近十年来，华盛顿和北京一直以关税、出口管制和列入黑名单等手段相互施压，每一轮摩擦都可能酿成关系破裂。然而，双方总能在悬崖边缘恢复过来。
Washington and Beijing have spent nearly a decade trading tariffs, export controls and blacklists, with each round threatening rupture. Yet they keep recovering from the brink.
峰会前，紧张局势会急剧升温，峰会一结束便骤然降温。例如，2019年在大阪，据报道北京同意购买美国农产品后，特朗普撤回了对价值3000亿美元中国商品加征关税的威胁，并放松了对华为的限制。去年10月在釜山，习近平暂停部分稀土出口限制并恢复大豆采购后，特朗普下调了关税，并暂缓对数千家中国公司的出口管制。
Tensions soared before summits and plunged immediately after. For example, in 2019 at Osaka, Trump walked back threats to impose tariffs on US$300 billion of Chinese goods and eased curbs on Huawei after Beijing reportedly agreed to buy American farm goods. In Busan last October, he lowered tariffs and shelved export controls on thousands of Chinese companies after Xi Jinping suspended some rare earth restrictions and resumed soybean purchases.
本周两位总统在白宫会晤时，这一模式再次上演。简而言之，脱钩正在让双方付出难以承受的代价：去年，双向货物和服务贸易额估计降至4946亿美元，降幅达25.1%；其中，美国对华货物出口下降26%。
As the two presidents met at the White House this week, that pattern was repeating. Simply put, decoupling is proving ruinously expensive on both sides: two-way goods and services trade fell 25.1 per cent last year to an estimated US$494.6 billion, with American goods exports to China down 26 per cent. The effective tariff rate on many Chinese goods remains close to 30 per cent – the highest of any country – yet it comes at a mutual cost.
北京手中的筹码，解释了华盛顿目前为何如此克制。中国控制着全球约70%的稀土开采量和约90%的加工产能，而这种依赖不可能在短时间内摆脱。尤为值得注意的是，与此前几次会晤相比，美国政府在本次峰会前并未威胁加征新高额关税或实施技术禁令。归根结底，美国容易受到中国施压的影响，也默认需要维持关键矿产供应的稳定与安全。
Beijing’s leverage explains much of Washington’s current restraint. China controls roughly 70 per cent of global rare earth mining and about 90 per cent of processing capacity; that dependence cannot be engineered away quickly. The administration has notably refrained from threatening steep new tariffs or technology bans before this summit, in contrast to earlier meetings. The US is, after all, vulnerable to Chinese pressure and tacitly admits the need to maintain stable and secure access to critical minerals.
美国贸易代表贾米森·格里尔4月表示，总统寻求的是稳定，并不寻求与中国发生“大规模对抗”或“全面冲突”。美国政府2025年11月发布的《国家安全战略》没有将中国列为竞争对手，而是表示要“与北京维持真正互利的经济关系”。
US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said in April that the president seeks stability and is not looking for “massive confrontation” or “full-on conflict” with China. The administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy declined to name China a competitor, speaking instead of “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing”.
这不是友谊，任何人都不应假装事实并非如此。华盛顿的种种不满——中国补贴、强制技术转让、所有权不透明，以及挤压外国企业的采购规则——将长期存在。但别指望中国改变。
This is not friendship, and no one should pretend otherwise. Washington’s grievances – Chinese subsidies, forced technology transfer, opaque ownership, procurement rules that squeeze foreign firms – are here to stay. But don’t expect China to change.
中国有选择地开放了市场准入，但并未放弃那些令华盛顿十分恼火的经济工具。双方仍在不断微调针对彼此的实体（黑）名单和出口管制措施。
China has selectively opened market access but has not abandoned economic tools that so irk Washington. Both sides continue to calibrate entity (black) lists and export controls against each other.
至少，有选择的开放并不等于全面排斥。对等的选择性开放，是北京经过三十多年打磨形成的一种做法。特斯拉在没有本地合作伙伴的情况下进入上海，但附带了本地数据存储以及日后深度本地采购等条件。结果是，这家美国公司获得了一座盈利工厂，其国内产业也更具竞争力，比亚迪由此崛起为全球竞争对手。
At least selective openness is not blanket exclusion. Reciprocal selectivity is an approach Beijing refined over three decades. Tesla’s entry into Shanghai without a local partner came with conditions on local data storage and, in time, deep local sourcing. The result was a profitable plant for the US company and a sharper domestic industry, with BYD emerging as a global rival.
