这是我每周日发布的政治数据汇总,涵盖了过去七天内发布的新数据。阅读完全免费,但如果您希望支持独立的数据驱动型政治新闻,欢迎成为付费订阅用户,每周至少可获得一次额外的数据产品和深度分析。
This is my weekly Sunday roundup of new political data published over the last seven days. It is free to read, but if you want to support independent data-driven political journalism, become a payingr and get additional data products and premium analysis at least once weekly.
大家好,我是Elliott,这里有一个简短的说明:我已经开放了周日汇总的评论区,无论是付费读者还是免费读者,都可以直接向我及整个社区提出问题或分享推荐链接。
Hi everyone, Elliott here with a short programming note: I have opened up comments on the Sunday roundups so both paying and free readers can leave questions and recommended links directly to me and the whole community.
如果您有任何希望在“Strength In Numbers”系列内容(包括播客、深度报道,或周五和周日的免费文章)中得到解答或讨论的问题与建议,请在下方留言!
If you have a question or comment you want answered/addressed in any Strength In Numbers output, including the podcast, Deep Dives, or free Friday and Sunday articles, leave it below!
- 这就是为什么中期选举大会是个愚蠢的主意,第一部分本月初,当“特朗普狂欢节”(Trumpapalooza)在达拉斯开幕时,我曾指出,举办这场史无前例的中期“大会”在战略逻辑上完全是本末倒置。利亚姆·多诺万(Liam Donovan)和帕特里克·鲁菲尼(Patrick Ruffini)等共和党战略家认为,一场以特朗普为核心的大型集会,有助于激活共和党在11月选举中急需的低投票倾向选民。
- This is why a midterm convention is a dumb idea, part one Earlier this month, as “Trumpapalooza” opened in Dallas, I argued the strategic logic of this first-ever midterm “convention” was entirely backwards. Republican strategists like Liam Donovan and Patrick Ruffini said a big Trump-centric gathering would help activate low-propensity Republicans the party needs in November.
这一策略的问题在于(这一点在大会前的数据中就已经很明显了),那些尚未决定在11月投票的共和党选民,实际上比那些已经计划投票的共和党人更不认可特朗普。民调显示,他们最关心的问题是生活成本——而特朗普在电视上称其为骗局,其他演讲者也对此只字未提。两周前,我与大卫·尼尔(David Nir)在播客中讨论了这些数据,并在当周五的“每周图表”中再次进行了分析。
The problem with this strategy (and this was obvious in the pre-convention data) is that Republican voters who are not committed to voting in November actually disapprove of Trump more than the Republicans who were already planning to vote. And polls show the issue they care most about is the cost of living — which Trump called a hoax on TV, and no other speakers mentioned. I covered this data on the podcast with David Nir two weeks ago and again in that Friday’s Chart of the Week.
现在,我们于9月16日至21日进行的“Strength In Numbers/Verasight”民调,为我们评估特朗普此次大会的成效提供了更多数据点。这些结果此前尚未发布。
Now our September Strength In Numbers/Verasight poll, fielded Sept. 16–21, gives us a few more data points to assess the success of Trump’s convention. These results have not been released previously.
我还整理了新闻标题的历史数据,以观察此次大会的报道是否像总统提名大会那样,突破了其他新闻的重围。我将把这些数据留到明天发表的一篇独立文章中。
I have also compiled historical data on news headlines to see if coverage of the convention broke through other stories, much in the way presidential nominating conventions tend to. I’m saving that data for a standalone article to be published tomorrow.
这里的数据对总统来说几乎是一边倒的负面。在大会结束后的几周里,他的民调支持率甚至进一步下滑。
The data here is almost uniformly bad for the president. And in the weeks since the convention, his polls have only gotten worse.
