Many have offered a lukewarm assessment of the Xi-Trump summit in Washington, citing the lack of a breakthrough. What is your take?

There are two primary views right now. One is nihilism, which holds that China and the US are ultimately bound to fight for global dominance – that the world isn’t big enough for two superpowers. The other is idealism, which expects all differences to be resolved in a single step.

We should assess China-US relations with realism. The fact that both countries have managed to get to where they are today is already no small feat. China and the US will remain somewhere between a de facto G2 and a formal G2 for a long time, navigating between being two de facto superpowers and exercising joint governance.

As two major powers, China and the US naturally have distinct national interests. We must recognise that cooperation and competition coexist.

Everyone must keep a floor in mind, acknowledging that conflict between China and the US would only bring about the destruction of the world, whereas their cooperation can lead to win-win outcomes.

China has published its list of deliverables and the United States has released its fact sheet of the event. What did the summit achieve?

The summit delivered the best outcome within the range of expectations. Although the two sides framed the results differently, that is because they have different priorities.

Two aspects stand out. The first is economic and trade relations, which I think have become more stable. That is very important. According to our assessment, about 70 per cent of the Chinese and US economies are highly complementary, while 20 to 30 per cent are competitive, such as the hi-tech sector.

The summit essentially confirmed the structural complementarity between the two economies and further consolidated the consensus that economic and trade ties are indeed the ballast of the bilateral relationship.

Even in the hi-tech field, there is common ground. As for “super intelligence” and “artificial intelligence” (AI), that is a distinction in technical wording but not a substantive one. The consensus [the establishment of the bilateral AI dialogue] is a positive trend.

The second aspect is political trust. China-US relations need to proceed in three steps: first economic and trade ties, then politics and finally security. The Chinese list of deliverables and understanding reflects such a sequence.

The Chinese statement announced eight points of consensus, but the most important element is the one that follows them – that we consider the “ninth point” even though it was not described in this way. That is about military-to-military communication and security.

Still, security issues are not ready to be addressed, as the level of bilateral political trust remains insufficient. Perceptions that the other side poses a security threat are high in both the US and China. Many so-called security threats are perceived, rather than real. Tackling this will require building a lot of political trust through frequent communication between the two countries’ leaders. Without that, it could get challenging.

President Xi [Jinping] and President [Donald] Trump are on track to meet twice more this year, which is remarkable. For the leaders of China and the US to meet four times in a single year on different occasions is unprecedented and might not happen often in the future.

Looking ahead to the next two summits, a task should be to further expand and strengthen the economic and trade ballast while making the consensus on stability bigger, stronger and deeper.

After trust has gradually built up, it would be somewhat easier for the two countries to then work on security issues. This is not an impossible mission.

Speaking of the “ninth point”, only the Chinese readout said the two militaries “agree to conclude a memorandum of understanding on crisis communication and prevention as soon as possible”. The White House’s fact sheet did not include this, although the US has long called for keeping military-to-military communication open. Instead, it mentioned Trump’s call for trilateral arms control negotiations between the US, China and Russia. How do you read those differences?

Of course, what the US highlighted were the issues of its concern, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Korean peninsula and the war on Iran. The Beijing side’s emphases, though not explicitly written out, remained on Taiwan and the South China Sea, which are our most significant security concerns. From the Chinese perspective, these are issues of sovereignty that transcend security.

Still, they manifest as security issues and call for more communication. There is an implicit shared understanding regarding those fields, namely, both sides need to cooperate.

To address the Taiwan question and the South China Sea, Beijing needs US cooperation. Likewise, Washington needs the Chinese side’s cooperation to resolve the major challenges on its agenda.

You said Beijing and Washington should work together to make the consensus on stability bigger, stronger and deeper. What should they do to ensure a durable, stable relationship that outlasts Trump’s presidency? There are both certainties and uncertainties. The certainty is the minimum baseline for the stability of the bilateral relationship, which is that the two countries cannot come into conflict.

This is a consensus not only between China and the US but also between the Democratic and Republican parties in America. The consensus has been even clearer [since the summit]. Such a consensus will go beyond Trump’s current term and likely endure for much longer. This is grounded not only in the reality that the China-US relationship rests on a foundation of strength but also in the common recognition by both sides that a conflict between the two countries would not merely affect themselves; it would throw the entire world into chaos.

Today, much of the world conflates issues of sovereignty with those of geopolitical space. They are completely different. Zheng Yongnian Meanwhile, there is still much that can be done.

First, shaping the future of China-US relations hinges on high-level summits. Communication between the heads of state should continue.

