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澳大利亚加息是错误药方,更是糟糕借口Australia’s interest rate rise is the wrong medicine and an even worse alibi

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周二,澳大利亚储备银行宣布加息,且未来还将继续加息。表面上看,此举是为了抑制因汽油与天然气价格飙升而上涨的通货膨胀,而非应对所谓的“过度工资增长”。然而除了少数受益者——比如波琳·汉森——之外,这一举措实际上是对绝大多数澳大利亚人毫无意义的“攻击”。

When the Reserve Bank of Australia lifted its cash rate on Tuesday, with more rate rises in the pipeline, it did so ostensibly to combat an inflation rate swollen by petrol prices and gas bills, not by avaricious wage claims. Apart from a few beneficiaries, among them Pauline Hanson, the RBA’s move amounts to an act of pointless aggression against the majority of Australians.

近期通胀率飙升的根源并非经济过热,而是海湾地区的一场“选择性战争”。自美国和以色列开始对伊朗实施轰炸后,霍尔木兹海峡便成了“收费站”:航运保险费用暴涨三倍,油轮也不得不绕道非洲好望角。在澳大利亚,只有极少数与能源寡头集团有关联的人赚取了巨额利润,而绝大多数民众却承受着物价上涨带来的痛苦。此次加息只会进一步加重普通民众的负担,却难以带来任何实际益处。

An overheating economy is not the cause of the recent inflation spike. Its cause is a war of choice in the Gulf. Since US and Israeli bombs began falling on Iran, the strait of Hormuz has turned into a toll booth, shipping insurers have tripled their premiums, and tankers have been diverted around the Horn of Africa. In Australia, a tiny minority connected to the energy oligopoly raked in exorbitant profits while the vast majority felt the pain. The interest rate hike deepens the majority’s pain without delivering much gain.

通货膨胀其实分为两种类型,但四十年来各国央行一直假装只有一种。需求拉动型通胀发生在家庭与企业支出超出经济产出能力之时:此时提高利率便能抑制过度消费。而成本推动型通胀则源于某些与国内需求无关的因素导致关键生产要素价格大幅上涨——比如战争导致航道封闭、干旱或疫情扰乱供应链。如今,受唐纳德·特朗普与本雅明·内塔尼亚胡发动的伊朗战争影响,澳大利亚经济正深陷成本推动型通胀的泥潭。

There are two species of inflation, and central bankers have spent 40 years pretending there is only one. Demand-pull inflation occurs when households and firms spend more than the economy can produce: raise the price of money and you cool their ardour. Cost-push inflation is what happens when the price of an essential input is yanked upward by forces that have nothing to do with domestic demand: a war closing a shipping lane, a drought, a pandemic snarling supply chains. The price spiral now rattling through the Australian economy, courtesy of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu’s war on Iran, is cost-push to its marrow.

无论利率如何上调,都无法打通霍尔木兹海峡,也无法促使海湾地区的保险公司降低保险费率,更不会让全球市场上以美元计价的布伦特原油价格因墨尔本的房贷借款人感到经济压力而下跌。利率上调只会抑制澳大利亚人的消费能力、压低工资水平,削弱他们维持基本生计的能力,最终削弱整个经济体的投资与生产潜力。这无异于为了治疗一条断腿而把另一条健康的腿也截掉。

No plausible rise in the cash rate will open up the strait of Hormuz, or convince Gulf insurers to lower their premiums, or compel a barrel of Brent crude priced in a global market to come down because a Melbourne mortgage holder is stressed. What it will do is suppress Australians’ spending, wages, their ability to keep a roof over their heads, ultimately their economy’s capacity to invest and to produce. It is a little like treating a broken leg by amputating the healthy one.

与此同时,这场针对伊朗的战争却让少数受益者赚得盆满钵满。澳大利亚是全球最大的液化天然气出口国之一,其中约五分之四的天然气都由外资企业负责出口,随后这些企业又按照因伊朗战争而剧烈波动的国际市场价格,将天然气卖回给澳大利亚的普通家庭。正如澳大利亚研究所多次指出的那样,这些企业几乎不用缴纳任何税款,实在令人愤慨。

In the meantime, the few beneficiaries of the war against Iran are laughing all the way to the bank. Australia is one of the largest exporters of liquefied natural gas on Earth, and roughly four-fifths of that gas is shipped out by foreign-owned companies, who then sell it back to Australian households at prices set by the same volatile international market that Iran’s war has set alight. Scandalously, as the Australia Institute has demonstrated time and again, they pay next to no tax.

在此背景下,加息行为完全不可取:这等于要求澳大利亚民众承受两次由战争引发的能源危机冲击——首先作为资源拥有者却无法分享任何额外收益,其次作为借贷者又不得不为那些与能源价格上涨毫无关联的房贷支付更高利息。

Against this backdrop, the rate increase is inexcusable: it is asking Australians to absorb a war-driven energy shock twice over, first as the owners of the resource receiving none of the windfall, and second as borrowers now paying a premium for mortgages that were never the cause of the price spike.