达拉斯提出的“5000美元”提议适得其反,那是唐纳德·特朗普承诺,只有在共和党保持国会控制权的前提下,才会向每位美国成年人发放5000美元支票。这类议题在民调中很难处理,因为人们通常支持现金转移支付,但我们有理由相信,将此与共和党的胜利挂钩会引起选民反感。因此,我们进行了一项调查实验,将受访者分为三组:三分之一的受访者被问及是否支持“向美国家庭发放5000美元”,不附加任何条件;三分之一被告知这是唐纳德·特朗普的提议;剩下三分之一则听到了他在达拉斯提出的条件:只有共和党在11月获胜,才会发放支票。
The $5,000 offer backfired out of Dallas was Donald Trump’s pledge to send every American adult a $5,000 check if and only if Republicans keep control of Congress. This type of thing is tricky to poll about, since people generally support transfers, but we had a reasonable belief the conditioning on GOP victory would turn voters off the idea. So we ran a survey experiment where respondents were broken into three groups: One third of respondents were asked whether they support “sending $5,000 payments to American households,” full stop. A third were told Donald Trump proposed it. And a third got the deal as he conditioned it in Dallas: the checks go out if Republicans win in November.
当这些支付被描述为一项中性政策时,53%的成年人表示支持,35%表示反对,净支持率为+18。当我们告诉选民这是特朗普的主意时,支持率小幅下降至+12,差异在误差范围内。但当我们按照他实际提出的条件来描述这些支票时,选民转为反对,支持率为35%,反对率为54%,净支持率为-18。
When the payments were described as a neutral policy, 53% of adults said they supported them while 35% opposed them, a net of +18. When we told voters it was Trump’s idea, support ticked down to +12, a difference inside the margin of error. But when we described the checks as he actually offered them, voters were opposed, at 35% support and 54% oppose, net −18.
而在那些表示不确定今年秋季是否会投票的选民中——即大会本应争取的那类低意愿选民——这种波动更为剧烈,从+39降至-5。
When the payments were described as a neutral policy, 53% of adults said they supported them while 35% opposed them, a net of +18. When we told voters it was Trump’s idea, support ticked down to +12, a difference inside the margin of error. But when we described the checks as he actually offered them, voters were opposed, at 35% support and 54% oppose, net −18.
选民们也很清楚特朗普的真正动机:62%的受访者认为他做出这些承诺主要是为了在11月的选举中赢得更多选票;只有13%的人认为他真的打算兑现这些承诺。此外,71%的成年人认为总统不应该承诺那些取决于其政党能否赢得选举的政府补贴或资金支持(其中53%的受访者是共和党人)。只有大约四分之一的受访者认为,即使共和党获胜,这些补贴或资金也会真正被发放出去。
And among the voters who didn’t say they were definitely voting this fall — the kind of low-propensity voters the convention was supposed to reach — the swing is bigger still, from +39 to −5. Voters aren’t confused about the motive, either. 62% say Trump made the promise mainly to win votes in November, and only 13% think he genuinely intends to send the money. Moreover, 71% of adults say it is inappropriate for a president to promise government payments that depend on his party winning an election, including 53% of Republicans. Only about a quarter think the checks would actually go out even if Republicans win.
我们还询问了选民:特朗普的这些承诺是否会让他们更倾向于投票给共和党候选人。28%的受访者表示这种承诺会让他们减少投票给共和党候选人的可能性,13%的人表示这种承诺会增加他们投票给共和党候选人的可能性,53%的人则表示这不会对他们产生任何影响。不过,在那13%表示“这种承诺会影响他们投票决策”的受访者中,许多人已经明确表示自己会在11月投票给共和党。仅有不到4%的成年人表示这些承诺会让他们更倾向于投票给共和党候选人(而且他们本来就已经倾向于投票给共和党了)。不过,独立选民中的反对者比例较高——他们表示特朗普的这一计划让他们对共和党失去了兴趣(他们的反对比例比支持者高出11个百分点)。
We also asked voters whether Trump’s promise makes them more or less likely to vote for Republican candidates for Congress. 28% said less likely, 13% more likely, and 53% said it makes no difference. But many voters in that 13% already told us they were voting Republican in November. Fewer than 4% of adults say the checks make them more likely to vote Republican, and aren’t already there. This offsets with large losses among independents, who said by an 11-point margin Trump’s scheme turned them off.
