President Trump has made normalization with Israel a condition for moving forward with U.S.-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation, while Washington has deepened defense ties with Riyadh. The Saudis have not publicly accepted Trump’s quid pro quo and continue to demand meaningful progress toward Palestinian statehood. Trump may accomplish during his remaining term what seemed impossible after Oct. 7, Saudi recognition of Israel. But Washington should not confuse a diplomatic breakthrough with a warm peace.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may be ready for a strategic relationship with Israel, but Saudi society is not ready to embrace the Jewish state. If diplomatic relations are eventually established, almost certainly with significant American influence, the critical question is what kind of relationship will follow. Will it resemble Israel’s relatively warm relationship with the United Arab Emirates, which has survived the enormous strains since Oct. 7?

Or will it look more like Israel’s cold peace with Egypt and Jordan, essential security cooperation accompanied by considerable public hostility? Washington too often uses the word “peace” as though Middle Eastern normalization means something resembling relations between the United States and Canada. It does not. Regional governments must contend with conservative domestic politics, Islamist religious currents, ahistorical grievances, and populations whose attitudes toward Israel can be far more hostile than those of their rulers.

Saudi Arabia illustrates the problem. Bin Salman has dramatically modernized parts of the kingdom. But Saudi society is not Riyadh’s business elite, and its attitudes toward Israel present a formidable obstacle to an Emirati-style relationship. Recent polling underscores the challenge. In 2025, 81 percent of Saudis surveyed viewed establishing normal, peaceful relations with Israel negatively, while only 13 percent viewed the Abraham Accords positively.

After Oct. 7, 96 percent favored Arab states cutting ties with Israel, illustrating the enormous gulf between Bin Salman’s strategic calculations and Saudi public opinion. Israel and Saudi Arabia have quietly cooperated for years, sharing intelligence and coordinating against common adversaries, particularly Iran. For the foreseeable future, that may be closer to what Riyadh wants or believes it can politically sustain, than an Emirati-style embrace of Israel.

Disrupting Saudi-Israeli normalization served Hamas and Iran’s strategic interests on Oct. 7. Before the attack, there was considerable optimism that Saudi normalization could build upon the Abraham Accords, combining Israeli technology, intelligence and security capabilities with Saudi economic power. That moment has passed. Even if Trump persuades Bin Salman to resume normalization, the relationship will begin under vastly different circumstances.

Washington should also think carefully before permitting Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium on its soil as a quid pro quo for diplomatic relations. Saudi Arabia is stable today, but nuclear agreements must be designed for decades. Bin Salman will eventually succeed his father, King Salman, while members of the royal family remember being detained at the Ritz-Carlton during his consolidation of power. A future succession could produce significant instability. Creating an indigenous enrichment capability therefore carries proliferation risks extending well beyond today’s geopolitical calculations.

Israel, meanwhile, has work to do. A future Israeli government may offer Riyadh sufficient movement on the Palestinian issue to facilitate normalization. But Israel can take immediate action on something far more manageable, extremist violence in the West Bank. Israel confronts genuine Palestinian terrorism every day. That threat should not be minimized or equated with settler violence.

But Israelis who attack innocent Palestinians, destroy property or violate Israeli law undermine their country’s strategic interests. The Netanyahu government or the next one, should aggressively enforce Israeli law, including administrative detention when justified by security considerations, against the relatively small number of extremists responsible. Allowing their actions to continue creates an unnecessary diplomatic vulnerability when Israel needs to rebuild international and, most importantly, American support.

European governments are increasing pressure over West Bank policies, while congressional Democrats have proposed sanctions connected to Israeli settlement activity. For now, substantial public progress between Israel and Saudi Arabia is unlikely, particularly before Israel has a stable government following its elections. Yet Iran will continue pushing the two countries together. Shared threats from Tehran and the Houthis make Saudi-Israeli intelligence and security cooperation necessary, even if much remains in the shadows.

Riyadh must also calculate America’s long-term commitment to the region. Trump leaves office in January 2029, and neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel knows whether his successor, Democrat or Republican, will sustain the same level of engagement. American credibility and deterrence in the Middle East also reverberate in Beijing and Taipei. Trump nevertheless should not be underestimated. The Abraham Accords overturned decades of conventional wisdom that Arab-Israeli normalization could not advance without first resolving the Palestinian conflict.

He could surprise the region again. But Saudi recognition of Israel, however historic, would not necessarily mean reconciliation. The more realistic relationship may resemble Egypt or Jordan: formal diplomatic relations and extensive security cooperation while societal normalization remains years, perhaps decades, away.

Jerusalem knows, and Washington should understand the difference between an agreement between governments and peace between peoples. Eric R. Mandel is the director of the Middle East Political Information Network and senior security editor for the Jerusalem Post’s Jerusalem Report.