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半岛电视台

印度选举“顾问”行事隐秘,业务版图扩至美国中期选举Shadowy Indian election ‘consultants’ add US midterms to global footprint

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从肯尼亚到苏里南,再到美国,印度选举顾问正向竞选团队出售雇佣机器人,试图在社交媒体上影响投票模式 [盖蒂图片社]From Kenya to Suriname, and now the US, Indian election consultants are selling bots for hire to campaigns, as they try and influence voting patterns on social media [Getty Images]

在印度西部艾哈迈达巴德一个不起眼社区的一间无家具公寓里,一名22岁的数字内容创作者通宵达旦地工作,为数千公里外的一场总统竞选设计海报、剪辑视频——那是肯尼亚威廉·鲁托2022年的总统竞选。

In an unfurnished flat in a nondescript Ahmedabad neighbourhood in western India, a 22-year-old digital content creator worked through the nights, designing posters and editing videos for a presidential campaign thousands of kilometres away — William Ruto’s 2022 bid for the presidency in Kenya.

拉詹·库马尔制作的内容并未由鲁托的官方竞选团队分享。相反,他每天7美元的报酬创作的50条社交媒体帖子,被发布在隐藏身份的“影子社交媒体账号”上,以使协调一致的信息传播看起来独立自主,实则为鲁托的竞选造势。

Rajan Kumar’s content was not shared by Ruto’s official campaign. Instead, the 50 social media posts he created for $7 a day were shared on shadow social media accounts that conceal their identity to make coordinated messaging appear independent while backing Ruto’s campaign.

库马尔说,就内容而言,他会剪辑对手领导人的演讲或采访以曲解其言论,或者制作包含虚假声明的海报,在选举前夸大鲁托的前景和人气。

For content, Kumar said he would trim opposing leaders’ speeches or interviews to twist their statements, or create posters with false claims amplifying Ruto’s prospects and popularity ahead of the election.

“如果是一位女性政客,我们就直接把她和某人联系起来,以毁坏她的名声。这是最容易让人丧失信誉的方法之一,”库马尔告诉半岛电视台,并补充说“所有有争议的内容”都会被转移到影子页面进行“广泛分发”。鲁托赢得了2022年大选,成为肯尼亚第五任总统。

“If there’s a woman politician, we simply link her to someone to damage her reputation. It’s one of the easiest ways to discredit,” Kumar told Al Jazeera, adding that “all controversial content” is diverted to shadow pages for “extensive distribution”. Ruto won the 2022 election and became Kenya’s fifth president.

四年后,随着美国于周二进入中期选举,研究人员发现,印度的社交媒体机器人和账号一直在为特定竞选活动进行影子发布视频。《纽约时报》最先报道了此类帖子在美国参议员海利·史蒂文斯参加8月4日密歇根州参议员初选前为其造势,她在该初选中败给了民主党中期选举候选人阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德。

Four years later, as the United States heads into its midterm elections on Tuesday, researchers have found that Indian social media bots and accounts have been shadow-posting videos backing specific campaigns. The New York Times first reported such posts supporting US Democratic politician Haley Stevens ahead of the August 4 Senate primary in Michigan, which she lost to Abdul El-Sayed, the party’s candidate for the midterm election.

但美国只是政客们雇佣印度社交媒体“雇佣兵”进行影子竞选的最新战场,此类影子竞选此前已在南美和非洲多个国家展开。

But the US is only the latest theatre of electoral war where politicians are banking on Indian social media mercenaries-for-hire, who have fought shadow election campaigns in several countries in South America and Africa.

近十位接受半岛电视台采访的印度政治顾问表示,此类影子竞选没有任何限制、护栏或红线。

Nearly a dozen political consultants in India, who spoke with Al Jazeera for this report, say there are no limits, guardrails, or red lines in such shadow campaigns.

“我们在操纵选举;别无他辞,”新德里政治顾问图沙尔·吉里说。“选举民主的概念被高估了。选民没有自由意志。一切都在被操纵。”

“We are manipulating elections; there is no other way to say it,” said Tushar Giri, a political consultant in New Delhi. “The concept of electoral democracy is so overrated. There is no free will for voters. Everything is manipulated.”

美国参议员候选人阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德和美国众议员海莉·史蒂文斯于2026年7月27日在密歇根州索斯菲尔德参加了一场电视辩论 [Robin Buckson/Reuters]“隐形权力来源” 政治咨询公司为政客和竞选团队提供如何赢得公众支持和选举的建议。这类兜售政治说服服务的专业私营公司于20世纪30年代在美国出现。

US Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed and US Representative Haley Stevens participate in a televised debate in Southfield, Michigan, July 27, 2026 [Robin Buckson/Reuters]‘Hidden sources of power’ Political consultancies advise politicians and election campaigns on how to win public support and elections. Such specialised private companies selling political persuasion as a service emerged in the US in the 1930s.

