在10月27日，从比勒陀利亚到拉巴特的非洲各国政府正在权衡这一结果可能对其自身的外交和国内政策意味着什么。
on October 27, African governments from Pretoria to Rabat are weighing what the result could mean for their own foreign and domestic policies.
加沙战争暴露了整个非洲大陆的分歧，一些政府对以色列采取了外交举措，而另一些政府则维持着商业和安全联系。
The war on Gaza has exposed sharp differences across the continent, with some governments pursuing diplomatic measures against Israel while others maintain commercial and security ties.
近期民调显示，总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡领导的利库德集团及其领导的极右翼联盟，与一个由犹太人领导的反对党阵营之间展开了势均力敌的竞争。预计双方都无法赢得120个席位的议会中获得多数席位所需的61个席位，投票后预计将经历一段漫长的组阁谈判期。
Recent polling has shown a closely contested race between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and the far-right coalition it leads and a bloc of Jewish-led opposition parties Neither is projected to win the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset, with a protracted period of coalition talks expected to follow the vote.
下一届政府对加沙和巴勒斯坦问题的态度可能会影响以色列维护和扩大其在整个非洲大陆伙伴关系的努力。
The next government’s approach to Gaza and the Palestinian question could influence Israel’s efforts to preserve and expand its partnerships across the continent.
以色列在非洲各地的关系受到相互冲突的优先事项的影响。虽然加沙战争加剧了许多国家的外交压力和公众反对，但安全需求、商业利益和长期的双边伙伴关系继续影响着政府的决策。
Israel’s relationships across Africa are shaped by competing priorities. While the Gaza war has intensified diplomatic pressure and public opposition in many countries, security needs, commercial interests and longstanding bilateral partnerships continue to influence government decisions.
外交紧张与更紧密联系自2023年10月战争爆发以来，南非已成为以色列在非洲最直言不讳的批评者之一。南非政府在国际法院对以色列提起诉讼，指控其违反了1948年的《防止及惩治灭绝种族罪公约》。以色列拒绝接受这些指控。该法院在2024年做出所谓的临时措施（其中包括命令以色列采取行动防止灭绝种族行为），并非关于是否发生灭绝种族的最终裁决。
Diplomatic strain vs closer ties Since the war began in October 2023, South Africa has emerged as one of Israel’s most vocal critics in Africa. Its government brought a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Israel rejects the allegations. The court’s so-called provisional measures in 2024, including an order for Israel to take action to prevent acts of genocide, are not a final ruling on whether genocide has occurred.
2023年11月，南非国民议会通过了一项动议，呼吁政府关闭以色列大使馆并暂停外交关系。该动议本身并未实施这些措施，但它突显了对以色列军事行动的政治反对力度。
In November 2023, South Africa’s National Assembly adopted a motion calling on the government to close the Israeli embassy and suspend diplomatic relations. The motion did not itself implement those measures, but it underscored the strength of political opposition to Israel’s military campaign.
其他非洲政府采取了不同的做法，反映了各国的政治优先事项和外交政策计算，而非单一的大陆立场。
Other African governments have taken different approaches that reflect national political priorities and foreign policy calculations rather than a single continental position.
乍得于2023年11月召回了其驻以色列大使，而一些国家尽管对以色列在加沙的军事行动表示批评，仍维持了关系。
Chad recalled its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, while some countries have maintained relations despite criticism of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.
摩洛哥则提供了一个形成对比的例子。它在2020年在美国支持的安排下恢复了与以色列的关系，该安排与华盛顿承认摩洛哥对西撒哈拉的主权有关。尽管公众示威反对正常化，拉巴特仍继续推动发展更紧密的关系。
Morocco offers a contrasting example. It restored relations with Israel in 2020 under a US-backed arrangement linked to Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Despite public demonstrations opposing normalisation, Rabat has continued to pursue closer ties.
9月16日，以色列外长吉迪恩·萨阿尔和摩洛哥外长纳赛尔·布里塔在纽约会面，参加由美国驻联合国大使迈克·沃尔茨主办的三边峰会。三国重申了升级外交关系、将各自使团提升为大使馆并任命大使的计划。
On September 16, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. The three countries reaffirmed plans to upgrade diplomatic relations, elevate their respective missions to embassies and appoint ambassadors.
