夏巴兹·谢里夫政府上周日对巴基斯坦正义运动党（PTI）执政的开伯尔-普什图省（KPK）实施紧急状态和总督统治，这对拉瓦尔品第的陆军总部（GHQ）产生了严重影响，陆军元帅阿西姆·穆尼尔的军队正在巴基斯坦开辟另一条战线。首先，这清楚地表明，穆尼尔未能与自2023年以来一直被监禁且拒绝流亡的PTI领导人伊姆兰·汗达成政治协议。
Imposition of emergency and governor’s rule in Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-ruled Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province by Shehbaz Sharif's government last Sunday has serious ramifications for Rawalpindi General Headquarters (GHQ), with Field Marshal Asim Munir's military opening another front in Pakistan. First, this clearly indicates that Munir has failed in striking a political deal with incarcerated PTI leader Imran Khan, who has been in prison since 2023, and refuses to go into exile.
巴基斯坦以政治交易闻名，贝娜齐尔·布托、纳瓦兹·谢里夫、夏巴兹·谢里夫和佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫将军在被深层政府支持的政治对手监禁后，都曾流亡西方或沙特阿拉伯。显然，在普什图人占主导地位的开伯尔-普什图省广受欢迎的伊姆兰·汗，选择了留在监狱，而不是去伦敦投奔他的孩子们。
Pakistan is known for political deal-making as Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, Shehbaz Sharif and Gen Pervez Musharraf all went to exile in either west or Saudi Arabia after being imprisoned by deep state-backed political adversaries. Clearly, Imran Khan, who is popular in Pashtun-dominated KPK, has chosen to stay in prison rather than go to his children in London.
其次，PTI省政府被解散的理由是其未能对巴基斯坦塔利班（TTP）等恐怖组织采取行动，穆尼尔指责这些组织从阿富汗塔利班政权获得了跨境支持。尽管自2024年6月以来，巴基斯坦军队一直在开伯尔-普什图省参与针对恐怖分子的“坚定决心行动”（Operation Azm-e-Istehkam），但它通过将不打击恐怖分子的责任归咎于省政府，从而推卸了所有负担。
Second, the PTI's provincial government has been dismissed on grounds of its failure to take action against terrorist groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Munir accuses of getting cross-border support from the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. Even though it is the Pakistan Army that is currently participating in Operation Azm-e-Istehkam against terrorists in KPK since June 2024, it has absolved itself of all burden by putting the blame of not taking action against terrorists on the provincial government.
事实是，在穆尼尔领导下的巴基斯坦军队在过去25年中，在开伯尔-普什图省发起了不少于16次反恐行动——从“米赞行动”到“利剑行动”，再到“根除混乱行动”，但均未成功。巴基斯坦空军也通过空中打击轰炸了这些地区。
Fact is that the Pakistan Army, now under Munir, has launched no less than 16 counter-terrorist operations in KPK—from Op al-Mzan to Op Zarb-e-Azb to Op Radd ul-Fassad in the past 25 years without success. The Pakistan Air Force has also bombed these areas through aerial strikes.
第三，随着伊姆兰·汗在开伯尔-普什图省普什图人中的受欢迎程度，以及来自阿富汗塔利班的支持（因为这是大普什图斯坦的一部分），开伯尔-普什图省已经爆发了暴力事件，并可能像邻近的俾路支省一样成为另一个安全国家，拉瓦尔品第和情报机构三军情报局（ISI）完全控制该地区。这意味着，从长远来看，开伯尔-普什图省可能像俾路支省一样，出现反伊斯兰堡的叛乱，而巴基斯坦军队将被拖入这个由好战的普什图部落主导的动荡地区。
Third, with Imran Khan’s popularity among KPK Pashtuns and support from Afghanistan Taliban (as it is part of greater Pashtunistan), KPK has already erupted in violence and could become another security state like neighboring Balochistan, with Rawalpindi and spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) fully dominating the region. This means that KPK, like Baluchistan, could see an anti-Islamabad insurgency in the long run with the Pakistan Army being stretched into this volatile region dominated by warring Pashtun tribes.
