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特朗普再次表明总统权力为何丧失得如此之快Trump Is Showing Again Why Presidents Lose Power So Fast

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无助于他的事业 摄影师:温·麦克纳米/盖蒂图片社Not helping his cause Photographer: Win McNamee/Getty Images

试图降低共和党人对11月3日选举的预期,副总统JD·万斯最近强调,总统所在的党通过中期选举维持众议院和参议院的统一控制已经变得几乎不可能。他对这一趋势的判断是正确的。但他忽视了总统唐纳德·特朗普及其椭圆形办公室前任在使这一趋势成为自我实现预言方面所起的作用,这是错误的。这其中有值得未来总统汲取的教训。

Trying to lower expectations for Republicans on Nov. 3, Vice President JD Vance has recently stressed that it has become almost impossible for the president’s party to maintain unified control of the House and Senate through a midterm election. He’s right about that trend. But he’s wrong to ignore the role that President Donald Trump — and his Oval Office predecessors — have played in making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. There’s a lesson in that for future presidents.

过去五次总统在掌握政府统一控制的情况下参加中期选举时,选民都收回了这种控制权。这份名单包括2022年的乔·拜登、2018年的特朗普、2010年的贝拉克·奥巴马、2006年的乔治·W·布什和1994年的比尔·克林顿。这一连败纪律似乎几乎肯定会在下个月继续,共和党人正在失去众议院的轨道上,甚至可能失去参议院。

The last five times a president went into a midterm election with unified control of government, voters have revoked it. That list includes Joe Biden in 2022, Trump in 2018, Barack Obama in 2010, George W. Bush in 2006, and Bill Clinton in 1994. This streak seems virtually certain to continue next month with Republicans on track to lose the House and maybe the Senate.

这将延续这一令人沮丧的纪录,使总统在中期选举中进入时拥有统一控制权并 subsequently 失去它的连续次数增至六次。(在此前的时代,纪录是四次。)正如万斯的言论所暗示的,两党如今认为统一控制的快速丧失是不可避免的。这一信念的悖论在于,它促使双方采取行为方式,使失去控制的可能性更大。与其精心构建旨在逐步扩大联盟的议程来获得支持,各方选择在新总统任职的前两年里,通过政党路线的立法闪电战,将议程前置堆砌。

That will extend a dismal record, raising to six the number of consecutive times a president has gone into a midterm with unified control and lost it. (Before the current era, the record was four.) As Vance’s comments suggest, the two parties now consider the rapid loss of unified control to be unavoidable. The paradox is that conviction has encouraged them to behave in ways that make the loss of control more likely. Rather than carefully building support with an agenda that aims to steadily broaden their coalition, each side has chosen to cram its agenda into a front-loaded, party-line legislative blitz during a new president’s first two years.

特朗普政府将这种做法推向了极端。特朗普将其联盟之外的地方和人民视为需要征服的敌人,而非需要说服的怀疑者。他在第二任期的狂热政策冲刺包括一系列深度党派化的举措,这些举措几乎普遍受到民主党人和独立人士的反对:助长通胀的关税、鲁莽的伊朗战争、军事化的大规模驱逐以及联邦支出和监管的动荡削减。

The Trump administration has taken this approach to an extreme. Trump has treated the places and people outside his coalition not as skeptics to convert, but as enemies to subdue. His frantic second-term policy sprint has included an array of deeply partisan initiatives almost universally opposed by Democrats and independents: inflation-fueling tariffs, a reckless Iran war, militarized mass deportation and tumultuous cutbacks in federal spending and regulation.

当然,前置策略确实产生了一些立法成果,这些成果被两党无可否认地视为珍贵,包括奥巴马时期的《平价医疗法案》以及共和党总统时期的大规模减税。但不可避免的是,这些重大改革疏远了摇摆选民,激怒了另一党,导致中期选举惨败,权力丧失成为必然。尤其是在他们通过重新划分选区的赌注之后,普林斯顿大学社会学家保罗·斯塔尔表示,共和党“在2026年本来有所有条件打破这一模式 — — 除了他们自己的总统”,他是《》一书的作者,该书是自1950年代以来美国政治史的历史。

To be sure, the front-loading strategy has produced some legislative achievements undeniably prized by each party, including the Affordable Care Act under Obama and big tax cuts under the Republican presidents. But inevitably, these major overhauls have alienated swing voters and enraged the other party, making big midterm losses, and the surrender of control, inevitable. Especially after their redistricting gambit, Republicans “had everything going for them in 2026 to break that pattern — except their own president,” says Princeton University sociologist Paul Starr, author of , a history of US politics since the 1950s.

