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AI独裁者The AI Autocrat

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2022年3月,莫斯科全面入侵乌克兰两周后,俄罗斯第一频道编辑玛丽娜·奥夫相尼科娃闯入晚间新闻直播现场。她在主播头后举起一块手绘标语,上面写着:“停止战争。别信宣传。他们在骗你们!”她高喊“反战!”直到被拖走。

Two weeks after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, the Russian TV Channel One editor Marina Ovsyannikova burst onto the set of the evening newscast. She held up a hand-drawn sign behind the anchor’s head that read: “Stop the war. Don’t believe propaganda. They’re lying to you!”She shouted, “No to war!” until she was dragged away.

此后,再无人在俄罗斯电视上抗议战争,部分原因是安保收紧,普遍弥漫着恐惧氛围。但2024年10月,俄罗斯主要宣传工具之一、RT电视台台长玛格丽塔·西蒙扬给出了另一种解释。她在接受采访时表示,RT台越来越多的主播“不是真人”。“那张脸不存在。声音和其他一切都是我们生成的。”她指的是,这些主播是由人工智能生产的。

No one has protested the war on Russian television since then, partly as a result of tighter security and a general climate of fear. But in October 2024, Margarita Simonyan, one of Russia’s chief propagandists, gave another explanation. A growing number of the RT network’s anchors, she explained to an interviewer, are not real. “That face doesn’t exist. We generated the voice and everything else.”They were, she meant, produced by artificial intelligence.

在随后接受《报纸》采访时,她详细阐述了其中的逻辑:“这些主播不需要工资或保险,”她说,“他们不会被捕,警察也不会搜查他们的家。这既美妙又可怕。”这是AI对每一位独裁统治者的承诺:无需将任务委托给不可靠的人类,即可维持控制。这是一个极具吸引力的前景。无论多强大,独裁者一直都需要下属——审查员、宣传员、警卫、警察、情报分析师和地方官僚——来执行命令。

In a follow-up interview with the newspaper , she spelled out the logic: “These anchors don’t need a salary or insurance,” she said. “They won’t get arrested, and the police won’t search their homes. It’s all wonderful and terrifying at the same time.”This is AI’s promise to every autocratic ruler: the ability to maintain control without delegating tasks to unreliable humans. It is an extremely attractive prospect. No matter how powerful, dictators have always needed subordinates—censors, propagandists, security guards, police officers, intelligence analysts, and local bureaucrats—to carry out their orders.

但下属始终构成潜在威胁。他们可能偷懒、贪污、撒谎、泄密,或密谋反对上司。因此,独裁者面临的最古老困境之一,就是如何授权代理人执行命令,同时又不让他们获得反叛领袖的能力。独裁者通常通过在关键岗位安插平庸之辈来应对这一权衡,正如政治理论家汉娜·阿伦特所言,他们的“无能是其忠诚的最佳保证”。但这不可避免地让独裁统治更难治理、更难度过危机。

But subordinates always pose a potential threat. They could shirk, steal, lie, leak, or conspire against their boss. As a result, one of the oldest dilemmas facing autocrats is how to empower agents to carry out orders without also enabling them to turn against their leader. Autocrats have usually managed the tradeoff by filling key positions with mediocrities whose incapacity is, as the political theorist Hannah Arendt put it, “the best guarantee of their loyalty.”But this inevitably makes it harder for dictatorships to govern and survive crises.

AI似乎为独裁者提供了两条化解这一长期困境的途径。首先,这意味着他们现在可以轻松地实时监控和管控追随者。地方官员消费习惯或会议日程的变动,可由AI系统自动标记,无需靠利己的线人告密。其次,AI可以彻底取代下属。通过将原本需要人类自由裁量权的任务自动化,统治者可以用忠诚、不受贿赂、不可操纵的算法取代不可靠的中间人。

AI appears to offer autocrats two ways to resolve this long-standing dilemma. First, it means they can now easily monitor and discipline their followers in real time. A change in a local official’s spending habits or meeting schedules can be flagged automatically by an AI system, without any need for self-interested informants. Second, AI can eliminate underlings altogether. By automating tasks that once required human discretion, rulers can replace unreliable intermediaries with faithful algorithms that cannot be bribed or manipulated.