他们还同意在今年年底前完成投资保护和双重征税协定，扩大航班以包含摩洛哥航空公司，并在未来几个月安排互访的高层访问。这些是宣布的承诺，而非确认这些变化已经实施。
They also agreed to conclude investment protection and double taxation agreements by the end of this year, expand flights to include Moroccan airlines and arrange reciprocal high-level visits in the coming months. These were announced commitments, rather than confirmation that the changes had already been implemented.
对于伊巴丹大学国际关系副教授伊多乌·约翰逊而言，非洲国家的多样性使得预测对以色列选举的统一反应变得困难。
For Idowu Johnson, associate professor of international relations at the University of Ibadan, the diversity of African states makes it difficult to predict a uniform response to Israel’s election.
“非洲的多元性意味着各个国家单独处理与以色列的关系。自2023年10月7日袭击事件以来，非洲的批评集中在以色列对巴勒斯坦国家地位的否认上。
“Africa’s heterogeneity means individual states have handled relations with Israel separately. Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, African criticism has focused on Israel’s denial of Palestinian statehood.
“因此，10月27日的选举将至关重要，因为新政府对巴勒斯坦事业的立场将塑造非洲在农业、贸易、安全和技术方面合作的深度，这种合作将在自决原则和国际法以及双边利益的指引下进行，”约翰逊说。
“The October 27 election will therefore be pivotal, as a new government’s stance on the Palestinian cause will shape how far Africa cooperates on agriculture, trade, security and technology, guided by self-determination and international law as well as bilateral interests,” Johnson said.
以色列与非洲联盟（非盟）的关系也反映了这些分歧。2021年，非盟委员会主席给予了以色列驻该组织代表团认证，引发了成员国的反对。
Israel’s relationship with the African Union (AU) also reflects these divisions. In 2021, the AU Commission chairperson accredited Israel’s representative to the organisation, prompting objections from member states.
2022年2月，非盟大会成立了一个由国家元首和政府首脑组成的委员会，就以色列的观察员地位进行磋商。这场争端持续到了2023年，当时非盟采取行动暂停了以色列的认证，以待进一步审议。
In February 2022, the AU Assembly established a committee of heads of state and government to consult on Israel’s observer status. The dispute continued into 2023, when the AU moved to suspend Israel’s accreditation pending further consideration.
这一分歧反映了各方在以色列对待巴勒斯坦人问题以及该组织处理冲突的方式上存在的更广泛分歧。
The disagreement has reflected wider divisions over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and the organisation’s approach to the conflict.
一个新的以色列政府可能会寻求缓和这些紧张局势，但任何改变都将取决于其政策以及非盟成员国的立场。
A new Israeli government could seek to ease those tensions, but any change would depend on its policies as well as the positions of AU member states.
安全关系可能会经受住外交紧张局势的考验。安全合作一直是以色列与部分非洲政府关系中的重要组成部分。以色列公司一直在寻求涉及装备、监控技术和培训的国防与安全合同。
Security ties may outlast diplomatic tensions Security cooperation has been a significant part of Israel’s relationships with some African governments. Israeli companies have pursued defence and security contracts involving equipment, surveillance technology and training.
但这些关系的性质和规模因国家而异，有关特定协议或技术的说法应当与有据可查的案例相联系，而不应被视为整个非洲大陆存在统一的以色列安全存在的证据。
But the nature and scale of those relationships vary by country and claims about particular agreements or technologies should be tied to documented cases rather than treated as evidence of a uniform Israeli security presence across the continent.
刚果民主共和国为深化合作的努力提供了一个近期案例。刚果总统费利克斯·齐塞克迪于8月31日至9月1日访问以色列，会见了总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡和总统伊萨克·赫尔佐格。双方讨论了安全、国防、农业、基础设施、能源和高科技等议题。双方均表达了加强战略伙伴关系并扩大多个领域合作的愿望。
The Democratic Republic of the Congo offers a recent example of efforts to deepen cooperation. Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi visited Israel on August 31 and September 1, meeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. Discussions covered security, defence, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and high technology. Both sides expressed a desire to strengthen their strategic partnership and expand cooperation across several sectors.