This will continue even if the Democrats return to power or another Republican takes office. It is impossible for China and the US to absolutely not engage. Second, both sides should continue to enlarge and strengthen the economic and trade ballast. For China, this is a force to help keep US capital engaged. As long as American interests are deeply embedded in China’s economy and China’s in America’s, there is a foundation to build on.

Economic interdependence does not necessarily prevent war but it can encourage everyone to be more rational and continue to expand bilateral trade and investment reciprocally.

Third, it is critical for bureaucracies on both sides to earnestly materialise the consensus rather than undermine it. That involves communication and coordination between the two countries’ respective bureaucratic apparatuses as a whole, not just their diplomatic services.

Fourth, the overall media environment needs to improve. Mutual criticism is fine, but demonising each other is not. We talked about the American press’ unfriendliness towards China.

Chinese media should also tone down their rhetoric about the US being finished, degraded or in decline. Both sides should practise empathy. If the Chinese press attacks the US all day while American outlets constantly attack China, it will only worsen public sentiment in both countries.

Will Trump’s high-level reception for Xi’s Washington visit put Beijing in a stronger position for their potential bilateral encounters during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) meeting in November and the G20 gathering in December?

The summit gave both nations greater confidence to face and discuss problems directly, rather than shunning them. As for the high-level reception offered by President Trump to President Xi, this reflected reciprocity. When Trump visited China in May, Beijing also arranged warm hospitality for him.

This is a good trend. Major powers truly should show mutual respect. It is often difficult for a major power and a small nation to get along with each other due to the gap in strength.

However, it is actually easier for major powers to deal with each other, as their strengths are matched, allowing for genuine equality. From the perspective of the different civilisations they each represent, China and the US are also bound to cooperate rather than be in conflict.

In the sphere of media discourse, there are overly simplistic interpretations of one another on both sides. We should see the reality of the two countries rather than solely look through the lens of ideology and moral sentiment.

How might the two further bilateral summits this year help manage or shape the China-US relationship, especially given that the US midterm elections will be held before those meetings? Apec is about economics and trade. It grew during the heyday of globalisation and free trade.

One of the largest concerns in the region has been that security issues have come to dominate the agenda, overshadowing economics and trade. When security becomes the overriding focus, it can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy where everyone actually ends up less secure.

It is not that the US no longer wants to trade now, but it is adjusting its approach. China and the US can do a great deal not only on the bilateral dimension but also on advancing economic development across the entire Asia-Pacific.

It is feasible to build on good interactions between the two countries to steer Apec back towards economic cooperation and trade facilitation, which would benefit all sides.

China is well positioned to contribute a lot in this regard, including on energy, agricultural goods and rare earths. We should think about how to use the positive momentum to take the China-US relationship into its next phase, rather than simply maintaining the current situation.

After all, standing still can mean stepping back. After the four summits this year, how can the momentum be sustained into next year? You have emphasised the importance of stable economic and trade ties.

Should we be concerned that while the two-month trade truce extension would offer a window of opportunity, the outlook could again become uncertain?

First, we should recognise that Trump’s trade war is not directed exclusively at China. China is just one part of his broader trade war, which has also targeted US allies. If China has the capacity to expand economic and trade ballast, why not do so? We should not struggle for the sake of struggling.

Struggle must have a purpose. In fact, there is plenty of room for cooperation between China and the US. For instance, both countries are confronting the question of how a major power manages its borders. Many of the problems facing the US come from its immediate neighbourhood, including illegal immigration and drugs. China also faces challenges, such as telecoms fraud operations in Myanmar and Cambodia.

China-US ties are not like the US-Soviet relationship. Never before in history have two economies this large been so closely interconnected. The two countries can build consensus not only at greater depth but also across a wider range of areas. And effective policy implementation will lay the foundation for credibility and trust.

Even if there are no formal meetings next year [as there were in May and September], there will still be the annual Apec and G20 gatherings, as well as many other potential occasions. There are many ways for communication. We do not have to worry too much.

Replicating this year’s high frequency of bilateral summits may not be necessary, but head-of-state diplomacy will certainly continue. The key is not to lose the momentum, which is hard won. China and the US could mobilise the positive forces for the bilateral relationship in both countries.

Negative forces undoubtedly exist too, on both sides. For example, we see constant talk of “China is going to defeat America” or “America must defeat China” within the two societies. We need to shape a favourable media and social environment, which is crucial.

Take China’s unilateral opening-up measures in recent years to welcome more American visitors; both sides should do more of what benefits China-US relations, rather than framing the relationship in terms of who defeats whom. Neither side can defeat the other.

When the two sides agreed in May to build “constructive strategic stability”, the White House cited demands for “fairness and reciprocity”. China echoed the two points this time, and both sides added “respect”. What is your take on this development?