第四，通过在开伯尔-普什图省实施紧急状态，穆尼尔与塔利班统治下的阿富汗的关系将进一步恶化，因为喀布尔一直向开伯尔山口对面的普什图兄弟提供他们所谓的道义支持。塔利班不承认杜兰德线，在两国所谓的国际边界上，从托尔哈姆到斯平布尔达克，军事冲突已成常态。穆尼尔以针对TTP的反恐行动为名轰炸阿富汗，已经破坏了与这个巴基斯坦曾称之为“战略纵深”的国家的关系。
Fourth, by imposing emergency in KPK, Munir’s relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will further worsen as Kabul has always offered what they call is moral support to their Pashtun brothers across the Khyber Pass. Taliban does not recognise the Durand Line and military skirmishes are the order of the day on the so-called international border between the two countries from Torkham to Spin Boldak. Munir, by bombing Afghanistan in the name of counter-terrorist operations against TTP, has already ruined ties with the country that Pakistan once called its strategic depth.
最后，纳伦德拉·莫迪总理领导下的印度在2025年帕哈尔加姆大屠杀后仍未取消“辛杜尔行动”；因此，巴基斯坦在其东部战线上也很脆弱。塔利班统治下的阿富汗因巴基斯坦空军的轰炸而怒火中烧，因此伊斯兰堡的西部战线也已开启。巴基斯坦存在着像俾路支省那样的现存叛乱。现在开伯尔-普什图省可能会爆发冲突，在印度河以西造成严重的内部安全局势。
Finally, India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has still not called off Opersation Sindoor after the 2025 Pahalgam massacre; so Pakistan is vulnerable on its eastern front as well. Afghanistan under Taliban is seething in rage to avenge the bombing by Pakistan Air Force—and hence Islamabad has its western front also opened. Pakistan has live insurgencies like that in Balochistan. Now KPK could erupt, creating a serious internal security situation west of Indus river.
最重要的是，伊朗对巴基斯坦在持续的波斯湾战争中站在美国一边，随后为了支持沙特阿拉伯，根据麦加防御条约攻击其在也门的代理人胡塞武装感到非常不满。鉴于伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）支持的胡塞武装使用了射程超过2000公里的远程弹道导弹和自杀式无人机，并袭击了特拉维夫、阿拉伯联合酋长国以及现在的整个沙特阿拉伯，如果胡塞武装决定因穆尼尔站在王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼一边而惩罚他，巴基斯坦的防空系统将不得不保持警惕。
On top of all this, Iran is very unhappy with Pakistan for siding with the United States in the ongoing Gulf War and then attacking its proxy Houthis in Yemen in support of Saudi Arabia under the Mecca defence pact. Given that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC)-backed Houthis have used long-range ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones that have a range of over 2000 km—and have targeted Tel Aviv, the United Arab Emirates and now all over Saudi Arabia, Pakistan air defence will have to be on alert in case Houthis decide to punish Munir for siding with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
事情变得更糟，因为伊朗批评巴基斯坦加入麦加条约（即巴基斯坦所谓的“逊尼派北约”）；距离德黑兰用弹道导弹袭击巴基斯坦俾路支省、打击其所谓的拉瓦尔品第支持的逊尼派恐怖分子，才刚刚过去两年多（自2024年1月16日以来）。
The matters get worse as Iran has criticised Pakistan for joining the Mecca pact or what Pakistan calls Sunni NATO; it is just been a little more than two years (since January 16, 2024) when Tehran attacked Pakistan with ballistic missiles in Balochistan against what they called were Sunni terrorists backed by Rawalpindi.
总而言之，穆尼尔在开伯尔-普什图省和也门的行动将进一步使这位陆军元帅的生活复杂化，巴基斯坦军队在内部和外部面临多条战线。巴基斯坦总理谢里夫未来也将不得不为成为陆军元帅方便的政治工具付出代价。
In sum and substance, Munir’s action in KPK and in Yemen is further going to complicate the Field Marshal’s life, with Pakistan Army facing multiple fronts internally and externally. Pakistan PM Sharif will also have to pay in future for being a convenient political tool for the Field Marshal.