安迪·伯纳姆上台时承诺，将对英国水务和能源等公用事业实施更大的“公共管控”。他提出这一举措的理由是，削减消费者为公共服务支付的所谓“私有化溢价”，并提升服务质量。陷入困境的泰晤士水务公司正是这些问题严重程度的缩影。
Andy Burnham came to power promising greater “public control” over the UK’s utilities such as water and energy. His reasons for doing so were to cut what is described as the “privatisation premium” paid for public services by consumers, and to improve their quality. The plight of the stricken Thames Water exemplifies the scale of those problems.
然而，两个月过去了，政府仍未就“公共管控”的具体含义提供任何实质性澄清，仅表示这未必意味着对这些公司的公共所有权。目前讨论的一个选项是建立区域政治机构网络，以监督水务公司。但单凭这一举措，本身并不足以赋予实现首相目标所需的控制权。与此同时，在借款人情绪紧张的环境下，“公共管控”的不确定性正在给受影响的公司和英国政府带来实实在在的成本。
Yet two months on, the government has failed to provide any real clarification of what it means by “public control” beyond stating that this may not necessarily mean public ownership of these companies. One option under discussion is to build a network of regional political bodies to hold water companies to account. But such a step would not, by itself, confer the control needed to meet the prime minister’s objectives. Meanwhile, in a febrile environment for borrowers, uncertainty about “public control” is imposing real costs, both on those companies affected and the UK government.
由于这种不确定性，公用事业公司本应用于融资投资的债券发行被推迟，且成本正在上升。
As a result of this uncertainty, bond issues by utility companies that would have financed investment are being deferred and their costs are rising.
泰晤士水务公司目前处于停滞状态，部分原因在于无人知晓其最终拟定的所有权和监管结构将是什么。由于公共所有权尚未被排除，其可能带来的巨大成本成为加剧英国政府债务市场压力的另一因素。
Thames Water is in a state of suspended animation in part because no one knows what its ultimate proposed ownership and regulatory structure will be. With public ownership not having been ruled out, its potentially significant cost is another factor adding to pressures in UK government debt markets.
面对不断攀升的成本，政府有充分理由迅速澄清其意图。为了以合理的成本确保尽可能优质的公共服务，公用事业的“公共管控”究竟应作何解？
In the face of these mounting costs, there is a strong case for the government to quickly clarify its intentions. What should it mean by public control of utilities, in order to secure the best possible services at a reasonable cost?
良好的治理通常涉及在激励与专业能力之间寻求适当平衡。对于公共服务而言，这意味着建立一套与顾客——即公众——利益高度一致的激励机制，同时具备有效提供服务的专业能力。
Good governance typically involves seeking an appropriate balance between incentives and expertise. For public services, this means a set of incentives well aligned with the interests of customers – namely, the general public – while having the expertise to deliver services effectively.
这凸显了私有化模式的种种弊端。以泰晤士水务公司（Thames Water）为例：该公司由一个投资者联盟拥有，其中包含许多杠杆率极高的对冲基金。虽然该公司的治理结构中不乏优秀的金融专家，但这种高度“创新”（且充满杠杆风险的）融资模式显然并不适合运营低风险的公共事业企业；投资者的利益诉求与公共利益严重脱节。
This underlines the perils of the privatised model. For example, Thames Water is owned by a consortium of investors, including highly leveraged hedge funds. This governance structure has no shortage of high-quality financial expertise. Unfortunately, this highly “innovative” (and leveraged) financing structure is singularly ill-suited to a low-risk public utility; investor incentives are horribly misaligned with the public good.
全面国有化则面临截然相反的问题：在这种情况下，根据法律规定，公司的经营目标会与公共利益保持一致。然而，由于缺乏商业纪律和专业管理能力，公司很难被高效、专业地运营。从英国铁路（British Rail）、英国钢铁（British Steel）到英国莱兰汽车（British Leyland）的过往经验都证明了这一风险。
Full nationalisation faces the opposite problems. In this scenario, the company’s incentives would be aligned, by statute, with the public good. But without commercial discipline and expertise, there are fewer reasons to expect it to be run expertly and efficiently. Past experience – from British Rail to British Steel to British Leyland – demonstrates this risk.
因此，对于公共事业企业而言，“公共控制”应意味着建立那些其治理目标与公众利益相一致的治理结构。但这并不意味着公共部门必须直接拥有或运营这些企业。这种错误的观念正在给英国（以及相关公共事业企业）带来巨大损失，必须尽快予以摒弃。
For public utilities, then, “public control” should mean seeking governance structures with aims that are aligned with those of the general public. This should not be mistaken to mean that the public sector itself should necessarily play a central role in owning or operating the company. This erroneous belief is costing the UK (and the utilities) dear, and needs dismissing once and for all.
