土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安在纽约联合国总部举行的第81届联合国大会期间讲话，9月22日摄。
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks during the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly at United Nations headquarters in New York, Sept. 22.
塞思·韦尼格/美联社 伊斯坦布尔——这是一个具有里程碑意义的时刻。沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和巴基斯坦的领导人在一座俯瞰伊斯兰教圣城麦加大清真寺的宫殿会面。
Seth Wenig/AP ISTANBUL — It was a milestone moment. Leaders from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan were meeting at a palace overlooking the Grand Mosque in Islam's holy city of Mecca.
8月7日当天，三人并排而坐，面前是硬木书桌，身后悬挂着丝绸帷幔。他们提笔在协议上签字，正式签署了《麦加联合防御协定》。
Sitting side by side that day, on Aug. 7, at hardwood desks set against a backdrop of silk drapery, the three leaders put pen to paper and signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.
一些人士将这份协议称为“逊尼派安全三角”的诞生。协议将沙特阿拉伯的石油财富、土耳其日益增强的防务实力——土耳其已拥有北约第二大军队——以及巴基斯坦的核能力 combines 在一起。协议纳入了类似北约《北大西洋公约》第五条的条款，即三国中任何一个逊尼派穆斯林国家遭到武装攻击，都将被视为对三国全体的攻击；三国还承诺相互交换情报和防务技术。
Described by some as the birth of a "Sunni Security Triad," the agreement combines Saudi Arabia's oil wealth, the growing defense might of Turkey, which already fields NATO's second largest military, and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. It includes NATO's Article 5-style language, that any armed attack on one of the three Sunni Muslim states is regarded as an attack on all of them, and a commitment between them to exchange intelligence and defense technology.
但或许比协议内容更重要的是，该协定象征着一个正在形成的地区安全架构的一块基石，同时也是应对美国影响力衰退后地缘政治不确定性的一道对冲。
But perhaps more important than the contents of the deal, the agreement symbolizes a cornerstone of an emerging regional security architecture and a hedge against post-U.S. geopolitical uncertainty.
土耳其外长哈坎·菲丹称，推动这场持续三年的谈判是安卡拉的主要动力。分析人士表示，协议的背后是安卡拉的一项愿景：逐步将土耳其打造为中东的核心参与者。这个地区多年战争不断，长期以来的权力格局受到冲击。
According to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Ankara was a main driver of the talks that went on for three years. And analysts say it was pushed by Ankara's vision that aims to slowly establish Turkey as a central player in the Middle East, a region rocked by years of war that has shaken longstanding power dynamics.
土耳其不断扩大的国防工业基础使其在军事上对西方的依赖程度降低（尽管它仍希望从美国获得 F-35 战斗机）。土耳其的军事影响力也在不断扩大：它在索马里、卡塔尔和利比亚都设有军事基地，并在叙利亚从长达十年的内战中逐渐恢复秩序的过程中发挥着越来越重要的作用。土耳其还巧妙地运用了文化软实力（其电视节目在该地区广为传播）以及人道主义援助（如在各地修建学校）来提升自身影响力。
Turkey's broadening defense-industrial base leaves the country less dependent on the West militarily (though it still craves F-35 jets from Washington). It has also widened its military reach: it has bases in Somalia, Qatar, Libya and is playing an increasingly central role in shaping Syria as it emerges from a decade of civil war. Turkey has also deftly used cultural soft power — its TV shows are watched across the region — and humanitarian causes — building schools across the region — to gain influence.
同时，土耳其也积极扮演调解者的角色，试图帮助解决从乌克兰到伊朗等一系列全球性冲突。
And Turkey has cast itself as a capable mediator to help bring an end to global conflicts, from Ukraine to Iran.
