由于美国和以色列在2月底联合袭击伊朗后，霍尔木兹海峡的安全局势陷入危机，海湾国家正在寻求替代的石油和天然气出口路线。作为报复，伊朗关闭了这一重要的海上通道，这暴露了该地区能源基础设施的脆弱性。
Gulf countries are looking to find alternative oil and gas export routes due to the security crisis in the Strait of Hormuz after the joint US and Israeli attacks on Iran at the end of February prompted Tehran to close the vital waterway in retaliation, exposing vulnerabilities in the region’s energy infrastructure.
霍尔木兹海峡通常承担着全球约20%的石油运输任务。其关闭对各国造成的影响各不相同，这取决于各国现有的替代运输基础设施的容量及其自身的能源安全状况。
The Strait of Hormuz typically handles around 20% of global oil supplies, and its closure led to varying outcomes depending on the alternative infrastructure capacities and vulnerabilities among Gulf nations.
根据美国能源信息署（EIA）的数据，只有沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国（UAE）拥有能够绕过该海峡的管道运输系统。
Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have active pipeline infrastructure able to bypass the strait, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
科威特、卡塔尔和巴林依赖通过该海峡的海上运输方式，因此没有其他出口选择；而阿曼则得益于其地理位置——它位于这个关键交通要道的之外，因此未受到直接影响。
Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain rely on maritime transit via the strait and have no alternative export capacity, while Oman benefits from its unique geographic location outside the chokepoint.
由于没有立即可行的替代运输方案，科威特的经济遭受了严重冲击：其原油日产量从战前的260万桶骤降至57.3万桶（5月份时储油设施已达到极限）。到9月份，科威特的原油出口量虽有所回升至每天100万桶，但仍仅为战前水平的36%左右。
Kuwait suffered massive economic disruptions, having no immediate bypass options, with its daily crude production plummeting from a pre-war level of 2.6 million barrels to a low of 573,000 in May after its storage facilities maxed out. Kuwaiti crude exports partially recovered to 1 million barrels per day by September while still remaining below 36% of pre-war levels.
尽管科威特正在与沙特阿拉伯讨论长期的管道运输项目，但这类需要多年才能完成的基础设施建设项目无法立即缓解该国对霍尔木兹海峡的短期经济依赖。
Even though Kuwait is in talks with Saudi Arabia on long-term pipeline bypass projects, such multi-year infrastructure solutions do not offer immediate relief to the country’s short-term economic dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
卡塔尔的处境也类似：作为全球最大的液化天然气（LNG）出口国之一，其天然气无法通过管道运输。卡塔尔的一艘商业船只曾遭到直接袭击；随着地区紧张局势的升级，多哈不得不缩减拉斯拉凡（Ras Laffan）液化天然气生产厂的运营规模。
Qatar is in a similar situation, facing a structural crisis as one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which cannot be transported via pipelines in its liquefied state. A Qatari commercial vessel suffered direct attacks, and escalating regional tensions prompted Doha to scale back operations at its Ras Laffan plant.
分析人士称，长期的海上运输中断预计已导致卡塔尔2026年的液化天然气出口目标出现了约3000万公吨的缺口。
The prolonged maritime transit suspension is estimated to have led to a shortfall of around 30 million metric tons in Qatar’s 2026 LNG export targets, analysts say.
卡塔尔无法在海峡外建设新设施，因为该国官员表示不会寻求修建绕行管道。相反，卡塔尔政府正与巴基斯坦一道，在美伊外交谈判中进行斡旋，以恢复海上安全并重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。
Constructing new facilities outside the strait is not possible for Qatar, as country officials said they will not pursue bypass pipelines. Instead, the Qatari government is mediating US-Iran diplomatic talks alongside Pakistan to restore maritime security and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
与此同时，在海上封锁期间，巴林除了面临物流瓶颈外，还遭受了直接的基础设施破坏。
At the same time, Bahrain suffered direct infrastructure damage in addition to logistical bottlenecks amid the maritime blockade.
巴林唯一的石油加工厂——西特拉（Sitra）BAPCO炼油厂因储油罐达到极限，被迫停止了其每日40万桶的产能。
The Sitra BAPCO refinery, Bahrain’s only oil processing plant, was forced to idle its 400,000-barrel-per-day capacity as its storage tanks maxed out.
