There is new cause for alarm in the Horn of Africa. A week after a coalition of seven opposition groups announced an alliance to overthrow the government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, fighting has broken out across several regions of the country of 130 million people. Led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, the militias of Ethiopia’s largest regions of Amhara and Oromia have also pledged their support.

Early battles have taken place along a critical commercial route leading east to the port of Djibouti, while drone strikes were carried out around the army’s main airbase near the capital, Addis Ababa. The choice of economic and political targets reflects the reality that even though the Tigrayans are weaker militarily than in their previous war that ended in 2022, they can still create asymmetric pressure on the government.

Ethiopia’s army is now quickly regrouping and is pushing the TPLF back into Tigray, where government forces have retaken the regional airport and now occupy the capital, Mekelle. As the conflict moves into urban areas, the risk of displacement and civilian casualties grows. And in a region already suffering from aid shortages, and anticipating even greater food insecurity from this year’s El Nino, humanitarians are rightly nervous about a potential catastrophic fallout.

But the Tigrayans and their “Alliance for Survival” allies believe they have an ace up their sleeves. A coalition of neighboring states, led by Egypt and including Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia have reportedly been working in the background to support the Prime Minister’s armed opponents. Abiy’s announcement of building three new hydroelectric dams on the Nile, along with his threatening claims on the Eritrean port of Assab, and his army’s support for the Rapid Support Forces militia next door in Sudan have made him no friends across the region. All would like to see his ambitions contained.

With a fully internationalized conflict already raging in neighboring Sudan and long-time foe Eritrea poised to enter the fight on the side of the Tigrayans, the risk that Ethiopia’s conflict converges with existing regional instability and animosities is high. The fallout from a regional war on US priorities from counterterrorism to Red Sea security would be disastrous, which raises the question why isn’t the Trump Administration doing more to stop it?

On Oct. 4, the State Department urged Ethiopia and Eritrea to “exercise maximum restraint,” though curiously did not address the current fighting by Ethiopia’s internal armed groups. But back in June, the State Department sanctioned a group of Tigrayan officials for “undermining resolution to the crisis in Tigray” and last week the US ambassador in Addis blamed Tigrayans for their “poor decision to launch a large-scale offensive.”None of this suggests an even-handed approach this time around that would enable Washington to mediate an end to the violence as it did in 2022 to end the last Tigray war. This time, Washington has picked a side.

Rubio’s newfound prioritization of commercial diplomacy, reflected in the announcement last week of the sale of $5 billion in Boeing aircraft to Ethiopia’s national airline, speaks to Washington’s focus on economic returns over peacemaking. But that view is shortsighted.

Ethiopia’s double-digit economic growth and large infrastructure plans are vulnerable to the threat of nationwide war and regional meddling. The African Union has called for calm, but only Washington has the political leverage to manage a regional crisis. With Red Sea instability occupying more of Washington’s strategic focus, it would do well to prioritize peacemaking and ensure that Ethiopia’s economic potential is not undone by a descent into a region-wide conflict.