The self-styled secretary of war strode confidently across the stage as he outlined his vision for America’s armed forces. He spoke of establishing an autonomous warfare command and an office of religious affairs, of developing preferred relationships with select universities, of reducing the number of senior officers by 20 percent, and of creating an external team of civilians to chart the future of warfare. Unlike last year, when the senior officers Pete Hegseth called to order in Quantico responded with silent stoicism, this year the junior officers and enlisted troops he addressed gave him a standing ovation.

Some of Hegseth’s supporters have compared him to George Marshall, the legendary U.S. Army chief of staff who reshaped that service before World War II, because Marshall relieved at least 600 senior officers of their positions. He defended the choice on the grounds that “most of our senior officers on such duty are deadwood and should be eliminated from the service as rapidly as possible.”Only 11 of 42 generals retained their commands for combat; only one was given a top command during the war.

But the taciturn, disciplined Marshall would never have crowed that “the ideological clowns are out. The patriotic cowboys are in, with testosterone testing on top,” or suggested that journalists who criticized a military mission were guilty of treason, both of which Hegseth did in his speech. And this is just the beginning of what makes the comparison both ridiculous and patently self-serving for Hegseth.

Marshall had to create a wartime military from an Army that hadn’t fought in 20 years. Hegseth is leading a military that has been at war for more than 25 years. Marshall’s judgments were trained on his long experience in important positions inside the military hierarchy. Hegseth sits in judgment of an officer corps that found his performance wanting at a fairly junior level of leadership. Marshall evaluated combat capabilities through rigorous field experiments known as the Louisiana Maneuvers, in which officers tested new technology, such as tanks, and were assessed by experienced officers.

Hegseth proposes to test combat fitness largely through a two-hour written exam administered by an ideologue drummed out of service for insubordination. Marshall gained congressional authorization before enacting his program. Hegseth’s comportment has drawn articles of impeachment from a congressman of his own political party.

What Marshall and Hegseth do have in common is that their plans for radically reshaping the military begin with selecting its senior leadership. In Marshall’s day—he was appointed chief of staff in 1939—seniority, meaning time in service, was the main criterion for promotion. But technological advances had increased the Army’s mobility and firepower, and Marshall believed that more imaginative leadership was needed to make the adjustment. At the time, the U.S. Army was rated the world’s 19th-largest fighting force, behind Portugal’s and just ahead of Bulgaria’s.

Marshall established a two-part system of officer evaluation. First, a board of ranking veterans, selected by Marshall for their rigor and judgment, would review the officers’ records. Then the commanders would undergo a demanding field test to evaluate performance in combat conditions. The processes Marshall put in place—merit-based evaluation boards, an up-or-out promotion system, rotations through field testing at a national training center—produced the military leadership that Hegseth is culling.

The U.S. military is, in fact, top-heavy. Congress has authorized 857 general and flag officers for a force of only about 1.35 million active-duty personnel and 771,200 reservists. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 called for the armed forces to study the possibility of drawing down the number of such officers, and in 2025, Hegseth directed a minimum 10 percent reduction in general officer billets, and a minimum 20 percent reduction in both four-star and National Guard generals. In his State of the Force speech, Hegseth raised the level to 20 percent, with a deadline of January 2027—just about 90 days from the announcement—while also establishing a new four-star command.

An organization as large as the U.S. military no doubt can, and perhaps even should, cut back its senior management. The proportion of generals has increased by 31 percent over the past 50 years, as have the responsibilities, as the American way of war has come to rely more and more on technology, joint operations, leadership of coalition forces, and managing and reporting on financial resources. Some responsibilities have also migrated from the one- and two-star levels up to the three- and four-star levels, and these could be forced back down the grade structure.

But the way Hegseth is doing his job does not merit the benefit of the doubt that was accorded to Marshall—an officer so concerned about even the appearance of political favoritism that he declined to vote. Hegseth, by contrast, claims that he’s eradicating political bias from the military but is in fact importing the culture wars into the force in a way that damages both the military and the public’s trust in it.

He convenes troops for partisan purposes. At the Quantico meeting, he distributed a collection of his speeches titled “The War Department Field Manual.”He relieved or coerced into retirement without explanation 23 senior officers, and in at least two cases replaced them with dramatically less qualified successors. He removed 80 officers from merit-based promotion lists, and precipitated the resignation in protest of the secretary of the Army. He attempted to censure and court martial a sitting senator.

He revoked press access to the Pentagon. The U.S. has been at war for five months without a single Pentagon press briefing. Most dangerously, as the Quantico meeting demonstrated, he and the president are corroding the chain of command by encouraging disrespect for “the generals” and inculcating loyalty to themselves instead. Such politicization of the military destroys republics.

Hegseth is arrogating to himself authorities that properly belong to Congress. Article I of the U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the authority to raise armies and maintain a navy. Congress is the body that establishes the standards for appointments, assignments, duties, and grades of general and flag officer positions. Congress determines these officers’ promotions. And this Congress is overdue to protect the American military from a civilian leadership that is its greatest threat.