有很多理由让人相信民主党即将在中期选举中大获全胜。唐纳德·特朗普的平均工作支持率低于40%,比2018年中期选举时低约5个百分点,那次选举被视为一场“蓝色浪潮”。他的威权主义行径持续主导媒体报道,他及其家族看似腐败的行为也是如此。在通用国会选票民调平均值中,民主党领先近9个百分点,与2018年众议院选举的全国普选票差距持平。9月份的参议院竞选民调显示,民主党在六个由共和党把持的州领先,超过了夺取控制权所需的四个席位。汽油和食品价格居高不下,公众普遍将其归咎于特朗普笨拙的关税政策和与伊朗的鲁莽对抗。
There are lots of reasons to believe Democrats are about to crush the midterm elections. Donald Trump’s average job approval is below 40 percent, about 5 points lower than it was in the 2018 midterms, which were deemed a “Blue Wave.” His authoritarian antics continue to dominate media coverage, as does seemingly corrupt behavior from him and his family. Democrats are ahead in the generic congressional ballot poll average by nearly 9 points, matching the national popular vote margin for the 2018 House elections. In September polling of Senate races, Democrats lead in six states with Republican-held seats, more than the four needed to take control. Gas and food prices remain high, which the public broadly blames on Trump’s ham-fisted tariffs and blunderbuss war with Iran.
有数百万个理由让人相信共和党将挡住蓝色浪潮:具体来说,就是他们投入数亿美元的政治广告资金,将民主党候选人描绘成激进社会主义者。由于民主党需要在特朗普2024年大胜的州和选区获胜,决定结果的右倾选民很可能会被这场负面广告狂潮所左右。此外,民主党在大多数参议院民调中的领先优势通常在误差范围内,且共和党在选举日表现优于民调的先例比比皆是。但有一个因素可能压倒一切:实际可支配收入的下降。
There are millions of reasons to believe Republicans are going to hold off a Blue Wave: specifically, the hundreds of millions of dollars they are flooding into political advertising to paint Democratic candidates as radical socialists. As Democrats need wins in states and districts where Trump won comfortably in 2024, the right-leaning voters who will determine the outcomes may well be swayed by the negative advertising avalanche. Furthermore, the Democratic margins in most Senate polling are usually within the margin of error, and there is plenty of precedent for Republicans to outperform polls on Election Day.
实际可支配收入衡量的是人们税后收入经通胀调整后的水平。长期追踪实际可支配收入与中期选举结果关联性的政治学家塞思·马斯凯特,如今经营着一份 Substack 通讯。早在 2010 年,《大西洋月刊》的德里克·汤普森在评述马斯凯特的研究时指出:“这虽非完美相关,但趋势显而易见。当民众感觉更富有时,他们会奖励执政党。”
But one factor may outweigh the rest: the decline in real disposable income. Real disposable income measures how much money people have after taxes, adjusted for inflation. Seth Masket, the political scientist who now publishes a Substack newsletter has long tracked the correlation between real disposable income and midterm election outcomes. As The Atlantic’s Derek Thompson observed about Masket’s research back in 2010, “It’s not perfect correlation, but the trend is clear. When folks feel richer, they reward the party in power.” This May, Masket offered a midterm forecast largely based on the specific metric he uses, “growth in per capita real disposable income between the second quarter of the year before the election and the first quarter of the election year,” which came in at a limp 0.4 percent. The model projected a 46-seat net gain for House Democrats, though even Masket said he would consider it surprising if that exact number came to pass.
今年 5 月,马斯凯特基于其特定指标——“选举前一年第二季度至选举年第一季度的人均实际可支配收入增长率”发布了中期选举预测,该数值仅为疲软的 0.4%。模型预测众议院民主党人将净增 46 个席位,尽管马斯凯特本人也表示,若真出现这一确切数字,他会感到惊讶。允许我补充一个数据点:选举年第二季度。
Real disposable income measures how much money people have after taxes, adjusted for inflation. Seth Masket, the political scientist who now publishes a Substack newsletter has long tracked the correlation between real disposable income and midterm election outcomes. As The Atlantic’s Derek Thompson observed about Masket’s research back in 2010, “It’s not perfect correlation, but the trend is clear. When folks feel richer, they reward the party in power.” This May, Masket offered a midterm forecast largely based on the specific metric he uses, “growth in per capita real disposable income between the second quarter of the year before the election and the first quarter of the election year,” which came in at a limp 0.4 percent. The model projected a 46-seat net gain for House Democrats, though even Masket said he would consider it surprising if that exact number came to pass.
