
研究人员发现,数千台GPU服务器将Nvidia的DCGM Exporter暴露在互联网上,其中数百台可能面临一个高严重性漏洞的威胁。该漏洞可能让未经身份验证的攻击者导致GPU监控服务崩溃,并干扰AI工作负载。DCGM Exporter会从主机上的GPU读取遥测数据,包括硬件信息、使用率、内存占用、功耗和错误事件等。每台GPU都有唯一的标识符(UUID),而所有这些指标都以明文形式通过HTTP暴露在外。
Researchers found thousands of GPU servers exposing Nvidia's DCGM Exporter to the internet, with hundreds potentially vulnerable to a high-severity flaw that could let unauthenticated attackers crash the GPU monitoring service and disrupt AI workloads. DCGM Exporters read telemetry from the GPUs on a host, including its hardware, utilization, memory usage, power consumption, and error events. Each GPU has its own unique ID, or UUID, and all of these metrics are exposed in plaintext over HTTP.
这种暴露行为为潜在攻击者提供了可用于侦察的详细信息,包括绘制GPU基础设施地图、识别可能存在的脆弱系统以及监控工作负载活动。数据中心安全初创公司Lava的研究员Michael Katchinskiy发现了这一GPU健康与性能监控服务的漏洞,并进行了报告。今年9月,GPU巨头Nvidia发布了针对该漏洞的修复方案,其编号为CVE-2026-47483,并获得了8.2的CVSS高严重性评分。
This exposure provides would-be attackers with detailed information useful for reconnaissance, including mapping GPU infrastructure, identifying potentially vulnerable systems, and monitoring workload activity. Michael Katchinskiy, a researcher at datacenter security startup Lava, found and reported the bug in the GPU health and performance monitoring service. In September, the GPU giant Nvidia released a fix for the flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-47483, and gave it an 8.2 CVSS high-severity rating.
“一旦我们意识到这些端点暴露的信息量有多大,下一个问题就是:究竟有多少个端点暴露在互联网上?”Katchinskiy在周四的一篇博客中写道。于是,研究人员开始扫描互联网,寻找被暴露的DCGM Exporter。他发现,暴露的规模“尤其惊人”。在3月至5月期间进行的四次扫描中,这些威胁猎人发现了约2100台将DCGM Exporter指标暴露在互联网上的GPU服务器,其中包括12000个GPU UUID。
“Once we realized how much these endpoints revealed, the next question was: How many of them are exposed to the internet?”Katchinskiy said in a Thursday blog. So the researchers started scanning the internet for exposed DCGM Exporters. And the scale of exposure proved “especially significant,” he wrote. Over the course of four scans between March and May, the threat hunters found about 2,100 GPU servers exposing DCGM Exporter metrics to the open internet. These included 12,000 GPU UUIDs.
这些服务器均无需身份验证。据Katchinskiy称,这些主机属于约300家组织,其中近一半——即5274台被暴露的GPU,占总数的44%——位于美国。这些GPU的硬件价值约1亿美元,包括用于运行大规模AI工作负载的Nvidia Blackwell Ultra B300、H200和H100 GPU,以及消费级的RTX 5090和4090系统。
None of these required authentication. The hosts belonged to about 300 organizations, according to Katchinskiy, and nearly half - 5,274 of the exposed GPUs, or 44 percent of the total - were located in the US. These GPUs represented about $100 million in hardware, and included Nvidia Blackwell Ultra B300 GPUs, H200s, and H100s - used to run large-scale AI workloads - plus consumer RTX 5090 and 4090 systems.
在调查这些被暴露的系统时,Lava 团队发现,约 25% 的已暴露 DCGM 主机也泄露了 Go 语言内置性能分析工具 /debug/pprof/ 的数据。该分析工具会收集并暴露运行中的 Go 应用程序的运行时性能数据,例如 CPU 和内存使用情况。这些数据包括 CPU 使用率、内存分配、 goroutine 状态以及阻塞事件。“如果同时存在大量未经身份验证的请求,数据导出器可能会因内存不足而崩溃,从而中断对 GPU 健康状况和活动的监控,”Katchinskiy 写道。
While investigating the exposed systems, the Lava team found that about 25 percent of the exposed DCGM hosts also revealed data from Go’s /debug/pprof/ built-in profiling tool. The profiler collects and exposes runtime performance data such as CPU and memory usage for running Go applications. This includes CPU usage, memory allocations, goroutine states, and blocking events. “With enough concurrent unauthenticated requests, the exporter could run out of memory and crash, cutting off visibility into GPU health and activity,” Katchinskiy wrote.
CPU 和内存的压力也可能影响 AI 训练或推理任务。Nvidia 已在版本 4.8.2 中修复了该问题,运营商应升级到该版本或更高版本。除了 GPU 遥测数据外,Lava 还研究了 Prometheus Node Exporter,该工具用于监控服务器硬件和操作系统,并通过 HTTP 接口暴露指标数据。团队发现共有 12,096 台公开的 Node Exporter 主机泄露了 GPU 集群中常用的服务器型号、操作系统、固件版本、主机名、存储路径和网络硬件信息。
The CPU and memory pressure could also affect AI training or inference workloads. Nvidia fixed the issue in version 4.8.2, and operators should upgrade to that version or later. In addition to GPU telemetry, Lava looked into Prometheus Node Exporter, which monitors server hardware and operating systems, and also exposes metrics over HTTP. The team found 12,096 public Node Exporter hosts exposing data on server models, operating systems, firmware versions, hostnames, storage paths and networking hardware commonly used in GPU clusters.
这些信息揭示了环境的构建和配置方式,攻击者也可能利用这些信息开展侦察,将系统与已知漏洞进行匹配。这些被公开暴露的监控服务影响了 neocloud 和 GPU 云提供商(包括 Nebius、Voltage Park、Lambda、Northern Data 和 DigitalOcean)的客户基础设施。Lava 已将上述情况报告给相关提供商,Katchinskiy 表示,这些提供商已与客户合作解决暴露问题。
This information reveals how environments are built and configured, which could also be used by attackers for reconnaissance, matching the system to known vulnerabilities. The publicly exposed monitoring services affected customer infrastructure across neocloud and GPU cloud providers including Nebius, Voltage Park, Lambda, Northern Data, and DigitalOcean. Lava reported all of this to the affected providers, and Katchinskiy says that these providers worked with customers to address the exposures.
对于运营商,该安全团队指出,Nvidia DCGM Exporter、Node Exporter 和 Prometheus 服务不应直接通过公共互联网访问,并建议将其访问权限限制在授权的监控基础设施内。“这些发现凸显了 AI 基础设施中日益严重的安全漏洞:企业正投入数百万资金购买 GPU,却同时让关键系统处于暴露状态,”Katchinskiy 写道。
For operators: the security shop says Nvidia DCGM Exporter, Node Exporter and Prometheus services should not be directly reachable from the public internet and recommends restricting them to authorized monitoring infrastructure. “The findings highlight a growing security gap in AI infrastructure: companies are spending millions on GPUs while leaving critical systems exposed,” Katchinskiy wrote.
这些暴露可能会揭示人工智能环境的构建方式,在某些情况下,还可能让攻击者对其造成破坏。” ®
“Those exposures can reveal how AI environments are built and, in some cases, allow attackers to disrupt them.” ®