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美国不缺电,缺的是足够快接入电网的地方。America isn’t short of electricity. It’s short of places to plug in fast enough.

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2026年7月22日,德克萨斯州电网创下历史新高。在一个酷热的夏夜,需求达到约91吉瓦,系统成功应对,其中天然气发电约占一半,太阳能发电约占三分之一。一切运行正常。

On 22 July 2026, the Texas grid set an all-time record. Demand reached about 91 gigawatts on a punishing summer evening and the system met it, roughly half from natural gas and a third from solar. Nothing broke.

然而,围绕人工智能与电力的讨论大多预示着即将到来的短缺。2023年,美国数据中心用电量约为176太瓦时,占全美用电总量的4.4%。这一比例正在快速增长。但这本身并不构成短缺。

Yet much of the discussion around artificial intelligence and electricity suggests a looming shortage. American data centers used about 176 terawatt-hours in 2023, or 4.4 percent of all US electricity. That share is growing quickly. It is not, by itself, a shortage.

真正的制约因素更为具体。问题不在于有多少电力,而在于有多少特定地点能在某个可融资的日期前接入大量电力。这一区别正悄然重塑美国土地价格,并催生了一类尚无定名的开发商。问题从来不是“有没有电”抽象的兆瓦数对任何人都没有用处。大型工业用户需要的是:在特定地图坐标点,于特定日期前,以一种能经受设备故障考验的方式,交付确定数量的电力。每一个限定条件都会进一步缩小可选范围。

The real constraint is narrower. It is not how much electricity exists. It is how many specific places can receive a great deal of it; on a date somebody will lend against. That distinction is quietly repricing American land and creating a kind of developer that does not yet have a settled name. The question is never “is there power”A megawatt in the abstract is not useful to anyone. What a large industrial user needs is a defined quantity of power, delivered to one point on the map, by a date, in a way that survives the loss of a piece of equipment. Every one of those qualifiers narrows the map further.

商业地产市场已经察觉到了这一点。仲量联行(JLL)报告称,“获电速度是驱动选址的首要标准”,且主要市场的电网接入平均等待时间超过四年。世邦魏理仕(CBRE)发现,能在18至36个月内供电的地块极其抢手,以至于买家正向更小、更不显眼的市场进军以寻找此类资产。

The commercial property market has already noticed. JLL now reports that “speed to power is the primary criteria driving site selection”, and that average waits for a grid connection in major markets exceed four years. CBRE finds that sites offering power within 18 to 36 months are so sought after that buyers are pushing into smaller, less obvious markets to find them.

一切皆源于这一缺口:接入需四年,值得购买的标准却是18至36个月。

Everything else follows from that gap: four years to connect, 18 to 36 months to be worth buying.

这不是一个关于算力的故事。将这一切归类到人工智能名下颇具诱惑力,但这正是导致该主题大多数评论毫无价值的错误。

This is not a story about computing It is tempting to file all of this under artificial intelligence. That is the mistake that makes most commentary on the subject useless.

2026年初发布的一项针对企业选址决策者的调查显示,98.5%的受访者将“大规模电力供应可用性”评为重要,82.6%将其评为非常重要,这是基础设施类别中任何因素获得的最高强度评分。这些受访者并非都在建设数据中心。他们还在开发化工厂、电池工厂和配送中心。

In a survey of corporate site-selection decision-makers published in early 2026, 98.5 percent rated “electric power availability at scale” as important, and 82.6 percent rated it very important, the highest intensity score of any factor in the infrastructure category. Those respondents are not all building data centers. They are also developing chemical plants, battery factories and distribution centers.

ERCOT自身的输电规划预测,2030年夏季峰值需求将超过150吉瓦,其中包括约50吉瓦的大负荷增长,归因于数据中心、氢能制造、加密货币挖矿和电气化,但未细分各行业的贡献。此外,二叠纪盆地石油天然气生产的电气化需要单独的可靠性计划,该计划于2024年10月获州监管机构批准,进口项目估计成本在77亿至91亿美元之间。这些需求都不是来自训练语言模型。

ERCOT’s own transmission plan projects 2030 summer peak demand above 150 gigawatts, including roughly 50 gigawatts of large-load growth attributed to data centers, hydrogen manufacturing, crypto mining and electrification, without breaking out the contribution of each sector. Separately, electrifying oil and gas production in the Permian Basin required its own reliability plan, approved by state regulators in October 2024, with import projects estimated to cost between $7.7 billion and $9.1 billion. None of that demand comes from training a language model.

