The peace deal agreed in December by the presidents of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, brokered by a beaming President Donald Trump, was doomed to fail. The main belligerent in the conflict, the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group that controls the mineral-rich eastern DRC, wasn’t a signatory. And the optics were inauspicious: Trump mispronounced the names of Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and the DRC’s Felix Tshisekedi, and the pair avoided eye contact and wouldn’t shake hands.

It was a classic case of parachute diplomacy: A powerful outsider, the US, didn’t understand the local dynamics before imposing a solution that Trump claimed was “a great miracle.”Within days, fighting raged in the eastern DRC, with M23 taking control of a third city after a blitzkrieg that had seen regional hubs Goma and Bukavu fall under its control. To be fair, the Trump administration isn’t alone in failing to arrest the conflict in an effort to access the DRC’s coltan, tantalum, and other critical minerals; Qatar oversaw a similar framework between M23 and the DRC government in November.

Both initiatives lie in tatters after former DRC President Joseph Kabila, who ran the country from 2001 to 2019, said earlier this week he was starting a new rebel group that will fold in the rampant M23 and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo. Kabila, who was sentenced to death by a military court in absentia last year after being convicted of treason, announced M23 leader Sultani Makenga as one of his four deputies in the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN), saying he wants to “put an end to tyranny by any means, including force.”It’s effectively a declaration of war.

The DRC’s situation is fragile. Tshisekedi’s government is weak outside of the capital Kinshasa. Recent attempts to amend the constitution to allow Tshisekedi to serve a third term have triggered protests, further eroding his political authority and legitimacy. An Ebola crisis, with confirmed cases at more than 9,000 and deaths exceeding 4,300, is roiling the country.

While the outlook for peace in the DRC is bleak, that’s no excuse to give up on this beautiful and abundantly endowed country. The many groups involved must abandon the charade that a lasting settlement can be achieved by bringing a handful of participants to a hotel andg a few papers. Short-term initiatives driven by a rush to exploit the country’s resources won’t work. Progress will require patient mediation, broad participation and long-term engagement; as many as possible of the more than 100 armed groups and regional coalitions operating in the region need to be involved. A mistake as basic as excluding M23 — whose troop numbers have swelled to 30,000 today from just 3,000 six years ago — will wreck any agreement.

Multilateral, inclusive processes have succeeded before. Between 1998 and 2003, the late South African President Nelson Mandela, his successor Thabo Mbeki and the late Botswana leader Ketumile Masire worked with regional governments, armed groups, civil organizations and others to resolve the DRC-Rwanda-Great Lakes crisis. In April 2003, a 45-day meeting of more than 350 groups signed the historic Sun City Agreement that resolved the conflagration.

A power-sharing interim government and elections in 2006 followed. That Inter-Congolese Dialogue, as it came to be known, provides a template for constructing a robust peace process in the DRC.

Other regions offer similar lessons in the benefits of patience and inclusiveness. US Senator George Mitchell worked with all of the antagonists in Northern Ireland for four years before the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998; the Colombian Peace Process, ending 50 years of conflict, also took four years to negotiate.

Kabila’s decision to align with the rebels looks like a huge setback for peace efforts. However, with M23 now achieving political heft and legitimacy under his leadership — rather than being dismissed as a mere proxy of Rwanda — it offers a chance to draw the new unified FRN grouping to the negotiating table along with Tshisekedi’s DRC government and Kagame’s Rwandan administration.

Other interested parties, including regional bodies such as the African Union, the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, as well as the tens of internal DRC parliamentary and paramilitary groupings, can be included. But getting all three of the main players involved in the conflict on board is crucial to any hopes of securing a robust peace accord.