对于整个事件来说,这些数据实在令人失望,因为这几乎是整个事件中唯一备受关注的新闻焦点。在明天发布的这篇文章的第二部分中,我将深入分析一个新的数据库(该数据库记录了媒体在社交媒体上分享的新闻标题),以揭示这次共和党全国代表大会未能像往常那样起到推动媒体报道的作用。
These are bad numbers for what was essentially the only major story from the entire event. In part 2 of this article, publishing tomorrow, I dig into a new database on news headlines shared by the press on social media to show the failure of the convention to act as a forcing mechanism for earned media the way conventions normally do.
更多相关内容,请参阅塞思·马斯凯特(Seth Masket)上周一发表的精彩文章。他在文章中指出:自特朗普的“疯狂演讲”(Trumpapalooza)以来,特朗普及其支持者的支持率持续下降(不过他在数据分析中使用了RealClearPolitics的数据源,而非FiftyPlusOne的数据源)。马斯凯特正确地指出了这次全国代表大会从一开始就存在逻辑上的缺陷:那些处境艰难的共和党人需要机会摆脱特朗普的影响;就像2010年民主党在选举中试图与奥巴马保持距离一样,这些共和党人也需要这样的机会。然而,如果一个全国代表大会是以特朗普为中心来组织的,那么中期选举自然就会完全围绕特朗普展开。对于那些在竞争激烈的选区参选的共和党候选人来说,这无疑是一个巨大的劣势——因为整个选举过程都会被特朗普的个人支持率所主导。
For more on this, see the great piece by Seth Masket published last Monday. He shows that the numbers for Trump and Republicans have only decreased since Trumpapalooza (though he uses RealClearPolitics instead of FiftyPlusOne for some reason). Masket makes the correct point that the convention was illogical from the start; vulnerable Republicans need room to run away from Trump this fall, just like blue-dog Democrats tried to distance themselves from Obama in the 2010 red wave. But a convention built around Trump naturally makes the midterm all about Trump. If you’re a Republican running in a competitive district, this hurts you, because it makes the election all about the guy with a 34% approval rating. 2. What Strength In Numbers published last week In last Sunday’s roundup, I walked through how to update your beliefs about an election given a new poll, using the Cook Political Report’s battleground-district survey as the worked example. A rough heuristic about how much a single survey is worth is to calculate the distance between that poll result and the current average in a race, and move it toward the new poll by difference * 1/(number of polls in average + 1).
- 《Strength In Numbers》上周发布了什么内容在上周日的综述中,我演示了如何根据新民调更新你对选举的看法,以《库克政治报告》的关键选区调查为实例。一个粗略的启发式方法来衡量单次调查的权重,是计算该民调结果与当前竞选平均值之间的差距,并按 差值 × 1/(平均值包含的民调数量 + 1) 将平均值向新民调方向移动。
On Wednesday, I released the results of our new September Strength In Numbers/Verasight poll. Trump’s approval in that poll fell to 33% approve, 63% disapprove, his worst reading in the 16 waves of our tracker, driven by opinion among Republicans dropping 11 points in a month. Democrats lead the House vote 52–42 among likely voters:
周三,我发布了我们新的9月《Strength In Numbers》/Verasight民调结果。特朗普的支持率在该民调中跌至33%支持、63%反对,这是我们追踪器16轮以来的最低读数,主要由共和党人支持率一个月内下跌11个百分点所致。在可能投票者中,民主党以52%比42%领先众议院通用选票:周四,David Nir和我进行了一次关于“蓝色浪潮”的“氛围检验”,探讨今年的感觉是否像过去的中期选举。民调是否再次存在偏差,还是说我们可以通过其他指标(如投票率和特别选举)对其准确性感到放心?
