
这听起来或许像是为2026年更新版的蒙提·派森小品:人工智能对决德国哲学家。待解之谜在于,当AI变得比我们更聪明时,身为人类意味着什么。
It might sound like a Monty Python sketch updated for 2026: Artificial Intelligence vs. German philosophers. The question to be settled is what it means to be human in an age when AI becomes more intelligent than we are.
这位德国哲学家是吕迪格·萨夫兰斯基,他写了一部论著(尚未出版英文版),题为《》,大意可译为“第四次打击”。萨夫兰斯基借用了精神分析之父西格蒙德·弗洛伊德1917年的一篇论文,文中指出:“迄今为止,人类的普遍自恋、他们的自爱,因科学的进步已遭受了三次严重的。”一词介于打击、冒犯与羞辱之间。
The German philosopher in this case is Rüdiger Safranski, who has written a treatise (not yet published in English) titled , which translates roughly to the “fourth blow.”Safranski is alluding to an essay written by Sigmund Freud in 1917, in which the father of psychoanalysis stipulated that “the universal narcissism of men, their self-love, has up to the present suffered three severe ” from the advance of science. means something between blow, affront and humiliation.
据弗洛伊德所述,第一次羞辱是尼古拉·哥白尼的宇宙学冒犯:太阳突然成了宇宙中心,我们只是在它周围公转,这与《圣经》给我们的印象截然不同。
The first humiliation, according to Freud, was Nicolaus Copernicus’ cosmological slight: Suddenly the sun was at the center of the universe, and we were just orbiting around it, which wasn’t the impression the Bible had given us.
第二次是查尔斯·达尔文的生物学侮辱:我们并非如《创世记》所言是造物的皇冠,而是与猿类拥有共同祖先。
The second was Charles Darwin’s biological insult: Rather than being the crown of creation, as in Genesis, we descend from the same ancestors as apes.
第三次羞辱,弗洛伊德不谦虚地认为,是他自己的发现:人类的自我“不是自己家里的主人”,因为最终主导我们精神生活的不是理性或意志,而是无意识。
The third humiliation, Freud immodestly argued, was his own realization that the human ego “is not master in its own house,” because what ultimately guides our mental life is not our reason or will but our unconscious.
而今萨夫兰斯基提出了第四次冒犯:这是一个令人震惊的洞见——智力不再能成为让我们作为人类显得特殊的品质,因为由死物质构成的机器将在许多(如果不是全部)认知与智力领域超越我们。这一打击格外羞辱人,因为那些机器是我们亲手制造的。
And now Safranski coins the fourth affront: This is the shocking insight that intelligence can no longer be the quality that makes us special as humans, because machines made of dead matter will outdo us in many, if not all, cognitive and intellectual domains. This blow is especially humiliating because we made those machines.
借助这一框架,萨夫兰斯基切中时下人类与其最伟大(或最可怕)造物之间新兴的心理与本体论张力,直击当前由对AI的焦虑所主导的时代精神——涉及其对劳动力市场、大规模杀伤性武器、社会错位等方面的影响,乃至关乎我们的人性本身。
With this framing of the emerging psychological and ontological tension between humans and their greatest (or worst) creation, Safranski is pitching right into the zeitgeist, dominated as it is by angst about AI — its effects on labor markets, weapons of mass destruction, social dislocation and much else, up to and including our humanity.

许多自认为是人文主义者的人感到担忧。(人文主义最初是一场文艺复兴运动,在一切事务中优先考虑个人的人格尊严、能动性、体验和繁荣,而非上帝、意识形态或技术。)例如,印度作家阿伦达蒂·罗伊担忧,“AI的胜利将是对人性的犯罪。”
Many people who consider themselves humanists are worried. (Humanism, originally a Renaissance movement, gives priority in all matters to individual human dignity, agency, experience and flourishing, rather than, say, God, ideology or technology.) The Indian author Arundhati Roy, for example, frets that “the triumph of AI will be a crime against humanness.”
罗伊认为,我们的处境“感觉有点像2004年海啸来临前的那一刻。还记得吗,在泰国和印度尼西亚,海水从海岸线退去?人们跑出去惊叹于突然出现的数英里原始新海滩,却没有意识到,在远处的海上,一道水墙正在形成,并将向他们倾泻而下。我们现在就处于那个时刻。”例如,她担心未来几代人越来越多地将人际关系和内心世界外包给AI,会发生什么。
Our situation, Roy thinks, “feels a little like that moment before the tsunami in 2004. Remember how, in Thailand and Indonesia, the ocean drew back from the coastline? People ran out to marvel at the miles of pristine new beach that suddenly emerged, not realizing that, far out at sea, a wall of water was building up and would come crashing over them. We’re in that moment now.”She worries, for instance, about what will happen to future generations who increasingly outsource their relationships and inner worlds to AI.
