indoctrination process, such as regularly attending usrah (guided study sessions). In short, a PAS technocrat can be as dogmatic as a religious scholar; the only difference is that one wears a suit and a tie while the other wears a robe and a turban. Authority over matters of faith and ideological underpinnings still resides with the ulama council. Economic policies formulated by the party’s technocrats have to get a religious imprimatur from the ulamas.

As Malaysia heads into the 16th general election, PAS needs to make a case for its governing ability to hesitant Malay voters in urban and semi-urban areas. This is especially so when development in PAS strongholds still lags behind Pakatan Harapan-governed areas like Selangor and Penang.

Working with Umno would help PAS leverage the former’s vast experience and proven track record in government. In the 2022 general election and various 2023 state polls, PAS combined forces with Bersatu, allowing it to penetrate Malay-majority areas outside its strongholds. As a result, PAS increased its parliamentary seats from 18 to 43 and made inroads in Perak, Selangor and Pahang.

There is a similar dynamic now with Umno, but a key difference is that Umno is stronger than Bersatu and would not want to play second fiddle to PAS in this partnership. The tussle for dominance will be a key dynamic as the general election looms closer. If PAS decides not to ally itself with Umno, it would face a tough challenge in persuading the sceptical Malay electorate to put their trust in its mixed technocratic record.

Dr Azmil Tayeb is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is an Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia. This article was first published on the institute’s commentary website fulcrum.sg.