“澳大利亚储备银行自身也必须为通胀反弹，进而为利率上升承担部分责任，”索尔·埃斯莱克在澳大利亚现金利率上调至4.6%后写道。
‘The Reserve Bank itself has to accept some of the blame for the rebound in inflation, and hence in interest rates,’ Saul Eslake writes after the cash rate in Australia was hiked to 4.6%.
照片：妮基·肖特/AAP 正如经济学家和金融市场普遍预期，澳大利亚储备银行的货币政策委员会于周二将现金利率上调25个基点至4.6%，这是自2011年10月（矿业投资热潮顶峰时期）以来的最高水平。
Photograph: Nikki Short/AAP Saul Eslake s universally expected by economists and financial markets, the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy board on Tuesday lifted its cash rate by 25 basis points to 4.6%, the highest level since October 2011 (at the peak of the mining investment boom).
财政部长吉姆·查尔默斯将本周的决定——以及支撑该决定的通胀担忧——归因于中东战争。其他人，包括影子财政部长蒂姆·威尔逊和一些经济学家，则将其归咎于政府支出水平“过度”及其增长。
Treasurer Jim Chalmers has attributed this week’s decision – and the inflation concerns underpinning it – to the war in the Middle East. Others, including shadow treasurer Tim Wilson some economists blame it on “excessive” levels of, and growth in, government spending.
事实上，这些因素以及其他因素共同导致了澳大利亚今年经历的通胀和利率反弹。
In truth both of these factors, and others besides, have contributed to the rebound in inflation and interest rates that Australia has experienced this year.
订阅澳大利亚突发新闻 油价从6月底略高于每桶70美元（当时中东冲突似乎可能结束）反弹至近几周超过每桶100美元，因为目前看来该冲突短期内结束的可能性很小。
Sign up for the Breaking News Australia Oil prices have rebounded from just over US$70 a barrel in late June, when it briefly appeared that the Middle East conflict might be over, to more than US$100 a barrel in recent weeks, now that there seems little prospect of an imminent end to that conflict.
一个较少被关注但同样重要的因素是，自冲突爆发以来，原油价格与汽油和柴油等成品油价格之间的“裂解价差”一直维持在较高水平，鉴于中东和俄罗斯的炼油能力已受到损害，这种价差似乎不太可能下降。
Less well recognised, but no less important, the “crack spreads” between crude oil prices and prices of refined petroleum products such as gasoline and diesel, have remained at elevated levels since the conflict began, and seem unlikely to come down given the damage that has been done to refining capacity in the Middle East and in Russia.
此外，美国（全球最大的石油生产国）和中国（全球最大的石油进口国）似乎已将储备降至其认为合理的最低水平，因此与冲突初期相比，美国目前的石油出口量减少，而中国的石油进口量增加。
Additionally, the US (the world’s biggest oil producer) and China (the world’s biggest oil importer) appear to have run down their reserves as far as they deem prudent, and so are now exporting less and importing more oil, respectively, than they had been doing in the early months of the conflict.
这些影响已在其他“发达”经济体中显现，这些经济体近几周因通胀升温而加息——包括美国、日本、韩国、欧元区和新西兰。
These influences have been evident in other “advanced” economies which have lifted their interest rates in recent weeks in response to higher inflation – including the US, Japan, South Korea, the Euro area and New Zealand.
但澳大利亚通胀的反弹，早在唐纳德·特朗普和本雅明·内塔尼亚胡引发中东冲突之前就已开始。
But the rebound in Australian inflation began well before Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu started the conflict in the Middle East.
澳储行（RBA）青睐的“核心”通胀衡量指标，在2024年6月止的年度中触底至2.8%，并在今年2月冲突爆发前已升至3.3%。自那时起，这一核心通胀指标已升至7月止年度的3.6%。
The RBA’s preferred measure of “underlying” inflation bottomed out at 2.8% over the year to June 2025, and had already risen to 3.3% by February this year, before the outbreak of the conflict. Since then, this measure of underlying inflation has risen to 3.6% over the year to July.
因此，促使澳储行在今年2月至5月间加息三次的通胀升温，主要不能归因于中东冲突。
So most of the increase in inflation which prompted the Reserve Bank to raise interest rates three times between February and May this year can’t be attributed to the conflict in the Middle East.
相反，这反映了“总需求”——澳大利亚家庭、企业和政府在商品和服务上的支出总和——与“总供给”——企业和政府生产的总量，减去出口，加上进口——之间持续存在的失衡。
Rather, it reflects the persistent imbalance between “aggregate demand” – the sum total of spending on goods and services by Australian households, businesses and governments – and “aggregate supply” – the sum total of what is produced by businesses and governments, less what is exported to foreign countries, plus what is imported from abroad.
本十年来我们极差的生产率表现抑制了总供给的增长，这实际上设定了一个“速度上限”，规定了我们在实现“充分就业”（自2022年以来已实现）后，经济在不产生通胀压力的情况下能增长多快。总需求的增长则由公共和私人支出共同驱动。
The growth of aggregate supply has been held down by our abysmal productivity performance during this decade, which effectively sets a “speed limit” on how fast our economy can grow, once we’ve attained “full employment” (which we have done since 2022), without generating inflationary pressure. Growth in aggregate demand has been driven by both public and private spending.
