华盛顿不想犯同样的错误两次。在帮助中国成为经济和技术强国之后，却制造了其最大的战略对手，华盛顿现在似乎决心以不同的方式应对印度的崛起。
Washington does not want to make the same mistake twice. Having helped China become an economic and technological powerhouse, only to create its greatest strategic rival, Washington now appears determined to approach India’s rise differently.
国务院副部长克里斯托弗·兰道在今年早些时候访问新德里期间提出了这一观点。兰道直言不讳地表示，美国不会再次犯下对华错误，即允许印度“发展所有这些市场”和能力，却发现印度在“许多商业事务”上“击败了我们”。
Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau made the point during his New Delhi visit earlier this year. Landau stated bluntly that America would not make its China mistake again by allowing India to “develop all these markets” and capabilities, only to discover that India was “beating us in a lot of commercial things.”
这些言论呼应了华盛顿对印度崛起的更广泛重新评估。两个月前，国务院的五年战略计划仅提到印度一次，并宣称华盛顿将“寻求与印度等新兴地区经济体的伙伴关系，但前提是推进美国的安全和经济利益，避免重蹈过去的错误。”二十年来，华盛顿认为崛起的民主印度本质上对自由世界有利，尤其是作为日益专制和扩张主义的中国的制衡力量。
The remarks echoed a broader reassessment in Washington of India’s rise. Two months earlier, the State Department’s five-year strategic plan made only one reference to India and declared that Washington would “seek partnership with growing regional economies such as India but on terms that advance U.S. security and economic interests and avoid repeating past mistakes.”For two decades, Washington saw a rising democratic India as inherently good for the free world, especially as a counterweight to an increasingly autocratic and expansionist China.
一个更强大的印度也意味着美国公司拥有更大的市场，以及一个更有能力的印太伙伴。因此，印度在美国的印太战略中占据重要地位，该战略首次于2017年提出。
A stronger India also meant a larger market for American companies and a more capable Indo-Pacific partner. India was thus given pride of place in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, first unveiled in 2017.
如今，政府似乎不再认为印度的崛起完全是良性的。印度在美国政策中的角色正在被降级，尤其是在特朗普总统采取更为缓和的对华政策时，包括将其视为美国的主要战略对手。
Now, the administration no longer appears to view India’s rise as entirely benign. India’s role in U.S. policy is being downgraded, especially as President Trump adopts a more conciliatory approach to China, including recognizing it as America’s principal strategic peer.
白宫最新的国家安全战略与以往不同，仅对印度作了简单提及，从而降低了印度的角色。五角大楼的2026年国家防御战略则完全未提及印度，尽管新德里每年与美国进行的军事演习次数多于任何其他国家。另一个表明印度战略地位下降的信号是，六月份，五角大楼从“印太”中删除了“印”这一前缀。印度在美国政策中的重要性下降也削弱了四方机制——美国与印度、日本和澳大利亚的战略联盟。
The White House’s latest National Security Strategy, unlike previous iterations, demotes India’s role by making only a passing reference to the country. The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy, for its part, does not mention India at all, although New Delhi holds more annual military exercises with America than any other country. In another signal of India’s strategic downgrading, the Pentagon in June dropped the prefix “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific.”India’s eroding salience in U.S. policy is also weakening the Quad, America’s strategic coalition with India, Japan and Australia.
随着印度在美国战略中的边缘化加剧，四方机制面临战略无关紧张的风险。自2024年以来，尚未举行四方领导人峰会。特朗普去年对印度发动的贸易战争导致峰会被取消，而今年亦未安排新的峰会。特朗普自身的国家安全战略也体现了四方机制地位的下降，仅对该机制作了简单提及，且仅在涉及印度时才提及。
Increasingly marginal to U.S. strategy, the Quad risks strategic irrelevance. No Quad leaders’ summit has been held since 2024. Trump’s trade war against India derailed last year’s summit, and none has been scheduled this year. Trump’s own National Security Strategy reflects the Quad’s diminished standing, giving the grouping a single passing mention and only in relation to India.
印度的战略 establishment 仍大多认为特朗普只是一个异常。他们视其关税、施压手段以及对新德里的交易方式为一位特别具破坏性总统的过度行为。他们认为，一旦特朗普离任，美印关系将恢复到他上任前的轨道。
Much of India’s strategic establishment still sees Trump merely as an aberration. They view his tariffs, pressure tactics and transactional approach to New Delhi as the excesses of an unusually disruptive president. Once Trump leaves office, the thinking goes, the U.S. and India can return to the trajectory that preceded him.
但这一假设把结构性转变误认为是总统任期的插曲。华盛顿对印度的思考发生的深层转变始于拜登总统任期的后半段，并且很可能会超越特朗普的任期。
But that assumption mistakes a structural shift for a presidential interlude. The deeper shift in Washington’s thinking about India began in the latter half of Joe Biden’s presidency and is likely to outlast Trump.
随着印度实力的增长，双方在贸易、美国在南亚的政策以及新德里在乌克兰战争中的中立立场上产生了分歧，这加剧了紧张关系。特朗普加速了这一转变，并削弱了曾经缓和双方分歧的外交缓冲。
As India’s power grew, disagreements over trade, U.S. policies in South Asia and New Delhi’s Ukraine-war neutrality spurred tensions. Trump has accelerated that shift and stripped away much of the diplomatic cushioning that once softened bilateral differences.
