
区块链研究人员表示,加密货币交易为俄罗斯敲诈团伙“沉默勒索组织”(Silent Ransom Group,SRG)所谓泄露材料的部分内容提供了可信度。Chainalysis 称,材料中的一些钱包地址与其已有情报相匹配,尽管无法对整套资料进行验证。该公司发布声明:“虽然我们无法对泄露中记录的全部主张作出评论,但可以确认,某些泄露的 SRG 地址下游流入了 SRG 从受害者处勒索的数百万美元勒索软件付款。”
Cryptocurrency transactions lend credibility to parts of a purported leak from Russian extortion crew Silent Ransom Group (SRG), according to blockchain researchers. Chainalysis said some wallet addresses in the material match its existing intelligence, although it could not authenticate the entire collection. It posted: "While we cannot speak to the totality of claims documented in the leak, we can confirm that certain leaked SRG addresses sit downstream of millions of dollars in ransomware payments that SRG has extorted from victims."
尽管名称如此,SRG 以窃取数据并索要付款为主,而非部署勒索软件。其手段包括回拨钓鱼和实体入侵。FBI 在五月警告称,冒充 IT 支持人员的人员正在进入律所,并将文件复制到 USB 驱动器上。Chainalysis 表示,两个 SRG 钱包地址的交易历史显示,数十万美元的资金是从一名已知 SRG 成员的钱包转出的。该公司认为,观察到的通过泄露地址流动的资金来源于受害者在 2026 年中期支付的一笔大额敲诈款项,并被用于支付 SRG 的开支,如成员工资和 IT 基础设施。
Despite its name, SRG is known for stealing data and demanding payment rather than deploying ransomware. Its methods include callback phishing and physical intrusions. The FBI warned in May that people posing as IT support staff were entering law offices and copying files onto USB drives. Chainalysis said the transaction histories of two SRG wallet addresses detailed hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of funds sent from the wallet of a known SRG member. The company believes the funds it observed flowing through the leaked addresses came from a large extortion payment made by a victim in mid-2026, and were used to pay for SRG's expenses, such as members' wages and IT infrastructure.
“我们的信心来源于泄露地址的交易历史,”Chainalysis 说。“泄露中包含的多个付款地址的资金来源于已确认的 SRG 勒索付款。例如,泄露聊天中指定的某位沉默成员的钱包全部来自 SRG 在 2026 年中期收取的超过 1000 万美元的受害者付款,而我们在泄露前就已对其进行追踪。”区块链分析公司 Crystal Intelligence 也对泄露的聊天记录进行了单独审查,并追踪了其中标识的钱包付款。聊天记录声称,SRG 在 2026 年 4 月至 9 月期间从 27 家公司获得约 2.07 亿美元。
"Our confidence stems from the leaked addresses' transaction history," said Chainalysis. "Several payment addresses contained within the leaks source their funds from confirmed SRG ransom payments. "For example, one of the Silent members' wallets specified in the leaked chats is funded entirely from a $10 million+ victim payment that SRG collected in mid-2026, and which we were tracking before the leak." Blockchain analytics company Crystal Intelligence separately examined the leaked chats and traced payments to wallets identified in them.
Crystal 无法验证该总金额,尽管它通过资金追踪,发现这些资金曾流向一个上游收集钱包,该钱包在其生命周期内大约接收了 2,675 枚比特币。Crystal 识别出了 SRG 花费这笔钱的多种方式。有时资金会直接发送给关联方,但该团伙也有将加密货币兑换成他们实际可以使用的现金的方法。根据 Crystal 的分析,该团伙使用了即时兑换商(即把加密货币兑换成汇入俄罗斯银行卡的现金的服务),对于较大额的存款,则通过一名驻莫斯科的名叫“Zhenya”的经纪人,用加密货币向该团伙提供实体现金。Crystal 表示,泄露的聊天记录显示,成员们怀疑 Zhenya 在汇率上捞取回扣。
The chats claim SRG received about $207 million from 27 firms between April and September 2026. Crystal could not verify that total, although it traced funds to an upstream collection wallet that received about 2,675 Bitcoin over its lifetime. Crystal identified a range of ways SRG spent this money. Sometimes the funds would be sent directly to affiliates, but the group had ways of swapping the crypto for cash they could actually use. According to Crystal's analysis, the group used instant exchangers, services that swap crypto for cash sent to Russian bank cards, and for larger deposits, a Moscow-based broker named "Zhenya" who provided the group with physical cash in exchange for crypto.