按GDP统计衡量的公共支出增速已放缓——从2023-24和2024-25财年实际增长超过4%，降至2025-26财年的2%。但国民核算中的公共支出衡量指标仅包括政府及国有企业在商品和服务上的直接支出。它们不包括其他形式的政府支出——特别是联邦政府以及同样重要的州和领地政府近年来发放的现金支付给家庭和生活成本救助措施。
Growth in public spending as measured in the GDP statistics has slowed – from more than 4% per annum in real terms in 2023-24 and 2024-25 to 2% in 2025-26. But the national accounts measures of public spending only include direct spending by governments and government-owned enterprises on goods and services. They don’t includes other forms of government spending – in particular, cash payments to households and cost-of-living relief measures which the federal government and, of no less importance, state and territory governments have handed out in recent years.
周一发布的最终预算结果文件显示，2025-26财年联邦政府总支出实际增长5.1%，仅略低于2024-25财年的5.6%，且这两个数字均高于过去25年中除五年外的所有年份。
skip past newsletter promotion after newsletter promotion Thus the final budget outcome document released on Monday showed that total expenses by the federal government rose by 5.1% in real terms in 2025-26, only marginally less than the 5.6% figure for 2024-25, and that both of those figures were higher than in all but five of the past 25 years.
尽管大多数州和领地尚未发布同类文件，但根据其2026-27财年预算中的估算，2025-26财年州和领地政府及其机构的支出实际增长约6%——为2019-20财年以来最大增幅。
And although most of the states and territories are yet to publish their equivalent documents, based on the estimates presented in their 2026-27 budgets it is likely that spending by state and territory governments and their instrumentalities rose by about 6% in real terms in 2025-26 – the largest increase since 2019-20.
联邦、州和领地政府提供的大多数生活成本救助，无论是现金发放还是减税（如暂时减半燃油消费税），均属非定向性质——即既发给可能不需要的家庭，也发给确有需要的家庭。且大多数家庭似乎已将其花出。这在国民核算中体现为私营部门支出——但实际上是由政府政策推动的。
Most of the cost-of-living relief given by the federal, and state and territory, governments, whether by way of cash handouts or tax cuts (such as the temporary halving of fuel excise) has been untargeted – that is, it has been given to households who might not need it as well as those who undoubtedly do. And most households appear to have spent it. That shows up in the national accounts as private sector spending – but it has really been facilitated by government policy.
当总需求持续超过总供给，导致通胀长期高于澳洲联储（RBA）目标区间时，政府通过生活成本补贴或减税所给予的，联储会以加息的形式收回。只不过，加息的负担主要落在背负高额房贷的较小群体身上，而享受补贴和减税的人群范围要广得多。
In circumstances where inflation is running persistently above the Reserve Bank’s target because aggregate demand is running persistently in excess of aggregate supply, what governments give by way of cost-of-living relief or tax cuts, the Reserve Bank takes away in the form of higher interest rates. Except that the burden of higher interest rates falls primarily on a smaller group of households – those with big mortgages – than those who received the cost-of-living relief and tax cuts.
联储自身也需为通胀反弹、进而导致利率上升承担部分责任。原因在于——事后诸葛亮来看——他们去年过早降息。他们判断通胀已可持续回落至 2% 至 3% 的目标区间，结果证明是错误的。
The Reserve Bank itself has to accept some of the blame for the rebound in inflation, and hence in interest rates. That’s because – with the benefit of hindsight – they cut interest rates prematurely last year. Their belief that inflation had sustainably returned to their 2% to 3% target band turned out to be wrong.
他们当然面临政府施压要求降息——例如查尔默斯在 2024 年 8 月毫无根据地断言联储“重创了经济”（如果真重创了，通胀随后就不会以这种方式反弹）。但——同样事后看来——他们本应抵制这种压力。
They were of course under considerable pressure from the government to cut rates – recall, for example, Chalmers’ unjustified assertion in August 2024 that the Reserve Bank had“smashed the economy” (if it had, inflation wouldn’t have rebounded in the way that it subsequently did). But – again, with the benefit of hindsight – they should have resisted that pressure.
从许多角度看，这种“甩锅游戏”毫无意义。正如澳联储行长布洛克本周重申：“高通胀伤害所有澳大利亚人，尤其是最脆弱群体”，“至关重要的是，我们必须阻止高通胀在全经济的定价决策中扎根，否则问题只会恶化”。
In many ways this “blame game” is beside the point. As RBA governor Michele Bullock re-iterated this week, “high inflation hurts all Australians, especially the most vulnerable” and “it’s critical that we stop high inflation from becoming embedded in price setting decisions across the economy or the problem will only get worse”.
政客们应避免做出或主张任何“让问题恶化”的举动，让澳联储专心履职。
Politicians should avoid doing, or advocating, things that will “make the problem worse”, and let the Reserve Bank get on with its job.