阿拉伯国家在其南部的大型、山地且荒凉的邻国也门面临胡塞叛乱分子的严重问题。沙特一直在该国支持国际公认的也门政府作战，已超过十年，但顽固的胡塞叛军——得到伊朗的大力支持——仍在威胁也门的稳定，并直接攻击沙特阿拉伯。
Arabia has a serious problem with Houthi insurgents in its large, mountainous and inhospitable neighbor to the south, Yemen. The Saudis have been fighting there in support of the internationally recognized Yemeni government for more than a decade, but the stubborn Houthi rebels — with enormous support from Iran — continue to threaten Yemen’s stability and attack Saudi Arabia directly.
这场残酷的内战已持续12年，始于2014年叛军占领首都萨那。自此，近40万人在冲突中死亡，且自2023年以色列-哈马斯战争爆发后，冲突只会加剧。胡塞武装如今频繁发动远程袭击沙特，包括本月早些时候对利雅得国际机场的攻击，导致包括一名美国人在内的十余人死亡，数百人受伤。
This vicious civil war has gone on for 12 years, starting with the rebel seizure of the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Since then, nearly 400,000 people have died in the fighting, and the conflict has only intensified since the Israel-Hamas war began in 2023. The Houthis are now launching frequent long-range strikes on Saudi Arabia, including an attack earlier this month on the international airport in Riyadh that killed a dozen people, including an American, and wounded hundreds.
这对全球经济构成重大威胁。也门位于战略要冲曼德海峡，连接红海和苏伊士运河，全球约12%至15%的航运通过此道。改走替代航线会大幅增加海运货物成本。对沙特自身而言，风险更高。随着霍尔木兹海峡受阻，红海港口延布及其供油的东西向管道已成为沙特主要的出口生命线，而胡塞已对其发动攻击。
This is a major threat to the global economy. Yemen sits astride the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, through which 12-15% of the world’s shipping passes. Using alternative routes adds significant costs to seaborne goods. And the stakes are even higher for Saudi Arabia itself. With the Strait of Hormuz disrupted, the Red Sea port of Yanbu and the East-West pipeline that feeds it have become the main Saudi export lifeline, and the Houthis have already struck them.
那么，穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼王储应向何处寻求援助？最合乎逻辑的答案当然是美国——但美军正深度卷入与伊朗的战争，特朗普政府迄今仍未对沙特提供帮助。鉴于此现实，沙特将需要更依赖其他伙伴——首先是土耳其和巴基斯坦，同时也可能包括欧洲乃至以色列。
So where should Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman turn for assistance? The most logical answer, of course, is the United States — but US armed forces are heavily engaged in the war with Iran, and the Trump administration has so far held back from coming to the Saudis’ aid. Given that reality, Saudi Arabia will need to rely more heavily on other partners — starting with Turkey and Pakistan, but also potentially Europe and even Israel.
对于利雅得而言幸运的是，该王国于8月与土耳其和巴基斯坦达成了一项明智的地区防务条约。这两个同为逊尼派的国家带来了巨大的军事能力——前提是它们能够兑现麦加防务条约中“对一国的攻击就是对所有国家的攻击”的承诺，这很像北约著名的第五条。
Fortunately for Riyadh, the kingdom concluded a smart regional defense pact in August with Turkey and Pakistan. These two fellow Sunni nations bring significant military capability to bear should they fulfill the Mecca Defense Pact’s pledge that “an attack on one is an attack on all,” much like NATO’s famous Article 5.
沙特面临的问题是，胡塞武装深陷险峻的地形之中。也门的山脉是胡塞运动的发源地，这里有支持游击队员的基地、洞穴和隧道。沙特在针对胡塞武装的山地战中一直举步维艰，但巴基斯坦人在该领域拥有丰富的经验。
The problem for the Saudis is that the Houthis are dug into difficult terrain. Yemen’s mountains, in which the Houthi movement originated, are home to bases, caves and tunnels that support guerrilla fighters. The Saudis have struggled in mountain warfare against the Houthis — but the Pakistanis have deep experience in it.
