Vandana Hari is the founder of Vanda Insights, a Singapore-based global energy market intelligence provider.

Japan entered the Iran war far less exposed to a disruption in supplies of Middle Eastern liquefied natural gas than it was to oil. Yet the past seven months have demonstrated an uncomfortable reality: A country that imports virtually all its natural gas is not insulated from a major LNG supply shock simply by virtue of being less directly dependent on the source of disruption.

Japan imported just under 65 million metric tons of LNG in 2025, of which only around 11% came from the Middle East and about 5% from Qatar, the supplier most affected by the war. Australia and Malaysia together accounted for more than half of Japan's imports.

That diversified supply base helped Japan weather the initial shock after the war erupted in late February. Utilities entered March with just under 4 million metric tons of LNG in storage, roughly equivalent to an entire year's imports through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Japan's government.

But LNG presents a fundamentally different energy-security challenge from oil. Crude can be stored relatively cheaply for years, and Japan maintains enormous strategic and commercial reserves of this refinery feedstock. LNG requires expensive cryogenic storage, and inventories are typically measured in weeks rather than months. Japan, therefore, needs to build its LNG safety net differently.

Tokyo took an important step in that direction last month, when the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOMEC) and Malaysia's Petronas agreed on Japan's first framework specifically designed to procure LNG in an emergency. The master sales and purchase agreement creates a mechanism under which JOGMEC can procure Petronas cargoes for Japanese buyers if electricity or gas supplies are threatened.

No fixed volume or delivery schedule was announced, and Malaysia's own domestic requirements will take priority. That makes the arrangement a contingency mechanism rather than a strategic reserve. Its significance lies as much in its timing as its terms.

Just five weeks before the war began, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the nation's largest power producer JERA and QatarEnergy had signed a memorandum establishing another emergency LNG supply framework. Under that arrangement, Tokyo could ask QatarEnergy to consider supplying additional cargoes when Japan faced serious supply constraints.

At the time, the logic was compelling. Qatar had supplied Japan with additional LNG after the 2011 earthquake and Fukushima disaster, and JERA described Qatari LNG as particularly reliable in emergencies. On the same day in February, the Japanese utility signed a 27-year contract for 3 million metric tons of annual Qatari LNG supply beginning in 2028. Then the emergency came from the Middle East itself.

Iranian attacks in March damaged two of Qatar's LNG trains at Ras Laffan, wiping out around 17% of the country's liquefaction capacity. The damaged plants, with a combined capacity of around 12.8 million metric tons a year, could remain out of service for up to three years.

QatarEnergy has subsequently been seeking LNG from the U.S. to help meet its own contractual commitments.

September brought some encouraging news on Hormuz energy flows. Oil as well as LNG shipments through the strait rose to their highest monthly levels since the start of the war.

The Negishi LNG Terminal in Yokohama is operated by Tokyo Gas and JERA. Japan relies on imports for its supplies of liquefied natural gas.

But by early October, Iran had significantly ratcheted up attacks on tankers transiting the chokepoint, once again putting the recovery in oil and LNG flows at risk.

For Japan, the lesson is clear: An emergency supply arrangement offers limited protection if the supplier expected to provide the emergency molecules is itself exposed to the same crisis.

Tokyo's answer should be to build overlapping layers of protection across geographically independent supply regions. Some of that architecture is already taking shape.

JERA agreed last year to secure up to 5.5 million metric tons a year of U.S. LNG under long-term arrangements. Importantly, JERA will control the shipping and is not restricted in where the LNG can be delivered, giving it the flexibility to redirect or resell cargoes as its needs change.

In June, JERA added another layer,g a 20-year agreement for up to 2 million metric tons a year from Petronas, primarily sourced from Malaysia, beginning in 2028. The emergency framework agreed in September now sits alongside that long-term supply relationship.

Japan should replicate the emergency model with suppliers in different producing regions while continuing to diversify the physical origins of its LNG. Long-term contracts can provide security of supply, while destination-flexible volumes and some reliance on spot purchases give buyers room to adjust when demand or trade flows change. Australia offers large-scale supply that is insulated from Middle Eastern disruptions, while expanding U.S. exports and Canada's emerging Pacific coast LNG industry provide additional opportunities to spread geographical risk.

Japan's existing "strategic buffer" LNG mechanism also deserves strengthening. Under the scheme, a designated supplier secures additional cargoes during the peak winter months that can be directed to utilities in an emergency.

There is a cost to all this. Security means paying for optionality that may sometimes go unused. It also means accepting that the cheapest LNG cargo in normal conditions is not necessarily the most valuable one during a crisis.

The Iran war has provided a stark demonstration of that distinction. Qatar's loss has tightened a global market in which Japan must compete not only with other Asian buyers but with Europe. American LNG exports reached a record 10.9 million metric tons in September, of which more than half went to Europe, where buyers are rebuilding depleted inventories ahead of winter.

Japan cannot eliminate that competition. But it can reduce the circumstances in which it enters the spot market as a distressed buyer.

The Petronas agreement is, therefore, best viewed not as the solution but as a template. Japan's post-war LNG security strategy should combine geographically diversified long-term supply, flexible contracts, emergency procurement arrangements and a strengthened strategic buffer.

For oil, energy security can be measured partly in barrels held in tanks. For LNG, Japan increasingly needs to measure it in options.