随着社交媒体的繁荣,肮脏手段蔓延至线上平台,以操纵和吸引选民,尤其是通过在Meta和谷歌平台投放定向广告活动,触达数百万选民。此前的报告发现,俄罗斯曾使用类似战术影响美国选民。

With the boom in social media, dirty tricks have spread to online platforms to manipulate and attract voters, especially by running targeted advertising campaigns on Meta and Google platforms to reach millions of voters. Previous reports have found that Russia used similar tactics to influence voters in the US, for instance.

美国参议员候选人阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德和美国众议员海莉·史蒂文斯于2026年7月27日在密歇根州索斯菲尔德参加一场电视辩论 [罗宾·巴克森/路透社]US Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed and US Representative Haley Stevens participate in a televised debate in Southfield, Michigan, July 27, 2026 [Robin Buckson/Reuters]

在竞选期间,传播被官方账号视为过于敏感内容的策略多种多样,范围涵盖:政治咨询公司接管政党在Meta或谷歌上建立的现成“影子页面”,从零创建新页面,将现有页面重新包装以适应竞选需求,或选择租用页面。

Strategies for dissemination of content deemed too controversial for official accounts during election campaigns vary, ranging from political consultancies taking over a party’s established shadow pages on Meta or Google to making new ones from scratch, rebranding existing pages to suit a campaign’s needs, or opting for pages for hire.

半岛电视台在印度2024年大选前夕的调查揭露了一个庞大的此类“影子页面”网络,这些页面分布在Meta和谷歌旗下的Facebook、Instagram和YouTube等产品上公开出售——规避了平台禁止利用定向广告滥用影响选民的政策。

Al Jazeera investigation in the run-up to India’s 2024 national election revealed a sprawling network of such shadowy pages on Meta and Google products like Facebook, Instagram and YouTube on sale — skirting the platforms’ policies against such misuse of targeted s to influence voters.

“反机器人支持纳瓦利内”(Antibot4Navalny)是一个匿名的虚假信息研究小组,专门调查并揭露协调的在线影响力行动,特别是与俄罗斯有关的行动。该小组告诉半岛电视台,他们在X(原Twitter)上发现了至少28个此类账号,分享支持史蒂文斯在密歇根州民主党初选中竞选的视频,累计观看量超过700万次。

Antibot4Navalny, an anonymous group of disinformation researchers that investigates and exposes coordinated online influence operations, particularly those linked to Russia, told Al Jazeera that it found at least 28 such accounts on X (formerly Twitter) sharing videos supporting Stevens’s campaign in the Democratic primary in Michigan, garnering more than seven million views.

半岛电视台的一项审查发现,至少15个已识别账户是从印度发帖的。

At least 15 of the identified accounts were posting from India, a review by Al Jazeera has found.

克莱姆森大学媒体取证中心的研究人员还发现,受雇的印度账户和页面正在使用类似策略,支持史蒂文斯反对埃尔赛德的竞选活动。

Researchers at Clemson University’s Media Forensic Hub have also identified similar tactics being used by for-hire Indian accounts and pages to support Stevens’s campaign against El-Sayed.

阿莫格·达尔·沙尔马是《民主的幕后》一书的作者,该书讲述了印度政治咨询公司的运作方式。他说,像史蒂文斯这样的政客喜欢在选举前让选民的注意力集中在“公众视野中发生的事情”上。

Amogh Dhar Sharma, author of Backstage of Democracy — a book on Indian political consultancies’ workings, said politicians like to keep voters’ focus ahead of elections “on things that happen in the public eye”.

“但有时真正的权力正在被行使,完全对公众视而不见,”沙尔马对半岛电视台说,指的是政治咨询公司。“它在民主制度中制造某些隐藏的权力来源,这是最大的伦理问题之一。”

“But sometimes the real power is being wielded, completely hidden from the public eye,” Sharma told Al Jazeera, referring to political consultancies. “The way it creates certain, hidden sources of power in a democracy is one of the biggest ethical concerns.”

肯尼亚总统鲁托在2022年8月9日大选前的最后一次竞选集会上,在内罗毕,2022年8月6日[巴兹·拉特纳/路透社]“小心,隐藏足迹”dia,此类政治咨询公司现在构成了任何竞选活动的支柱,他们的工作成为营销材料,用来吸引其他国家的政客。

Kenya’s William Ruto attends his final election rally ahead of the August 9 general elections, in Nairobi, August 6, 2022 [Baz Ratner/Reuters]‘Be careful, hide footprints’ dia, such political consultancies now make up the backbone of any election campaign, and their work serves as marketing material to lure politicians in other countries.