“当然,既然他们拒绝就他的战争、关税、腐败和自恋发表反对意见,他们只能怪自己。”现代政党已经忘记了一条重要的历史真相:从亚伯拉罕·林肯时代的共和党到富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福领导下的民主党,以及后来的约翰·F·肯尼迪和林登·贝恩斯·约翰逊,那些最能改变美国的选举联盟成功地在较长时期内保持了统一的控制权。

“Of course, since they have refused to speak out against his war, tariffs, corruption and narcissism, they have nobody to blame but themselves.”The modern parties have forgotten an important historical truth: From the Abraham Lincoln-era Republicans to Democrats under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and later John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, the electoral coalitions that most changed America managed to preserve unified control over a sustained period.

这些联盟通常会以轰动性的开局成就宣布他们的到来。罗斯福在1933年推动性的首个“百日”奠定了动态总统领导力的范本。

It’s true that these coalitions usually announced their arrival with thunderous opening achievements. Roosevelt’s propulsive first “100 days” in 1933 created the template for dynamic presidential leadership.

但关键的是,这些联盟都长期掌握统一政权,足以巩固并扩大其最初的突破。共和党人直到林肯第二任期(包括他遇刺之后)才构想并批准那些废除奴隶制、确保所有美国人享有平等保护的高耸宪法修正案。罗斯福许多持久的成就——包括社会保障和保障工会组织权的瓦格纳法案——都是在他第一次中期选举后扩大国会多数席位、推出“第二次新政”时取得的。

But critically, these coalitions all held unified power long enough to both cement and supplement their initial breakthroughs. Republicans didn’t conceive and ratify the towering constitutional amendments ending slavery and establishing equal protection for all Americans until Lincoln’s second term (including after his assassination). Many of Roosevelt’s most lasting achievements — including Social Security and the Wagner Act safeguarding the right to unionize — came during the “Second New Deal,” after he enlarged his congressional majorities in his first midterm.

约翰逊只有在1964年赢得压倒性胜选、带来压倒性的民主党国会多数席位之后,才通过了他伟大社会议程的核心内容——医疗保险、医疗补助和投票权法案。

Johnson passed the pillars of his Great Society agenda — crowned by Medicare, Medicaid and the Voting Rights Act — only after winning a landslide reelection in 1964 that swept in overwhelming Democratic congressional majorities.

总统有时也能在控制时间较短的情况下留下深刻印记,就像伍德罗·威尔逊在1912年后扩大政府,以及罗纳德·里根在70年后限制政府所做的那样。但要持久地重塑美国生活,没有什么能比得上那些找到办法随时间推移维持甚至扩大其联盟的总统和政党。林肯时代的共和党人和罗斯福时代的民主党人曾连续14年掌握白宫和国会的统一控制权;在肯尼迪和约翰逊时期,民主党人则维持了8年。

Presidents at times have left a powerful mark with more fleeting control, as Woodrow Wilson did when expanding government after 1912 and Ronald Reagan did when limiting it 70 years later. But to durably reshape American life, nothing compares to the presidents and parties that found ways to sustain, and even enlarge, their coalition over time. Both the Lincoln-era Republicans and FDR-era Democrats held unified control of the White House and Congress for 14 consecutive years; under JFK and LBJ, Democrats did it for eight.

如今这似乎难以想象。自1968年以来,没有任何政党实现过超过四年的连续统一控制。这种波动部分源于选民对生活水平增长放缓的不满,部分源于导致国会席位持续狭窄的人口和地理极化。但总统们通过意识形态过度伸张,反复加速了这一趋势。

That seems unimaginable today. Since 1968, no party has managed more than four consecutive years of unified control. That volatility is in part due to voters’ frustration with a slowdown in the growth of living standards, and partly due to the demographic and geographic polarization that has produced persistently narrow congressional margins. But presidents have repeatedly accelerated the trend through ideological overreach.

尽管维持对两院的统一控制权已变得越来越困难,但2029年上任的新任总统很有可能实现这一目标。自1993年的比尔·克林顿以来,每位新任总统就职时都拥有众议院和参议院的多数席位。据我统计,自1828年现代政党制度形成以来,选民仅六次让新任总统同时掌控国会两院。(理查德·尼克松、罗纳德·里根以及乔治·H·W·布什便是其中的三位。)

Though unified control has proved increasingly difficult to sustain, there are good odds the next president in 2029 will arrive with it. Every new president since Bill Clinton in 1993 has entered office with majorities in both the House and Senate. In fact, by my calculation, only six times since the formation of the modern party system in 1828 have voters provided a new president with control of both congressional chambers. (Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were three of them.)

因此,下任总统面临着明确的选择:他或她可以接受万斯公开表露、且被华盛顿多数权势人物默默认同的宿命论观点,效仿近年历任总统那种孤注一掷的行事方式;也可以采取更为循序渐进的策略,以此争取更广泛的支持,进而实现那些最具影响力的总统们所达到的长期执政局面。

So the next president will have a clear choice. He or she can accept the fatalism openly voiced by Vance and quietly internalized by most other Washington power players and repeat the immediate go-for-broke approach of recent presidents. Or Trump’s successor could pursue a more incremental strategy designed to broaden support and nurture the extended hold on power that the most consequential presidents have achieved.