庞大的摇滚一代把账单甩给了自己为数不多的孩子。插图:彼得·施兰克 收听这篇报道 从前,欧洲的不平等在很大程度上是横向的。富裕的西欧人开车出行、到国外度假,而较贫穷的东欧人则自己修理电器、排队买面包。但昔日共产主义国家三十年的追赶式增长,让关于罗马尼亚汽车最高时速是“下坡”的笑话成了过去。
The huge rock ’n’ roll generation is sticking its few kids with the bill Illustration: Peter Schrank Listen to this story nce upon a time, inequality in Europe was largely horizontal. The rich western half drove s and holidayed abroad, while the poorer east rewired its own appliances and queued for bread. But three decades of catch-up growth in erstwhile communist countries has put paid to jokes about Romanian cars whose top speed was “downhill”.
如今,欧洲的不平等有了纵向的维度——沿着家族谱系上下延伸。由于房价高得离谱而无法搬出父母多余房间的年轻人,不知道自己成年后能否过上小时候熟悉的那种生活方式。三十多岁、有工作的人缴纳高额税款,为那些在壮年就退休的老年人支付养老金。与人口老龄化相关的成本正吞噬着欧盟预算的四分之一,随着“旧大陆”进一步老化,这一比例不太可能下降。身为一个年轻的欧洲人,就是觉得自己在不知不觉中参与了一场代际骗局。
These days inequality in Europe has a vertical dimension—one that goes up and down family trees. Youngsters unable to move out of their parents’ spare room due to sky-high house prices wonder if they will ever enjoy the lifestyle as adults which they knew as kids. Thirty-somethings in jobs pay hefty taxes to fund the pensions of oldies who retired in their prime. Costs related to ageing are guzzling a quarter of the European Union’s a figure unlikely to fall as the Old Continent grows older still. To be a young European is to feel oneself an unwitting participant in an intergenerational confidence trick.
如果说欧洲的福利国家看起来像一个金字塔骗局,那么它的“法老”就是“婴儿潮一代”。1945年后二十年出生的这一庞大一代,如今年龄大约在60到80岁之间(妈妈你好!爸爸你好!),他们希望以几个世纪以来第一代没有挑起欧洲一部分与另一部分之间战争的人而载入史册。社会学家肯定会颂扬20世纪60年代,当时婴儿潮一代试图用摇滚乐取代沙文主义。
If the European welfare state looks like a pyramid scheme, its pharaohs are the “baby-boomers”. The bumper generation born in the two decades after 1945, aged roughly between 60 and 80 (Hello Mum! Hi Dad!), would like to go down in history as the first in centuries not to have started a war pitting one bit of the continent against another. Sociologists will surely celebrate the 1960s, when boomers sought to replace chauvinism with rock ’n’ roll.
但经济学家对他们的评价不会那么宽容。婴儿潮一代给自己争取到了丰厚的养老金,依赖的是此后已经失效的人口趋势。这些成本让欧洲变得萎靡不振。今天的祖辈继承的是一个战后重建的欧洲;而他们留下的,是一个因他们参与造成的破坏而亟待修复的欧洲。
But economists will judge them less kindly. Boomers granted themselves generous pensions, relying on demographic trends that have since lapsed. The costs turned Europe lethargic. Today’s grandparents inherited a continent rebuilding itself after war; they will pass on one in need of repair after the damage they helped wreak.
在这场代际“劫掠”中,最显而易见的战利品是房子——婴儿潮一代当年以极低的价格买下,如今价值数百万。没错,他们当时是以令人咋舌的高利率借钱买的——但房贷还清之后,房价持续攀升,他们因此获利。即便按通胀调整后计算,欧洲的房价在短短十年间也上涨了四分之一,租金的涨幅同样快于收入。其结果,除了让婴儿潮一代明明只是运气好却感觉自己像金融高手之外,就是把年轻人挡在了自有住房的门外。
The most obvious goodies in the intergenerational heist are houses, which boomers bought for a song and which are now worth millions. Yes, they did so by borrowing money at eye-watering interest rates—but they then profited when property prices kept climbing after the mortgages had been repaid. Even adjusted for inflation, housing in Europe has gone up by a quarter in just a decade, with rents also increasing faster than incomes. The result, beyond making boomers feel like financial whizzes when they were merely lucky, is to lock the young out of home ownership.
在欧洲,一直到中年仍住在父母家里的人(想必并非完全出于自愿,无论妈妈做的饭有多好吃)所占比例随着时间的推移稳步上升。在20世纪80年代出生的人当中,近四分之一的人在30岁时仍住在父母家里,是20年前出生者的1.5倍。拥有住房曾经是通往财务独立的途径。如今,继承遗产看起来是更靠谱的选择——如果真能等来的话。
The share of Europeans who live in their parents’ homes well into middle age (not entirely voluntarily, one assumes, no matter the quality of mama’s cooking) has steadily increased over time. Among those born in the 1980s nearly a quarter still lived at home at 30, half again as many as those born two decades earlier. Home ownership used to be the path to financial independence. Now inheritance looks a better bet—if it ever arrives.
