全球电子产业正在经历一场结构性转型。二十多年来，中国一直是电子制造业的主导者，拥有无可比拟的供应商资源、熟练劳动力、基础设施以及工程能力。不过，这种优势正在逐渐减弱。不过，将这种现象简单地视为中国制造业的衰落，其实是一个误解。
The global electronics industry is entering a structural transition. For over two decades, China served as the dominant manufacturing centre, with an unmatched concentration of suppliers, skilled labour, infrastructure, logistics and engineering capabilities. That concentration is being diluted. But interpreting this as the decline of Chinese manufacturing would be a mistake.
中国正在将部分生产环节转移到海外，同时仍保留着那些对制造业至关重要的核心能力。
China is exporting parts of its manufacturing process while retaining the industrial capabilities that matter most.
根据波士顿咨询集团（BCG）的研究，自2017年以来，来自中国（包括台湾、香港和大陆）的电子制造商在海外设立生产设施的比例从12%上升到了56%。BCG的分析基于942家年收入超过5亿美元的上市公司数据，其中314家公司的总部位于中国。这一转变非常显著。
According to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), since 2017, the share of electronics manufacturers from China – Taiwan, Hong Kong and the mainland – with overseas production has risen to 56 per cent from 12 per cent. BCG based its analysis on 942 publicly traded companies with annual revenues above US$500 million, including 314 headquartered in China. This transformation is remarkable.
从21世纪初到2010年代中期，许多企业将生产重心集中在中国的主要工业集群地区，以降低生产成本。低成本劳动力是当时的重要因素，但真正的优势在于中国高度发达的制造业生态系统——这种生态系统带来了规模经济和难以被其他国家超越的运营效率。
From the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, companies concentrated production in China’s major industrial clusters to minimise costs. Low-cost labour played a significant role but the true advantage lay in the high density of the manufacturing ecosystem. This produced economies of scale and an operational efficiency few countries could match.
自2017年以来，不断上涨的关税、日益严格的出口管制以及对关键技术的严密审查改变了制造业的格局。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普对中国商品征收高额关税，旨在减少对中国的依赖，并将生产环节重新转移到美国境内；但这也促使中国企业将生产设施转移到其他国家。
Since 2017, rising tariffs, increasingly extensive export controls and stricter scrutiny of critical technologies have transformed the calculation. US President Donald Trump’s high tariffs on Chinese goods were intended to reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing and force production back to America, but it has also increased the incentive for Chinese companies to establish production capacity in third countries.
与此同时，东南亚、印度和墨西哥纷纷提供税收优惠、补贴、工业园区等政策，以吸引外国制造商。如今，企业将生产多元化视为应对关税、出口限制以及突发市场波动的有效手段。不过，这并不意味着它们会完全放弃与中国之间的合作关系。
At the same time, Southeast Asia, India and Mexico began offering tax incentives, subsidies, industrial parks and other measures designed to attract manufacturers. Companies now see diversification as insurance against tariffs, export restrictions and sudden disruptions. But that does not necessarily mean abandoning China.
在许多情况下，企业只是将产品的最终组装环节转移到了其他地区；零部件、原材料、生产工具、机械设备以及相关的工程技术仍然来自中国。这种生产模式形成了一个“枢纽-辐条”结构：中国作为核心枢纽，而生产网络则延伸至越南、马来西亚、泰国、印度、墨西哥等其他国家。
In many cases, companies are relocating only the final assembly. Components, materials, tooling, machinery and engineering expertise continue to originate in China. This is producing a “hub-and-spoke” model: the hub remains China; the spokes extend into Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Mexico and other countries.
波士顿咨询公司（BCG）估计，在东南亚扩张的中国制造商中，约有76%选择了越南、泰国或马来西亚作为新的生产基地。越南在电子产品组装领域具有显著优势；马来西亚在半导体测试和封装方面实力强劲；印度则拥有巨大的国内市场潜力；墨西哥则得益于其靠近美国的地理位置。不过，所有这些新的生产基地都与中国原有的供应链保持着紧密的联系。
BCG estimates that about 76 per cent of Chinese manufacturers expanding in Southeast Asia are choosing Vietnam, Thailand or Malaysia. Vietnam is increasingly important for electronics assembly; Malaysia has strengths in semiconductor testing and packaging; India offers enormous domestic market potential; and Mexico benefits from its proximity to the United States. But all of these new centres remain deeply connected to Chinese supply chains.
最值得关注的发展趋势可能并不局限于电子产品领域。中国的工业战略正逐渐转向一种新的分工模式：先进的研究、工程设计、技术创新以及高精度的制造业仍然集中在国内，而部分生产环节则被外包到海外。这可能成为中国工业全球化进程中的新特征。与其将生产活动全部集中在中国，更重要的是掌握核心技术、机械设备、零部件标准、工程技术以及供应链管理权。这种制造业格局的本质与传统的模式截然不同。
The most consequential development may lie beyond electronics. China’s industrial strategy is increasingly compatible with a division of labour in which advanced research, engineering, technological innovation and sophisticated manufacturing remain concentrated domestically. At the same time, it distributes selected production stages internationally. This could become a defining feature of China’s next stage of industrial globalisation. Rather than keep production concentrated in China, what matters more is control of the technologies, machinery, components, standards, engineering capabilities and supply-chain relationships underlying production. This is a fundamentally different conception of manufacturing power.
传统的衡量工业实力的标准主要是工厂的地理位置；而新的衡量标准则是谁能够控制整个工业生态系统。
The old model measured industrial strength largely by where factories were. The emerging model measures it by who controls the industrial ecosystem.
这一变化具有明显的讽刺意味：华盛顿试图通过征收关税和限制技术出口来削弱中国的全球制造业影响力，但反而促使中国企业建立更加多元化的生产网络，从而提高其应对政治风险的能力。
This process carries an unmistakable irony. Washington seeks to reduce China’s role in global manufacturing by imposing tariffs and restricting access to technology. Instead, it has spurred Chinese companies to build production networks with greater geographic diversification and potentially higher resilience to political risks.
确实，如果中国企业能够将中国的研发能力、零部件制造、机械设备以及工程技术与东南亚、印度、墨西哥等地区的生产设施相结合，那么这样的制造业体系将不会那么容易受到任何单一国家贸易政策的影响（即该体系具有更强的抗风险能力）。
Indeed, if Chinese companies can combine Chinese research and development, components, machinery and engineering with production facilities in Southeast Asia, India, Mexico and other markets, the result may be a manufacturing system less vulnerable to any single country’s trade policy.
但这并不意味着中国的制造业主导地位就一定会得到保障——竞争对手也会发展自己的供应商网络、技术体系以及工业生产能力，因此竞争只会更加激烈。
This does not mean China’s manufacturing dominance is guaranteed. Competitors will also develop their own supplier ecosystems, technologies and industrial capacities. Competition will only increase.
不过，主要的结论已经很明确：全球化并没有结束，而是在经历快速的重塑。中国并没有放弃自己作为“世界工厂”的角色，而是在重新定义这一角色的内涵。中国正在逐渐成为全球创新与发展的中心。虽然制造业产能可能会继续分散到各个国家，但真正的“工业智慧”（即创新的源泉）仍然留在中国。
But the main conclusion is already clear: globalisation is not ending; it is rapidly being reshaped. China is not abandoning its role as the “world’s factory”; rather, it is transforming what that concept means. It is becoming a global hub for innovation and development. While manufacturing capacity may continue to disperse across various countries, the “industrial brain” remains in China. By Djoomart Otorbaev