4月5日，无人机和导弹袭击导致西特拉设施的储油罐起火并严重受损，局势进一步恶化，这使得巴林的能源经济雪上加霜。
The situation worsened when drone and missile strikes set fire to storage tanks and severely damaged them at the Sitra facility on April 5, further crippling the Bahraini energy economy.
相比之下，阿联酋在很大程度上安然度过了这场危机，这得益于其哈布山-富查伊拉（Habshan-Fujairah）输油管道，该管道也被称为阿布扎比原油管道（ADCOP）。
In contrast, the UAE navigated the crisis mostly unscathed, relying on its Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline, which is also known as the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP).
这条全长360公里（223.7英里）的阿布扎比原油管道每天可将多达180万桶原油直接从阿布扎比输送到阿曼湾。
The 360-kilometer (223.7-mile) ADCOP transports up to 1.8 million barrels of crude per day directly from Abu Dhabi to the Gulf of Oman.
阿联酋正计划进行新的基础设施投资，以将其绕行输送能力翻倍，旨在实现明年每日500万桶的生产目标。此前，阿联酋已退出石油输出国组织（OPEC），以规避每日最高350万桶的配额限制。
The UAE is planning new infrastructure investments to double its bypass capacity amid its push to reach its production goal of 5 million barrels per day by next year, having recently withdrawn from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to evade quotas of up to 3.5 million barrels per day.
沙特阿拉伯的情况则显示了耗资数十亿美元的绕行系统所存在的脆弱性。
The situation in Saudi Arabia showed the vulnerabilities of multi-billion-dollar bypass systems.
沙特阿拉伯依赖全长1200公里（745.6英里）的东西向原油管道，将每日多达700万桶的原油输送到红海港口延布（Yanbu）。
Saudi Arabia relies on the 1,200-kilometer (745.6-mile) East-West Crude Oil Pipeline to transport up to 7 million barrels per day to the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
9月11日，由伊朗支持的也门胡塞武装组织发动的无人机袭击破坏了该石油管道的泵站，导致沙特阿美（Saudi Aramco）不得不关闭整个输送系统，并取消了向至少两家欧洲炼油厂的原油供应计划。
Drone strikes by Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthi militias on Sept. 11 damaged the pipeline’s pumping stations, which led Saudi Aramco to shut down the system and cancel October deliveries to at least two European refineries.
为履行合同义务，利雅得被迫重新调整原油运输路线，改经霍尔木兹海峡（Strait of Hormuz）运输原油；这使得该国通过该海峡的日运输量从8月份的70万桶激增至本月的290万桶。
Riyadh was forced to reroute its shipments back via the Strait of Hormuz to meet its contractual obligations, causing its daily transit via the waterway to rise from 700,000 barrels in August to 2.9 million barrels this month.
东西向石油管道已于上周恢复有限运营，但专家估计修复受损泵站仍需至少八周时间，因此这条运输路线在未来仍可能面临胡塞武装的袭击风险。
The East-West pipeline resumed limited operations last week, but experts estimate it will take up to eight weeks to repair the damaged pumping stations, leaving the route vulnerable to future Houthi attacks.
与此同时，只有阿曼能够利用其位于阿拉伯海沿岸的索哈尔（Sohar）、杜克姆（Duqm）和萨拉拉（Salalah）港口，将这场地区危机转化为自身的发展机遇——这些港口为其他海湾国家的原油运输提供了安全的中转平台。
Meanwhile, only Oman has been able to turn this regional crisis into an advantage through its Sohar, Duqm, and Salalah ports along the Arabian Sea, serving as a secure transshipment hub for other Gulf producers making ship-to-ship oil transfers.
根据土耳其能源战略与政策研究中心（TESPAM）的数据，在危机发生的第一个月里，依赖霍尔木兹海峡运输的海湾国家原油出口量下降了36.4%，由此造成的原油收入损失高达152亿美元。
Crude exports from Hormuz-reliant Gulf nations fell 36.4%, costing $15.2 billion in lost oil revenues during the first month of the crisis alone, according to the Turkish Center for Energy Strategies and Policy Research (TESPAM).
总部位于美国的贝克研究所（Baker Institute）在最近的一份报告中也证实了这些经济影响，报告指出：由于缺乏替代的出口基础设施，科威特、卡塔尔和巴林受到了危机最严重的冲击。
Texas-based think tank Baker Institute confirmed these economic impacts in a recent report, which showed that the lack of alternative export infrastructure concentrated the most severe effects of the crisis squarely on Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.