独裁政权的官员已公开表态。俄罗斯数字发展部长马克苏特·沙达耶夫在2025年4月莫斯科的一个数据论坛上表示,AI“肯定能取代一半的官员”,并补充道,“也许略多于一半”。然而,这种自我运行国家的承诺是虚幻的,因为AI从未真正实现自主。系统必须由一批工程师和数据科学家构建和维护,而政治领导人无法评估他们的专业能力。

Officials in autocratic regimes have said as much. AI “can definitely replace half of officials,” Russia’s Digital Development Minister, Maksut Shadaev, told a Moscow data forum in April 2025, adding, “maybe slightly more.”Yet these promises of a self-running state are illusory, because AI is never truly autonomous. Systems have to be built and maintained by a cadre of engineers and data scientists whose expertise political leaders cannot evaluate.

试图借助AI减少对不可靠人类的依赖的统治者,最终可能比以往更盲目地依赖维持系统运转的少数AI专家。这支新的“数字禁卫军”可能拥有与旧禁卫军相同的弱点,从而对统治者构成威胁。

The ruler who turns to AI to reduce a dependence on unreliable humans may end up relying, more blindly than before, on the few AI specialists who keep the system running. And this new digital Praetorian Guard may have the same weaknesses as the old, which makes it a threat to the ruler.

眼耳并用 中国在开发能够监控或取代下属的AI系统方面处于领先地位。北京、上海及其他城市中心的智慧城市项目利用AI追踪绩效、集中监管曾在舒适的默默无闻中运作的地方官员,让他们接受算法绩效考核。中国还开发了“零信任AI系统”,在过去十年间在约30个县市部署。该系统交叉比对150多个政府数据库,以查获地方官员的贪污和裙带关系。

EYES AND EARS China is in the lead when it comes to developing AI systems that can monitor or replace subordinates. Smart city programs in Beijing, Shanghai, and other urban centers use AI to track performance and centralize oversight of local officials who once operated in comfortable obscurity, subjecting them to an algorithmic performance review. China also developed a “Zero Trust AI system,” which it deployed across roughly 30 counties and cities over the past decade. This system cross-referenced more than 150 government databases to catch embezzlement and nepotism by local officials.

效果好得有点过头,标记了8700名官员,随后在被监控的官僚施压下,地方政府开始叫停该系统。但北京并未废弃其新的电子政务门户,这些门户利用自动化系统办理文件和许可证,减少了滋生小额腐败或徇私舞弊的面对面互动。与此同时,中国共产党大力推进其所谓的“思想管理”研究,即如何利用AI制作精准定向宣传。中国的网络评论员队伍曾由受薪人类组成,现已正在被机器人取代。

It worked a little too well, flagging 8,700 officials before local governments, under pressure from the bureaucrats it was monitoring, began rolling it back. But Beijing has not gotten rid of its new e-government portals, which use automated systems for issuing documents and permits, reducing face-to-face interactions that bred petty corruption or favoritism. The Chinese Communist Party, meanwhile, has plowed ahead with researching what it calls “thought management,” or how to use AI to create microtargeted propaganda. China’s army of Internet commentators, once composed of paid humans, is already being replaced by bots.

