如果早在1998年2月我刚进入中央情报局工作时，有人告诉我日后会坐在昏暗的审讯室里审问萨达姆·侯赛因，我肯定会觉得对方疯了。那时萨达姆仍稳坐权力宝座；在“9·11”恐怖袭击发生前的三年里，我和同事们都觉得，他迟早会摆脱海湾战争后对伊拉克实施的制裁，重新在地区事务中发挥影响力。然而，纽约与华盛顿发生的“9·11”恐怖袭击，以及布什政府试图将萨达姆与袭击事件挂钩的举动，让我们这些负责伊拉克事务的分析员意识到：美国与伊拉克很可能走向战争。
If someone had told me when I started working at CIA in February 1998 that one day I would be sitting in a darkened cell interrogating Saddam Hussein, I would have thought they were crazy. Back then, Saddam was safely ensconced in power and, during the three years before the 9/11 terror attacks, it seemed to my CIA colleagues and me that it was only a matter of time before he got out from under the sanctions slapped on Iraq after the Gulf War and resumed a position of regional influence. The terrorist attacks of September 11 in New York and Washington — and the Bush administration’s efforts to link Saddam to the attacks — showed CIA Iraq analysts that the U.S. and Iraq might be on a collision course that would culminate in war.
有趣的是，后来与萨达姆交谈时，他告诉我，得知袭击消息后他曾寄望于借此消除美伊之间的隔阂。他坚称，华盛顿终会明白他的政权并不会对美国构成威胁——毕竟我们有着共同的敌人：逊尼派极端主义。可惜他完全想错了。最近，TNT电视台播出了电视剧《高价值目标：追捕萨达姆》，这部剧改编自我所著的关于2003至2004年间审问这位被俘伊拉克前总统经历的书籍，情节引人入胜。
Interestingly, during my later conversations with Saddam, he told me that when he learned of the attacks, he had hoped that they would end the estrangement between the U.S. and Iraq. Surely, Saddam argued, Washington would see that his regime did not pose a threat to the U.S. — that we shared a common enemy in Sunni extremism. He could not have been more wrong. Recently, TNT premiered “High Value Target: The Hunt for Saddam,” a captivating dramatization inspired by my book about debriefing the captured former Iraqi president in 2003 and 2004.
当时，萨达姆被捕堪称全球最重大的事件，对许多华盛顿政界人士而言，这更是伊拉克战争期盼已久的结局。当时在华盛顿和巴格达，不少人认为萨达姆被抓后局势很快就会恢复平静，美国也能撤军或转而处理中东地区的其他事务。在萨达姆被捕前，我已研究他的生平多年，起初自认对审讯工作胸有成竹。不过很快我便发现，萨达姆具备极强的政治手腕；只要觉得这样做能改善自身处境，他便能表现得魅力十足、平易近人，甚至还会展露幽默感。
At the time, Saddam’s capture was the biggest event in the world and, to many in Washington, the hoped-for climax of the Iraq War. Many in Washington and Baghdad believed that with Saddam’s detention, things would soon settle down to normal. The U.S. would be able either to return home or to move on to other priorities in the Middle East. I had studied Saddam’s career for several years prior to his capture, and I initially felt well-prepared for his interrogation.
他有时也会表现得漠不关心、易怒、粗鲁且居高临下，尤其是当他认为我们提出的问题——尤其是有关人权侵犯的问题——不值得他费神回答时。随着我们逐渐熟络起来，我意识到萨达姆的生平远比许多西方专家所描绘的“非黑即白”的形象要复杂得多。那么，这是否意味着我们此前对萨达姆的认知有误呢？完全不是。他是个冷酷残忍的独裁者，对敌人以及本国民众都采取极其残暴的手段。
I noticed almost immediately Saddam's enormous political skills and how he could be charming, affable, and, yes, even display a sense of humor if he felt his life as a prisoner would improve by doing so. He could also be dismissive, irritable, rude, and condescending if he felt that our line of questioning, particularly about human rights abuses, was beneath his dignity to answer. As we began to get to know each other, I realized that there were many more facets to Saddam’s history than the black and white caricature that many Western experts believed to be true. Now, did this mean we had misunderstood who Saddam was? Not at all.