土耳其寻求增强地区影响力的举动正值该地区遭遇重大冲击之际：这些冲击始于 2023 年 10 月 7 日哈马斯对以色列发动的袭击，随后是美国与以色列之间持续了七个月的军事冲突。这场冲突使伊朗陷入困境，其在中东和黎巴嫩的代理人网络几乎被彻底摧毁。华盛顿方面越来越多地讨论在战后减少美国在中东的安全存在；同时，该地区也对美国所提供的安全保障的价值提出了质疑。
Turkey's bid for greater regional influence comes at a time when the region has been hit by profound shocks that started with the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, and continues with the stalemated, seven-month-old U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. Those have seen Iran defiant but diminished, with its network of proxies across Syria and Lebanon in ruins. There's growing talk in Washington of the U.S. reducing its Middle East security footprint in the aftermath of the war, amid persistent questions from the region about the value of the U.S.'s security umbrella.
（从左至右：土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安、沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼和巴基斯坦总理谢赫巴兹·谢里夫于 8 月 7 日在沙特阿拉伯麦加签署了一项三方国防协议。）然而，土耳其实现其地区影响力的目标面临一些现实障碍：多年的经济管理不善导致通货膨胀持续高企、货币贬值以及能源进口成本上升，这些因素都给国家资源带来了巨大压力。土耳其面临的最大挑战或许来自日益强硬和好战的以色列。
From left: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif sign a trilateral defense agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 7. Turkish Presidency/Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images Turkey's ambitions to fill any void though face some real obstacles. Years of economic mismanagement have led to persistent high inflation, a weak currency and rising energy import costs, straining state resources. Its biggest challenge though might come in the form of an increasingly assertive and aggressive Israel.
“土耳其的地区野心显然超出了其当前的经济实力。但这并不意味着土耳其在军事或战略上是一个弱国，”布鲁金斯学会“土耳其项目”主任阿斯利·阿伊丁塔斯巴斯（Asli Aydintasbas）指出。“不过，安卡拉明白自己无法将日益增长的影响力转化为能够主导该地区秩序的力量（尤其是超出其直接周边范围的秩序）。”
"Turkey's regional ambitions clearly exceed its current economic means. That doesn't make Turkey a militarily or strategically weak country," says Asli Aydintasbas, director of The Turkey Project at the Brookings Institution. "But Ankara understands that it's been unable to translate its growing influence into a Turkish-led order beyond its immediate periphery." Turkey as "big brother"
土耳其：地区中的“大哥”角色奥斯曼帝国曾从伊斯坦布尔控制并管理着该地区的大部分地区，这一统治持续了近五百年，直到第一次世界大战后崩溃。以雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安（Recep Tayyip Erdogan）总统为首的土耳其政府中的许多人从文明的角度看待土耳其在该地区的作用，并认为奥斯曼帝国所提供的治理模式与国家主义政权相比更为优越。
The Ottoman Empire controlled and ran much of the region from Istanbul for nearly half a millenium before it collapsed in the aftermath of World War I. Many in the Turkish government led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan see its regional role in civilizational terms and believe that the Ottoman Empire essentially offered a better model of governance and cohesion than the nation-states that replaced it.
“我认为，土耳其当前的统治精英普遍认为土耳其注定要成为该地区的核心力量，”阿伊丁塔斯巴斯说。不过，土耳其的外交政策实际上更为谨慎和现实，这在一定程度上受到了该国自身经济困境的影响。阿伊丁塔斯巴斯表示，安卡拉更倾向于通过维护地区稳定来保护自身的核心利益，而非试图主导该地区或建立一个新的奥斯曼帝国。
" I think that there is a sense of a manifest destiny among Turkey's current ruling elite that Turkey's destined to be the region's heavyweight," says Aydintasbas. But Turkish foreign policy is far more restrained and realistic, tempered in part by its own economic struggles. Aydintasbas says Ankara is trying to manage regional disorder to protect its vital national interests rather than dominate or build a neo-Ottoman empire.
根据阿伊丁塔斯巴斯的说法，《阿塔图尔克的三个面貌》（The Three Faces of Ataturk）一书指出，该地区很可能正在进入一个“后美国时代”（即美国影响力逐渐衰退的时期），而土耳其正在采取长期的战略布局。
Throughline The Three Faces of Ataturk Turkey, says Aydintasbas, understands the region is likely entering a post-U.S. phase after the war with Iran, and it's playing the long game.