那么，在国有化和私有化这两种极端模式之外，还有哪些更合适的治理结构呢？最简单、最有效的办法是将公共事业企业转变为以提供高质量服务为首要目标的公益型企业，将盈利能力置于次要位置。这样一来，就能使企业的利益诉求与公众利益保持一致。
Having done so, what alternative governance structures strike a better balance than the extremes of nationalisation or privatisation? Aligning the incentives of utilities with those of the public could be done most easily and effectively by turning them into public-benefit companies with a primary, constitutional objective of delivering high-quality services, with profitability subordinate to that broader aim.
这一方案的优势在于：它可以在现有的所有权和许可制度框架内得以实施。虽然可能存在一定的法律挑战，但原则上无需向那些在投资时就已经考虑过相关监管风险的股东支付高额补偿。政府本身可以以象征性的价格（例如1英镑）购买“特别股份”，这种做法曾被用于维持BAE Systems和Rolls-Royce（以及后来的Royal Mail）的国有控股地位。
This has the advantage that it could be introduced within the current ownership and licensing regime. While not without potential legal challenge, in principle it would not require expensive compensation to shareholders who have already considered a level of regulatory risk when making their investment. The government itself could take a special or “golden share” at a nominal cost of £1, of the type used to maintain BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce (and latterly Royal Mail) in domestic ownership.
重要的是，这些公用事业公司不仅需要达到“利益相关者企业”（B Corps）的标准（即必须展现出高水平的社会与环境绩效、透明度及问责性），还需要满足更加严格的治理要求；这些治理要求会根据它们的具体需求和标准进行定制。这些要求可以是现成的（例如，Ofgem已经要求能源公司遵守某些国际环境标准），或者由利益相关者共同制定行业-specific的标准。
Importantly, the utility companies would go beyond “benefit” or B Corps (obliged to display high standards of social and environmental performance, transparency and accountability), and instead would have more demanding governance requirements, tailored to their needs and standards. These could be taken off the shelf – for example, Ofgem already requires energy companies to comply with certain international environmental standards – or alternatively, stakeholders could work together to develop industry-specific standards.
在这个核心框架的基础上，还有多种方式可以进一步完善治理机制。例如，可以要求这些公用事业公司将其部分股份公开上市交易，以提高透明度和市场纪律性；事实证明，公开上市的公用事业公司在各项指标上的表现通常优于其他类型的公司。
With this core structure, there are various ways the governance regime could be enhanced. For example, utilities could be required to have a minimum fraction of their shares publicly listed and traded, which would help transparency and market discipline. Publicly quoted utilities have tended to outperform the alternatives across all metrics.
为了进一步激发公众的积极性，还可以将高管薪酬与公共利益成果挂钩；此外，还可以要求每家公用事业公司设立独立的客户咨询机构，并在公司的所有决策过程中充分考虑客户的意见。在众多公用事业企业的实践中，都有充分证据表明客户的参与确实能够改善公司的运营成果。
To strengthen further public incentives, executive pay could be linked to public-benefit outcomes. This could also be achieved by requiring each utility to create an independent customer group and incorporating its views in all dimensions of the companies’ decision-making. There is good evidence across the utilities of customer involvement improving outcomes.
最后，这意味着监管文化和架构将发生范式转变。当前的监管体系在监管俘获与相互不信任之间摇摆不定，其失败已显而易见。公益公用事业将在宪法层面被要求追求与公共利益监管者相同的目标。当监管者和被监管者都将提供高质量公共服务置于优先地位时，公开账簿会计将成为常规做法。
Lastly, this would imply a paradigm shift in the culture and architecture of regulation, currently alternating between regulatory capture and mutual distrust, which has palpably failed. Public-benefit utilities would be constitutionally obliged to want the same outcomes as public-interest regulators. Open-book accounting would be routine as regulator and regulated both prioritised the delivery of high-quality public services.
政府亟需就公共控制的意图作出明确说明，以免不确定性给脆弱的公用事业和公共财政带来进一步的成本。我们认为，公益结构能够在公共产品激励与运营专长之间实现更优的平衡，同时大幅降低消费者、投资者和政府所承担的成本。其成本将以英镑为单位衡量，而非数亿英镑。伯纳姆因敢于与众不同而赢得权力。在切实可行的范围内，敢于与众不同也应指导他对公用事业公共控制问题的处理方式。
There is an urgent need for the government to clarify its intention around public control before uncertainty imposes further costs on fragile utilities and public finances alike. A public-benefit structure would, we believe, achieve a much better balance between public-good incentives and operational expertise at a much lower cost for consumers, investors and the government. It would be measured in single pounds rather than hundreds of millions. Burnham won power by daring to be different. Daring to be different – within practical bounds – should also inform his approach to public control of utilities.
威尔·哈顿是一名记者和政治经济学家，也是“我们社会”播客的主持人。安迪·霍尔丹是英国商会主席，曾任英格兰银行首席经济学家。
Will Hutton is a journalist and political economist and host of the We Society podcast. Andy Haldane is president of the British Chambers of Commerce and a former chief economist of the Bank of England