或许他的失误在于未能找到妥善的方式来改善与华盛顿的关系，从而让伊拉克和美国都能从中受益。我认为他心里明白，入侵科威特是个严重的错误，这一举动使得他在任期间在地区内以及与美国的关系上都处于弱势地位。如今回想起来，我仍不明白为何美国政府会认定他的政权对美国安全构成重大威胁。事实上，他的势力早已受到遏制。
He was a ruthless and brutal dictator who used ruthless and brutal tactics against his enemies and own people. Perhaps his failing was his inability to understand how best to advance relations with Washington that would benefit both Iraq and the U.S. I think he understood that his invasion of Kuwait had been a grave mistake that put him in a weakened position in the region and with the U.S. for the rest of his time in power. Looking back, I still don’t understand why our government thought his regime posed a significant threat to U.S. security. He had been contained.
后来我们得知，他并未囤积大规模杀伤性武器，也没有积极研发此类武器，更不具备制造这类武器的原材料。此前他试图研发大规模杀伤性武器的举动只给他招来了国际社会的诸多指责。不过出于威慑目的，他仍希望敌人相信自己拥有这类武器。在这场对萨达姆的战争中，真正的赢家其实是伊朗。萨达姆原本是遏制伊朗在地区内称霸的最大屏障；具有讽刺意味的是，倘若他的政权仍掌控着伊拉克，我坚信如今我们也不会与德黑兰陷入战争。
We came to know later that he did not have weapons of mass destruction stockpiles, was not actively pursuing such weapons, and did not possess the material to build a weapon of mass destruction. Previous efforts to build such weapons had gotten Hussein nothing but trouble from the international community. Still, for purposes of deterrence, he wanted his enemies to believe he still had them. If there was a winner in our war against Saddam, it was Iran. Saddam was the greatest hedge against Iranian dominance of the region and, ironically, if his regime still controlled Iraq, I strongly believe we would not be at war with Tehran today.
眼下伊朗正在与周边阿拉伯国家发生冲突，这让我想起曾与一位阿联酋年轻职场人士的对话：她问我是否真的见过萨达姆。我回答说是的，她便询问我对他的印象如何。听完我的回答后，我又问她对萨达姆有何看法。
As Iran lashes out at its Arab neighbors in the current conflict, I am reminded of a conversation I had with a young Emirati professional who asked me if it was true that I had met Saddam. When I said yes, she asked me what I thought of him. After telling her, I asked what she thought of him.
这位聪明、年轻的女士告诉我，她和她的许多同龄人都非常敬佩他——因为他是唯一一个敢于为阿拉伯人发声、站出来维护他们权益的人。我的这些结论都是基于我亲眼所见的事实得出的。不过，正如那位阿联酋女士所提醒我的那样：历史的看法往往会因观察者的立场不同而大相径庭。约翰·尼克松曾在中央情报局（CIA）担任高级领导分析师（1998年至2011年），同时也是《Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein》一书的作者。
This bright young woman told me that she and many of her generation deeply admired him because he was the only one who was brave enough to stand up for the Arabs. I have drawn my conclusions from what I witnessed firsthand. But as that young Emirati woman reminded me, history can look very different depending on where you stand. John Nixon was a senior leadership analyst with the CIA from 1998 to 2011 and author of "Debriefing the president: The interrogation of Saddam Hussein."
根据他的这本书改编的电视剧《High Value Target: The Hunt for Saddam》将于10月14日在HBO Max平台上线播出。
"High Value Target: The Hunt for Saddam," a limited series based on his book that originally debuted on TNT, will be available to stream on HBO Max starting Oct. 14.