基辅日常的监管问题以及欧洲军队缺乏想象力的体制思维,正在阻碍联合武器生产。这不仅削弱了乌克兰在战场上的表现,也让欧洲军队无法应对现代战争。
Mundane regulatory problems in Kyiv and unimaginative institutional thinking in Europe’s militaries are holding up joint weapons production. And that is undermining Ukraine’s battlefield performance and leaving Europe’s armed forces unprepared for modern warfare.
这是伦敦国王学院国家治国方略与国家安全中心(CSNS)的一份新报告以及接受半岛电视台采访的专家们得出的结论。
Those are the conclusions of a new report from the Centre for Statecraft and National Security (CSNS) at King’s College London, and experts who spoke to Al Jazeera.
两年多来,基辅一直试图通过邀请西方合作伙伴资助新的生产设施并以战场测试作为回报,来扩大其武器生产规模。基辅获得了武器,西方伙伴获得了专业技术。
For two years, Kyiv has sought to scale up its weapons production by inviting Western partners to fund new production facilities in exchange for battlefield testing. Kyiv receives weapons, Western partners receive know-how.
据报告《超越援助:让乌克兰防务合作发挥作用》(Beyond Aid: Making Ukraine Defence Cooperation Work)显示,这一模式促成了乌克兰与外国合作伙伴之间至少180项企业间合作,但其中22%的项目陷入停滞。
That formula has led to at least 180 business-to-business partnerships between Ukrainian and foreign partners, but 22 percent of them are stalled, according to the report, Beyond Aid: Making Ukraine Defence Cooperation Work.
其中一个陷入停滞的项目是德国国防巨头莱茵金属公司(Rheinmetall)于一年前宣布的一家火炮弹药厂,该厂本应在此时开始生产。然而,该项目尚未破土动工,因为乌克兰当局延迟发放许可证,随后政府又更改了工厂的选址。此外还存在其他法律和官僚主义问题。
One of those stalled ventures is an artillery shell factory that German defence giant Rheinmetall announced a year ago, which should now be starting production. Yet ground has not been broken on the project, because Ukrainian authorities have delayed permits and the government then moved the factory’s site. There are other legal and bureaucratic problems.
CSNS客座研究员克里斯·普尔(Chris Pool)对半岛电视台表示:“知识产权的保护过程非常漫长。迭代周期变化如此之快,以至于通常获得批准和保护的技术已经过时。”
“The process ofing intellectual property is lengthy,” Chris Pool, a visiting fellow at the CSNS, told Al Jazeera.
前中情局局长兼将军大卫·彼得雷乌斯(David Petraeus)最近讨论了乌克兰无人机制造商如何“根据俄军对其系统的反制措施,每周更改一次软件。他们每三到四周就能进行一次硬件更改。”按照西方和平时期的标准,这是一个令人晕眩的创新速度。
“Iteration cycles move so quickly, often what’sed and protected is obsolete.”Former CIA Director General David Petraeus recently discussed how Ukrainian drone manufacturers “can make software changes once a week as required by what the Russians are doing to counter their systems. They can make hardware changes every three or four weeks.”
“如果产品最终交付给一支乌克兰旅,而该旅随后对其进行修改并适应新的发展态势,那么改进后产品的知识产权归谁所有?乌克兰国家在此时是否拥有权益?”普尔问道。出口权是另一个问题。
That is a dizzying speed of innovation by the West’s peacetime standards. “What happens If the product ends up with a Ukrainian brigade and that brigade then modifies it and adapts it to new developments? Who then owns the intellectual property in the improved product? Does the Ukrainian state have a stake at that point?” said Pool.
报告指出:“在初期阶段,仅专注于乌克兰市场或许是可行的,但缺乏明确的出口机制,日后可能会限制企业将乌克兰本土设施纳入更广泛的国际供应链的能力。”“与我们无关”普尔表示,问题有时源于欧洲对陆战僵化的态度。他曾与正在寻找西方合作伙伴的乌克兰团队进行过交流。
Export rights are another problem. “While focusing exclusively on the Ukrainian market may be viable at the initial stage, the absence of a clear export mechanism may later constrain companies’ ability to … integrate Ukrainian-based facilities into wider international supply chains,” said the report. ‘Not relevant to us’
2022年,俄罗斯和乌克兰都仅使用传统的战场火炮和重型装甲车辆作战。乌克兰通过有效运用防御性武器,击败了俄罗斯的初期进攻。
The problems sometimes lie in Europe’s rigid approach to land warfare, said Pool, who has spoken to Ukrainian teams looking for Western partners. In 2022, both Russia and Ukraine were fighting exclusively with classic battlefield artillery and heavy armour.
然而,当乌克兰在2023年发起反攻时,由于无法在规模和产能上与俄罗斯抗衡,它迅速进行了调整。
Ukraine defeated Russia’s initial attacks with effective use of defensive weapons.
乌克兰设计了低成本、远程的无人机和导弹,以切断俄罗斯武器和燃料向前线的输送,并摧毁俄罗斯的炼油能力。它也开始自行设计和制造第一人称视角(FPV)无人机,将其作为一种火炮形式使用。
But when Ukraine went on the counteroffensive in 2023, it was unable to compete with Russian scale and production capacity, and quickly adapted. It designed cheap, long-range drones and missiles to stanch the flow of Russian weapons and fuel to the front, and to destroy Russian refining capacity.
据报道,乌克兰在2023年在无人机战争上投资了10亿美元,是2022年支出的10倍。《纽约时报》的视频分析发现,今年三个月内,乌克兰击毁的俄罗斯装甲车辆数量与2022年全年相当。
It also began to design and build its own first-person view (FPV) drones as a form of artillery. Ukraine reportedly invested $1bn in drone warfare in 2023, 10 times what it spent in 2022.
