
每隔几年,美国的枪支辩论就会回到同一个问题:第二修正案是一项绝对权利,还是允许实施广泛限制,甚至包括没收枪支?双方都争论得仿佛答案就能决定一切。但事实并非如此。即使绝对主义者明天输掉了所有宪法层面的论战,政府仍然无法没收全国的火器。其中的障碍包括成本、法院、核实和供应问题,而任何尝试都会使国家本已享有但尚未被量化的切实利益付诸东流。
Every few years the American gun debate circles back to the same question: is the Second Amendment an absolute right, or does it allow sweeping restrictions, up to and including taking guns away? Both sides argue as if the answer decides the matter. It doesn’t. Even if the absolutists lost every constitutional argument tomorrow, the government could not confiscate the nation’s firearms. The obstacles are cost, courts, verification and supply, and the attempt would throw away real, unmeasured benefits the country already enjoys.
首先看成本。美国私人拥有约5亿支火器,即平均每名男性、女性和儿童拥有一支以上。即便按每支枪500美元的标准向所有者赔偿,总额也将达到约2500亿美元——这还尚未计算政府律师、法官或执法人员的薪酬,也尚未支付任何仓库的租金。相比之下,澳大利亚1996年的枪支回购计划仅回收了约65万支枪,不到美国枪支储备量的0.2%。
Start with cost. Americans privately own roughly 500 million firearms, more than one for every man, woman and child in the country. Compensating owners at even $500 per gun would come to about $250 billion, before a single government lawyer, judge or agent is paid or a single warehouse is rented. For comparison, Australia’s 1996 buyback collected about 650,000 guns, less than two-tenths of one percent of the American stockpile.
其次是法院问题。每一次有争议的枪支没收或估价都会演变成诉讼:既有主张政府征收未给予合理补偿的索赔案,也有针对搜查行为的第四修正案挑战,还有对拒绝交枪的所有者的刑事起诉。数千万美国人拥有枪支。即使只有其中一小部分人在法庭上抗争,结果也将是数十万起诉讼,每起案件都有上诉权,而本已积案如山的司法系统将不堪重负。
Then there are the courts. Every contested seizure or valuation becomes a case: takings claims disputing whether compensation was just, Fourth Amendment challenges to searches, and criminal prosecutions of owners who refuse. Tens of millions of Americans own guns. If even a small fraction fought back in court, the result would be hundreds of thousands of cases, each with a right to appeal, landing on a court system that is already backlogged.
作为佛罗里达州税务局的前法律顾问,我深知即便只是一项有争议的政府行为,要应对行政抗议和诉讼也需要耗费巨大成本。而推行此类计划所需的立法、规则制定和行政体系只会进一步推高成本。若将这一成本乘以全国范围,整个政府机器恐怕会彻底停摆。
As a former counsel for the Florida Department of Revenue, I know what it costs to defend even one contested government action through administrative protest and litigation. The legislation, rulemaking and administration needed to run such a program would only add to that cost. Multiply it across the country, and the machinery of government would simply stop.
验证工作或许是所有环节中最棘手的问题。自1986年起,联邦法律便禁止建立全国性的枪支登记制度。政府根本不清楚谁拥有哪些枪支,因此也无法判定谁遵守了规定。实际上,收缴行动只能依赖民众自愿上交,但这种可能性微乎其微。另一种办法就是挨家挨户搜查,但每次搜查都需要有合理的理由,还需执法部门参与——而他们还有诸如打击欺诈与贩毒等更为紧迫的任务要完成。
Verification may be the hardest problem of all. Federal law has barred a national gun registry since 1986. The government does not know who owns what, so it cannot know who has complied. In practice, confiscation would depend on voluntary surrender, which is unlikely. The alternative is door-to-door searches, each requiring its own probable cause and the participation of law enforcement, which has more pressing work to do, such as fighting fraud and drug trafficking.
此外,枪支的供应源源不断。仅2023年一年,美国境内的枪械制造商便生产了近1000万支枪械,进口量也接近600万支。如今,借助3D打印机与未加工零件套件,普通爱好者也能在家制造出可用的枪支。任何收缴计划都如同试图用桶从有漏洞的船体上往外舀水一般徒劳无功;这么做只会让真正的问题被忽视。
Finally, the guns keep coming. U.S. factories made nearly 10 million firearms in 2023 alone, and the U.S. imported almost 6 million more. Meanwhile, 3D printers and unfinished parts kits now let a hobbyist build a working gun at home. Any confiscation program would be analogous to bailing water from a boat with a hole in the hull. It’s a fool’s errand, and real problems would be neglected while it was being pursued.