“我们在像印度这样复杂的选举民主国家交付预期结果方面有着可靠的记录,这现在也吸引了外国竞选活动,”位于新德里的顾问吉里说。

“We have a proven track record of delivering desired results in a complicated electoral democracy like India, which now attracts foreign campaigns too,” said Giri, the New Delhi-based consultant.

肯尼亚总统威廉·鲁托于2022年8月6日在内罗毕出席其在8月9日大选前的最后一场竞选集会 [巴兹·拉特纳/路透社]Kenya’s William Ruto attends his final election rally ahead of the August 9 general elections, in Nairobi, August 6, 2022 [Baz Ratner/Reuters]

Meta(Facebook的母公司)制定的规则禁止用户“尝试或成功出售、购买或交换”账户,或使用虚假或被盗身份运营。一般来说,Meta和谷歌的政策都要求政治广告商验证身份并披露谁为选举付费,尽管具体规则因国家而异。但印度的顾问告诉半岛电视台,这些社区标准经常被违反。

Rules set by Meta, Facebook’s parent firm, disallow users from any “attempt to or successfully sell, buy, or exchange” accounts, or from operating under false or stolen identities. In general, both Meta and Google’s policies require political advertisers to verify their identities and disclose who paid for election s, though specific rules vary from country to country. But Indian consultants tell Al Jazeera that these community standards are routinely violated.

“这些平台有长长的规则清单,但如果你细读其中的言外之意,会发现有几个可以利用的漏洞,”吉里说。当这些咨询公司在某个地区面临限制时,高级虚拟专用网络(VPN)是它们的首选工具。有时,仅仅更改账户的原产国就能解决问题,让身处外国的人也能开展有针对性的政治活动。

“These platforms have long pages of such rules, but when you read between the lines, there are several loopholes one can exploit,” said Giri. Premium virtual private networks (VPNs) are the go-to tools for such consultancies when they face restrictions in one geography. Sometimes, changing an account’s country of origin simply does the job, enabling a person sitting in a foreign country to run targeted political s.

吉里回忆说,去年曾会见过苏里南总统竞选团队的代表,但谈判最终告吹。作者夏尔马告诉半岛电视台,他在研究过程中还发现印度咨询公司在澳大利亚和德国也有业务。顾问们告诉半岛电视台,他们同样曾在印度的邻国开展竞选活动,包括尼泊尔和斯里兰卡。

Giri recalled meeting representatives of a presidential campaign in Suriname last year, although negotiations ultimately fell through. Sharma, the author, told Al Jazeera that he found Indian consultancies working in Australia and Germany as well during his research. Consultants told Al Jazeera that they have similarly worked on campaigns in India’s neighbouring countries, including Nepal and Sri Lanka.

库马尔曾为鲁托2022年的肯尼亚总统竞选工作,他说他在一份月度合同下日薪约为7美元,有些日子被要求交付多达100份创意素材,通过Telegram群组进行协调。

Kumar, who worked for Ruto’s campaign for the Kenyan presidency in 2022, said he was paid about $7 a day under a monthly contract and was asked to deliver up to 100 creatives on some days, coordinated via groups on Telegram.

他说,他从未直接与鲁托的任何代表共事,像他这样的内容创作者从未被告知供应链上所有涉及人员的身份,而这条供应链一直延伸至竞选团队的高级官员。

He said he never worked directly with any of Ruto’s representatives, and that content creators like him are never informed of the identities of all the individuals involved in the supply chain that leads up to senior officials in a campaign.

“无论何时都需要小心谨慎,隐藏踪迹,”他说。聊天记录会被删除,SIM卡也会被频繁销毁。风险是真实存在的。

“One always needs to be careful and hide footprints nonetheless,” he said. Chats are deleted, and SIM cards are destroyed frequently. The risks are real.

两名为鲁托竞选团队工作的印度政治顾问——祖尔菲卡尔·艾哈迈德·汗和穆罕默德·扎伊德·萨米·基德瓦伊——于2022年7月大选前在内罗毕失踪。他们于10月被发现遇害,据称是被肯尼亚一支精锐警察部队绑架。鲁托获胜后解散了该部队。十五名警官被指控谋杀,但2026年8月,肯尼亚高等法院在检方要求终止谋杀调查后,撤销了这些指控。

Two Indian political consultants, Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan and Mohamed Zaid Sami Kidwai, who were working for Ruto’s campaign, went missing in Nairobi in July 2022 ahead of the election. They were found dead in October, allegedly abducted by an elite police unit in Kenya. After winning, Ruto disbanded that unit. Fifteen officers were accused of murder, but in August 2026, Kenya’s High Court terminated those charges after the prosecution requested that the murder investigation be discontinued.