欧洲绝不是唯一一个老年人住在昂贵养老院的地方。但其“从摇篮到坟墓”的福利国家制度已将更多养老成本转嫁给了年轻人。在美国、日本和韩国等大多数其他富裕地区,65岁以上人群的大部分收入来自少量工作和动用他们在职业生涯中积累的私人养老金。欧洲人提前离职、寿命更长,并期望国家——即当前的纳税人——为他们的退休计划买单。
Europe is hardly the only place with old people in pricey homes. But its cradle-to-grave welfare state has pushed more of the cost of ageing onto the young. In most other rich places, including America, Japan and South Korea, over-65s derive most of their income from working a bit and drawing on private pensions they funded during their careers. Europeans quit their jobs early, live long and expect the state—ie, current taxpayers—to pick up the tab for their retirement plans.
在美国,数万亿美元存入私人养老金,为风险投资和私募股权基金提供了资金,进而使美国公司成长为巨头。在大多数欧洲国家,当下的养老金由当下的劳动者支付,并期望未来尚未出生的劳动者接过接力棒,在父母年老时供养他们。(部分资金来自政府赤字,而尚未出生的一代总有一天也要偿还这些赤字。)这意味着欧洲企业可获得的资本更少,这也是为什么在科技等领域欧洲大型企业如此之少的原因之一。取而代之的是一笔巨大的、尚未偿付的成本,拖累着公共财政。
In America the trillions of dollars stashed away in private pensions provided the cash for venture-capital and private-equity funds, which in turn allowed American firms to grow into behemoths. In most European countries today’s pensions are paid by today’s workers, in the expectation that tomorrow’s as-yet-unborn workers will pick up the baton and fund their own parents as they age. (Some of it is financed by government deficits, which the yet-to-be-born will also have to repay one day.) That means less capital for European firms, one reason why there are so few big ones in areas like tech. Instead there is a huge unmet cost that weighs down the public purse.
当经济和人口都在增长时,这一切都无关紧要,战后婴儿潮一代从青年时代起就对此记忆犹新。但欧洲人口现在正达到峰值——尤其是因为婴儿潮一代开启了少生孩子的趋势。1960年,西欧每名养老金领取者由超过五名劳动者供养。现在只有2.5名劳动者供养每名养老金领取者。结果是,如今的年轻人知道,除了要为父母的养老金掏钱外,他们至少必须部分地像美国人那样为自己的养老金做安排。
None of this mattered when both the economy and the population were growing, as post-war babies remember from their youths. But Europe’s population is now peaking—not least thanks to boomers starting the trend of having fewer kids. In 1960 over five workers supported each pensioner in western Europe. Now there are just 2.5 workers supporting each pensioner. The upshot is that today’s young know they must at least in part make their own pension arrangements, as Americans do, on top of shelling out for payouts to their parents.
提高劳动者与养老金领取者比率的唯一其他现成选项是输入大量移民。但这样做的努力却助长了民粹右翼的恶劣政党,从而毒化了欧洲政治。
The only other readily available option to improve the ratio of workers to pensioners is to import lots of migrants. But efforts to do so have helped poison European politics by boosting nasty parties on the populist right.
不适合年轻人的大陆。没有人会嫉妒婴儿潮一代延长的寿命。(再次向本专栏作者的父母致以尴尬的问候。)但一个老龄化的社会,是一个迎合当下而非未来的社会。法国最近几次总统选举中,选民的中位年龄为52岁,尤其是因为老年人比年轻人更有可能拖着步子去投票。这距离实际退休年龄不到十年。不出所料,政客们已将老年人的优先事项当作自己的优先事项。
No continent for young men Nobody will begrudge boomers their elongated lifespans. (Again: an awkward hello to your columnist’s parents here.) But an older society is one that caters to the immediate present, not the future. The median age of voters in France’s most recent presidential elections was 52, not least because the old are more likely than the young to shuffle to the polls. That is within a decade of the effective retirement age. Unsurprisingly, politicians have made old people’s priorities their own.
当预算紧张时,总能找到钱来保护养老金和养老院;相比之下,推动削减教育和创新领域的开支要容易得多。法国人口智库朗多伊俱乐部(Club Landoy)的经济学家马克西姆·斯拜希感叹道:“民主的未来正日益由没有未来的选民来决定。”
When budgets are tight, money can always be found to protect pensions and old-age homes; it is far easier to push through cuts to education and innovation instead. “The future of democracy is increasingly decided by voters who don’t have one,” laments Maxime Sbaihi, an economist at Club Landoy, a demography think-tank in France.
新冠疫情之后,情况或许本应有所改变——当时年轻人为了 largely 保护老年人而忍受了多年的社会限制。唉,这份人情尚未得到回报(尽管如今已有一位负责“代际公平”的欧盟专员)。法国思想家雷蒙·阿隆曾警告说,一个老龄化的社会将“被退位精神所困扰”。对于今天的欧洲人来说,这种疲惫的情绪显得再真实不过——他们拖着脚步走过又一家被改建成养老院的托儿所。
Things might have changed after covid-19, when the young endured years of social restrictions largely to protect the old. Alas, the favour has yet to be repaid (though these days there is a European Commissioner for “intergenerational fairness”). Raymond Aron, a French thinker, once warned that an ageing society is one that will “be stalked by the spirit of abdication”. That weary mood feels all too real for today’s Europeans, as they trudge past yet another nursery being converted into a nursing home.
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