俄罗斯也在以类似的热情追求相同的目标。莫斯科部署在20万个摄像头上的全市级人脸识别系统,被用于在2021年反政府示威中识别并抓捕抗议者。中央政府已开始利用自动化数据收集和汇总,绕过可能篡改数据或利用数据谋取私利的地方官员。2023年,俄罗斯互联网监管机构推出了“Oculus”人工智能系统,每天扫描数十万张图片以查找违禁内容,包括政治内容——其处理量比人工审查员高出几个数量级。

Russia has been pursuing the same goals with a similar fervor. Moscow’s citywide facial recognition system, deployed across 200,000 cameras, was used to identify and apprehend protesters during the 2021 antigovernment demonstrations. The central government has started using automated data collection and aggregation to bypass regional officials who could taint the data or use it to promote their own interests. In 2023, Russia’s Internet regulator launched Oculus, an AI system that scans hundreds of thousands of images per day for prohibited content, including political content—orders of magnitude beyond what human censors could process.

俄罗斯安全局的“Meliorator”工具已被用于创建一千多个虚构的美国人档案,主要在X(原推特)上传播克里姆林宫的叙事,成本仅为人工水军的一小部分。

The Russian security service’s Meliorator tool has been used to create over a thousand profiles of fictitious Americans, primarily on X (formerly Twitter), to spread Kremlin narratives at a fraction of the cost of human troll farms.

其他专制国家正步北京和莫斯科的后尘。2025年4月,阿拉伯联合酋长国成立了监管情报办公室,利用人工智能起草和修订联邦法律,这项工作过去由立法工作人员完成。一年后,阿联酋总理穆罕默德·本·拉希德·阿勒马克图姆酋长宣布,自主人工智能代理将在两年内接管联邦政府一半的业务,并表示“部长、总干事和实体的绩效将根据其采纳这一变革的能力进行评估”。一个政权越依赖人工智能,就越依赖那些维持人工智能运转的人。

Other autocracies are following in Beijing’s and Moscow’s footsteps. In April 2025, the United Arab Emirates created a Regulatory Intelligence Office that uses AI to draft and amend federal laws, work once done by legislative staff. A year later, UAE Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum announced that autonomous AI agents would take over half of the federal government’s operations within two years and that “the performance of ministers, directors general, and entities will be assessed based on their ability to adopt this transformation.”The more a regime depends on AI, the more it depends on the people who keep AI running.

这些创新或许能减少独裁者所需的官僚人数。但它们无法真正创造独裁者最渴望的东西:一个能自我运转的国家。即使是AI生成的电视主播也需要人来构建和维护,审查系统也需要人在异见词汇变化时对其进行重新训练。每个AI模型背后,都有一小群工程师和数据科学家在进行必要的维护,他们的工作极其专业,以至于统治者无法理解。

These innovations may reduce the number of bureaucrats autocrats need. But they cannot actually create what dictators want most: a self-running state. Even AI-generated television anchors need people to build and maintain them, and censorship systems need people to retrain them as the vocabulary of dissent shifts. Behind every AI model, there is a small group of engineers and data scientists doing essential maintenance, and their work is so technical that rulers cannot understand it.

这种依赖因此成为另一种形式的权力。例如,维护独裁者监控装置的工程师可以塑造统治者所见的内容。他们决定哪些信息重要到值得传递,以及以何种形式呈现。他们决定标记哪些威胁,并能调整筛选被压制内容和逮捕对象的算法。而且他们可以在宫中无人察觉的情况下做到这一切。那些试图借助AI摆脱对不可靠下属依赖的独裁者,只是将他们的脆弱性转移给了一群新的官员。

This dependence thus becomes another form of power. The engineers who maintain an autocrat’s surveillance apparatus, for example, can shape what the ruler sees. They decide what information is important enough to pass along and in what form to present it. They determine which threats get flagged, and they can adjust the algorithms that select what content gets suppressed and who gets arrested. And they can do this without anyone in the palace noticing. Autocrats who turn to AI to escape a dependence on unreliable subordinates have only transferred their vulnerabilities onto a new group of officials.

