
据安全专家透露,以色列情报机构正借助社交媒体收集情报,并试图招募黎巴嫩和伊朗的潜在线人。这些机构会发布针对当地受众的帖子与招募启事。
Israeli intelligence services are believed to be turning to social media to gather information and recruit potential informants in Lebanon and Iran, according to security experts, using online s and appeals tailored to local audiences.
有一个Instagram账号自称隶属于以色列对外情报机构摩萨德,该账号发布了多条阿拉伯语信息,呼吁民众通过保密渠道与其取得联系。
One Instagram account, presenting itself as belonging to Israel’s foreign intelligence agency Mossad, has published Arabic-language messages encouraging people to make contact through confidential channels.
这个经过认证的账号用户名为@themossad_official,发布的招募启事使用的是黎巴嫩口语化阿拉伯语,内容包括邀请民众通过私信交流以寻求新的发展机会。
The account, which is verified and operates under the handle @themossad_official, has posted recruitment appeals in colloquial Lebanese Arabic, including inviting people to explore new opportunities by initiating a private conversation.
该账号的主页上置顶了多个带有阿拉伯语标题的图文集,诸如“黎巴嫩”(配图是武装人员照片)、“以色列”、“摩萨德需要你!”、“安全保障”以及“为你的未来做打算”等。
The profile prominently features pinned highlight reels with Arabic titles such as “Lebanon” displaying a photo of fighters, “Israel”, “Mossad wants you!”, “Protection”, and “Think about your future”.
2025年8月,黎巴嫩国家安全总局曾警告民众切勿与该Instagram账号产生互动。
In August 2025, Lebanon’s General Security Directorate warned residents against interacting with the Instagram account.
在黎巴嫩,多年来的经济动荡致使许多民众陷入经济困境。安全官员警告称,以色列情报机构正试图借助社交媒体实施招募行动。
Fake job traps In Lebanon, where years of economic turmoil have left many residents facing financial hardship, security officials have warned of suspected Israeli intelligence recruitment efforts involving social media.
2025年1月,黎巴嫩《Al Akhbar》报报道称,以色列情报人员试图通过提供高薪的虚假招聘信息,以及通过WhatsApp直接联系的方式来招募黎巴嫩民众。
In January 2025, the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar reported that Israeli intelligence operatives were attempting to recruit Lebanese citizens through fake job s offering high salaries, and through direct outreach on WhatsApp.
退役准将穆尼尔·谢哈德在接受该报采访时指出,这些招募行动主要针对那些真主党支持率较高的地区,包括贝鲁特南部郊区、黎巴嫩南部以及贝卡谷地。
Retired Brigadier General Mounir Chehade told the newspaper that the recruitment efforts targeted areas with significant support for Hezbollah, including Beirut’s southern suburbs, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.
同样在2025年1月,黎巴嫩国家安全总局还警告民众切勿与一个名为“SAWA”的Facebook页面产生互动,该机构怀疑该页面是摩萨德用来招募黎巴嫩民众的幌子。
Also in January 2025, Lebanon’s General Security Directorate warned against interacting with a Facebook page called SAWA, which it suspected was a Mossad front aimed at recruiting Lebanese citizens.
同样,在2025年12月,另一家黎巴嫩报纸《L’Orient Today》报道称,该国安全部门警告居民不要与一个名为“Unit 504”的社交媒体页面进行互动。该页面声称代表以色列军方的情报机构,并表示正在招募有意加入其组织的人员。
Similarly, in December 2025, another Lebanese newspaper L’Orient Today reported that the security agency had warned residents against interacting with a social media page calling itself “Unit 504”. The page claimed to represent the Israeli military’s human intelligence unit and said it was looking for individuals interested in joining its ranks.
这些担忧伴随着多起逮捕事件的发生——一些人被指控向以色列传递敏感信息。据报道,黎巴嫩当局在2025年10月已经逮捕了32名涉嫌向以色列提供情报的人,这些情报被用于针对真主党领导人的行动。
The concerns have been accompanied by arrests of people accused of passing sensitive information to Israel. Lebanese authorities were reported in October 2025 to have previously arrested 32 people suspected of giving information to Israel that was used to target Hezbollah leaders.
针对真主党的支持基础,学术和政治研究员维萨姆·纳西夫·亚辛(Wissam Nassif Yassin)在接受半岛电视台(Al Jazeera)采访时表示,以色列情报机构在这些社交媒体平台上使用黎巴嫩口语化的阿拉伯语,以避免引起怀疑并便于沟通。
Targeting Hezbollah’s support base Academic and political researcher Wissam Nassif Yassin told Al Jazeera that Israeli intelligence uses colloquial Lebanese Arabic on these platforms to avoid arousing suspicion and to facilitate communication.
亚辛指出:“以色列情报机构关注社会的所有阶层,因为他们认为每个人都有可能被渗透;毕竟真主党已经深深融入了黎巴嫩社会的核心。”他进一步解释说:“他们的首要目标是真主党成员,其次是抵抗运动的相关人员,最后才是真主党所处的社会环境。”虽然以色列在黎巴嫩的情报活动中取得了一些显著成果(包括获取用于攻击真主党领导人和成员的信息),但亚辛认为,在黎巴嫩,与以色列的合作仍然遭到广泛抵制。
“The Israeli side focuses on all segments of society because it considers that every person can be penetrated from their own angle, based on the fact that Hezbollah in Lebanon is integrated into the core of Lebanese society,” Yassin said. “It focuses on the party’s members primarily, then on the resistance environment secondarily, and on the environment surrounding it thirdly.”While Israel has had notable sucesses in its intelligence operations in Lebanon – including in gathering information leading to attacks on Hezbollah leaders and members, Yassin argued that collaboration with Israel remained widely rejected in Lebanon.