2026 年第二季度人均实际可支配收入遭受重创,较前一季度增长率为负 0.4%。就在第二季度伊始前,唐纳德·特朗普下令袭击伊朗,油价飙升。
Allow me to add a data point: the second quarter of the election year. Per capita real disposable income took a big hit in the second quarter of 2026, with growth coming in at negative 0.4 percent compared to the prior quarter.
若以中期选举前一年第三季度至选举年第二季度的人均实际可支配收入增速为衡量标准,2025-2026 年该数值同样为负:-0.5%。
And what happened just before the second quarter began? Donald Trump attacked Iran, and oil prices skyrocketed. If we look at growth in per capita real disposable income from the 3rd quarter in the year before a midterm to the 2nd quarter in the year of the midterm, the 2025-2026 number is also negative: -0.5 percent.
此类下降极为罕见。我们即将迎来自 1950 年以来的第 20 次中期选举。仅在四次选举中,从前一年第三季度到选举年第二季度,人均实际可支配收入出现了萎缩。
Any such decline is unusual. We’re about to hold the 20th midterm election since 1950. In only four of these, from the period of third quarter to the second quarter, did per-capita real disposable income shrink.
在这些中期选举中,1958年和1974年并列为过去75年来最大的“蓝色浪潮”,每次都让民主党净增48个众议院席位。第三次是2022年拜登总统任内,当时高企的通胀吞噬了薪资,但马斯凯特指出这是一个巨大的异常值,执政党仅失去了9个众议院席位。他将有限的失利归因于一批特朗普支持的极端候选人毫无根据地炒作选举欺诈,以及右翼主导的最高法院推翻“罗诉韦德案”引发的反弹。我要补充的是,最严重的通胀飙升已经结束;2022年第二季度的降幅不如前四个季度,而接下来的一个季度转为正增长。换句话说,走势正朝着正确的方向发展。
Two of those midterms, 1958 and 1974, tie for the biggest Blue Waves of the last 75 years, each netting Democrats 48 House seats. A third was in 2022 during the Joe Biden presidency, when red-hot inflation chewed up paychecks, but Masket notes it as a massive outlier, with the president’s party coughing up only nine House seats. He attributes the limited losses to a slew of Trump-backed extremist candidates baselessly flogging election fraud and backlash over the right-wing Supreme Court ending Roe v. Wade. I would add that the worst of the inflation spike had ended; 2022’s second quarter decline was not as bad as the preceding four, and the following quarter was positive. In other words, the trajectory was moving in the right direction.
第四个案例是1954年中期选举,反对党民主党净增18个席位,相对温和,略低于二战以来非执政党在中期选举中的平均表现。那年在另一个方面与今年相似:1954年大选日前,民主党已拥有213个众议院席位,接近多数派地位,因此再增18席便夺得了控制权。当一个党派手中已握有相当数量的席位时,要取得大幅增席会更难。如今民主党起步同样拥有215席,这是压低预期的充分理由。
The fourth case is the 1954 midterm, which produced a relatively modest net gain of 18 for the opposition Democrats, slightly below the post-World War II midterm election average for the party not occupying the White House. That year is like this year in one other respect: ahead of Election Day in 1954, Democrats were already close to a House majority with 213 seats, so 18 more than did the trick to gain control. A party can have a tougher time scoring big gains when it already has a good number in hand. Today, Democrats start with a similar 215, a sound reason to contain expectations.
因此,我不会仅凭实际可支配收入的下降趋势来预测民主党能赢得多少席位。但若运用奥卡姆剃刀原理,对所有极度有利于民主党的民调数据的一个简单解释是:民众正在失去可支配收入,他们怪罪——且有充分理由,归功于特朗普的关税和与伊朗的冲突——执政党。
So I won’t predict a number of Democratic pickups based on the downward trajectory of real disposable income alone. But to apply some Occam’s razor logic, a simple explanation for all the wildly Democratic-friendly poll data is that the people are losing disposable income and they blame—and with good reason thanks to Trump’s tariffs and war with Iran—the party in power.