此次访问是在7月27日签署谅解备忘录之后进行的。刚果官员表示，此次访问将审查这些协议，并探讨以色列的进一步投资，包括与洛比托走廊相关的机遇。这些会议展示了双边合作的潜在范围，但并未表明已达成一项具体的新安全合同。
The visit followed memorandums of understanding signed on July 27. Congolese officials said the visit would review those agreements and explore further Israeli investment, including opportunities linked to the Lobito Corridor. The meetings demonstrate the potential scope of bilateral cooperation, but do not establish that a specific new security contract has been concluded.
面对武装团体的政府，不安全局势可能促使其寻求外国伙伴的装备、情报和培训。然而，以色列合作的重要性因国家而异，外交紧张也不一定对每一段安全关系产生相同的影响。
For governments confronting armed groups, insecurity can create incentives to seek equipment, intelligence and training from foreign partners. Yet the importance of Israeli cooperation differs between countries and diplomatic tensions will not necessarily have the same effect on every security relationship.
以色列的外交拓展也在去年12月26日承认索马里兰为独立国家后显露出其局限，当时它成为首个这样做的国家。索马里和其他批评者拒绝了这一举动，认为这削弱了索马里的领土完整。该决定在索马里和索马里兰引发了示威。
The limits of Israel’s diplomatic outreach were also evident after it recognised Somaliland as an independent state on December 26, last year, the first country to do so. Somalia and other critics rejected the move, arguing that it undermined Somalia’s territorial integrity. The decision triggered demonstrations in Somalia and Somaliland.
本月在接受半岛电视台采访时，总统哈桑·谢赫·莫哈穆德表示，索马里不会在任何情况下接受以色列在该国的存在。他补充说，以色列正计划在贝尔贝拉建立一个海军基地，并使用该市的机场，并指出其真正目标是接近海湾国家和伊朗。
Speaking to Al Jazeera this month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Somalia will not accept Israeli presence in the country “under any circumstances”. He added that Israel was planning to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city’s airport, adding that its real aim was to get closer to the Gulf states and Iran.
根据武装冲突地点与事件数据项目（ACLED）的数据，截至其2026年2月非洲概览之时，已记录有110起与以色列承认索马里兰直接相关的示威活动。其中仅有7起支持该举动，全部发生在索马里兰；其余均反对该举动。这些数据仅涉及与该特定决定相关的示威活动，而非所有非洲对以色列的看法，不应被视为衡量全洲公众意见的指标。
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED), 110 demonstrations directly linked to Israel’s Somaliland recognition had been recorded by the time of its February 2026 Africa overview. Only seven supported the move, all in Somaliland; the others opposed it. The figures cover demonstrations linked to that particular decision, not all African views of Israel, and should not be treated as a continent-wide measure of public opinion.
布卢姆斯伯里情报与安全研究所（Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute）的非洲分析师霍萨马尔丁·易卜拉欣（Hossamaldeen Ibrahim）认为，即便政府认为维持关系具有战略价值，公众反对也能对其形成约束。
Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, argues that public opposition can constrain governments even when they see strategic value in maintaining ties.
易卜拉欣对半岛电视台表示：“然而，最强大的约束可能来自非洲公众，而不是政府：索马里兰的获得承认引发了广泛反对，非盟和许多政府重申了索马里的领土完整，武装冲突地点和事件数据项目（ACLED）记录了110起相关示威活动，其中仅有7起表示支持。”
“The strongest constraint, however, may come from African publics rather than governments: the Somaliland recognition drew widespread opposition, the African Union and many governments reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity, and ACLED logged 110 related demonstrations, only seven in support.
“因此，根据其采取的方法，下一届以色列政府要么可以深化在摩洛哥、苏丹和红海地区的战略合作，要么如果继续推行被认为与加沙战争挂钩的政策，就会面临合法性问题，从而拉大国家层面的合作与公众情绪之间的鸿沟，”易卜拉欣说道。
“Depending on its approach, the next Israeli government could therefore either deepen strategic cooperation in Morocco, Sudan and the Red Sea, or face a legitimacy problem if it continues policies seen as tied to the Gaza war, widening the gap between state-level cooperation and public sentiment,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.