On Thursday, David Nir and I did a “vibe check” about the blue wave and asked whether this is what past midterm elections have felt like. Are the polls biased again, or can we be reassured in their accuracy by other indicators, like turnout and special elections? And Friday’s free Chart of the Week looked at our new poll results showing 58% of Americans say the country is worse off today than it was four years ago, including a quarter of Trump’s own 2024 voters. By 56% to 26%, voters say they want a Congress that checks President Trump rather than one that helps pass his agenda:
周五的免费“本周图表”分析了我们新民调显示的结果:58%的美国人认为国家比四年前更糟,其中包括四分之一的特朗普2024年选民。以56%比26%,选民表示他们希望国会制衡特朗普总统,而非协助通过他的议程:如果你是《Strength In Numbers》的常读者,我有信心你会从网站的付费订阅中获得巨大价值。你将每周获得周二深度报告、访问付费会员专属的Discord私密社区,并抢先查看我们每月的《Strength In Numbers》/Verasight民调结果(公开发布前)。
If you’re a frequent reader of Strength In Numbers, I’m confident you will get a lot of value out of a paid subscription to the site. You’ll get the Tuesday Deep Dive every week, access to a private community for paying members on Discord, and an early look at our monthly Strength In Numbers/Verasight poll before public release. More than that though, you’ll be supporting original journalism about American politics that is rooted in data that we collect, together, as a community devoted to the importance of public opinion. 3. Even more numbers!
更重要的是,你将支持基于我们共同收集的数据、致力于民意重要性的社区所进行的关于美国政治的原创新闻报道。
Bryan Bennett compiles 60 years of ANES data on trust in government and shows how skepticism is a core threat to Democratic power in 2028/30. Trust fell from 48% in 2004 to 30% in 2008 and, unlike after Vietnam or Watergate, it never bounced back: it was 16% in 2024. His warning to Democrats is that any majority they win this fall is at risk in 2030 unless they break a two-decade streak of distrust. Democrats Need to Confront the Length and Depth of Distrust in Government and Institutions The Wall Street Journal reports Republicans are panicking five weeks out (as we covered on Thursday). The Journal’s own poll puts Trump’s approval at 37%, the lowest for any president heading into a midterm in its polling going back to 1990. Trump Is Predicting Midterms Success, but Republicans Are Starting to Panic Consumer sentiment sank again this month. The University of Michigan’s final September index came in at 48.1, down from 51.7 in August and 55.1 a year ago, and year-ahead inflation expectations jumped from 4.0% to 4.6% on anxieties from fuel prices and new tariffs. University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers A new Politico poll shows a crack in the GOP base over deportations. The poll shows 31% of non-MAGA Trump voters say the deportation campaign is too aggressive, against 14% of MAGA voters, and 36% of the MAGA base says it isn’t aggressive enough. Poll: A crack is emerging in Trump’s coalition over deportations Julia Azari shows there’s a contradiction in the political science models of the election. The fundamentals point to big Republican losses (like 40+ House seats), but because polarization “calcifies” voters, the swing is likely to be smaller. Studying for the midterms Our model at FiftyPlusOne has a median forecast of +25 seats for Democrats.
