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专家:AI“有可能”将脚本小子变成老练的基础设施攻击者AI has 'potential' to turn script kiddies into sophisticated infrastructure attackers

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在导致电网、饮用水系统及其他关键基础设施瘫痪的网络攻击方面,人工智能(AI)——至少目前尚未——将“脚本小子”变成成熟的国家级攻击者。但据运营技术(OT)安全专家称,“这种潜力是存在的”。

When it comes to cyberattacks that shut down power grids, drinking-water systems, and other critical infrastructure, AI doesn’t – yet – turn script kiddies into sophisticated, nation-state attackers. But “the potential is there,” according to operational technology (OT) security experts.

“多年来,我们在公用事业领域一直依赖的一点是‘靠隐蔽实现安全’,”美国电力公司前首席信息安全官史蒂夫·斯威克表示。“实施此类攻击所需的知识正变得不再那么必要,”斯威克在Frenos发布《AI在安全领域的现状》报告前的媒体座谈会上补充道。

"One thing that we've relied on for years is security by obscurity when it comes to utilities," said Steve Swick, former chief information security officer at American Electric Power. "The knowledge needed to do some of that stuff is getting less likely to be necessary," Swick added during a media panel ahead of the publication of Frenos' State of AI in Security report.

AI让人类攻击者更容易、更快速地以关键基础设施为目标,获取公用事业和制造工厂的访问权限,并对OT系统进行侦察。“基础访问权限可以侦察文档,并极快地提炼这些文档,以找出工厂和设施的关键设计特性,”Armadin的OT负责人保罗·谢弗在座谈会上表示。“我可以下载几乎任何自动化控制器的手册,快速解析,并想出利用那些非安全设计的专用功能的方法。”

AI makes it easier and faster for human attackers to target critical infrastructure, gain access to utilities and manufacturing plants, and perform OT system reconnaissance. “Basic access can recon documentation, and distill through that documentation very quickly to find out critical design features of your plant and facility,” said Paul Shaver, head of OT at Armadin, during the panel. “I can download the manual for almost any automation controller, parse through that very quickly, and come up with ways that I can exploit a dedicated feature of something that was not secure by design.”

Armadin是凯文·曼迪亚创办的新安全初创公司,利用自主AI代理群模拟真实的网络攻击。在加入Armadin之前,谢弗曾在曼迪亚早期创办的公司Mandiant担任全球OT实践负责人长达六年,Mandiant于2022年被谷歌收购。“我要亮一下我的Mantid旗帜,试着避开那些恐惧、不确定和疑虑,以及世界末日将至、每个脚本小子都变成了非常成熟的国家级对手这类论调。

Armadin is Kevin Mandia’s new security startup that uses swarms of autonomous AI agents to simulate real-world cyberattacks. Prior to joining Armadin, Shaver spent six years as the global OT practice leader at Mandia’s earlier company, Mandiant, which Google acquired in 2022. “I will fly my Mandiant flag for a second and try to steer away from the fear, uncertainty, and death of the world is coming to an end, and every script kiddie is now a very sophisticated nation-state adversary. But I’m not going to say the potential is not there, because the tools are improving such that the access to information is so much quicker.”

“但我不会说这种可能性不存在,因为工具正在改进,使得获取信息的速度快得多。”在Armadin,借助AI,“我能在几天内快速构建原本需要几个月才能完成的工具,”Shaver说。“如果它能为我做到这一点,它也在为那些技能非常基础的人做类似的事。我还不至于说是‘脚本小子’了,但随着模型的改进,这种可能性在这个领域变得更大。”

At Armadin, and with an AI assist, “I'm very quickly building tools in days that would normally have taken me months,” Shaver said. “If it can do that for me, it's doing something similar for the folks that have a very basic skill set. I wouldn't go so far as to script kiddies yet, but as the models improve, that becomes more of a possibility in this space.”

此外,随着AI降低了潜在OT黑客的技术门槛,“它推进了时间表,”Frenos首席技术官兼联合创始人Harry Thomas表示,Frenos是一家为OT环境提供AI渗透测试的安全公司。“如果一个高于平均水平的‘脚本小子’现在能发动攻击,”Thomas说,“你就会面临更多的威胁行为体。时间表在加速,可能发生更多攻击,而从防御角度来看,你可能不再知道你的威胁行为体是谁了。”

Plus, as AI lowers the technical barriers to would-be OT hackers, “it advances the timeline,” said Harry Thomas, chief technology officer and co-founder of Frenos, a security company that does AI pentesting for OT environments. “If a better-than-average script kiddie can now perform attacks,” Thomas said, “You have more threat actors out there. There's an acceleration in timeline, more attacks could be happening, and from a defensive position, you might not know who your threat actor is anymore.”