我在北约任职期间，曾对巴基斯坦的边防军和其他山地部队赞叹不已。他们在阿富汗和巴基斯坦之间的群山中进行了广泛的行动，在与印度的持续争端中也战斗在“世界之巅”，并且在山地反叛乱作战方面拥有独特的专业知识。2015年沙特议会投票决定在也门保持中立时，伊斯兰堡拒绝加入沙特领导的联军。但新条约应该会改变这种算计。王储向巴基斯坦寻求帮助将是明智之举。
During my time with NATO, I marveled at Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and other mountain troops. They have operated extensively in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as at the “top of the world” in ongoing disputes with India, and have particular expertise in mountain counterinsurgency. Islamabad refused to join the Saudi-led coalition in 2015, when Pakistan’s parliament voted to stay neutral in Yemen. But the new pact should change that calculus. The crown prince would be wise to press the Pakistanis for help.
另一种完全不同的援助可能来自新条约的另一成员国土耳其。这将是帮助保持红海畅通的海军力量。土耳其人拥有新型、先进的护卫舰和轻型护卫舰，并且在这些水域拥有丰富的经验。他们曾是北约组建的打击索马里海盗联盟中能力极强的成员。要求安卡拉向红海派遣一支庞大的舰队，并以该王国西海岸的沙特港口为基地，将是合乎情理的。
Another very different form of assistance could come from Turkey, the other member of the new pact. These would be naval forces to help keep the Red Sea open. The Turks operate new, sophisticated frigates and corvettes, and have plenty of experience in these waters. They were very capable members of the coalition NATO put together to combat Somali pirates. Asking Ankara to send a significant flotilla to the Red Sea, based out of Saudi ports on the kingdom’s west coast, would make sense.
这位王储还应该将目光转向北方的欧洲。尽管欧洲人迄今为止一直置身于霍尔木兹海峡与伊朗的战争之外，但他们有充分的理由支持沙特阿拉伯对抗胡塞武装。毕竟，苏伊士运河对欧洲经济而言是一个至关重要的咽喉要道。欧盟可以扩大其目前在红海的“阿斯皮德斯”（Aspides）海军任务——该任务目前仅拥有几艘船舰且奉行防御性授权——以帮助维持货物运输和苏伊士运河的畅通。
The crown prince should also turn north to Europe. While the Europeans have so far stayed out of the war with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, they have good reasons to support Saudi Arabia against the Houthis. The Suez Canal is a vital chokepoint for European economies, after all. And the European Union could expand its existing Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, now just a handful of ships with a defensive mandate, to help keep goods flowing and the Suez open.
英国人已经在使用“天剑”（Sky Sabre）防空系统协助保卫沙特领空，并派遣了一架英国皇家空军加油机为沙特的“台风”战机加油。法国正在派遣军队和防空系统以保护延布，由希腊操作的“爱国者”导弹也已在王国上空拦截了伊朗导弹。更大规模的欧盟海军或空中任务可以在这一基础之上建立起来。
The British are already helping defend Saudi airspace with Sky Sabre air defenses and an RAF tanker to refuel Saudi Typhoons. France is sending troops and air defenses to protect Yanbu, and Greek-operated Patriots have intercepted Iranian missiles over the kingdom. A larger EU naval or air mission could build on that foundation.
最后，也是最具争议的一点，沙特阿拉伯可以向以色列寻求合作。据报道，耶路撒冷和利雅得在导弹防御、网络和特种部队方面已经有了一定程度的低调合作。这一合作可以进一步扩大，纳入来自以色列位于亚喀巴湾埃拉特海军基地的海军合作。
Finally, and most controversially, Saudi Arabia could look to Israel. There is already reportedly a level of quiet cooperation between Jerusalem and Riyadh on missile defense, cyber, and special forces. This could be expanded to include naval cooperation coming from Israel’s naval base at Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba.
沙特人显然在应付胡塞武装方面分身乏术，并于近期将他们重要的年度投资会议——被称为“沙漠达沃斯”的会议——推迟到了2027年。他们需要让胡塞武装重返谈判桌。实现这一目标的部分途径是争取外部力量的参与，以在也门叛军面前展现出一个有能力的统一战线。这个战线越强大，利雅得在恢复谈判时手中的筹码就会越多。
The Saudis clearly have their hands full dealing with the Houthis and recently postponed until 2027 their important annual investment conference, the so-called “Davos in the Desert.”They need to get the Houthis back to the negotiating table. Part of doing so will be enlisting outside actors to present a capable front against the Yemeni rebels. The stronger that front turns out to be, the stronger Riyadh’s hand will be when talks resume.