从实际操作层面来看,上述因素已足以说明问题,但这样做还会带来其他代价。我拥有犯罪学学位,业内学者早已认识到:威慑作用在很大程度上依赖于不确定性。窃贼或劫车犯若无法确定房主或司机是否携带武器,就不得不权衡相关风险,从而很可能打消作案念头。虽然我们无从统计那些从未发生的犯罪,但犯罪学家们深知这类事件确实存在。
The practical case is decisive on its own, but there is also a cost in what we would lose. My degree is in criminology, and criminologists have long known that deterrence works partly through uncertainty. A burglar or carjacker who can’t know whether the homeowner or driver is armed has to weigh that risk, and is likely to be deterred. We don’t track crimes that were never committed, but criminologists know they exist.
这一逻辑同样适用于国际层面。有个流传甚广的说法:山本五十六海军大将曾警告不可贸然入侵美国本土,理由之一就是“每一片草叶后都可能藏着一支步枪”。无论他是否真的说过这话,这一逻辑依然成立。一支军队可以击败另一支军队,但要占领一个遍布武装平民的国家则完全是另一回事,且代价要高昂得多——美国在伊拉克与阿富汗的遭遇便是例证;英国在独立战争期间也领教过美国民兵的厉害。
The same logic applies internationally. There is a well-worn story that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto warned against invading the American mainland, in part, because there would be a rifle behind every blade of grass. Whether or not he said it, the reasoning holds. An army can defeat another army, but occupying a country full of armed civilians is a different and far costlier problem, as the U.S. itself learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as the British learned from the Minutemen of the American Revolution.
瑞士和芬兰将武装公民纳入其国防体系。2022年,随着俄军纵队逼近,乌克兰向基辅平民发放步枪。美国私人拥有的武器库是一种常态威慑,纳税人无需为其维护付出成本。它每时每刻都在带来回报,表现为潜在侵略者从未尝试发动入侵。
Switzerland and Finland build armed citizens into their national defense. In 2022, Ukraine handed rifles to civilians in Kyiv as Russian columns approached. America’s privately owned arsenal is a standing deterrent that costs taxpayers nothing to maintain. It pays dividends every hour of every day, in the form of invasions never attempted in the minds of would-be conquerors.
关于第二修正案是绝对的还是可以受到限制的争论,在法庭上构成良好的法律辩论,也是良好的筹款议题和良好的电视节目,但这与要点无关。没收枪支的成本根本就是禁止性的。政府、法院和执法部门将不堪重负;无法核实遵守情况;而且新枪支将继续流入或被制造出来。
The fight over whether the Second Amendment is absolute or can be restricted makes for good legal debate in the courts, a good fundraising issue and good television, but it is beside the point. The cost of confiscating guns is simply prohibitive. Government, the courts and law enforcement would be overwhelmed; compliance could not be verified; and new guns would keep coming in or being made.
与此同时,武装人口在国内和国外提供了一种无法完全衡量且不应被随意丢弃的威慑。无论你对第二修正案持何种看法,算术和物理已经解决了没收问题的争论。辩论应转向实际可行的事情,例如鼓励枪支安全培训。但那是另一天的议题。
Meanwhile, an armed population provides deterrence at home and abroad that no one can fully measure and no one should casually discard. Whatever you think of the Second Amendment, arithmetic and physics have already settled the question of confiscation. The debate should move on to what can actually be done, such as encouraging gun safety training. But that is a debate for another day.
埃里克·A·德莫亚是持牌佛罗里达州律师,曾任佛罗里达州税务署顾问,在那里他起草了规则和立法,并帮助解决了纳税人争议。他持有佛罗里达州立大学的犯罪学学士学位。
Eric A. de Moya is a licensed Florida attorney and former counsel for the Florida Department of Revenue, where he drafted rules and legislation and helped resolve taxpayer disputes. He holds a B.S. in Criminology from Florida State University.”