此外,如果普通选民感到愤怒,并将购买力下降归咎于共和党政策,那么共和党将很难让他们对其他事情感到愤怒——无论是阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德与一位激进的Twitch主播一起竞选,还是詹姆斯·塔拉里科捍卫跨性别者权利的记录——无论他们花多少钱。
Moreover, if the general electorate is angry and attributes weakened purchasing power to Republican policies, then Republicans will have a difficult time getting them mad about something else—whether it’s Abdul El-Sayed campaigning with a radical Twitch streamer or James Talarico’s record of defending transgender rights—no matter how much money they spend. Amy Walter, of The Cook Political Report with Amy Walter, recently shared that, “Democratic and Republican operatives we spoke with this week told us that, at this point, attack ads against Democrats were not yet ‘moving the needle’ in the races they were tracking. Democratic candidates, for the most part, appear to be withstanding the deluge of advertising so far.” The decline in disposable income is not happening in a vacuum. As noted earlier, Trump’s average job approval is below 40 percent, worse than it was ahead of the 2018 midterm when Democrats netted 41 House seats (but net lost two Senate seats). Yet he is as incorrigible as ever, generating negative headlines—and free footage for Democratic admakers—on a daily basis. Instead of alleviating cost pressures on households heading into the fall campaign season, Trump escalated the trade war with Canada, shrugged off his failure to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, and has stood by impotently as the Saudi Arabia-Yemen conflict spirals out of control and further chokes oil supply lanes. The swingy Latino vote is recoiling at Republicans because of Trump’s wanton mass deportation policies and violent—sometimes deadly—behavior of his immigration enforcers.
《与艾米·沃尔特共同主持的库克政治报告》的艾米·沃尔特最近表示:“我们本周交谈的民主党和共和党操盘手告诉我们,到目前为止,针对民主党人的攻击性广告在他们追踪的竞选中尚未‘产生实质性影响’。总体而言,民主党候选人似乎迄今为止一直在抵御广告轰炸。”
Moreover, if the general electorate is angry and attributes weakened purchasing power to Republican policies, then Republicans will have a difficult time getting them mad about something else—whether it’s Abdul El-Sayed campaigning with a radical Twitch streamer or James Talarico’s record of defending transgender rights—no matter how much money they spend. Amy Walter, of The Cook Political Report with Amy Walter, recently shared that, “Democratic and Republican operatives we spoke with this week told us that, at this point, attack ads against Democrats were not yet ‘moving the needle’ in the races they were tracking. Democratic candidates, for the most part, appear to be withstanding the deluge of advertising so far.” The decline in disposable income is not happening in a vacuum. As noted earlier, Trump’s average job approval is below 40 percent, worse than it was ahead of the 2018 midterm when Democrats netted 41 House seats (but net lost two Senate seats). Yet he is as incorrigible as ever, generating negative headlines—and free footage for Democratic admakers—on a daily basis. Instead of alleviating cost pressures on households heading into the fall campaign season, Trump escalated the trade war with Canada, shrugged off his failure to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, and has stood by impotently as the Saudi Arabia-Yemen conflict spirals out of control and further chokes oil supply lanes. The swingy Latino vote is recoiling at Republicans because of Trump’s wanton mass deportation policies and violent—sometimes deadly—behavior of his immigration enforcers.
可支配收入的下降不是在真空中发生的。如前所述,特朗普的平均工作支持率低于40%,比2018年中期选举前更差,当时民主党净增41个众议院席位(但净失两个参议院席位)。然而,他依然故我,每天都制造负面新闻标题——并为民主党广告制作人提供免费素材。
Moreover, if the general electorate is angry and attributes weakened purchasing power to Republican policies, then Republicans will have a difficult time getting them mad about something else—whether it’s Abdul El-Sayed campaigning with a radical Twitch streamer or James Talarico’s record of defending transgender rights—no matter how much money they spend. Amy Walter, of The Cook Political Report with Amy Walter, recently shared that, “Democratic and Republican operatives we spoke with this week told us that, at this point, attack ads against Democrats were not yet ‘moving the needle’ in the races they were tracking. Democratic candidates, for the most part, appear to be withstanding the deluge of advertising so far.” The decline in disposable income is not happening in a vacuum. As noted earlier, Trump’s average job approval is below 40 percent, worse than it was ahead of the 2018 midterm when Democrats netted 41 House seats (but net lost two Senate seats). Yet he is as incorrigible as ever, generating negative headlines—and free footage for Democratic admakers—on a daily basis. Instead of alleviating cost pressures on households heading into the fall campaign season, Trump escalated the trade war with Canada, shrugged off his failure to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, and has stood by impotently as the Saudi Arabia-Yemen conflict spirals out of control and further chokes oil supply lanes. The swingy Latino vote is recoiling at Republicans because of Trump’s wanton mass deportation policies and violent—sometimes deadly—behavior of his immigration enforcers.