然而，印度已不再是一个战略政策可以被华盛顿塑造的相对弱势国家。自2000年以来，印度的实际经济规模几乎增长了三倍。印度也发展出了自身的工业抱负、能源战略、科技政策以及地缘政治关系。作为一个崛起中的大国，印度希望保留自主制定战略选择的自由。
India, however, is no longer a relatively weak power whose strategic policies Washington can shape. India’s economy has almost quadrupled in real terms since 2000. India has also developed its own industrial ambitions, energy strategy, technology policies and geopolitical relationships. As a rising power, India seeks to preserve the freedom to make its own strategic choices.
战略自主并非印度独有。每个主要大国都会维护自身的行动自由，美国也不例外。
Strategic autonomy is not uniquely Indian. Every major power safeguards its freedom of action, and America is no exception.
因此，问题并不在于战略自主本身，而在于华盛顿期望印度的崛起能够强化美国的战略目标，与德里方面希望确保其日益增长的力量能够扩大而非限制自身行动自由之间的紧张关系日益加剧。
The problem, then, is not strategic autonomy itself. It is the growing tension between Washington’s expectation that India’s rise should reinforce American strategic objectives and New Delhi’s determination to ensure that its growing power expands rather than narrows its freedom of action.
目前，双边贸易谈判陷入僵局。印度希望成为制造业强国，减少对外依赖，并保护其战略产业。而美国则希望获得进入印度庞大国内市场的更多机会——这是全球最大且增长最快的市场。
Bilateral trade negotiations are currently deadlocked. India wants to become a manufacturing powerhouse, reduce external dependence and protect strategic industries. The U.S., on the other side, wants greater access to India’s enormous domestic market, the world’s largest and fastest-growing.
不过，只要华盛顿不把伙伴关系误解为完全一致，德里方面也不将战略自主与战略对抗混为一谈，这种紧张关系仍是可控的。
The tensions, however, are manageable, provided Washington does not mistake partnership for alignment and New Delhi does not confuse strategic autonomy with strategic defiance.
华盛顿与北京的经验有助于解释为何再次出现将印度与中国类比的论调：这段经历改变了美国政策制定者对经济相互依赖的看法。过去的假设是，帮助一个崛起中的大国变得更富裕、更融入全球经济，会使其成为一个更具责任感的利益相关者，甚至可能成为战略伙伴。
Washington’s experience with Beijing helps explain the renewed China analogy: It has changed how U.S. policymakers view economic interdependence. The old assumption was that helping a rising power become wealthier and more integrated into the global economy would make it a more responsible stakeholder and perhaps even a strategic partner.
如今华盛顿得出的教训，并不一定意味着应该阻止印度的崛起，而是美国在帮助另一个主要大国崛起时，应更加谨慎地考虑其合作条件。美国国务卿马可·卢比奥计划于下周初第二次访问印度，这是他在五个月内的第二次访问。
The lesson Washington is drawing today is not necessarily that India’s rise should be stopped, but that America should be more careful about the terms on which it helps another major power rise. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to visit India early next week for the second time in five months.
讽刺的是，中国也在采取措施限制印度的崛起。今年，北京对印度实施了针对性的出口限制，这被普遍视为旨在减缓印度成为替代性全球制造中心的努力。凭借对全球供应链的主导地位，中国限制了对印度出口制造设备、工业零部件、锂离子和电池技术以及关键矿物。
The irony is that China is also taking steps to constrain India’s rise. This year, Beijing has imposed India-specific export curbs, widely seen as efforts to slow India’s emergence as an alternative global manufacturing hub. Leveraging its dominance of global supply chains, China has restricted exports to India of manufacturing equipment, industrial components, lithium-ion and battery technologies, and critical minerals.
印度与美国仍然相互需要，但这种关系必须建立在更现实的基础之上。对新德里而言，考验在于如何在不牺牲自身利益的前提下管理美国的期望。而对华盛顿来说，则必须接受一个真正强大的印度有时会做出美国不喜欢选择的事实。
India and the U.S. still need each other, but the relationship must be built on a more realistic foundation. For New Delhi, the test is to manage U.S. expectations without sacrificing its own interests. For Washington, it is to accept that a genuinely powerful India will sometimes make choices America dislikes.
华盛顿应当认识到，一个强大的印度恰恰因为其能够独立行动，才能成为有价值的合作伙伴。随着特朗普政府要求美国盟友承担更多自身安全责任，美国国防部政策副部长埃尔布里奇·科尔比宣称：“印度是一个模范盟友，它对自己的国防问题极为重视。”美国从中国身上吸取的教训最终或许能加强美印关系。但前提是华盛顿要学会区分独立合作伙伴与潜在竞争对手，而新德里则需要证明，自主性并不必然排斥合作。
Washington should recognize that a powerful India can be a valuable partner precisely because it is capable of acting independently. With the Trump administration asking U.S. allies to take greater responsibility for their own security, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby declared, “India is a model ally that takes its own defense with utmost seriousness.”America’s China lesson could ultimately strengthen the U.S.-India relationship. But that will happen only if Washington learns to distinguish an independent partner from a prospective rival, and New Delhi shows that autonomy need not preclude collaboration.
布拉玛·切拉尼是九部著作的作者，其中包括屡获殊荣的《水：亚洲的新战场》。
Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.“