Crystal 表示,聊天记录中提及了一项在 Telegram 上以 SAFU Exchange 名义宣传的“比特币转 Zelle”服务。其数据库将该账号与一家总部位于格鲁吉亚、被其描述为无牌且遭制裁标记的交易所联系起来。其风险最高的支付方式留给了直接支付给诸如“现场特工和文件伪造者”等较小金额的款项,这些人员直接将款项接收到他们的交易所钱包中。Crystal 称,这些是验证客户身份的受监管交易所。Crystal 表示:“这是该网络最薄弱的环节,也是执法部门识别网名背后人员的最直接途径。”
The leaked chats suggest members suspected Zhenya of skimming money through the exchange rate, Crystal said. Crystal said the chats identified a Bitcoin-to-Zelle service advertised on Telegram as SAFU Exchange. Its database associates the same handle with a Georgia-based exchange it describes as unlicensed and sanctions-flagged. The riskiest of its payment methods was reserved for smaller sums paid directly to the likes of "field agents and document forgers," who received their payments directly into their exchange wallets. Crystal said these were regulated exchanges that verify customers' identities.
根据 Crystal 的说法,聊天记录中包含了当面购买房产的建议,以及关于购买新建住宅和跑车的讨论。他们建议为购房申请按揭贷款,如果任何银行询问资金来源,就告诉对方那是遗产或礼品,或者出示一份虚假的贷款协议。
"This is the network's weakest point, and the most direct route for law enforcement to identify the people behind the handles," it said. According to Crystal, the chats included advice to buy property in person and discussions of purchasing new-build homes and sports cars.
这些资料本周在网上发布,标题为“月神蛾档案”(The Luna Moth Files),这是研究人员对 SRG 的另一个称呼的代指。SRG 大约自 2022 年以来一直很活跃,且一直专注于律所,尽管它也将业务拓展到了其他类型的机构。
They said to use mortgages for the homes and, if any banks asked questions about the source of the money, to tell them it was an inheritance or a gift, or to produce a fake loan agreement. The material appeared online this week under the title "The Luna Moth Files," a reference to another name researchers use for SRG.
该团伙通常采用回拨网络钓鱼的方式。他们伪装成IT支持人员,说服受害者回电并授予其对桌面会话的远程访问权限,然后运行各种工具来窃取数据。“月神蛾档案”(Luna Moth Files)网站声称,这些资料包含近5700条内部消息,其中辨识出了高级成员和外勤特工。这些身份尚未得到独立核实。这些“外勤特工”是被招募前往美国律师事务所通过U盘窃取数据的人员。
SRG has been active since around 2022 and has maintained a consistent focus on law firms, although it has branched out to other types of organizations too. The group's usual method is callback phishing. Presenting as IT support staff, they convince marks to return their calls and grant remote access to their desktop sessions, running various tools to steal data. The Luna Moth Files website claims the material contains nearly 5,700 internal messages identifying senior members and field agents. Those identities have not been independently verified.
Crystal对聊天记录的分析得出结论,这些“外勤特工”是在俄语招聘网站上招募的。招聘信息承诺向“夜总会推广员”支付每晚300美元以上的报酬,但应聘者随后却被推入实体入侵的工作中。美国联邦调查局(FBI)在5月份发布的预警中,针对该春季出现的新一轮攻击报告,再次发出了关于SRG的警告。该预警未透露有多少起事件涉及实体入侵。®
These "field agents" are the individuals who were recruited to walk into US law offices to steal data via a thumb drive. Crystal's analysis of the chat logs concluded that these "field agents" were recruited on Russian-language job boards. Job listings promised $300+ per night for "nightclub promoters," although respondents were instead pushed into the physical intrusion line of work. The FBI's May advisory renewed its warning about SRG following fresh reports of attacks that spring. It did not disclose how many incidents involved physical intrusions. ®