他们还会“体验到解出一道数学题、创作出一件艺术品、文学作品或音乐作品——无论多么拙劣——那种不可能的痛苦和狂喜的快乐吗?”他们还会像我们今天理解的那样,感到完整的人性吗?
Will they “experience the impossible pain and ecstatic pleasure of solving a math equation or creating art or literature or music of its own — however flawed?”Will they feel fully human, as we understand that feeling today?
德国哲学家萨夫兰斯基或许出人意料地带来了一种博学的乐观主义。毕竟,前三次对人类自恋的冒犯,与当时人的担忧相反,并没有贬低我们这个物种,反而可以说将我们提升到了新的高度。
Safranski, perhaps surprisingly for a German philosopher, comes to the rescue with an erudite optimism. After all, those first three affronts to human narcissism, contrary to fears among contemporaries, did not abase us as a species, but arguably elevated us to new heights.
萨弗兰斯基认为,人工智能所展示的是:在经历那三次早期冲击后,我们误以为智力是让我们与众不同的特质,犯了一个错误;实际上享有这一殊荣的是精神。两者并不相同。人工智能或许具有智能,但它没有意识:它不知道自己知道。它也没有像我们那样的内心世界——当我们受苦、希望或恐惧;当我们感到厌倦或尴尬、担忧死亡或产生同情、为道德困境痛苦挣扎,或思索我们是什么样的生灵、这一切的意义何在时,我们拥有的那个内心世界。
What AI is demonstrating, Safranski argues, is that we made a mistake after those three earlier shocks in thinking that intelligence is the thing that makes us special, when instead that honor belongs to spirit They are not the same. AI may be intelligent, but it’s not conscious: It does not know that it knows. Nor does it have an interior world, as we do when we suffer, hope or fear; when we become bored or embarrassed, worry about death or feel compassion, agonize over moral dilemmas or wonder what kind of beings we are and what the point of it all is.
在萨弗兰斯基看来,我们是“活的精神”,而人工智能是“死的精神”。据萨弗兰斯基说,风险不在于人工智能毁灭或奴役我们,而在于我们把它对人性日益娴熟的模仿误认为是真货。
To Safranski, we are “living spirit” whereas AI is “dead spirit.”The risk, according to Safranski, is not that AI destroys or enslaves us, but that we mistake its increasingly masterful of humanity for the real thing.
萨弗兰斯基也是德国浪漫主义作家E.T.A.霍夫曼专著的作者,他援引了霍夫曼1816年发表的经典恐怖小说《奥林匹亚》(注:原著为《沙人》,奥林匹亚为书中自动人偶)。书中,一个名叫纳塔奈尔的年轻人爱上了一位女子奥林匹亚。当她被揭露是个机器人时,纳塔奈尔发疯了。
Safranski, who is also the author of a monograph on the German romantic author E.T.A. Hoffmann, evokes Hoffmann’s classic horror story ,published in 1816. In it, a young man named Nathanael falls in love with a woman, Olimpia. When she turns out to be a robot, Nathanael goes mad.
如果我们把新技术拟人化,赋予大语言模型道德、情感、幽默感等特质,而不去意识到那些仅仅是模型将我们创造的所有这些特质识别为模式、再播放回给我们,那么这也可能成为我们的命运——但仅限于此程度。
That could be our fate too, but only to the extent that we anthropomorphize our new technology, ascribing morality, feelings, humor and the like to our large-language models, instead of realizing that those are merely recognizing all those qualities as patterns that we have created and then playing them back to us.
萨弗兰斯基的论点有一个显而易见的缺陷。他干脆假设人工智能——现已进入“递归自我改进”阶段、能不断让自己变得更好——永远无法获得意识,一旦有了意识也无法进化。这未免过于自大,尤其是因为我们才刚刚开始理解意识到底是什么。
Safranski’s argument has an obvious flaw. He simply assumes that AI, which has now entered the phase of “recursive self-improvement” and can keep making itself better, can never become conscious and, once conscious, evolve . That’s presumptuous, especially since we are only just beginning to understand what consciousness even is.
这个缺陷并不会对他的论文造成致命性的影响。萨弗兰斯基的贡献在于在人们感到焦虑不安的时候给予了人们安慰与慰藉。他的观点让我想起一个关于佛陀的故事:佛陀曾对一位弟子说:“当有人指着月亮时,如果人们只盯着手指看,那将是愚蠢的——因为这样我们不仅会错过月亮,还会对手指本身产生误解。”人工智能(AI)就如同那根“手指”;而人类的本质(即人类的本质与价值)才是真正的“月亮”。
The flaw is not fatal to his thesis. Safranski’s contribution is to provide reassurance in a time of angst. His message reminds me of a story about the Buddha, who once told a disciple that when someone points at the moon, it would be foolish to look at the finger: Not only would we miss the moon, we’d also be mistaken about the finger. AI is the finger; humanness is the moon.