“如果美国无法取得明确的胜利，那么美国在该地区的影响力将会逐渐减弱，土耳其将会趁机发挥作用，”阿伊丁塔斯巴斯指出。
"Without a clear U.S. win, gradually, U.S. influence in the region will decline and Turkey will be there to step in," says Aydintasbas.
特朗普总统长期以来一直质疑美国在该地区设立军事基地的必要性，并已下令撤出驻叙利亚和伊拉克的美军；美国似乎也对《麦加联合防御协议》（Mecca Joint Defense Agreement）表示支持。
President Trump has long questioned the value of U.S. bases in the region and has overseen a drawdown of U.S. troops in Syria and Iraq. The U.S. also seems to have blessed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.
阿伊丁塔斯巴斯认为，由于该地区经历了太多苦难，人们现在更渴望稳定，而非基于价值观的民主转型。
Aydintasbas says the region is now craving stability over values-based democratic transition because there has been too much suffering.
以色列高度戒备 叙利亚已成为土耳其日益增长影响力的核心实验场。2024年巴沙尔·阿萨德政权倒台后，安卡拉实现了主要核心目标：它获得了战后叙利亚重建的数十亿美元合同，并成为帮助叙利亚重建军队的主要合作伙伴。这与以色列对该地区的自身设想背道而驰。
Israel on high alert Syria has emerged as the central laboratory for Turkey's growing influence. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in 2024, Ankara achieved major core objectives: It secured multibillion-dollar contracts for postwar Syrian reconstruction and became Syria's main partner helping it rebuild its army. This cuts across Israel's own vision of the neighborhood.
阿伊丁塔斯巴斯将哈马斯发动袭击导致近1200名以色列人死亡后，以色列在该地区的战略称为“修剪草坪”——这是一个借用自以色列军方自身的短语。据加沙卫生部称，以色列在加沙的战争已造成74000多人死亡。
Aydintasbas calls Israel's strategy in the region after the Hamas-led attacks on Israel that killed almost 1,200 people, "mowing the lawn" — a phrase borrowed from the Israeli military itself. Israel's war in Gaza has killed more than 74,000 people, according to Gaza's Health Ministry.
“确定了一项地区政策，要求在军事上压制邻国，给予以色列行动自由，并确保该地区没有任何势力崛起到足以对以色列构成挑战的程度，”她说。
"Settling on a regional policy that calls for keeping their neighbors militarily suppressed, giving Israel freedom of action, and making sure that no power rises in the region enough to present a challenge to Israel," she says.
这意味着一个分散且碎片化的叙利亚，以色列目前控制其南部地区，且没有放弃的迹象。
That means a decentralized and fragmented Syria, the southern part of which Israel now controls and shows no signs of ceding.
“过去，我们没有看到以色列和土耳其在地区愿望方面存在竞争，或试图保护或扩大其势力范围，”法兰克福和平研究所高级研究员、以色列-土耳其关系专家埃尔达德·本·阿哈龙说。
"In the past, we didn't see Israel and Turkey competing in terms of regional aspirations, or trying to protect or expand their spheres of influence," says Eldad Ben Aharon, a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and expert on Israeli-Turkish relations.
8月初，以色列发动空袭，目标是叙利亚北部阿布·杜胡尔的一个废弃空军基地，以预防土耳其部队预期在那里的部署。土耳其和叙利亚均否认有任何此类军队调动，美国官员批评此次袭击是“不必要的升级”脆弱的和平 土耳其与以色列长期保持着一种虽存但脆弱的关系。1949年，它成为首个承认以色列的穆斯林占多数国家，2023年哈马斯10月7日袭击前夕，埃尔多安与总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡在纽约联合国大会上握手言欢。这与埃尔多安今年在联大聚会上对以色列的措辞形成了鲜明对比。
In early August, Israel launched an airstrike targeting a defunct airbase in Abu al-Duhur, in northern Syria, to pre-empt an anticipated deployment there of Turkish forces. Both Turkey and Syria denied any such troop movements, and U.S. officials criticized the strike as an " unnecessary escalation A frosty peace Turkey has had a long-standing, if frosty, relationship with Israel. It was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, and in 2023 just before Hamas' Oct. 7 attacks, Erdogan and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shook hands at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. It was a stark difference from how Erdogan addressed Israel at this year's General Assembly gathering.