他还提到了真主党的反情报能力,指出该组织长期以来一直能够识别并破坏以色列的情报活动。亚辛以埃尔哈南·坦嫩鲍姆(Elhanan Tannenbaum)为例:这名被指控为以色列间谍的人在2000年被诱骗出国,后于2004年通过囚犯交换协议获释。
He also pointed to Hezbollah’s own counterintelligence capabilities, arguing that the group has a long history of identifying and disrupting Israeli intelligence activity. Yassin pointed to the case of Elhanan Tannenbaum an alleged Israeli spy who was captured in 2000 after being lured abroad, and was released in 2004 in a prisoner exchange deal.
情报战争 使用数字平台招募潜在线人也构成了以色列与伊朗之间长期情报战争的一部分,这一情报战争随着两国之间的军事冲突而加剧。
Intelligence war The use of digital platforms to recruit potential informants also forms part of the longstanding intelligence war between Israel and Iran, which has intensified alongside the military conflict between the two countries.
德黑兰大学政治学助理教授哈桑·阿赫迈迪安将当前形势描述为两国数十年谍报斗争中最激烈的时期之一。
Hassan Ahmadian, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Tehran, described the current situation as one of the most intense periods in decades-long espionage between the two countries.
“这场是情报战争。伊朗与以色列的对峙已经持续数十年,但近年来已达到顶峰,”阿赫迈迪安对半岛电视台说。“双方都在开展情报行动。这是一场从未停止的激烈冲突。”阿赫迈迪安表示,以色列在伊朗的招募工作有时通过社交媒体上的公开广告机会进行。
“This is an intelligence war. The confrontation between Iran and Israel has continued for decades, but in recent years it has reached its peak,” Ahmadian told Al Jazeera. “Both sides are engaged in intelligence operations. It is an intense conflict that has never stopped.”Ahmadian said that Israeli recruitment efforts in Iran were sometimes carried out through openly advertised opportunities on social media.
“以色列当然会利用在线广告招募人员,”他说。“当我在伊朗时,我会在社交媒体上看到招聘分析人员或从事安全工作人员的广告,有时提供高薪并邀请有意者访问特定页面。”他指出,公开发布此类机会可能除了招募线人之外,还具有心理目标,旨在强化以色列情报渗透伊朗的感知。
“Israel certainly uses online advertising to recruit people,” he said. “When I was in Iran, I would see s on social media seeking analysts or people to work in security, sometimes offering high salaries and inviting interested applicants to visit a particular page.”He suggested that openly advertising such opportunities could have a psychological goal beyond recruiting informants, in an attempt to reinforce perceptions of Israel’s intelligence reach inside Iran.
“以色列使用宣传,但这种公开的方法或许部分是为了放大以色列的存在,”阿赫迈迪安指出。该学者还指出,伊朗曾开展过自身的反行动。
“Israel uses propaganda, but this blatant method is perhaps partly to amplify the Israeli presence,” Ahmadian noted. The academic also pointed to cases in which Iran had conducted its own counter-operations.
例如,2024年10月,以色列当局宣布逮捕七名被指控为伊朗收集军事设施和其他敏感场所情报的以色列国民。
In October 2024, for example, Israeli authorities announced the arrest of seven Israeli nationals accused of spying for Iran by gathering intelligence on military facilities and other sensitive sites.
此外,前以色列能源部长戈南·塞格夫于2018年因被指控为伊朗从事间谍活动而被捕。他随后认罪,并于2019年被判处11年监禁。
Separately, the former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev was arrested in 2018 on accusations of spying for Iran. He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to 11 years in prison in 2019.
将面临严厉的法律后果:黎巴嫩与伊朗当局均警告称,任何与以色列相关账户产生联系的人都将受到严惩。
Severe legal consequences Authorities in Lebanon and Iran have threatened severe penalties for anyone interacting with Israeli accounts.
今年7月,伊朗《凯汉报》报道称,伊朗情报部警告称,近期发生的安全事件之后,以色列情报机构摩萨德涉嫌创建了多个社交媒体账户,旨在窃取情报并散布虚假信息。该部门还称,摩萨德甚至向在美国与以色列对伊朗发动的军事行动中受伤的人员提供医疗建议,企图获取敏感情报。
In July, the Iranian newspaper Kayhan reported that Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence had warned of social media accounts allegedly set up by Mossad to extract information and spread fake news following recent security operations. The ministry claimed that Mossad even offered medical advice to people injured during the United States-Israeli war on Iran, in an attempt to gather sensitive intelligence.
同月,伊朗司法部门也发出警告:向被认定为敌对势力的网络平台发送图片或信息者,可能面临10至15年监禁、巨额罚款,甚至被指控犯下“世间腐败罪”,该罪名最高可判处死刑。
In the same month, the Iranian judiciary also warned that sending images or information to networks deemed to be hostile could result in sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison, heavy fines and potential charges of “corruption on Earth”, which carries the death penalty.
在黎巴嫩,任何与以色列勾结的行为均属违法行为,需承担监禁刑罚。
In Lebanon, collaboration with Israel carries a penalty of imprisonment.
随着这场隐秘的情报战向网络领域蔓延,阿赫马迪安指出,目前几乎没有迹象表明双方的对峙态势会有所缓和。
As the covert conflict expands online, Ahmadian said that there was little indication that the confrontation would ease.
“我认为双方之间的这场情报战短期内不会停止,”阿赫马迪安说道,“这场斗争将持续下去,并继续对整个冲突局势产生深远影响。”
“I do not expect this intelligence war to stop at any moment between the two parties,” Ahmadian said, “it will remain ongoing and will continue to affect the entire conflict.”