- 更多数据!布莱恩·贝内特汇编了60年的ANES(美国国家选举研究)关于政府信任度的数据,展示了怀疑论如何成为2028/2030年民主党掌权的核心威胁。信任度从2004年的48%跌至2008年的30%,不同于越战或水门事件后的反弹,它从未回升:2024年仅为16%。他对民主党的警告是,除非打破长达二十年的不信任趋势,否则他们今秋赢得的任何多数席位在2030年都将面临风险。民主党需要直面对政府和机构不信任的长度与深度《华尔街日报》报道,距离中期选举还有五周,共和党人开始恐慌(我们周四已对此进行报道)。该报自有民调显示,特朗普的支持率为37%,是自1990年其民调记录以来,任何总统进入中期选举时的最低支持率。特朗普预测中期选举将获胜,但共和党人开始恐慌消费者信心本月再度下滑。密歇根大学9月最终指数为48.1,低于8月的51.7和一年前的55.1,未来一年通胀预期从4.0%跃升至4.6%,源于对燃油价格和新关税的担忧。密歇根大学消费者调查《政治》最新民调显示,在驱逐移民问题上,共和党基本盘出现裂痕。民调显示,31%的非MAGA特朗普选民认为驱逐行动过于激进,而MAGA选民中仅14%持此观点,36%的MAGA核心基本盘则认为力度不够。民调:特朗普联盟因驱逐移民问题出现裂痕朱莉娅·阿扎里指出,选举政治学模型中存在矛盾。基本面指向共和党将大败(如失去40个以上众议院席位),但由于两极分化"固化"了选民,实际席位变动可能较小。备战中期选举我们FiftyPlusOne的模型预测民主党中位数将净增25个席位。
Bryan Bennett compiles 60 years of ANES data on trust in government and shows how skepticism is a core threat to Democratic power in 2028/30. Trust fell from 48% in 2004 to 30% in 2008 and, unlike after Vietnam or Watergate, it never bounced back: it was 16% in 2024. His warning to Democrats is that any majority they win this fall is at risk in 2030 unless they break a two-decade streak of distrust. Democrats Need to Confront the Length and Depth of Distrust in Government and Institutions The Wall Street Journal reports Republicans are panicking five weeks out (as we covered on Thursday). The Journal’s own poll puts Trump’s approval at 37%, the lowest for any president heading into a midterm in its polling going back to 1990. Trump Is Predicting Midterms Success, but Republicans Are Starting to Panic Consumer sentiment sank again this month. The University of Michigan’s final September index came in at 48.1, down from 51.7 in August and 55.1 a year ago, and year-ahead inflation expectations jumped from 4.0% to 4.6% on anxieties from fuel prices and new tariffs. University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers A new Politico poll shows a crack in the GOP base over deportations. The poll shows 31% of non-MAGA Trump voters say the deportation campaign is too aggressive, against 14% of MAGA voters, and 36% of the MAGA base says it isn’t aggressive enough. Poll: A crack is emerging in Trump’s coalition over deportations Julia Azari shows there’s a contradiction in the political science models of the election. The fundamentals point to big Republican losses (like 40+ House seats), but because polarization “calcifies” voters, the swing is likely to be smaller. Studying for the midterms Our model at FiftyPlusOne has a median forecast of +25 seats for Democrats.
农村选民并未背弃特朗普,但约半数受访者在AP-KFF的民调中表示,经济状况比他上任时更糟。他们将食品杂货、汽油和医疗保健列为首要问题。只有半数农村选民认可特朗普作为总统的工作表现,这一比例远高于全国平均水平,却低于他的得票率。
Rural voters haven’t turned on Trump, but about half of them tell the AP-KFF that the economy is worse than when he took office. They put groceries, gas, and health care at the top of their list of problems. Only half of rural voters approve of Trump’s job as president, well above the national number but below his vote share. Economic frustration tests Trump’s standing with rural voters, new AP-KFF poll finds And that’s it for this week! Thanks for reading. Strength In Numbers will be back in your inbox on Tuesday.
新的AP-KFF民调发现,经济挫败感考验着特朗普在农村选民中的地位本周内容到此结束!感谢阅读。《Strength In Numbers》将于周二回到您的收件箱。
Rural voters haven’t turned on Trump, but about half of them tell the AP-KFF that the economy is worse than when he took office. They put groceries, gas, and health care at the top of their list of problems. Only half of rural voters approve of Trump’s job as president, well above the national number but below his vote share. Economic frustration tests Trump’s standing with rural voters, new AP-KFF poll finds And that’s it for this week! Thanks for reading. Strength In Numbers will be back in your inbox on Tuesday.
本帖开放评论。如果您有希望在下周播客或另一篇文章中得到解答/回应的问题或评论,请在下方留言!
Comments are OPEN on this post. If you have a question or comment you want answered/addressed in next week’s podcast or another article, leave it below!