这对土地意味着什么 后果是,两块土壤、分区和高速公路通达条件相同的相邻地块,现在可能落入完全不同的类别,因为其中一块能容纳另一块无法容纳的一类用户。

What this does to land The consequence is that two adjacent parcels with the same soil, zoning and highway access can now fall into entirely different categories because one can host a class of user that the other cannot.

起分类作用的变量由来已久。高压走廊和大口径管道是几十年前为服务炼油厂、城镇和工业而规划的,而这些设施此后已发生变化。当初划定这些线路的人,没人想到过这种情况。

The variable doing the sorting is old. High-voltage corridors and large-diameter pipelines were routed decades ago to serve refineries, towns and industries that have since changed shape. Nobody who drew those lines was thinking about this.

德州电力基础设施开发商GoodPeak的首席财务官Vicente Garrido亲眼目睹了这一动态的演变。

Vicente Garrido, chief financial officer at GoodPeak, a Texas power infrastructure developer, has seen this dynamic play out firsthand.

“我们的休斯顿园区最初是作为电池储能项目的开发用地,”他说道,“在实地考察过程中,我们发现该地块还能接入138千伏和345千伏的输电网络,附近还有一条大型天然气管道以及暗光纤线路。正是从那时起,我们开始以全新的视角来看待这块土地。”这样的叙述方式比简洁版的描述更具信息量。这些基础设施并非刻意寻求的结果,而是偶然发现的。这也意味着,在这个市场中决定企业成败的关键因素并非开发商的远见卓识,而是地理区位——而这一区位优势早在市场需求出现之前便已存在。

“Our Houston campus started with greenfield development for battery storage,” he says. “As we worked through the site, we realized it also had access to 138 and 345 kV transmission, a major gas pipeline, and dark fiber. That’s when we started looking at the land differently.”That sequence is more informative than the tidier version. The infrastructure was not sought; it was found. That means the mechanism separating winners from losers in this market is not simply developer foresight. It is the map, and the map was drawn long before the demand arrived.

关于“具备供电条件”的真正含义 目前围绕这一概念正在形成一套术语体系,但其定义却迅速变得模糊不清。“具备供电条件的土地”或“可供电地块”如今频繁出现在各类地产宣传中。那些专门研究该市场的权威机构虽然大量论述电力供应状况及时间表,却极少对这一类别本身作出明确定义。

What “powered” ought to mean A vocabulary is forming around this, and it is being diluted about as fast as it is being coined. “Powered land” and “powered site” now appear routinely in listings. The major research houses that track this market publish a great deal about power availability and timelines, and remarkably little defining the category itself.

“具备供电条件”不应仅仅理解为靠近基础设施,”加里多指出,“它应指一块能在相对明确的时间框架内切实获得特定电量供应的地块。供电容量与时间节点的确定性越高,该地块的商业价值便越成熟。”不过这一评判标准其实相当严格:仅有供电容量数值并无太大意义,除非它同时具备三个宣传资料中极少提及的要素——已签约的供电量、明确的供电方以及具体的交付日期。

“Powered land should mean more than proximity to infrastructure,” Garrido says. “It should mean a site with a credible path to a defined amount of power on a reasonably clear timeline. The more certainty around capacity and timing, the more mature the asset.”The useful version of that test is narrow. A capacity figure means very little unless it comes with three things a listing rarely provides: a contracted quantity, a named counterparty, and a delivery date.

以此为标准衡量,目前市面上号称“具备供电条件”的土地其实大多尚未真正具备供电能力。单纯的土地面积不算供电条件;地块附近输电线路的电压等级也不代表供电能力;管道直径同样无关紧要。即便所谓“经第三方验证的供电容量”,若验证依据仅为电力流模拟分析而非实际签署的协议,也并不能算作真正的供电条件。这一界限在业内常常被模糊处理,即便是经验丰富的从业者也常混淆二者。

Measured that way, much of what is marketed as powered is not yet power. Acreage is not power. The voltage class of a line running past the property is not power. Pipeline diameter is not power. Neither is “third-party validated capacity” when the validation is a power flow study rather than an executed agreement. It is a distinction the industry often blurs, even among experienced participants.