在进入秋季竞选季之际,特朗普没有缓解家庭的成本压力,反而升级了与加拿大的贸易战,对自己未能终结伊朗对霍尔木兹海峡的控制置之不理,并无能为力地旁观沙特-也门冲突失控进一步扼杀石油供应线。
Moreover, if the general electorate is angry and attributes weakened purchasing power to Republican policies, then Republicans will have a difficult time getting them mad about something else—whether it’s Abdul El-Sayed campaigning with a radical Twitch streamer or James Talarico’s record of defending transgender rights—no matter how much money they spend. Amy Walter, of The Cook Political Report with Amy Walter, recently shared that, “Democratic and Republican operatives we spoke with this week told us that, at this point, attack ads against Democrats were not yet ‘moving the needle’ in the races they were tracking. Democratic candidates, for the most part, appear to be withstanding the deluge of advertising so far.” The decline in disposable income is not happening in a vacuum. As noted earlier, Trump’s average job approval is below 40 percent, worse than it was ahead of the 2018 midterm when Democrats netted 41 House seats (but net lost two Senate seats). Yet he is as incorrigible as ever, generating negative headlines—and free footage for Democratic admakers—on a daily basis. Instead of alleviating cost pressures on households heading into the fall campaign season, Trump escalated the trade war with Canada, shrugged off his failure to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, and has stood by impotently as the Saudi Arabia-Yemen conflict spirals out of control and further chokes oil supply lanes. The swingy Latino vote is recoiling at Republicans because of Trump’s wanton mass deportation policies and violent—sometimes deadly—behavior of his immigration enforcers.
摇摆不定的拉丁裔选民因特朗普肆意的大规模驱逐政策及其移民执法人员暴力——有时甚至致命——的行为而对共和党望而却步。
Moreover, if the general electorate is angry and attributes weakened purchasing power to Republican policies, then Republicans will have a difficult time getting them mad about something else—whether it’s Abdul El-Sayed campaigning with a radical Twitch streamer or James Talarico’s record of defending transgender rights—no matter how much money they spend. Amy Walter, of The Cook Political Report with Amy Walter, recently shared that, “Democratic and Republican operatives we spoke with this week told us that, at this point, attack ads against Democrats were not yet ‘moving the needle’ in the races they were tracking. Democratic candidates, for the most part, appear to be withstanding the deluge of advertising so far.” The decline in disposable income is not happening in a vacuum. As noted earlier, Trump’s average job approval is below 40 percent, worse than it was ahead of the 2018 midterm when Democrats netted 41 House seats (but net lost two Senate seats). Yet he is as incorrigible as ever, generating negative headlines—and free footage for Democratic admakers—on a daily basis. Instead of alleviating cost pressures on households heading into the fall campaign season, Trump escalated the trade war with Canada, shrugged off his failure to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, and has stood by impotently as the Saudi Arabia-Yemen conflict spirals out of control and further chokes oil supply lanes. The swingy Latino vote is recoiling at Republicans because of Trump’s wanton mass deportation policies and violent—sometimes deadly—behavior of his immigration enforcers.
由于特朗普倾向于公开严厉抨击批评他的共和党人,甚至在初选中直接反对他们,因此上榜参选的共和党人鲜少能赢得独立人士的声誉;只有极少数人开始(且相当迟缓地)与他划清界限。共和党人无法改变塑造政治版图的许多因素,而候选人所能掌控的——塑造超越党派归属的个人形象和地方联系的能力——却被特朗普严重削弱了。
Because Trump is prone to publicly excoriating Republicans who criticize him, including outright opposition in primaries, few Republicans on the ballot have earned reputations of independence; only a handful have begun, quite belatedly, to distance themselves. Republicans cannot change many factors shaping the political landscape at this stage of the race, while what a candidate can control—the ability to forge an individual identity and local connections beyond party affiliation—Trump has severely limited.
有缺陷的民调是否高估了民主党的支持率?共和党的广告轰炸最终是否会奏效?未知的丑闻是否会毁掉前途光明的民主党新面孔?当然可能。任何对结果的确定性断言都是鲁莽的。但当美国人腰包瘪瘪时,执政党通常要付出惨重的政治代价。
Might faulty polls be overstating Democratic support? Might the Republican ad blitz eventually draw blood? Might unknown scandals derail promising Democratic fresh faces? Of course.Any assertion of certainty in the outcome is foolhardy. But when Americans have less money in their pocket, the party in power usually pays a steep political price.