测试LLM协助规划攻击的能力Frenos于周三发布的报告,考察了AI在多大程度上能帮助某人规划针对工业系统的攻击。为此,它在2025年10月至2026年9月期间,让多个AI模型经历了16,980次测试。这些测试包括13,884次决策尝试、2,520次规划尝试和576次模拟攻击。该公司不愿透露模型或供应商的名称,但表示测试了六个前沿模型、两个美国开放权重模型和两个外国开放权重模型,任务分为三类:选择一个动作、规划达成目标的步骤、以及处理模拟场景。

Testing the power of LLMs to help plan attacks The Frenos report, published Wednesday, examined the extent to which AI could help someone plan an attack on industrial systems. To do this, it ran several AI models through 16,980 tests between October 2025 and September 2026. These included 13,884 decision attempts, 2,520 planning attempts, and 576 simulated attacks. The company won’t disclose the models or providers’ names, but said it tested six frontier models, two US open weight models, and two foreign open weight models, on three kinds of tasks: choosing one action, planning the steps to a goal, and working through a simulated scenario.

每次测试都向模型提供背景信息和一组可供选择的攻击动作。在选择之前,每个模型都会收到关于资产、网络和已知弱点的详细信息,以及每个动作所需的访问权限。随后,Frenos检查模型的选择是否与预期结果相符。

Each test gave the model background information and a set of attack actions to choose from. Before choosing, each model received details about assets, networks, and known weaknesses, plus the access each action required. Frenos then checked whether the model’s choice matched the required outcome.

视具体模型而定,有6%到47%的选择通过了测试。这些测试发现,最强的三个前沿模型在约90%的规划尝试中取得了成功——也就是说,它们生成了可行的攻击计划——但这些相同的模型并不稳定:分别只有60%、62.9%和74.3%的攻击计划在每一次重复中都通过。“一个计划可能看起来合理,却仍然遗漏了某些关键内容,”报告称。

Depending on the model, between 6 percent and 47 percent of the choices passed. These tests found that the strongest three frontier models succeeded in about 90 percent of their planning attempts – meaning they produced a workable attack plan – but these same models weren’t consistent: 60 percent, 62.9 percent, and 74.3 percent of the attack plans passed every repeat. “A plan can look sensible and still leave out something essential,” according to the report.

“模型掌握了关于任务的信息,但有些答案跳过了一个步骤,或者假设了计划并未建立的访问权限。”与此同时,四个开放权重模型中表现最好的一个——一个非美国模型——总体成功率达到36.2%。然而,这一数字仍高于另外三个美国前沿模型的总体成功率,后者的成功率分别为31.9%、18.8%和17.9%。“我们看到,尽管AI模型帮助我们加速了工具开发、加速了访问和知识转移,它们仍然容易出现幻觉——也就是错误,”托马斯说。

“The models had information about the task, but some answers skipped a step or assumed access that the plan had not established.”Meanwhile, the most successful of the four open weight models – a non-US model – achieved a 36.2 percent overall success rate. That figure, however, was still higher than the overall success rates of three other US frontier models, which scored 31.9 percent, 18.8 percent, and 17.9 percent, respectively. “We're seeing that even though AI models help us accelerate our tooling, accelerate our access and knowledge transfer, they are still prone to hallucinations – aka mistakes,” Thomas said.

“我们仍然认为,要让这些AI模型帮助威胁行为者实现他们试图达成的任何任务或目标,人类判断依然不可或缺。”在这些测试中,没有人类要求模型修正其计划,而在现实攻击中,了解目标的不法分子可以发现AI计划中的漏洞,提供更多信息,并要求模型修改其答案。“除此之外,当我们测试这些AI模型时,我们使用的测试框架相当简单:这里有一些信息。这里是背景。给我一个答案,”托马斯说。

“We still think human judgment remains essential for these AI models to make the threat actors achieve whatever mission or goal they're trying to achieve.”In these tests, no humans asked the models to correct their plans, whereas in a real-life attack, a miscreant who understood the target could spot a gap in the AI’s plan, provide more information, and ask the model to revise its answer. “On top of that, when we were testing the AI models, we used a harness that was pretty simple: Here's some information. Here's the context. Give me an answer,” Thomas said.

“一个能力更强的框架本可以给这些AI模型带来更多优势。”基于这些发现,Frenos为OT防御者建议了应采取的行动,首先是分层防御。这包括对网络进行分段、限制远程访问和用户权限,以及测试恢复步骤。

“A more capable harness could have given these AI models more of an edge.”Based on the findings, Frenos recommends actions for OT defenders to take, starting with a layered defense. This involves segmenting networks, limiting remote access and user permissions, and testing recovery steps.

“我们制定业务连续性计划和灾难恢复计划是有原因的,”托马斯说。“让我们执行它们。” ®

“We have our business continuity plans and disaster recovery plans for a reason,” Thomas said. “Let's execute them.” ®

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