China certainly values respect, as the US has long been accustomed to exercising hegemony. I have argued that managing two variables is crucial to handling China-US relations properly.

First, China must manage its own rise. What we consume and do not consume and how much we consume all affect global markets, and even China-US relations. It is not that the world should applaud simply because we have risen. The way China rises matters a great deal.

It is not enough for us to feel that we are rising; other countries must also come to regard China’s rise as a positive development and welcome it. That would constitute a successful and peaceful rise. The Chinese modernisation also emphasises the path of peaceful development.

Second, the relative decline of the US must be managed too. [In a de facto Group of 2] the US has had a considerable psychological adjustment. It is no longer as arrogant or dismissive of others as it once was, and it has come to view China as a much more equal counterpart, as evidenced by speaking of “respect, fairness and reciprocity”.

That is beneficial for China. But the more this is so, the more humble China should be. Nations are like people – feelings and face matter. It is important to be mindful of the US’ psychological position. It would be unwise to show no consideration for that or adopt an attitude of kicking someone when they are down.

Narratives such as “the East is rising and the West is declining” still resurface from time to time in public discourse. Is this view still open to question?

I have said that great powers are not to be defeated. If the US were to fail, it would not be because China had defeated it, but because of problems within itself. And the same holds true for China. China and the US can only coexist. Neither can defeat the other. If one were to defeat the other, the result would be the destruction of the world. China now should go for smart diplomacy, approaching foreign policy through reason and wisdom rather than simply acting on instinct.

Great powers must shoulder their responsibilities. Managing the two variables discussed [in the previous answer] is one example of doing so. A country does not become a great power by defeating another. No one would like such a great power, and it will end up defeating itself.

At this summit, both presidents recalled that China and the US were allies during the World War II. Shortly after the meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi spoke with Trump and exchanged views primarily on issues related to China, including security. Meanwhile, new stand-offs have emerged between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

With Beijing and Washington agreeing to build constructive strategic stability, how should China manage its relations with US allies in the region, particularly Japan and the Philippines? These countries are also actively strengthening security ties between themselves. Could that in turn affect China-US relations?

[The de facto G2] has implications for many so-called middle powers. Countries such as France, Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom, which have fewer geopolitical disputes with Beijing, are not choosing sides between Beijing and Washington in managing their relations with the two powers.

Meanwhile, Japan appears to be trying to play the role of an “Israel in East Asia”. It likely feels that the US is now paying less attention to protecting it, so the country seeks to take security into its own hands and, based on that, keep Washington tied to its side. But there are limits to this approach.

As long as China and the US have enough trust between them, Japan and the Philippines will have little role to play. As a relationship between major powers, China-US relations constitute a structure within which Japan and the Philippines can only make some autonomous choices. No matter what [Japan and the Philippines] do, they cannot themselves become a structure.

On Taiwan and the South China Sea, there is still considerable room to explore in future exchanges between Beijing and Washington. For Beijing, Taiwan and the South China Sea are matters of sovereignty. For the US and Japan, these are issues of geopolitical space. Today, much of the world conflates issues of sovereignty with those of geopolitical space. They are completely different.

On the basis of mutual respect and reciprocity, we can talk with the American side over how to ensure US interests in the western Pacific. Addressing the Taiwan question and South China Sea issues does not mean Beijing wants to exclude Washington from the region. Likewise, we can also talk with the US about how to assure China’s interests in the eastern Pacific, including in Latin America. These are reciprocal matters the two sides can discuss. That rests on the deeply intertwined nature of China-US relations, and the two countries not carving so-called spheres of influence.

Once the Taiwan question is resolved, we could welcome US warships and aircraft carriers making port calls at the island openly, just as we once welcomed American military vessels to dock in Hong Kong. The two sides should work together to manage the Pacific and the world as a whole instead of trying to exclude each other.

Will the dynamics of Sino-US relations and Beijing’s posture vis-a-vis Washington during this summit affect how middle powers, including Japan and the EU, approach their relations with China? They have already begun to change. We should go back to the realistic dimension when looking at international relations.

Since the dawn of the modern era, an idea originating from Europe holds that all states are equal. This is an ideal, not a reality. As countries differ in size and strength, we cannot assume that they are fully equal at the starting point. But we can strive for equality. Every nation has its own positioning in international relations. If a country does what it ought not to do, or fails to do what it should, that is not helpful to its own national interests and is not sustainable.

Under the de facto G2 context, both China and the US are repositioning themselves. Other countries will also be doing the same. This is a structural issue that could shape international relations for decades. The boundaries of the China-US relationship may gradually become the boundaries of international relations as a whole. The bounds set by the two countries for the bilateral ties could also define red lines that other states should not cross.