2024年,乌克兰生产了100万架FPV无人机。2025年,产量超过300万架。今年,乌克兰预计将生产800万架——相当于俄罗斯部署数量的1.6倍——从而实现局部空中优势。新武器伴随着新战术和新指挥结构。
A New York Times video analysis found that it struck as many Russian armoured vehicles in three months this year as in all of 2022. In 2024, Ukraine produced a million FPV drones. In 2025, the production was more than 3 million. This year, Ukraine will produce an estimated 8 million – 16 for every 10 that Russia fields – achieving localised air superiority.
“最重要的是实现指挥权的分散化——乌克兰在这方面做得比任何其他国家都更出色,”康斯坦丁诺斯·格里瓦斯(Konstantinos Grivas)说道。他是希腊军事学院负责教授先进武器系统的教授。
The new weapons came with new tactics and new command structures. “The most important thing is decentralised command. Ukraine has implemented this more than anyone else,” said Konstantinos Grivas, who teaches advanced weapons systems at the Hellenic Military Academy.
“军队中的各个单位不会等待上级的命令;它们会自行收集信息并做出决策……因此,我们需要非常能干的基层指挥官,”他告诉半岛电视台(Al Jazeera)。这种分散化的指挥模式与传统的军事等级制度和战术背道而驰。
“Units don’t wait for commands from upstairs. They harvest their own information and make their own decisions … You need very capable junior commanders,” he told Al Jazeera. That dispersed command runs counter to classic military hierarchies and tactics.
“在英国,人们普遍认为英国军队不会采用这样的作战方式;不过这一切其实都与我们无关,”普尔(Pool)说道。他接触过的乌克兰团队曾被告知:“‘你们为什么不能与英国航空航天公司(British Aerospace)或巴布科克公司(Babcock)合作呢?这样我们就可以继续与那些我们熟悉的公司打交道了……’”乌克兰已经通过实际案例证明了这种作战方式的可行性。
“In the UK, there’s a certain amount of arrogance that the British army wouldn’t fight like this, and this is all very interesting, but ultimately, not relevant to us,” said Pool. The Ukrainian teams he spoke to were told, “’Couldn’t you just partner with [defence companies British Aerospace] or Babcock and then we can deal with the faces with whom we’re used to dealing,’” he said.
在8月份举行的名为“联合决心”(Combined Resolve)的军事演习中,乌克兰的无人机操作人员通过模拟“直接向坦克发射穿甲炮弹”的战术,成功摧毁了一个美国坦克旅;2月份,他们又对一个英国坦克旅采取了同样的行动。
Ukraine has demonstrated the challenges of this approach.
“当面对那些使用新型技术或无需依赖GPS的导航系统的对手时,英国军队缺乏探索这些新技术并将其应用于自身作战方式的意愿,”普尔指出。
In wargames dubbed Combined Resolve in August, Ukrainian drone operators destroyed a US tank brigade by simulating their tactic of dropping armour-piercing artillery directly onto tanks.
“西方军队甚至还没有开始将所有陆军部队改造成以无人机为主力的作战单位,”奥莱山大·丹尼柳克(Oleksandr Danylyuk)说道。他曾是乌克兰国防部及外交部的资深顾问,如今担任位于伦敦的皇家联合服务研究所(Royal United Services Institute, RUSI)的陆地作战专家。
They did the same to a British brigade in February. “Faced with teams who are presenting a new technology or navigation that doesn’t rely on GPS, for example, there isn’t that curiosity to find out what’s going on and how this could be adapted to the British Army,” said Pool.
“如果无人机不是步兵的主要作战工具,那么这些步兵就注定会过时,”他告诉半岛电视台。“那些被招募并接受过使用突击步枪作战训练的士兵,根本无法与敌人直接交战——他们最终都会被无人机消灭。”或许,最大的问题还是资金问题。
Western militaries have “not even started to shift all of the land forces units into drone infantry,” said Oleksandr Danylyuk, a former senior adviser to Ukraine’s Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, now a land warfare expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London-based think tank. “If you actually don’t use drones as the main weapon of your infantry, they are obsolete,” he told Al Jazeera. “These people, you recruited and trained to fight with assault rifles, they will never see the enemy. They will be all killed with drones.”
美国去年停止向乌克兰提供资金,法国和德国的极右翼领导人也想效仿。眼下,欧盟承担了乌克兰军事和财政援助的大部分,但基辅今年上半年为两次反攻提供资金时出现超支,收复了至少870平方公里此前被俄罗斯占领的土地,如今又急切盼望获得更多资金。
Perhaps the biggest problem of all is money. The US stopped funding Ukraine last year, and far-right leaders in France and Germany want to follow suit.
这些资金同样受到欧洲法规的掣肘。乌克兰人认为,按照当前的政治趋势,长期获得这些资金正变得越来越不确定。“我看不到西方有任何真正实现积极转变的可能,”丹柳克说。
The European Union is providing the bulk of Ukraine’s military and financial aid for now, but Kyiv overspent in the first half of this year to finance two counteroffensives that took back at least 870sq km of land Russia had occupied, and is impatient for more funds. Those funds, too, are tied up in European regulations, and Ukrainians feel that with current political trends, receiving them over the long term is an increasingly precarious proposition. “I don’t see any real chance for any positive transformations in the West,” said Danylyuk.
“上帝赐予西方的这个奇迹没有得到真正利用,乌克兰的英雄主义以及他们牺牲自身和整个国家的勇气也没有得到珍惜,全都被白白浪费了。”
“Instead of actually using this miracle, which was given by God to the West, and using this Ukrainian heroism and this readiness to sacrifice themselves and the nation, it was just wasted.”