特朗普第一任期让美国与中国彼此角力，但他第二任期的关税措施针对了100多个国家，包括欧洲和亚洲的盟友。华盛顿一直在拆解自己建立的全球贸易秩序，而不只是把中国作为目标。
Trump’s first term pitted America against China, but tariffs in his second term targeted more than 100 countries, including allies in Europe and Asia. Washington has been dismantling the global trade order it built, rather than targeting only China.
五月习近平与特朗普在北京会晤时，双方同意，两国应追求“建设性的战略稳定”。这是双方多年来第一次就避免两国关系进一步恶化形成共同理念。
When Xi and Trump met in Beijing in May, they agreed their countries should pursue “constructive strategic stability”. This marks the first shared idea in years to keep relations from deteriorating further.
六月的考验出现在美国国防部将阿里巴巴、百度和比亚迪列入其军民融合实体清单之后。中国则将10家美国实体列入两用物项出口管制清单。不过，双方都将反制措施控制在有限范围内。
A test came in June when the Pentagon added Alibaba, Baidu and BYD to its civil-military entity list. China placed 10 US entities on its dual-use export control list. Yet both kept countermeasures limited.
美国不该抱怨中国。华盛顿长期以来也拥有类似工具：通过跨机构的美国外国投资委员会（CFIUS）进行国家安全审查，利用行业监管机构，以及采用在被迫出售TikTok过程中得到检验的数据和治理规定。
The US should not complain about China. Washington has long had similar tools: national security agreements through the multi-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), sectoral regulators, and the data and governance provisions tested in the forced sale of TikTok.
北京已释放出在先进制造业、前沿研究中心和医疗技术领域进一步选择性开放的信号。许多中美分析人士一致认为，双方可以达成一项交易，使任何一方都不必牺牲安全，也不至于丧失竞争力。
Beijing has signalled further selective opening in advanced manufacturing, frontier research centres and medical technology. Many Chinese and US analysts agree there is a bargain to be struck, such that neither side surrenders security nor forfeits competitiveness.
双方持续的磋商以及对分歧的审慎管理，仍可能带来切实的成果。台湾仍是最敏感的引爆点，中国人民解放军向该岛防空识别区飞行了数千架次，并进行了大规模海上演习。这些行动应被视为对美国及其盟友在台湾海峡及附近水域反复进行海上演习和挑衅性穿越的回应。
Sustained consultation and careful management of differences on both sides can still yield tangible results Taiwan remains the most sensitive flashpoint, with the People’s Liberation Army flying thousands of sorties into the island’s air defence identification zone and conducting large-scale naval exercises. They should be seen as replies to repeated naval exercises and provocative sail-throughs by the US and its allies in the Taiwan Strait and nearby waters.
一个较为积极的信号是，杨志斌与塞缪尔·帕帕罗举行了两年来首次指挥层级的会晤，这表明在总统、部长和一线层级正在重建对话，暂停的军控谈判也有可能恢复。
On a brighter note, Yang Zhibin and Samuel Paparo’s first command-level meeting in two years signals dialogue rebuilding at presidential, ministerial and frontline tiers, with suspended arms-control talks possibly resuming.
即使本周的总统峰会未能取得外交突破，战略稳定以及在敏感议题上的渐进式进展也并非毫无意义。回避根本性分歧无法带来持久的稳定，但双方持续的磋商和对分歧的审慎管理，仍可能产生实际成果。
Even without a diplomatic breakthrough at this week’s presidential summit, strategic stability and incremental progress on hot-button issues are not nothing. Bypassing fundamental divergences will not produce lasting stability, but sustained consultation and careful management of differences on both sides can still yield tangible results.
这两个超级大国既非朋友，也非敌人。作为拥有核武器的巨人，且拥有全球两大经济体，它们无法承受彻底敌对的状态。
The two superpowers may not be friends, nor enemies. As nuclear-armed giants with the world’s two largest economies, they cannot afford outright enmity. By Alex Lo