Neither side’s release mentioned Taiwan. Trump said he and Xi “didn’t talk about it too much” at the summit. Should there be concern that the question has been shelved? How might Beijing and Washington approach Taiwan in future exchanges?

The fact that Taiwan was not mentioned in the documents does not mean the two sides did not consider or discuss it but only indicated they had not yet reached a broader consensus on it. Indeed, there is a concern that Taiwan could become the focal point of a conflict if it is not handled carefully, potentially undoing progress on all other work.

But as we talked about earlier, Taiwan is not a subject that cannot be discussed. Many specific issues need to be gradually untangled. If the dialogue simply consists of China accusing the US of being “a force from outside the region” while Washington levels the similar charge against Beijing, it goes nowhere and the two sides could drift towards conflict.

But adopting a more mutually inclusive mindset can make a difference. The US is still a significant actor in the western Pacific. Similarly, China’s influence in Latin America is growing. Every issue has its origins and its solutions. There are always solutions other than war. We should not underestimate human wisdom.

China made no mention of rare earths and critical minerals in its own list of summit outcomes, although the US repeated its concerns in its fact sheet. Does this signal a firm stance by Beijing on the issue, and how might it affect competition in this domain?

The US is looking to reinforce its toolkit, looking for additional means. China is doing the same, like the case of AI start-up Manus. This is reciprocity – and you can only negotiate for reciprocity when you have the strength to back it up. If political trust between China and the US gradually builds and both sides move towards the same direction, I do not think rare earths will be a problem. But if [political trust] deteriorates, more points of friction could emerge. Rare earths serve as a countermeasure for China but the country’s purpose is rather simple - [a Chinese idiom meaning “true martial virtue lies in stopping warfare”].

If the US weaponises something to pressure us, China has tools of its own to push back. Still, as long as the US remains rational, the Chinese side would not cut off rare earth supplies.

China and the US have agreed to establish an AI dialogue. Given their differing approaches to the technology and divisions within the US on AI slowdown, what concrete outcomes can we expect from AI discussions between the two countries?

First of all, when it comes to AI development, there is little consensus within China or the US, let alone between them. Domestically, the US is currently split into two camps on AI: one believes AI can solve many of our problems, while the other fears it could bring about doomsday. But China and the US do share a consensus on the security risks posed by AI; what remains to be mapped out is the specifics of what they should discuss.

The two countries also follow different models of AI development. Trump supports accelerated development with no regulation. China, at least theoretically, tries to balance development with security.

AI requires multilevel discussion between China and the US. Technology and capital circles essentially dominate the discourse about AI. Trump aligns himself with them, further reinforcing their power. Talk of regulation and slowing down AI development in the US has gone on for a long time but with little real progress. These issues cannot be driven by commercial companies – they can only be tackled by governments.

AI will undoubtedly serve as a major platform for future US-China discussions, much like nuclear weapons did between the US and the Soviet Union. [Former US secretary of state Henry] Kissinger’s final visit to China was also aimed at easing AI negotiations between Beijing and Washington.

Despite their different rhetoric on AI, both sides share the consensus that discussion between them is necessary. When people talk about AI today, they are effectively talking about China-US relations, as its technology and production capacity are highly concentrated in the two countries.

Trump has confirmed his intention to attend the Apec summit, further raising global expectations for the event in November. What impact do you think this could have on the host city, Shenzhen? And how do you view the frequent comparisons between Shenzhen and Hong Kong?

This is certainly a boon for Shenzhen. The entire Pearl River Delta, including Shenzhen and Hong Kong, has an export-oriented economy, for which China-US relations are paramount. Every twist in the relationship would be reflected immediately in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. Hong Kong and Shenzhen can also be key to implementing the consensus reached by the Chinese and US leaders.

If local governments and businesses do more to foster China-US friendship, it benefits not only themselves but the whole country. With the relationship enjoying such good momentum, I expect the Apec summit in Shenzhen to be a great success. It will also mark the first visit to Shenzhen by a sitting US president since the Chinese special economic zone was founded more than four decades ago.

Shenzhen can be proud in showing the world what it has achieved but should also stay humble. Although Shenzhen is a city that buys globally and sells globally, it still has things to learn from Hong Kong when it comes to institutions and mechanisms, and the internationalisation of people.

Apec is a test for Shenzhen. Although much is arranged by the central government, the local side will shape the atmosphere of the summit on the ground. I hope that, through the coming Apec summit, Shenzhen can gradually move closer to Hong Kong, though the city still has a lot to learn.