事实上,这个新的禁卫军可能比以往的精英阶层更危险。部分原因在于人工智能技术的不透明性,但也因为这个小圈子规模小得多。罗马皇帝通常有数万人效力于禁卫军;现代独裁者则依靠常备军。但有了人工智能,独裁者只需一个小规模的工程师圈子,就能构建并维护大规模人工智能系统。这或许对统治者有利,因为需要监视的人更少了;但这也集中了故障点,因为只需少数工程师就能造成灾难性中断,也让成员更容易密谋反对领导人。

In fact, this new Praetorian Guard could be more dangerous than previous elites. That is in part thanks to the opacity of AI technology but also because this clique is much smaller. Roman emperors typically had tens of thousands of people serving in the Praetorian Guard; modern autocrats rely on standing armies. But with AI, autocrats will need only a small clique of engineers to build and maintain large-scale AI systems. This might benefit rulers since they will have fewer people to watch, yet it also concentrates points of failure, since a devastating disruption requires only a handful of engineers and makes it easier for members to scheme against the leader.

新禁卫军的成员还可能不可或缺。独裁者可以更换将军而不致毁掉军队,但运行复杂的机器学习系统需要一套高度专业化的技能,工程师一旦被替换就可能造成中断,而且很难找到替代人选,这使这些行动者拥有巨大的影响力。不可替代者科技人员对独裁政权的重要性已经显现出来。例如,2022年2月俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰后,信息技术专家开始逃离俄罗斯。

The new guard’s members may also be indispensable. A dictator can replace generals without destroying the army. But running complex machine-learning systems requires such a specialized set of skills that engineers can be difficult to replace without disruptions, giving these actors great leverage. THE INDISPENSABLES The importance of tech workers to autocracies has already become apparent. When IT specialists began to flee Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for example, the Kremlin responded not with threats but with inducements, offering tech workers deferments from conscription. It exempted their firms from taxes and subsidized their mortgages.

克里姆林宫没有采取威胁手段,而是抛出诱饵,向科技人员提供缓征兵役待遇,免除其公司的税赋并补贴住房贷款。七个月后,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京下令动员30万人,信息技术专家则获得了全面免征兵役的待遇。考虑到一个人工智能系统只需几名工程师即可运行,这似乎有些矫枉过正。但政权无法事先确定自己需要哪些工程师,也无法迅速培训替代人员,因此只能留住可供挑选这些少数专家的全部人才库。

When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the mobilization of 300,000 men seven months later, IT workers were granted full-on waivers. This might seem like overkill, given that an AI system needs only a few engineers to run it. But a regime cannot know in advance which engineers it will need, and it cannot train replacements quickly, so it has to hold on to the entire talent pool from which these few are selected.

这些举措并没有遏制大约10万名专家(约占俄罗斯科技劳动力十分之一)在2022年期间的外流。但莫斯科仍然坚持利诱,因为专业知识很难用枪逼着人交出来,而且被强制征召的专家可能更不愿听从指令。即便如此,金钱和特权也无法保证这些精英会保持忠诚。独裁者应当铭记最初的近卫军带来的教训:在一段时间里,它为罗马皇帝提供了保护和安全。

These measures did not stem the outflow of roughly 100,000 specialists—about a tenth of Russia’s tech workforce—over the course of 2022. But Moscow stuck to bribery, because expertise is extremely difficult to conscript at gunpoint and because conscripted experts might be less likely to do as instructed. Even so, money and privilege cannot guarantee that these elites will stay loyal. Autocrats should recall the lesson of the original Praetorian Guard: for a time, it provided Roman emperors with protection and security.

但随后,近卫军发现了他们自身的不可替代性,到了公元二世纪,他们开始将帝国拍卖给出价最高的人。这批新精英也会做出同样的事。2023年6月,当叶夫根尼·普里戈任的瓦格纳准军事公司车队沿公路向莫斯科挺进时,普京需要依靠他的安全部门来告诉他发生了什么。未来处于普京这个位置的统治者将通过机器收到此类警告:由软件分类的截获通讯、通过识别系统过滤的摄像头画面、汇编成仪表板的地区报告。

But then the praetorians discovered their own indispensability, and by the second century, they were auctioning off the empire to the highest bidder. This new set of elites can do the same. In June 2023, when the column of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner paramilitary company moved up the highway toward Moscow, Putin depended on his security services to tell him what was happening. Future rulers in Putin’s position will receive such warnings through machines: intercepted communications sorted by software, camera feeds filtered through recognition systems, regional reports compiled into dashboards.