几位政治顾问向半岛电视台解释说,像库马尔这样的顾问所从事工作的隐秘性也延伸到了支付环节。

The shadowy nature of the work that consultants like Kumar do extends to payments, several political consultants explained.

“黑钱是政治咨询的支柱,”一位顾问告诉半岛电视台,因担心人身安全而要求匿名。“我们在国外设有公司,名义上雇佣某人从事杂项工作以进行支付,但这只是一个幌子,用于输送资金。”有多家咨询公司依赖“哈瓦拉”网络——一种非正式的、基于信任的汇款系统,允许人们通过经纪人跨境转移资金,绕过传统银行渠道。

“Black money is a pillar of political consultation,” one consultant told Al Jazeera, requesting anonymity, fearing for their safety. “We have companies abroad that hire a person on paper for random work to make payments, but it is just a front to funnel money.”Several consultancies rely on hawala networks — an informal, trust-based money-transfer system that allows people to send funds across borders through brokers, bypassing conventional banking channels.

至少三位顾问指出,位于首都辖区旧德里广阔的月光广场市场的出口导向型企业,是此类中心之一。一位接受半岛电视台采访、因本报道要求匿名的顾问回忆起两年前的一桩惊心动魄的商业交易。

At least three consultants identified export-focused businesses in Old Delhi’s sprawling Chandni Chowk market in the national capital territory as one such hub. A consultant who spoke with Al Jazeera for this report on condition of anonymity recalled a dramatic business deal two years ago.

这位顾问携带一张印有特定序列号的印度钞票,该序列号作为代码用于识别并领取款项。“我见过有人用10卢比纸币领取数百万现金,”他们告诉半岛电视台。“感觉就像身处电影之中。”他们拒绝透露为这笔特定交易付款的国家或竞选活动。

The consultant carried an Indian banknote bearing a specific serial number, which served as a code to identify and collect the payment. “I saw people use 10-rupee notes to collect millions in cash,” they told Al Jazeera. “It was like I’m in a movie.”They refused to disclose the country or campaign that paid for this particular transaction.

2024年6月4日,印度人民党支持者在新德里印度人民党总部外庆祝印度大选结果 [Money Sharma/AFP]“界限在哪里?”顾问吉里告诉半岛电视台,过去几年里,印度已变成“一个运作这些隐秘政治竞选活动的大型批发市场”。

Supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party celebrate after results of India’s general elections outside the BJP headquarters in New Delhi on June 4, 2024 [Money Sharma/AFP]‘What are the limits?’Giri, the consultant, told Al Jazeera that in the last couple of years, India has turned into “a big wholesale market to run these shadow political campaigns”.

2024年6月4日,印度人民党支持者在新德里印度人民党总部外庆祝印度大选结果 [马尼·夏尔马/法新社]Supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party celebrate after results of India’s general elections outside the BJP headquarters in New Delhi on June 4, 2024 [Money Sharma/AFP]

“就像你从中国买玩具一样;同样,你可以在印度以最低成本操纵世界任何地方的选举,”他说。作者沙尔马用了一个类似的比喻来解释印度政治咨询公司的性质。

“It is like you buy toys from China; similarly, you can manipulate elections anywhere in the world at the cheapest cost in India,” he said. Author Sharma had a similar analogy to explain the nature of India’s political consultancies.

“这或许是全球外包产业的延伸,而该产业一直是印度经济增长的核心,”夏尔马指出。“正如印度在2000年代成为业务流程外包中心一样”,该国如今正见证政治咨询公司的崛起,竞选团队可以雇佣这些公司,将其不够透明的业务外包出去。

“This is perhaps an extension of the global outsourcing industry that has been central to India’s economic growth,” Sharma argued. “Just as India became a hub for business-process outsourcing in the 2000s”, the country is now seeing the rise of political consultancies that campaigns can hire to outsource their less transparent operations.

夏尔马补充说,这些隐秘社交媒体推广背后的操盘手与他们服务的竞选团队之间存在物理距离,这让所有参与者在行动败露时都拥有“合理的否认空间”。

Sharma added that the physical distance of those behind these shadowy social media promotions and the campaigns they work for gives everyone involved “plausible deniability” if operations are revealed.

顾问吉里认为,顾问之所以成功,取决于他们愿意为竞选团队走多远。

Giri, the consultant, argued that what makes consultants successful is how far they are willing to go to help a campaign.

“底线在哪里?如果一家机构能实施肮脏手段来操纵选民——甚至超越政党自身的想象力——它们就会得到相应的回报,”他说。“你越能搞脏,钱和机会就越多。”

“What are the limits? If one agency can execute filthy tricks to manipulate a voter — and think beyond the political party’s own imagination — they are rewarded accordingly,” he said. “The dirtier you can get, the more money and opportunities there are.”

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