如今,美国在海外设立新的军事指挥部并不常见,但在2027年,印太地区将迎来两个。在日本,一个新的指挥部将充实人员,负责该国的所有美军。而在澳大利亚,美国潜艇将从珀斯以南的一处海军基地出海,这是半个世纪以来美国在海外设立的首个新潜艇港口。此举是对美国在亚洲最重要的两个盟友的重大升级,因为它们正为中国可能试图统一台湾做准备。
It is not often that America sets up a new military command overseas these days, but in 2027 the Indo-Pacific region will get two. In Japan a new headquarters will be staffed up to take charge of all American troops in the country. And in Australia, American submarines will sail from a naval base south of Perth, the first new American submarine port abroad in half a century. The moves are big upgrades for two of America’s most important allies in Asia as they prepare for the possibility that China will try to conquer Taiwan.
在美国唐纳德·特朗普政府陷入对伊朗的战争、并日益成为欧洲安全一个反复无常的保护者之际,美国加倍押注这些同盟可能会让人感到意外。但在特朗普的第二个任期内,美国对亚洲一直是比对欧洲更稳定的朋友。他对欧洲和中东的关注,使得五角大楼和美国军方高层中的对华强硬派基本上得以放手悄悄实施长期备案的计划。潜艇基地和新的日本指挥部都是在乔·拜登任内启动的。
That America is doubling down on these alliances may come as a surprise at a time when Donald Trump’s administration is bogged down in a war against Iran and is becoming an increasingly fickle patron of Europe’s security. But America has been a steadier friend to Asia than to Europe in Mr Trump’s second term. His focus on Europe and the Middle East has mostly left China hawks in the Pentagon and among America’s military brass free to quietly implement plans long on the books. Both the submarine base and the new Japan hq were initiated under Joe Biden.
这让该地区感到宽慰。与逆来顺受的北约盟友不同——北约盟友拥有令人瞩目的自身军火工业和两个核武器国家,如果美国抛弃防卫承诺,亚洲盟友则没有B计划。它们转而刻意讨好特朗普,承诺向美国投资数千亿美元。韩国甚至在2025年送给特朗普一顶金冠。这些奉承似乎大都奏效了。但这并不是说亚洲盟友可以高枕无忧。地平线上正酝酿着两大风险。
This has come as a relief in the region. Unlike Uncle Sam’s browbeaten NATO allies, who boast their own impressive arms industries and two nuclear powers, Asian allies have no Plan B if America were to abandon its promises to defend them. They have instead courted Mr Trump assiduously, promising to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in America. South Korea even gave Mr Trump a golden crown in 2025. Much of this flattery seems to have worked. But that is not to say that Asian allies are breathing easily. There are two big risks on the horizon.
第一个风险是亚洲出现双轨制同盟体系。早在2026年,美国的新《国防战略》就宣布将加大对“第一岛链”的承诺,这条群岛链从日本一直延伸到菲律宾。一些分析人士将该战略解读为一个信号:泰国和韩国这两个亚洲大陆上的盟友,如今已在美国新的防卫圈之外。这对自冷战结束以来一直与美国保持距离的泰国来说不算什么大事。
The first is the emergence of a two-tier system of alliances in Asia. Already in 2026 America’s new national-defence strategy announced that it would increase its commitment to the “first island chain”, the string of archipelagos stretching from Japan to the Philippines. Some analysts interpret the strategy as an indication that Thailand and South Korea, allies on the Asian continent, now lie outside America’s new defensive perimeter. That would not be a big deal for Thailand, which has distanced itself from America since the end of the cold war.
但对韩国而言,这将是一场地质级别的巨变。五角大楼的智囊们称,他们只是希望韩国为自身的安全承担更多责任。然而,美国国务卿迪安·艾奇逊在1950年作出的一次类似排除之举,曾引发了朝鲜入侵韩国。
But it would be a seismic shift for South Korea. Pentagon boffins say they merely want South Korea to take more responsibility for its own security. But a similar exclusion by Dean Acheson, America’s secretary of state in 1950, led North Korea to invade the South.
美国正在加倍押注亚洲同盟。韩国也面临着一项迫在眉睫的决定,即有关“作战指挥权”的问题——在与朝鲜的冲突中,谁将对韩国武装部队实施作战指挥。几十年来,这一职责一直由一名美国将军承担。像总统李在明这样的韩国左翼人士长期以来一直在竞选主张,要求将指挥权移交给韩国自己人。现在,特朗普政府的官员正在努力满足李在明及其同僚的要求,尽管一些美国军官认为韩国尚未准备好。
America is doubling down on Asian alliances A decision is also looming in South Korea in relation to “opcon”, the question of who would operationally control South Korea’s armed forces in a conflict with the North. For decades this responsibility rested with an American general. Left-wingers in South Korea like President Lee Jae Myung have long campaigned to have it transferred to one of their own. Now, officials in the Trump administration are working to give Mr Lee and his crowd what they want, though some American military officers believe South Korea is not ready.
2027年关于移交作战指挥权的决定,可能预示着美军的撤离,这是特朗普长期以来的目标。这种混杂的信号可能会诱使朝鲜独裁者金正恩向韩国发起挑战。
A decision in 2027 to transfer opcon might foreshadow American troop withdrawals, a longtime goal of Mr Trump’s. Such mixed signals could invite Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s dictator, to challenge the South.
(注:原文此处有一行插句“America is doubling down on Asian alliances”,内容与前文重复,此处按原文段落照译:美国正在加倍押注亚洲同盟。)另一个风险是特朗普本人难以预测的冲动。他那场考虑不周的对伊战争耗尽了威慑中国侵略所需的弹药,并迫使部分海军舰艇从太平洋重新部署到波斯湾。2027年初那里的局势升级可能会造成更大的破坏。
The other risk is Mr Trump’s own unpredictable impulses. His ill-judged war against Iran has drained munitions needed to deter Chinese aggression and forced the redeployment of some navy ships from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. An escalation there in early 2027 could do yet more damage.
特朗普似乎也不愿保卫台湾,尽管台湾是第一岛链的一部分。5月访问北京时,他曾若有所思地谈到为保卫该岛而战所面临的挑战,并表示他将把对台军售作为与北京谈判的筹码。这让他的承诺显得摇摇欲坠。
Mr Trump also seems reluctant to defend Taiwan, though it is part of the first island chain. Visiting Beijing in May he mused about the challenges of fighting a war to defend the island and said he would use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip in talks with Beijing. That made his commitment look shaky.
起到稳定作用的力量之一是美国印太司令部司令塞缪尔·帕帕罗海军上将,他通过低调的外交安抚了盟友的焦虑。但他将在2027年中旬完成三年的任期。特朗普对其次名人选的挑选,将在亚洲盟友能否继续信任美国方面发挥超乎寻常的作用。■
One stabilising influence has been Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of America’s Pacific Command, whose quiet diplomacy has soothed allies’ anxieties. But he will finish his three-year tour in mid-2027. Mr Trump’s pick to replace him will play an outsize role in whether Asian allies can continue to trust America. ■