蒂姆·戴斯是一名记者和分析师，过去15年来一直报道亚太地区的能源市场、可持续发展和地缘政治。
Tim Daiss is a journalist and analyst who has covered energy markets, sustainability and geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region for the past 15 years.
乌云正笼罩着东南亚的电动汽车发展。此际，东南亚三大主要国家——泰国、印度尼西亚和马来西亚——已制定政策，旨在将该地区打造成为全球电动汽车制造中心。
Storm clouds are gathering over Southeast Asia's electric vehicle development. This comes as three major Southeast Asian countries -- Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia -- have designed policies aimed at turning the region into a global EV manufacturing hub.
然而，这些雄心勃勃的政策现在反而有可能造成一个昂贵且分裂的市场，而就在此时，各国政府需要电动汽车变得足够平价以实现大规模普及。这些政府也渴望发展本国的电动汽车制造中心，以刺激就业和经济发展、拓宽税基，并减少对外国电动汽车进口的过度依赖，特别是来自中国和日本的进口。
Instead, these ambitious policies now risk creating an expensive, fragmented market just as governments need EVs to become affordable enough for mass adoption. These governments are also keen to develop their own EV manufacturing hubs to stoke employment and economic development, expand their tax bases, and reduce overreliance on foreign EV imports, particularly from China and Japan.
电动汽车发展还能帮助这些国家减少交通相关的碳排放，并更早实现脱碳目标。不过，这并非板上钉钉，尤其是当用于给电动汽车充电的电力很大程度上仍由燃气和燃煤电厂产生时。遗憾的是，世上依然没有免费的午餐。
EV development could also help these countries reduce transport-related carbon emissions and reach their decarbonization goals earlier. However, that's not a given, particularly when much of the electricity used to charge EVs is still generated from gas and coal power plants. There's still no free lunch, unfortunately.
作为东南亚领先的汽车生产国，泰国将慷慨的激励措施与本地生产挂钩。根据泰国投资促进委员会（BOI）的规定，受益于进口电动汽车优惠的车企，必须在2026年前实现每进口一辆车就本地生产两辆车，到2027年这一比例将升至三辆。泰国还要求大量本地采购零部件，并正在收紧对进口电池芯的规定——至少在纸面上，这是个好主意。
Thailand, Southeast Asia's leading auto producer, for its part, ties generous incentives to domestic production. According to Thailand's Board of Investment (BOI), automakers benefiting from imported EVs must compensate by producing two vehicles locally for every imported vehicle by 2026, rising to three by 2027. Thailand also requires significant local sourcing of components and is tightening rules on imported battery cells -- a good idea, at least on paper.
印度尼西亚走得更远，对电动汽车制造商实施法定本地成分要求。据《雅加达邮报》报道，至少40%的车辆部件必须在2026年前在国内采购，2027年至2029年这一比例将升至60%，并从2030年起达到80%。政府还将电动汽车进口特权与对国内制造业的投资挂钩。
Indonesia goes further, imposing statutory local content requirements on EV manufacturers. At least 40% of a vehicle must be sourced domestically through 2026, rising to 60% from 2027 to 2029 and 80% from 2030, according to a Jakarta Post article. The government also ties EV import privileges to investment in domestic manufacturing.
马来西亚也正果断转向本地电动汽车组装。去年我在吉隆坡进行研究项目的三个月里，这种转变已在街头显现，Grab司机越来越多地转用本地组装的电动汽车以削减燃油成本，尽管他们对充电限制和其他实际缺点有所抱怨。然而，该国绝大多数电动汽车仍是中国制造的进口车。
Malaysia is also shifting decisively toward local EV assembly. During the three months I spent in Kuala Lumpur last year for a research project, that transition was already visible on the streets, with Grab drivers increasingly turning to locally built EVs to cut fuel costs despite complaints about charging constraints and other practical drawbacks. However, the vast majority of EVs in the country are still Chinese-made imports.
值得注意的是，根据《新海峡时报》报道，马来西亚政府此后已取消对全进口电动汽车的特别优惠，同时将本地组装车型的税收减免延长至2027年。政府还实施了价格和功率要求，实际上将更便宜的进口电动汽车挡在市场之外——这有利于发展国内产业，但可能会使让普通马来西亚人买得起电动汽车的努力变得更加复杂。
Notably, Malaysia's government has since ended special incentives for fully imported EVs while extending tax breaks for locally assembled models through 2027, according to a New Straits Times report. It's also imposed price and power requirements that effectively keep cheaper imported EVs out of the market -- a good move for developing a domestic industry, but one that could complicate efforts to make EVs affordable for ordinary Malaysians.
3月31日，泰国总理阿努廷·占维拉库驾驶比亚迪电动汽车离开曼谷政府大楼。
Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul leaves Government House in Bangkok in his BYD electric car on March 31.
尽管这三个电动汽车生产国的雄心勃勃，但它们面临的障碍同样众多。
As ambitious as these three EV producing countries have become, they have just as many hurdles to overcome.
首先，泰国成为东南亚领先电动汽车枢纽的推动正撞上一堵大墙。自由贸易协定让廉价中国进口车涌入市场，引发价格战，给本地零部件供应商带来压力，威胁该国传统汽车制造基础。这场博弈正在国家媒体上、在国内受众面前上演。
First, Thailand's push to become the leading Southeast Asian EV hub is hitting a major wall. Free-trade agreements have allowed cheap Chinese imports to flood the market, resulting in price wars that put pressure on local component suppliers and threaten the country's traditional auto manufacturing base. This is being played out in the nation's media in front of a domestic audience.