运行这些系统的工程师可能会与新兴的挑战者达成交易,然后磨洋工。他们可以延迟数据,让警报迟到几个小时,在不合时宜的时刻降低画面质量,或者让识别系统停止运转。在这种情况下,统治者将沦为瞎子。近卫军不需要杀死皇帝尼禄来取代他。它只需要抛弃他,转而投奔竞争对手。

The engineers who run those systems could strike a deal with an upstart challenger and then drag their feet. They could delay the data, let alerts arrive a few hours late, degrade feeds at inconvenient moments, or make a recognition system stop functioning. In that scenario, the ruler would be operating blind. The Praetorian Guard did not need to kill Emperor Nero to replace him. It simply had to abandon him for a rival.

这些程序员不太可能为自己夺取政权,因为他们不太可能随身携带政变领导者最终需要的东西:枪支。但工程师利用其权力影响领导层挑战已有先例。1991年,当苏联军队试图从米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫手中夺取控制权时,Relcom网络上的少数程序员保持着向国外的信息流通,并将俄罗斯总统鲍里斯·叶利钦的法令传达给国内外的受众。策划者无法阻止叶利钦抗命的消息传播,政变在三天内崩溃。

These programmers are unlikely to seize power for themselves, because they are unlikely to carry what coup leaders ultimately require: guns. But there is already precedent for engineers using their power to shape leadership challenges. In 1991, when the Soviet army attempted to seize control from Mikhail Gorbachev, a handful of programmers at the Relcom network kept information flowing abroad and relayed Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s decrees to audiences inside the country and abroad. The plotters could not stop the news of Yeltsin’s defiance from spreading, and the coup collapsed within three days.

精简人工智能不会让独裁者解雇所有的执行者。仍然需要有人去实施逮捕和管理监狱,独裁者可以通过向支持者提供国家工作来收买忠诚。但它将使独裁者能够实现精简,而官员的数量归根结底不如统治者如何监督他们重要。追踪密谋或无能的下属一直是独裁者的沉重负担。人工智能可以减轻这种负担,让统治者在不必付出那么多主动关注的情况下,更密切地监视他们的官员。

SLIMMING DOWN AI will not let autocrats dismiss all their enforcers. Someone still has to make arrests and run the prisons, and autocrats can buy loyalty by offering supporters state jobs. But it will let authoritarians downsize, and the number of officials ultimately matters less than how the ruler oversees them. Keeping track of scheming or incompetent subordinates has always been the autocrat’s chief burden. AI could lighten it, letting rulers watch their officials more closely without paying as much active attention.

因此,在短期内,人工智能可能会极大地有利于独裁政体。尽管部署面临诸多障碍,但这项技术已经为独裁政权带来了更便宜的监控、更聪明的审查,以及更少需要恐惧和不信任的人类下属的好处。但对于独裁统治者来说,人工智能的诱惑可能会重现他们力图逃脱的同一个陷阱。政权对人工智能的依赖程度越高,它对那些让人工智能持续运行的人的依赖程度就越高。而这些人,就像历史上所有其他的近卫军阶层一样,将很快发现他们的不可替代性价值几何。

In the near term, then, AI may greatly benefit autocracies. Despite the many obstacles to deployment, the technology is already bringing autocratic regimes the upsides of cheaper surveillance, smarter censorship, and fewer human subordinates to fear and distrust. But for autocratic rulers, the temptations of artificial intelligence may re-create the same trap they are seeking to escape. The more a regime depends on AI, the more it depends on the people who keep AI running. And those people, like every other praetorian class in history, will quickly discover what their indispensability is worth.