“我们面前站着一种永远杀不够的种族灭绝心态，”埃尔多安上周在联合国讲台上说道，导致以色列代表团退场。以色列拒绝接受种族灭绝的指控。
"Before us stands a genocidal mindset that can never get enough of killing," Erdogan said from the U.N. podium last week, prompting the Israeli delegation to walk out. Israel rejects the charge of genocide.
以色列政客也没有示弱，其言辞部分受到即将到来的全国大选竞选活动的推动。以色列前总理纳夫塔利·贝内特称土耳其为“新伊朗”。8月，以色列国防部长伊斯雷尔·卡茨在两国因叙利亚问题军事紧张局势升级后，警告埃尔多安“不要招惹我们”。
Israeli politicians have not held back either, using rhetoric fueled in part by campaigning for upcoming national elections. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has called Turkey "the new Iran." In August, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned Erdogan "not to mess with us," after military tensions rose between the two countries over Syria.
本-阿哈龙表示，以色列和土耳其在几年内陷入暴力冲突并非不可能。
Ben Aharon says it's not out of the realm of possibility that Israel and Turkey could find themselves in a violent conflict in a few years.
“以色列和土耳其现在越来越通过零和博弈的视角来看待对方，”他说。
"Israel and Turkey now increasingly view each other through a zero-sum lens" he says.
在言辞激烈和紧张局势升级之际，本-阿哈龙表示，一线希望可能是特朗普总统与埃尔多安的私人关系。
Amid heightened rhetoric and tensions, Ben Ahron says a bright spot could be the personal relationship between President Trump and Erdogan.
2019年7月7日，土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安在安卡拉贝斯特佩总统府举行的北约峰会间隙与特朗普总统握手。索尔·洛布/法新社/盖蒂图片社“土耳其过去常常认为，通往华盛顿的道路要经过特拉维夫和耶路撒冷。以色列曾拥有的那种杠杆作用已经消失。在埃尔多安领导下，土耳其觉得凭借私人关系它拥有了通往白宫的直接渠道，”他说。
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shakes hands with President Trump at Bestepe presidential compound in Ankara, Turkey, on the sidelines of a NATO summit, on July 7. Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images "Turkey used to operate, quite often, on the belief that the path to Washington went through Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. That leverage Israel once had is gone. Under Erdoğan, Turkey feels that it has direct access to the White House based on personal ties, he says.
随着以色列和土耳其之间的互不信任达到历史最高点，布鲁金斯学会土耳其问题专家艾丁塔斯巴斯认为，作为两国强有力盟友的美国，掌握着重建土耳其和以色列关系的关键。
With mistrust between Israel and Turkey at an all-time high, Aydintasbas, the Turkey expert at Brookings, argues it is the U.S., a strong ally of both countries, which holds the keys to rebuilding the relationship between Turkey and Israel.
特朗普政府需要做它一直未能做到的事，即制定一个外交进程和路线图，以真正实现初步降级，随后建立土耳其和以色列之间合理的关系，从而让美国能够减少在中东的军事存在，”艾丁塔斯巴斯说。
"The Trump administration needs to do what it hasn't been able to do, which is come up with a diplomatic process and a roadmap to actually deescalate initially, and later on build a reasonable relationship between Turkey and Israel that would allow the U.S. to reduce its footprint in the Middle East," Aydintasbas says.
然而，特朗普交易式且反复无常的决策风格，使得任何此类长期规划都充满挑战。
However, Trump's transactional and volatile decision-making makes any such long-term planning challenging.
“领导风格和政府的抱负将决定埃尔多安时代之后和内塔尼亚胡时代之后会发生什么，”本-阿哈龙说。“关键在于人——不仅仅是制度或国家，而是那些领导并做出决策的特定个人。”土耳其 雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安。
"Leadership style and the aspirations of the government will determine what happens next in the post-Erdogan period and the post-Netanyahu period," Ben Aharon says. "The people make the difference — it's not just institutions or the countries, it's the specific individuals that lead and make the decisions." Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan.