数十年来,沙特阿拉伯与美国的关系一直围绕一个经常被提及、却很少得到验证的假设展开:如果这个王国遭到攻击,美国会前来救援。但近期事件表明,这把备受推崇的安全保护伞漏洞百出。上个月,与伊朗结盟的也门反叛武装突然袭击也门海岸,并威胁切断沙特阿拉伯在红海的运输生命线。然而,特朗普政府不愿在与伊朗的战争中开辟新战线,拒绝了利雅得提出的救援请求。
For decades, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. has centered on an often-mentioned but rarely tested supposition: If the kingdom were attacked, America would come to its rescue. But recent events have shown that much-vaunted security umbrella to be a leaky one. Last month, Iran-aligned Yemeni rebels blitzed through Yemen’s coast and threatened to shut down Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea lifeline. But the Trump administration, reluctant to open a new front in its war with Iran, rebuffed Riyadh’s calls to come to its rescue.
这迫使沙特阿拉伯在华盛顿之外寻找朋友,寻找愿意将口头支持化为实际火箭弹,并协助其投入一场被沙特视为关乎生存的战争的盟友。
That has left the kingdom searching for friends beyond Washington, for allies ready to put rockets where the rhetoric is and assist in a fight Saudi Arabia considers existential.
过去几个月,在波斯湾各国应对以色列和美国对伊朗战争所造成的影响之际,沙特阿拉伯大幅强化了以军事为重点的外交努力。7月,沙特宣布成立一个由15个国家参与的海上联盟,以保障经由红海、曼德海峡和亚丁湾的航运安全。不久后,《麦加联合防御协定》正式出台。这是一项受北约启发的安全协议,任何针对沙特阿拉伯、土耳其或巴基斯坦的攻击,都将被视为对三国共同的攻击。
Over the last few months, as Persian Gulf nations contended with the fallout from the Israel-U.S. war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has supercharged its military-focused diplomacy. In July, it announced a 15-nation maritime alliance to safeguard shipping through the Red Sea, the Bab al Mandab strait and the Gulf of Aden. Soon after came the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a NATO-inspired security pact where any attack on Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan would be regarded as an attack against all three. And this week, Saudi Arabia’s race to rally allies spurred a detente of sorts with its frenemy the United Arab Emirates, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — the country’s de facto ruler — and defense minister brother receiving the Emirates’ vice president for the first high-level meeting since the two sides fell out over Yemen late last year.
本周,沙特阿拉伯争取盟友的行动促成其与亦敌亦友的宿敌阿拉伯联合酋长国出现某种程度的和解。沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼——该国事实上的统治者——以及担任国防部长的弟弟,接待了阿联酋副总统。这是双方去年年底因也门问题交恶以来的首次高级别会面。甚至还有报道称,沙特阿拉伯可能与以色列合作对付胡塞武装;对于两个没有正式外交关系的国家而言,这是一个引人注目的发展——如果报道属实的话。
There have even been reports of possible cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel against the Houthis, a notable development — if true — for two countries with no formal diplomatic relations. The Saudi overtures come at a sensitive time for the kingdom. The standoff between the U.S. and Iran over the Strait of Hormuz has largely cut off Saudi Arabia's main export channel, and attacks on its energy infrastructure are lowering its oil output. As a result, the kingdom saw a 25% contraction in “oil activities,” according to official economic data, triggering an almost 5% decrease in the country’s gross domestic product between April and June, compared with the first quarter of the year.
沙特阿拉伯拉拢盟友的这些举动发生在该国一个敏感时期。美国与……之间的僵局与伊朗围绕霍尔木兹海峡的战争已在很大程度上切断沙特阿拉伯的主要出口通道,而对其能源基础设施的袭击也正导致其石油产量下降。据官方经济数据,沙特“石油活动”萎缩了25%,使该国4月至6月的国内生产总值较第一季度下降近5%。这一降幅迫使沙特对旨在重塑国家命运的2030愿景——王储的标志性政策——作出令人痛心的削减。
That reduction forced painful cuts to Vision 2030, the prince's signature policy aimed at remaking Saudi Arabia. So-called giga-projects, such as the Line and Trojena, have revised their ambitions downward amid the financial realities of a Saudi Arabia under fire. And all that was before the Houthis got involved. The Houthis had been fighting the Saudis since 2015 in Yemen's civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of people before settling into a stalemate and an uneasy ceasefire in 2022. But in July, Saudi Arabia attacked the airport in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, to prevent the landing of an Iranian plane carrying high-ranking Houthi officials.
在遭袭的沙特面临财政现实之际,所谓的超大型项目,如“线性城市”(The Line)和“特罗杰纳”(Trojena),都已下调目标。而这一切都发生在胡塞武装介入之前。自2015年以来,胡塞武装一直在也门内战中与沙特作战;这场战争造成数十万人死亡,随后双方在2022年陷入僵局,并达成了一项不稳定的停火协议。但今年7月,沙特袭击了也门首都萨那的机场,试图阻止一架搭载胡塞高级官员的伊朗飞机穆罕默德与特朗普总统也有一定的私人交情。
That set off a flurry of Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure, and the Houthis’ announcement of a blockade against Saudi shipping on the Red Sea — now the main corridor for Saudi energy exports. Then in September, the Houthis overran Yemen’s coastal cities, snapping up materiel left behind by Saudi-backed government fighters and seizing control of territory near the Bab al Mandab strait. A few days later, the Saudis accused an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq of coordinating with the Houthis to hit the East-West Pipeline, the vital infrastructure that had allowed Saudi Arabia to reorient its oil from Hormuz to the Red Sea. All that pushed the Saudi crown prince to turn to the U.S. for help — and he had reason to think it would come: Late last year, the U.S. signed a strategic defense agreement with the kingdom, designated it a major non-NATO ally and agreed to sell it advanced F-35 fighter jets.
2025年再次当选后,特朗普在首次海外出访中将沙特列为第一站,并 boast 称自己已为美国经济争取到近1万亿美元的沙特投资。特朗普起初似乎愿意接受王储的请求,但据报道,就在美军战机准备起飞打击胡塞武装目标时,他却退缩了。后来,他告诉福克斯新闻网,华盛顿“一直在与胡塞武装保持沟通,他们已经同意不对美国动武”。
Mohammed also has something of a personal relationship with President Trump, who made Saudi Arabia the first stop of his first overseas tour in 2025 after being reelected and boasted that he had garnered almost $1 trillion in Saudi investments into the U.S. economy. Trump initially seemed receptive to the prince's entreaties but reportedly pulled back just as U.S. warplanes were set to take off for sorties on Houthi targets. Later, he told Fox News that Washington was “in constant communication with the Houthis and that they've agreed not to fight the United States."
胡塞武装也已向欧洲国家保证,不会袭击这些国家的船只;欧洲国家一直不愿激怒这伙叛军。上个月,法国和英国表示将向沙特提供防御援助,希腊则正在沙特境内操作美国制造的“爱国者”导弹系统。在美国迟迟不愿出手的情况下,外界预计,沙特在《麦加联合防御协定》中的伙伴将组成多国驰援力量,但目前尚未在地面上采取实际行动。
The Houthis have also assured European nations, which have been wary of provoking the rebels’ ire, that they won't attack their shipping either. Last month, France and the U.K. said they would offer defensive assistance to Saudi Arabia, while Greece is operating U.S.-made Patriot missile batteries in the kingdom. With the U.S. hesitating, the expectation is that Saudi Arabia’s partners in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement will form the international cavalry to help, but that has yet to manifest itself on the ground.
本周,巴基斯坦国防部长哈瓦贾·穆罕默德·阿西夫表示,该国“受该协定约束,有义务保卫沙特”。他说:“这意味着,我们手里有什么手段,就也会把这些手段提供给沙特。”巴基斯坦已在沙特部署8000名士兵、16架中国制造的JF-17“雷电”战斗机、作战无人机中队以及一套地对空导弹系统,但尚不清楚他们是否参与了对胡塞武装的攻击。
This week, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said his country was “bound” by the pact to defend Saudi Arabia. “That means whatever means are available at our disposal, they’ll be available to Saudi Arabia also,” he said. Pakistan already has 8,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, along with 16 Chinese-made JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, combat drone squadrons and a surface-to-air missile battery. But it’s unclear whether they have participated in attacking the Houthis.
与此同时,土耳其官员称,在满足沙特“军事需求”方面“没有任何问题,特别是在技术事务上”。胡塞武装警告,任何攻击他们的一方都将遭到报复。胡塞武装高级成员穆罕默德·布海提在伊拉克电视台接受采访时说:“以真主之名,如果土耳其和巴基斯坦介入,我们将以铁拳打击他们。”
Turkish officials, meanwhile, say they have “no issues meeting” Saudi Arabia’s “military needs,” especially on technical matters. The Houthis say any party attacking them will face retaliation. “By God, if Turkey and Pakistan become involved, we will strike them with an iron fist,” said Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of the Houthis, in an interview on Iraqi television.
观察人士指出,沙特阿拉伯正准备发起地面攻势,旨在阻止胡塞武装在红海沿岸巩固既得成果并扭转战局。该计划由沙特支持的也门政府军打头阵。普林斯顿大学近东研究教授伯纳德·海克尔表示:“对沙特而言,这主要会是一次空中打击行动;地面部队则由也门士兵甚至巴基斯坦士兵组成,不过我认为后者不太可能越过边境参与战斗。”
Observers say Saudi Arabia is gearing up for a ground offensive aimed at preventing the Houthis from consolidating their gains on the Red Sea coast and reversing the tide. The plan is for Saudi-backed Yemeni government fighters to lead the charge. “It will be mostly an air campaign for the Saudis, with Yemenis and maybe Pakistanis on the ground, though I doubt the latter will get involved beyond being on the border,” said Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
美国几乎不可能派遣地面部队参与此次作战,但可以提供情报与后勤支援,正如2015年穆罕默德出兵也门时那样。此外,美国海军也有可能发动打击——2025年胡塞武装封锁红海时,特朗普宣布停火前美国海军便实施了此类行动。海克尔指出,尽管沙特领导人未必指望华盛顿直接介入,但他们担心的是美国会撇开利雅得的诉求,与胡塞武装达成新的协议。
There is little chance the U.S. would contribute to such a fight with boots on the ground. But it could provide intelligence and logistical support, just as it did during Mohammed's 2015 foray into Yemen. The U.S. Navy could also launch strikes, as it did when the Houthis blockaded the Red Sea in 2025, before Trump declared a ceasefire. In any case, although Saudi leaders may not expect Washington to get involved, their fear is that the U.S. will forge another agreement with the Houthis to the exclusion of Riyadh's concerns, Haykel said.
“沙特希望得到一个信号:一旦局势有变,美国会在背后提供支持。他们当然希望美国能全程深度参与,但若做不到,至少也要让外界觉得美国完全站在自己这一边,即便并未真正参战。”
“The Saudis want a signal that the U.S. is in the background as support if something happens,” he said. “They’d love to have it in the center of everything. But if they can’t, they want to make it seem like America is fully on board without necessarily being in the battle.”