天然气最能体现“地理位置邻近”与“实际用气权”之间的区别。要将前者转化为后者,需要签订一份明确规定每日供气量、具体交货地点及合同期限的运输协议;协议须确保供气服务的稳定性,不可出现中断情况——得克萨斯州在“尤里”冬季风暴期间便深刻体会到了这一点。此外,在运营商制定的限气指令中,相关企业相对于居民用户及公用事业公司的优先级也必须明确。

Gas makes the distinction obvious Natural gas is where the gap between proximity and entitlement is easiest to see. Converting the first into the second takes an executed transportation agreement with a specific daily quantity, defined delivery points and a term; firm rather than interruptible service, a difference Texas learned the cost of during Winter Storm Uri; and a clear position in the operator’s curtailment order relative to homes and utilities.

“一条穿越地块的输气管道确实能便利用气,”加里多说道,“但它无法说明可获得的天然气量、价格几何,以及供应是否可靠。”时间才是衡量价值的核心单位——而这正是大多数模型容易忽视的要点。

“A pipeline crossing the property makes access easier,” Garrido says. “But it doesn’t tell you how much gas is available, what it will cost, or how reliable that supply will be.”Time is the unit of value Which points at the thing most models get wrong.

当项目投产日期推迟时,人们的惯常思路是将其视为折现率问题:把未来现金流往后推延,再运用折现计算,便万事大吉。加里多则认为这种思路从根本上是错误的。

The instinct, when a project’s energization date slips, is to treat it as a discount-rate problem: push the cash flows out, apply the discount, move on. Garrido thinks that instinct is structurally mistaken.

“该行业的项目延期往往并非呈线性发展,”他说道,“项目需依次通过多个审批环节,错过任何一个环节都可能引发比单纯推迟数月更为严重的后果。它可能导致项目被归入不同的研究类别、改变原有假设条件或所需的升级措施;某些情况下,甚至会引发合同终止权。”最后这一点最为关键:大型长期购气协议中通常包含交货日期相关条款。

“Delay in this business isn’t always linear,” he says. “Projects move through a series of gates and missing one can have broader consequences than simply adding months to the schedule. It may move a project into a different study cohort, change the underlying assumptions or required upgrades, or, in some cases, create contractual termination rights.”That last mechanism is the sharpest. Large offtake agreements carry delivery-date rights.

一旦延期超出一定限度,项目价值便不会缓慢衰减,而是骤然下降。主要客户可能会转投其他如期投产的项目,使原项目重新沦为纯投机性资产。此外,排队顺序也并非固定不变:它是对动态分配资源的“优先权”,会随着其他项目的成败而相应提升或降低。

Past a certain slip, value does not decay gradually. The anchor customer may leave for a site that remains on schedule, returning the project to a speculative position. Queue position, meanwhile, is not a fixed asset. It is a claim on a moving allocation, improving or deteriorating according to whether other people’s projects survive.

同样的土地面积、同样的发电容量,仅因投产年份不同,便成了截然不同的资产。

Identical acreage, identical megawatts, a different energization year: a different asset entirely.

为何排队名单上挤满了各类项目?选址资源稀缺还有另一个原因,这涉及费率设计而非物理限制。

Why the queue filled up with options There is one more reason places are scarce, and it is a matter of rate design rather than physics.

德克萨斯州通常通过电力用户在整个夏季高峰时段的用电占比来分摊输电网络的建设成本,而非仅由提出升级申请的具体项目承担费用。因此,提交并网申请对申请方而言几乎无需成本,而最终产生的网络建设费用则由全体用户共同分担。

Texas recovers the cost of its transmission network from electricity users generally, allocated by their share of demand during four peak summer hours, rather than from the particular project whose request triggered an upgrade. Filing an interconnection request is therefore close to free for the filer, while the eventual network cost is spread across everyone else.

结果正如经济学家所预测的那样。据ERCOT统计,2026年6月共有超过43.8万兆瓦的大负荷用电申请,其中约89%来自数据中心;到了8月,排队等待审批的项目已逾1800个,涉及用电容量超过474吉瓦。然而,获得通电许可的装机容量却不足9000兆瓦,也就是说仅有约2%的申请项目最终得以实现供电。

The result looks as economists would predict. ERCOT reported over 438,000 megawatts of large-load requests in June 2026, roughly 89 percent from data centers; by August, more than 1,800 projects representing over 474 gigawatts were in the queue. Against that, fewer than 9,000 megawatts had approval to energize. Something on the order of two percent of what has been requested has reached the point of being switched on.