索马里兰事件表明，当一项外交举动被认为是对主权核心原则的挑战时，它是如何引发反对的。
The Somaliland episode shows how a diplomatic move can provoke opposition when it is perceived to challenge a core principle of sovereignty.
这本身并不能证明非洲政府将放弃与以色列的安全协议。其后果将取决于所涉国家、其合作条款以及维持这些合作所付出的国内政治代价。
It does not, by itself, establish that African governments will abandon security agreements with Israel. The consequences will depend on the countries involved, the terms of their cooperation and the domestic political costs of maintaining them.
贸易、农业技术与影响力竞争 贸易和发展合作则为以色列在非洲维持关系提供了另一条途径。以色列公司和官员一直在农业、灌溉、水资源管理、医疗和技术等领域寻求伙伴关系。
Trade, agritech and the contest for influence Trade and development cooperation offer Israel another route to maintaining relationships in Africa. Israeli firms and officials have pursued partnerships in areas including agriculture, irrigation, water management, health and technology.
此类合作可以为寻求投资和技术专长的政府带来实际利益，但商业联系并不一定能转化为对以色列政策的公众支持。
Such cooperation can offer practical benefits to governments seeking investment and technical expertise, but commercial ties do not necessarily translate into public support for Israel’s policies.
赞比亚说明了以色列深化双边互动的努力。以色列在去年8月在卢萨卡开设了常驻使馆，此前已缺席52年。农业、水资源管理、卫生、教育和技术被确定为深化合作的潜在领域。此举是以色列加强与非洲国家互动的更广泛努力的一部分。
Zambia illustrates Israel’s efforts to deepen bilateral engagement. Israel opened a resident embassy in Lusaka in August last year, after a 52-year absence. Agriculture, water management, health, education and technology have been identified as potential areas for closer cooperation. The move formed part of Israel’s broader effort to strengthen its engagement with African countries.
一些分析人士将以色列重新与赞比亚互动视为试图培养能够制衡南非在该地区影响力的伙伴。这仍然是一种解释，而非该关系的确立的解释。
Some analysts have interpreted Israel’s renewed engagement with Zambia as an attempt to cultivate partners who could counterbalance South Africa’s influence in the region. That remains an interpretation, not an established explanation for the relationship.
赞比亚有其自身寻求投资和合作的理由，特别是在农业、水资源管理和技术领域；仅凭更紧密的双边关系并不能证明以色列的目标是制衡南非。
Zambia has its own reasons for seeking investment and cooperation, particularly in agriculture, water management and technology; closer bilateral ties alone do not prove that countering South Africa is Israel’s objective.
奥巴费米·阿沃洛沃大学的伊韦布诺尔·奥克韦奇梅教授指出了南非对以色列立场的历史根源。
Professor Iwebunor Okwechime, of Obafemi Awolowo University, points to the historical roots of South Africa’s position towards Israel.
“如果我们追溯南非所采取的立场，可以追溯到 apartheid 时代，当时以色列支持 apartheid 政权并拒绝支持反对少数派政府的斗争。这一历史背景对于理解当今南非-以色列关系非常重要，”奥克韦奇梅对半岛电视台表示。
“If we trace the stance South Africa took, it goes back to the apartheid era, when Israel backed the apartheid regime and refused to support the struggle against the minority government. This historical context is important for understanding South Africa-Israel relations today,” Okwechime told Al Jazeera.
对于非洲政府而言，挑战在于在安全和商业利益之间取得平衡，同时应对公众反对、对巴勒斯坦权利的承诺以及对国际法的立场。对于以色列而言，即将到来的选举将检验一个新政府是否能够在不根本改变助长这些紧张局势的政策的前提下，缓解整个非洲的外交紧张局势。
For African governments, the challenge will be to balance security and commercial interests against public opposition, commitments to Palestinian rights and positions on international law. For Israel, the upcoming election will test whether a new government can ease diplomatic tensions across Africa without fundamentally changing the policies that have fuelled them.
正如奥克韦奇梅对半岛电视台所说：“无论哪个政府执政，情感都不会发生根本性变化。”
As Okwechime told Al Jazeera, “There won’t be a radical change in sentiments regardless of the government in power”.