那些参与提价过程并从中大赚一笔的管理者和股东,却感受不到货币紧缩的影响,这一事实本身就表明这项政策的目标定位存在严重问题。更令人愤怒的是,这些政策的受害者只能通过停止对生产和未来的投资,来对抑制通胀做出微乎其微的贡献。如今大幅削减住房建设和投资,虽然短期内能略微抑制通胀,但代价却是削弱长期供应——这无疑会引发更严重的长期通胀。

That managers and shareholders who are part of the process of raising prices, and profiting from it handsomely, do not feel the effects of monetary tightening is, on its own, indicative that the policy is ill-targeted. That its victims can only contribute to dampening inflation by ceasing to invest in production and in their future is outrageous. Slashing and burning housebuilding and investment today will inhibit inflation a little in the short-run at the price of diminishing long-term supply – a sure way to breed more long-term inflation.

这根本不是什么反通胀政策,而是一场冷嘲热讽的收入转移:从没有造成问题的人手中,将财富转移到那些实际上正从中大赚一笔的人手中。同时,这也为继续破坏澳大利亚一些重要机构提供了借口。

This is not an anti-inflation policy. It is a cynical transfer of income from people who did not cause the problem to people who are, in fact, profiting handsomely from it. And it is an excuse for further acts of vandalism on some of Australia’s important institutions.

更高的利率会推高政府自身的债务偿还成本,减缓经济增长,并减少税收收入——这正是世界各国财政部随后都会拿来当作“支出克制”不可避免的证据的配方。事实上,澳大利亚储备银行(RBA)的这一决定已经被那些一直试图对Medicare批量报销、老年护理以及国家残疾保险计划实施毁灭性削减的人当作武器来利用。于是,破坏行为进一步加深。

A higher interest rate pushes up the government’s own debt-servicing bill, slows growth and shrinks the tax take, precisely the recipe that every finance ministry in the world then waves about as proof that spending “restraint” is unavoidable. Already, the RBA’s decision is being weaponised by those who have always sought to impose debilitating cuts to Medicare bulk-billing, aged care and to the national disability insurance scheme. And so the vandalism deepens.

我早已目睹这一幕反复上演:2008年英国银行家们将经济拖入深渊之后;2009年德国和法国银行破产后整个欧元区的情况;以及2014年的澳大利亚——当时由于矿业投资放缓,财政部不是削减给予矿业公司的柴油补贴或私人健康保险退税,而是转头从医疗和福利领域寻找节省空间。

I have watched this script performed time and again. In Britain after the bankers had sunk the economy in 2008; across the eurozone after German and French banks went bankrupt in 2009; in 2014 in Australia where, after a mining-investment slowdown, the Treasury went hunting for savings in health and welfare rather than in the diesel subsidies handed to miners or the private health insurance rebate.

其逻辑始终如一:绝不放过任何利用危机的机会——这些危机并非大多数民众造成,却被用来剥夺他们辛苦争取来的社会保障与赖以生存的各类制度。十年过去了,针对的目标几乎没变,只是借口换了:过去是银行业危机或资源繁荣期的终结,如今则是特朗普挑起的伊朗战争。

The logic is always the same: never miss an opportunity to exploit a crisis that the majority had no hand in causing to deprive the majority of hard-won social protections and cherished institutions. A decade on, the targets have barely changed, only the alibi has: then it was the banking crises or the end of the resources boom, now it is Trump’s Iran war.

那么,除了动用利率这一“笨重工具”外,我们还能怎么做呢?应对战争引发的能源危机,应当实施出口限额措施,以此建立战略储备,让澳大利亚的能源价格不再受海湾地区地缘政治局势的影响。此外,设定价格上限并对天然气垄断企业征收暴利税,也能为那些深受能源价格上涨困扰的家庭及小企业提供定向救助资金。

So, what should we do instead of wielding the blunt instrument of interest rates? A war-driven energy shock should be dealt with by means of export caps, which would help create strategic reserves that decouple Australian prices from Gulf geopolitics. Furthermore, price caps and a windfall levy on the gas cartel would fund targeted relief for the households and small businesses squeezed by the energy price hike.

这些措施都无需进一步压榨房贷借款人,更无需对公共服务领域动刀。为了应对一场与自己无关的战争而加息,是极其错误的经济决策;若以这场战争为借口,让领取养老金的民众不得不推迟接受髋关节置换手术,那就更是错得离谱了。

None of that requires squeezing a single mortgage holder harder, and none of it requires a scalpel anywhere near public services. Raising interest rates to fight a war you are not fighting is bad economics. Using the bill for that war as the reason to make pensioners wait longer for a hip replacement would be something worse.

澳大利亚民众并未投票支持这些做法。如果工党政府意识不到这一点,在民众不满情绪日益高涨的背景下,便根本无力对抗势头正猛的“一国党”。

Australians did not vote for either. If the Labor government cannot see this, they stand no chance against a One Nation surging on the back of mounting discontent.