那些严格的生产授权本不该成问题，但它们确实成了问题。由于供应链缺口和缺乏国内电池制造，扩大本地组装规模证明很困难。
Those strict production mandates shouldn't be a problem, but they are Scaling up local assembly is proving difficult due to supply chain gaps and a lack of domestic battery manufacturing.
印度尼西亚的新生产授权也在国内引发问题。根据国际清洁交通委员会的一份工作文件，爪哇岛城市地区以外的充电基础设施几乎不存在，而国家电网仍以煤电为主。
Indonesia's new production mandates are also causing problems at home. Charging infrastructure outside urban Java is almost nonexistent, while the national grid remains overwhelmingly powered by coal, according to a working paper by the International Council on Clean Transportation.
更糟糕的是，随着全球汽车工业转向更廉价、无镍的电池化学体系，印尼面临将其经济系绳在一条昂贵、高碳供应链上的风险，而市场已在逐步摒弃这条链条。正如其电力部门一样，煤炭使用依然是东南亚人口最多、经济体量最大国家的棘手难题。
Worse, as the global auto industry pivots toward cheaper, nickel-free battery chemistries, Indonesia risks connecting its economy to an expensive, carbon-heavy supply chain that the market is already outgrowing. Just like in its power sector, coal usage remains problematic for Southeast Asia's most populous country and largest economy.
马来西亚同样举步维艰。政府意图以国民品牌宝腾和第二汽车为核心构建本土电动汽车战略，却遭遇绊脚石；尽管保护性进口壁垒开始成功庇护本土品牌，但马来西亚车企正竭力扩大本地供应链规模。
Malaysia is also struggling. The government's aim to build its domestic EV strategy around national brands Proton and Perodua is facing stumbling blocks while protective import barriers are starting to successfully shield domestic brands. However, Malaysian automakers are fighting to scale up local supply chains.
此外，从燃油车向电动汽车转型，需要在电池组装、电动动力总成及专业本地供应商网络上投入巨额资金。然而，国内供应商的跟进速度远远不够。
Moreover, transitioning from gasoline-powered cars to EVs requires substantial capital investment in battery assembly, electric powertrains and specialized local vendor networks. Yet domestic suppliers aren't catching up fast enough.
在落地层面，快充站建设也因电网容量严重不足和监管障碍而滞后于政府目标。全国范围内，备受民众欢迎的化石燃料补贴持续削弱了转向电动汽车的经济优势。这反过来又让马来西亚车企背负沉重的开发成本，而大众消费者因汽油低廉而犹豫不决。
On the ground, fast-charger station rollout is also lagging behind government targets due to severe grid capacity limits and regulatory hurdles. Nationwide, politically popular fossil-fuel subsidies continue to restrain the financial advantage of switching to EVs. This in turn leaves Malaysian automakers carrying heavy development costs while mass-market consumers remain hesitant to abandon cheap gasoline.
还存在一个更大的区域性问题。泰国、印尼和马来西亚各自试图建立自己的电动汽车制造和供应链，却采取了不同的本地化规则和激励措施。这给车企增加了额外成本，而车企越来越倾向于将东南亚视为一个统一的大市场，而非一个个分散的单一市场。
There's also a larger regional problem. Sure, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia are each trying to build their own EV manufacturing and supply chains, but they're doing so with different localization rules and incentives. That creates additional costs for automakers that increasingly view Southeast Asia as one large market rather than a collection of individual ones.
此外，车企可能不得不为每个国家制定不同的采购、组装和投资策略，而非实现更大的区域规模效应。这会增加成本，尤其是在东南亚电动汽车需求仍处于发展阶段的情况下。这些成本最终必须由某方承担，要么由制造商吸收，要么通过政府补贴，又或是最有可能的——由消费者通过更高的价格买单。
Additionally, instead of achieving greater regional scale, automakers may have to develop different sourcing, assembly and investment strategies for each country. That costs money, particularly when Southeast Asian EV demand is still developing. Those costs will eventually have to be absorbed somewhere, either by manufacturers, governments through incentives, or more likely by consumers through higher prices.
这正是原本合理的产业政策可能开始阻碍电动汽车大规模普及的地方。政府想要本地制造业带来的就业和投资，但也需要电动汽车价格足够低，以说服数百万东南亚司机完成转换。然而归根结底，他们可能会发现很难两全其美。
That's where otherwise sensible industrial policy can begin working against mass EV adoption. Governments want the jobs and investment that come with local manufacturing, but they also need EV prices low enough to persuade millions of Southeast Asian drivers to make the switch. Yet at the end of the day they could find it very difficult to have both.
这并不意味着东南亚应放弃电动汽车制造雄心。恰恰相反。泰国、印度尼西亚和马来西亚有充分理由希望将更多电动汽车供应链留在国内，而非单纯沦为进口车的倾销市场。就业、投资和技术发展至关重要。
None of this means Southeast Asia should abandon its EV manufacturing ambitions. Far from it. Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia have legitimate reasons to want more of the EV supply chain at home rather than simply becoming markets for imported vehicles. The jobs, investment and technological development matter.
但政府也需要决定什么最重要。如果本地化政策推高电动汽车价格、限制更便宜的进口车，或超前于国内需求，就有可能破坏其本意支持的转型进程。东南亚或许能同时建成电动汽车制造强国，并让普通消费者买得起电动汽车。但政策制定者必须认识到，要同时实现这两项目标，难度远超他们的预期。
But governments also need to decide what matters most. Localization policies that make EVs more expensive, restrict cheaper imports or outrun domestic demand risk undermining the very transition they are supposed to support. Southeast Asia may be able to build an EV manufacturing powerhouse and also put affordable EVs in the hands of ordinary consumers. Doing both at the same time, however, will be much harder than policymakers have acknowledged.