独立机构的预测数据远低于当前的并网申请总量。Ascend Analytics预计,到2030年ERCOT辖区内的用电高峰负荷约为120吉瓦;相比之下,ERCOT自身调整后的预测值为138吉瓦,而各输电运营商报告的预测值则高达约208吉瓦。该机构还指出,届时超过80%的新增大负荷用电项目将无法获得相应的发电容量作为配套。

Independent forecasts put the plausible figure well below the interconnection queue. Ascend Analytics projects ERCOT peak demand of roughly 120 gigawatts by 2030, compared with ERCOT’s adjusted forecast of 138 gigawatts and roughly 208 gigawatts reported by transmission providers. It also estimates that more than 80 percent of new large loads seeking interconnection will not have matching generation online by then.

“电网新增发电能力的速度远远赶不上用电需求的增长速度,”Ascend公司的罗伯特·拉法索对Utility Dive说道。

“The ability of the grid to add new generation is much, much smaller than the demand,” Ascend’s Robert LaFaso told Utility Dive.

加里多则强调,不能仅以单一因素来衡量并网申请排队现象。无论成本如何分摊,申请排序本身便具备一定的潜在价值。此外,大量申请之所以推高整体成本,还源于同一项目在多个地点及区域同时提交申请的情况。正因如此,德克萨斯州2025年出台的电网法规明确要求申请方必须披露其在其他地方提出的类似申请情况。

Garrido is careful not to reduce the queue to a single variable. Position in line has option value regardless of how costs are allocated. A meaningful share of the inflation also comes from the same project being filed across multiple sites and territories, which is why Texas’s 2025 grid legislation now requires applicants to disclose substantially similar requests elsewhere.

这项立法以及随后实施的并网改革并未改变优先审批的对象。它们只是提高了获得并网资格的成本:每兆瓦需缴纳5万美元作为财务担保金,同时还需提供场地控制权证明并满足各项信息披露要求。对于一个装机容量为1吉瓦的电站项目而言,这意味着在动工前就必须先投入5000万美元——这一门槛对于那些抱着投机心态的申请者来说实在难以逾越。还有一种风险是任何尽职调查都无法化解的。

What that legislation and the interconnection reforms that followed did was not change who gets studied first. They made holding a position more costly: $50,000 per megawatt of financial security, verified site control and disclosure requirements. On a 1-gigawatt site that is $50 million committed before anything is built , a meaningful threshold for a speculative applicant. The risk nobody underwrites Which leaves one category that no amount of diligence resolves.

“你可以对土地、天然气资源、企业信用状况乃至输电线路情况都进行尽职调查,”加里多说道,“但最难评估的却是新审批流程究竟需要多长时间。而这一点往往同样至关重要。”目前,批量审批流程、审计机制及验证制度尚属新生事物。在数百吉瓦规模的项目申请正陆续提交的同时,这些制度也正处于构建阶段,而众多申请机构都是首次参与此类流程。

“You can diligence the land, the gas, the credit, and even the wires,” Garrido says. “What’s harder to diligence is how long a new process will actually take. That can end up mattering just as much.”Batch processes, audits and verification regimes are new here. They are being built while several hundred gigawatts of requests move through them, by organizations doing it for the first time.

这并非对任何一方的批评;这正是大规模推行新制度时的常态。然而这种风险既不在任何检查清单之列,也未被纳入任何成本模型测算范围,更非开发商所能掌控。

That is not a criticism of anyone; it is what novelty at scale looks like. But it is a risk that appears on no checklist, prices into no model, and sits outside any developer’s control.

目前这一新兴类别尚无正式名称,其参与者也既不是土地所有者、公用事业公司、发电企业,也不是终端用户。他们就是那些在各方尚未签署任何协议之前,便同时掌握了土地、并网资格、燃料资源及充足资金的人。

The category forming here still has no name, and the people in it are not landowners, utilities, generators or end users. They are whoever is holding land, interconnection, fuel and capital simultaneously, before anyone signs anything.

无论这一群体最终被如何命名,评判标准都不会是谁能申请到多少兆瓦的并网配额,而是这些电力能否在相关方愿意承担风险的时间范围内顺利接入电网。在此之前,绝大多数潜在价值仍取决于并网审批流程的进展情况。

Whatever it ends up being called, the test will not be how many megawatts anyone claims. It will be whether those megawatts can arrive on a timeline somebody is willing to underwrite. Until then, much of the value remains contingent on the interconnection process.

本文为投稿文章。内容并非由TNW编辑部制作,也不代表TNW的编辑立场。

Contributed article. Not produced by the TNW newsroom and does not reflect the editorial stance of TNW.